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Abstract 
 
This socio-legal study reconceptualizes the principle of distinction in international 
humanitarian law (IHL). Moving away from the dominant vision of fixed civilian 
and combatant entities separated by a bright line, it introduces an alternative vision 
of how distinction works in different places and at different times, or what we might 
think of as ‘a new law of distinction’. This account is grounded in the practices of 
international actors across a number of global sites: from Geneva and The Hague to 
civil–military training programmes in Europe and the operational context of South 
Sudan. The main character of interest is the international humanitarian actor, who is 
situated alongside other international actors, such as NATO soldiers, UN 
peacekeepers and UN civilian actors. As is shown, the everyday interactions of these 
actors are shaped by contests over distinction. In the law of distinction that is 
distilled from these practices, qualities of ‘civilianness’ and ‘combatantness’ float 
around in the air, able to attach to any individual at any given moment, depending 
upon their self-presentation, behaviour and context. Three new figures emerge 
around these qualities: the ‘civilian plus’, the ‘mere civilian’ and the ‘civilian minus’. 
The ‘civilian plus’, this study proposes, represents a special status that international 
humanitarian actors disseminate on a daily basis. This special status relies upon a 
concept of civilianness that is relative, contingent and aligned with an already-
fragmented civilian category in IHL. The distinction practices of humanitarian 
actors also have an important performance component, designed to influence the 
perceptions of an omnipresent observer – the ‘phantom local’. The overarching aim 
of this inquiry is to uncover and contend with distinction’s perpetually disrupted 
nature. The study dismantles the idea of distinction as we know it, enabling us to 
recognize distinction in strange and unfamiliar forms. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
Introduct ion 
 
A common vision of the principle of distinction positions civilians and combatants 
as separate entities, divided by a fixed and stable bright line. As soon as one reaches 
for distinction and its promise of clarity, however, the line dissolves. It dims, moves 
or disappears. Even as distinction eludes one’s grasp, many people reach for it, in 
many different places and in many different ways. In sites as disparate as Geneva, 
The Hague, civil–military training grounds in Europe and South Sudan, 
international actors can be found producing distinction. In many instances, the 
things they are doing with distinction render it unrecognizable as a civilian–
combatant binary. One of the most important insights of this study is that 
distinction means many things to many people. This is a deceptively simple 
discovery that implicates our most fundamental assumptions about the ways in 
which international humanitarian law (IHL) is enacted on a daily basis.  
 
Ultimately, it may be determined that the principle of distinction in IHL cannot bear 
the load that such practices impose on it. Before arriving at such a conclusion, 
however, one must make sense of the relevant practices. Drawing on original 
empirical material, this socio-legal study embarks on this pressing task. Taking a 
sideways look at distinction, it uncovers distinction’s myriad forms and functions, 
illuminating how international actors – of whom many are unconventional from a 
legal standpoint – make and remake distinction on a daily basis. As this study sets 
about the delicate work of untangling competing perceptions and mindsets, it pieces 
together a practice-based law of distinction. An important methodological 
contribution of this study is its interrogation of the doctrine–practice divide. As it 
follows the idea of distinction across multiple global sites, it locates law’s meaning in 
very different spaces and places. It is not only distinction that is found in all of these 
contexts, but – more precisely – the disorder of distinction. Crucially, this includes 
 9 
legal doctrine and the codification of the legal rule in the First Additional Protocol 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP I). 
 
The main character of this story is a particular kind of civilian: the international 
humanitarian actor.1 Seizing upon signifiers of ‘civilianness’, humanitarian actors 
present themselves as harmless, innocent and external to the fight. To operationalize 
their vision of distinction, they enact a range of everyday distinction practices. In 
this context, South Sudan is treated as a (conflict-affected) site of everyday life, as 
are the civil–military training spaces where frontline actors gather to learn legal and 
operational rules. While humanitarian actors ground these practices in international 
law and the traditional humanitarian principles, they also seek to manage local 
perceptions. In this task, they are guided by the imputed perceptions of an 
amorphous local onlooker, which this study terms the ‘phantom local’. This figure 
merges three different (local) audiences for distinction: armed actors, authorities and 
the beneficiaries of humanitarian services. In the operational context of South 
Sudan, the visual life of distinction comes to the fore. Humanitarian actors deploy 
emblems, signs and symbols in the hopes of controlling the optics of distinction for 
observers – both real and imagined.  
 
By enacting these distinction practices, humanitarian actors produce a figure who is 
unfamiliar to IHL – the ‘civilian plus’. This special status, grounded in the social 
value of the role performed by humanitarian actors in war, attempts to capitalize on 
all that is strong about the civilian and to escape all that is weak. The ‘civilian plus’ 
relies upon a fragmentation of IHL’s civilian category; however, this study argues 
that civilianness is already relative. It is proposed that civilians who cannot claim a 
special status are thereby relegated to having ‘mere civilian’ – or perhaps even 
‘civilian minus’ – status. When humanitarian actors are situated alongside other 
international actors operating in armed conflicts – such as NATO soldiers, UN 
peacekeepers and other civilian actors – contests unfold along numerous fault lines. 
                                                
1 This actor is defined in Section 1.2.3. 
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Insofar as the distinctions that are enacted do not map onto a civilian–combatant 
binary, these dynamics are typically obscured in IHL. This study makes these 
practices legible in all of their complexity, treating them as valid engagements with a 
legal rule that is already deeply disrupted.  
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
Historically, there has been a lack of attention to the civilian in IHL doctrine. It is 
the combatant, not the civilian, who has traditionally been at the centre of the 
development of the laws of war.2 Some legal version of the combatant has existed 
since the 12th century,3 and the requirements for combatant status were laid out in 
early IHL treaties such as the Hague Regulations of 1907.4 In contrast, the civilian 
was not introduced as a protected legal figure until much later. The general 
conceptualization of the civilian, as someone who should be spared from violence in 
war, emerged in the 19th century.5 Prior to this, the term ‘civilian’ was used quite 
differently than its use in the modern context.6 For example, in the 18th century, 
‘civilian’ referred to Europeans of the East India Company who were ‘not in 
military employ’; thus, a civilian came to be understood as a ‘non-military man or 
official’.7 It was only as recently as 1977, with AP I, that the civilian was formally 
defined in international law, at the same time as the principle of distinction was 
                                                
2 Karma Nabulsi, ‘Evolving Conceptions of Civilians and Belligerents: One Hundred Years after the 
Hague Peace Conferences’, in Simon Chesterman (Ed.), Civilians in War (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers), pp. 9–24. 
3 Helen Kinsella, The Image Before the Weapon: A Critical History of the Distinction between Combatant and Civilian 
(Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 29. 
4 Article 1 and 2 (‘Qualification of Belligerents’) of Annex to Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907 (‘1907 Hague Regulations’).  
5 Kinsella, supra, p. 28. See also Michael Schmitt, ‘Discriminate Warfare: The Military Necessity–
Humanity Dialectic of International Humanitarian Law’, in David Lovell and Igor Primoratz (Eds.), 
Protecting Civilians During Violent Conflict: Theoretical and Practical Issues for the 21st Century (Ashgate, 2012), 
Chapter 6, pp. 87–88 (‘Discriminate Warfare’). Schmitt argues that the principle of distinction is 
introduced as a customary law norm in the St. Petersburgh Declaration. Citing the Declaration 
Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Saint 
Petersburg, 29 November / 11 December 1868. 
6 Kinsella, supra, pp. 28–29. 
7 Ibid., p. 29.  
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delineated.8 The principle of distinction requires parties to a conflict to distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants, as well as between civilian objects 
and military objectives.9 It stipulates that the civilian population, as well as individual 
civilians, shall not be the object of attack in armed conflict.10 This AP I definition of 
the civilian has been described as negative or residual, referring to anyone who is 
not a combatant.11  
 
The lack of engagement with the civilian in IHL has been largely reflected in an 
equivalent lack of attention to the concept in the relevant scholarly literature. While 
the combatant figure has pre-occupied international lawyers and scholars for years, 
scholars have taken longer to scrutinize the ways in which the civilian is constituted, 
produced and disseminated.12 However, a number of recent contributions have 
taken the civilian category seriously.13 Building on this burgeoning scholarship, the 
present study redirects attention to a neglected set of actors: international actors 
who operate in armed conflicts and, in particular, international humanitarian actors 
who deliver assistance to war-affected populations.  
 
                                                
8 As per Amanda Alexander, ‘The Genesis of the Civilian’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, 2007, 
pp. 359–376, 359–360 (‘Genesis’). 
9 Article 48 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, Can TS 1991 No 
1 (AP I) and Article 13 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 
609, Can TS 1991 No 2 (AP II). See Marco Sassoli, ‘Legitimate Targets of Attacks under International 
Humanitarian Law’, International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, 2003, available at: 
http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/Session1.pdf (‘Targets’). 
10 Article 52(1) of AP I. 
11 Article 50 of AP I. Discussed in Cecilie Hellestveit, ‘The Geneva Conventions and the Dichotomy 
between International and Non-International Armed Conflict: Curse or Blessing for the “Principle of 
Humanity’’’, in Kjetil Mujezinovic Larsen, Camilla Guldahl Cooper and Gro Nystuen (Eds.), Searching for 
a ‘Principle of Humanity’ in International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 86–123, 
102; Avril McDonald, ‘The Challenges to International Humanitarian Law and the Principles of 
Distinction and Protection from the Increased Participation of Civilians in Hostilities’, Spotlight on Issues of 
Contemporary Concern in International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law, Working Paper, 
University of Tehran Round Table, April 2004. 
12 Kinsella, supra, p. 6; Claire Garbett, The Concept of the Civilian: Legal Recognition, Adjudication and the Trials 
of International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Routledge, 2015), p. 3. 
13 Kinsella, supra; Amanda Alexander, supra (‘Genesis’); Garbett, supra.  
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From a legal standpoint, many of these international actors are unconventional. 
Traditionally, states have been positioned as the main actors engaged in making 
international law,14 including IHL.15 At the same time, the development of IHL has 
been demonstrably pluralistic, with non-state actors playing a significant role.16 This 
study understands IHL as a body of law and a practice with room for the 
contributions of non-traditional actors.17 Moving away from the traditional focus on 
collective entities, the study contributes to the literature on individual actors – 
particularly those occupying lower-level and frontline roles.18 It does not claim that 
these individuals necessarily shape positive law by contributing to treaties and 
conventions. However, it treats these unconventional actors as lawmakers in the 
broadest sense of the word. Through their everyday practices and interactions, these 
individuals produce IHL’s civilian–combatant distinction at multiple global sites.19 
 
The impetus for this study came from my personal experience as an international 
humanitarian actor. While based in West Darfur, Sudan as Head of Mission for the 
non-governmental organization (NGO) War Child Canada from 2009–2011, I 
experienced first-hand how international actors struggle with distinction. On a day-
                                                
14 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘International Law-Making by Non-State Actors: Changing the Model or Putting 
the Phenomenon into Perspective?’, in Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert (Eds.), Non-State Actor 
Dynamics in International Law: From Law-Takers to Law Makers (London: Routledge, 2010). 
15 Michael Schmitt and Sean Watts, ‘State Opinio Juris and International Humanitarian Law Pluralism’, 
International Law Studies, Vol. 91, 2015, pp. 171–215; Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Who Makes International 
Law: The Case of the Law of Armed Conflict’, unpublished paper, 2017 (‘Who Makes IL’). 
16 Leslie Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 3rd edition (Manchester University Press, 2008), 
pp. 26–64; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Cornell University Press, 1996), 
Chapter 1; Schmitt and Watts, supra, p. 172. On the role of non-state actors in producing customary law, 
compare Sivakumaran, supra (‘Who Makes IL’) (advocating an expansive approach) and Schmitt and 
Watts, supra, p. 174 (calling for a narrow approach). See also Chapter 2 of this study. 
17 Sivakumaran, supra (‘Who Makes IL’), arguing that IHL is made by the ‘community of international 
humanitarian lawyers’, which includes states, ‘state-empowered’ actors (e.g. ICRC, international tribunals) 
and non-state actors (e.g. academics, NGOs, non-state armed groups); Amanda Alexander, The Idea of the 
Civilian in International Law (unpublished PhD thesis, 2013), p. 136 (‘PhD Thesis’). 
18 Jutta Brunee and Stephen Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity and Change in 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Chapter 3; Michael P. Scharf, 
‘International Law in Crisis: A Qualitative Empirical Contribution to the Compliance Debate’, Cardozo 
Law Review, Vol. 31, 2009, pp. 45–97; Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (Longmans, 
Green,1905).  
19 For a similarly broad approach to law-making, see Itamar Mann, Humanity at Sea: Maritime Migration and 
the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
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to-day basis, international humanitarian NGOs in Darfur grappled with whether 
they should: participate in joint security planning with non-humanitarian actors; 
accept military offers of in-kind resources; conduct joint projects with the African 
Union (AU)/UN hybrid mission; travel in armed convoys; and engage in long-term 
development work and human rights advocacy. While the answers to these 
questions shifted as conflict dynamics fluctuated, what was striking was how these 
answers were routinely formulated in terms of distinction. Notably, this distinction 
did not always track along with a civilian–combatant binary. The more relevant 
divide was sometimes humanitarian–military or humanitarian–civilian, or even 
humanitarian–humanitarian. 
 
Whatever fault line these distinction practices mapped on to, they constituted 
civilian actors’ efforts to distinguish themselves. This corner of civilian activity is 
typically overlooked, because IHL puts the main onus of upholding the civilian–
combatant separation on the parties to the conflict. For example, combatants are 
required to (visually) distinguish themselves20 and a warring state must distinguish its 
armed forces from its civilian population.21 While IHL imposes clear reciprocal 
duties to uphold distinction on those engaged in fighting, the responsibilities of 
civilians in this respect are only implied. It can be gleaned from the AP I definition 
that civilians must not wear a uniform, carry a weapon or participate in hostilities.22 
However, the notion that civilians might otherwise be obliged to take active steps to 
distinguish themselves – such as by physically distancing themselves or modifying 
their conduct – is not something that IHL attends to. The present study illuminates 
                                                
20 See Chapter 2. Article 4(a)(4) of Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 
August 1949, 75 UNTS 135, Can TS 1965 No. 20 (GC III). Michael Bothe et al. (Eds.), New Rules for 
Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 2nd 
edition (Brill: 2013[1982]), pp. 281–283 (states must ensure their armed forces are easily distinguishable 
from members of the enemy armed forces and civilians); William Ferrell, ‘No Shirt, No Shoes, No Status: 
Uniforms, Distinction, and Special Operations in International Armed Conflict’, Military Law Review, Vol. 
78, 2003, pp. 94–140, 105–106. 
21 Article 51(7) of AP I. See also Article 58(b) of AP I. 
22 See Chapter 2. 
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these hidden distinction practices and explores their implementation by 
international humanitarian actors.23 
 
1.2 The research question and central claims 
 
When contemplating the distinction practices of international humanitarian actors, 
such as those depicted in Darfur, it might seem that the obvious question is whether 
these practices align with IHL’s principle of distinction. While answering this 
question would certainly generate findings about compliance, the framing is 
problematic because it potentially obscures significant aspects of actual practice.24 It 
is proposed that a more interesting possibility to consider is whether a law of 
distinction might be distilled from the practices of international actors. Two crucial 
moves are required here. The first move is to question the assumption that the 
civilian–combatant distinction is, in fact, the distinction of greatest significance. 
When a bright line civilian–combatant binary is defended, distinction is obviously at 
play. The presence of distinction is more difficult to discern, however, when the 
activities of interest appear to implicate a different fault line, altogether. These 
dynamics must be incorporated into the story of distinction, without prejudgment as 
to whether they can properly be accommodated by IHL. The second move required 
is to interrogate the utility of the traditional doctrine–practice divide. By 
foregrounding practice, this study uncovers the messiness of distinction at every 
level – from the articulation of IHL in Geneva to daily decision-making in South 
Sudan.  
 
                                                
23 On the self-protection efforts of the general civilian population, see: Erin Baines and Emily Paddon, 
‘“This is How We Survived”: Civilian Agency and Humanitarian Protection’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 43, 
No. 3, 2012, pp. 231–247; Betcy Jose and Peace A. Medie, ‘Understanding Why and How Civilians 
Resort to Self-Protection in Armed Conflict’, International Studies Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2015, pp. 515–
535; Frédéric Mégret, ‘Beyond the “Salvation” Paradigm: Responsibility to Protect (Others) vs. the Power 
of Protecting Oneself’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 40, No. 6, 2009, pp. 575–579. 
24 On the limits of a compliance focus see Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and 
Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 485 (a compliance 
focus ‘silently assumes that the political question—what the objectives are—has already been solved’). 
See also Kinsella, supra, p. 4. 
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 1.2.1 The research question 
 
The two moves outlined above are embedded in this study’s central research 
question, which is framed as follows: How does the idea o f  dis t inct ion c ir culate  in 
the pract i c es  o f  internat ional  ac tors?  Inspired by multi-sited ethnography,25 this 
three-part study follows the idea of distinction to Geneva and The Hague (Part I), 
civil–military training grounds in Europe (Part II) and the operational context of 
South Sudan (Part III). Each part attends to a particular set of international actors 
and produces a unique insight about distinction. The research question opens up 
fruitful avenues of inquiry, ultimately generating the conceptual claims at the centre 
of this study. 
 
 1.2.2 Central claims 
 
The first conceptual claim this study advances relates to the civilian entity in IHL. 
Resisting the urge to view everything through a civilian–combatant prism, this study 
explores how qualities of ‘civilianness’ and ‘combatantness’ attach to particular 
individuals. It shows civilianness to be a relative and contingent concept and draws 
attention to the way in which the idea of distinction circulates within civilian–civilian 
relations. To capture the fact that another distinction is at play in the practices of 
international actors, the study introduces the figure of the ‘civilian plus’. As the thick 
sociological description of these practices reveals, this figure – similar to the civilian 
in IHL – is plagued by complexity, fragility and fragmentation. Recognizing this, the 
intention is not to replace the idea of a unified civilian category with another 
equivalently unitary category. Rather, the ‘civilian plus’ is offered as a useful 
shorthand, much in the same way that certain international actors employ the 
                                                
25 George Marcus, ‘Ethnography In/Of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography’, 
Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 24, 1995, pp. 95–117; Sally Engle Merry, ‘Ethnography of the Global’, 
Workshop at the Berkeley Centre for the Study of Law and Society, February 2013; See also Mark-
Anthony Falzon, ‘Introduction: Multi-Sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis and Locality in Contemporary 
Research’, in Mark-Anthony Falzon (Ed.), Multi-Sited Ethnography: Theory, Praxis and Locality in Contemporary 
Research (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 1–24. 
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principle of distinction as a bright line. The study proposes that the existence of a 
‘civilian plus’ status relies upon a fragmentation of the wider civilian category, and 
gives rise to two corollaries: the ‘mere civilian’ and ‘civilian minus’. It is argued that 
international humanitarian actors equate ‘humanitarianness’ with the highest degree 
of ‘civilianness’, available. Their ‘civilian plus’ status is grounded in the social value 
of the role they play delivering assistance in war, as well as their virtuousness and 
moral uprightness. The ‘mere civilian’ represents a default status that humanitarian 
actors seek to transcend, but also one that they strive to reclaim when their 
civilianness is under threat. The ‘civilian minus’ label is shown to be one that most 
humanitarian actors assiduously try to avoid; encroachment by combatants 
provokes serious anxiety, in this respect.  
 
The second conceptual claim this study articulates is that the distinction practices of 
international humanitarian actors are designed to influence the perceptions of a local 
audience. Even as humanitarian actors take steps to distinguish themselves, they 
also recognize that it is other actors – observing them from the outside – who 
discern the intended distinction (or not). This study investigates how the 
perspectives of local actors are rallied for the purpose of distinction. It is proposed 
that the actual perceptions of the myriad of local actors who are present in armed 
conflict are collapsed into the ascribed perceptions of a monolithic observer. This 
omnipresent figure, the ‘phantom local’, conflates three audiences of distinction: 
beneficiary-perceivers (whose trust must be gained), attacker-perceivers (whose 
violence must be averted) and authority-perceivers (whose permission to operate 
must be secured).26 Of these three audiences, only the attacker-perceivers are strictly 
relevant for distinction in the sense of targeting in the conduct of hostilities. 
Tracking the way in which the phantom local is summoned thus sheds light on 
whether and how the principle of distinction in IHL is stretched beyond its 
intended function. In situations where international actors believe that onlookers 
cannot tell them apart, the prospect of a ‘phantom foreigner’ also looms. 
                                                
26 See Chapter 4. 
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International humanitarian actors worry that local observers lump all internationals 
together into a single amorphous foreign entity; the distinction practices they engage 
in aim at dispelling any confusion in this respect. Part III of this study, which 
examines how the idea of distinction circulates in the operational context of South 
Sudan, illuminates the ways in which humanitarian actors deploy signs and symbols 
to manage the optics of distinction. 
 
A third, methodological, claim pertains to an interrogation of the traditional 
doctrine-practice divide. In order to gain insight into the global circulation of the 
idea of distinction, this multi-sited study attends to numerous contexts, spaces and 
places.27 The fact that distinction takes on myriad forms and surfaces in a variety of 
contexts for different reasons, is in itself noteworthy. This study makes the case that 
settings as dissimilar as Geneva and South Sudan should be understood as sites 
where the meaning of IHL is articulated, disseminated and shaped.28 Crucially, the 
study does not simplistically juxtapose the practices of international actors with an 
inert legal doctrine; nor does it frame the practices in question as interfering with a 
rule that is otherwise orderly. Instead, it shows that the disorderliness of distinction 
is located at every level, from the AP I codification of the principle of distinction to 
the co-location of humanitarian actors with armed UN forces in South Sudan. 
 
 1.2.3 Defining the humanitarian actor 
 
In a study that grapples with the boundaries between actors, it would be 
problematic to firmly delineate the categories of interest at the outset. Doing so 
would predetermine the operative lines, anticipating the study’s key findings and 
                                                
27 See Sarah Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the International Criminal Court 
in Uganda and Sudan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 235, FN 45 (‘Moving between 
The Hague, Gulu, Khartoum, Darfur, Kampala, and headquarters of international organizations, the 
study does not focus, like classic anthropology, on the culture of one community, traditionally a village’) 
(‘Complementarity’). See also Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (Eds.), Anthropological Locations: Boundaries 
and Grounds of a Field Science (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1997).  
28 On the need to study unorthodox locales, see David M. Trubeck and John Esser, ‘Critical Empiricism 
in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program, or Pandora’s Box?’, Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 14, 1989, 
pp. 1-52, p. 45. 
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impeding the implementation of a practice-based approach. Having said that, for 
analytical purposes, it is helpful to begin with a broad sense of who the actors of 
interest are and how they connect. In this study, the relationship between the 
international humanitarian actor category and IHL’s civilian category is of central 
importance. However, the boundaries of these categories are far from 
straightforward: it is not obvious whether international humanitarian actors should 
be treated as civilians or considered a separate category in their own right. It is no 
coincidence that this relationship, which is of greatest concern to this study, also 
poses the biggest challenges in definitional terms. Indeed, uncovering this 
relationship is one of the main endeavours of this inquiry.  
 
Even before the term ‘humanitarian’ is brought into contact with IHL, it is plagued 
with indeterminacy. 29 It is too simplistic to declare that a humanitarian actor is 
someone who provides humanitarian assistance30 – though this is potentially a 
useful point of departure. Further, no category of ‘humanitarian actor’ exists as such 
in IHL doctrine. It is argued in Chapter 3 that IHL is embedded with a narrow 
fantasy of a very particular kind of humanitarian actor: the Red Cross figure. 
Problematically, few international actors who actively deliver humanitarian 
assistance in contemporary armed conflicts resemble this figure. While some 
typologies of humanitarian actors usefully grapple with the diversity of the role,31 
none meets the requirements of this study. What is needed is a new typology that 
                                                
29 Monika Krause, The Good Project: Humanitarian Relief NGOs and the Fragmentation of Reason (Chicago, IL 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 2014), p. 109; Samir Elhawary and Sara Pantuliano, ‘UN 
Integration and Humanitarian Space’, Panel at University of Ottawa Centre for International Policy 
Studies, 31 January 2012, video available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3SfTYAVvHyU. 
30 Humanitarian assistance is defined here as the provision of humanitarian relief – namely humanitarian 
and protection assistance involving food, water, sanitation, shelter and health services, as well as 
humanitarian coordination. This excludes post-conflict development activities, while recognizing that 
many actors who identify as humanitarian also engage in work across the relief–development continuum. 
For a similar definition, see: Kubo Macak, ‘Principles of Neutrality and Impartiality of Humanitarian 
Action in the Aftermath of the 2011 Libyan Conflict’, in Andrew J. Zwitter et al. (Eds.), Humanitarian 
Action: Global, Regional and Domestic Legal Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 
447–474, 447. 
31 Discussed in Abby Stoddard, ‘Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and Trends’, Humanitarian Policy Group, 
Briefing paper, No. 1, July 2003, p. 3; Krause, supra, p. 110.  
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explicitly engages with the categories of IHL and attends to both humanitarian and 
non-humanitarian actors.  
 
Ultimately, I made the decision to delineate the proposed groupings broadly, while 
tentatively reserving conclusions about the operative boundaries. As a placeholder, 
this study sets up three broad categories of international actors:32  
 
(i) International humanitarian actors: the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) and Red Cross family; UN humanitarian agencies 
(UNHCR, UNICEF, OCHA); international humanitarian NGOs (MSF, 
Oxfam). 
(ii) Other international civilian actors: civilian staff of peacekeeping 
missions (UNMISS); political and diplomatic actors (EU and UN human 
rights monitors). 
(iii) International military actors: military actors affiliated with EU or UN 
peacekeeping missions (UNMISS) or deployed as international military 
forces (NATO). 
 
The reference to ‘other international civilian actors’ (group ii) reflects the 
understanding that civilian humanitarian actors also have civilian status under IHL. 
The fact that humanitarian actors are not folded into this category of international 
civilian actors also hints at the possibility that (some) humanitarian actors might 
claim a special status. The next section provides a more detailed overview of the 
study, outlining its three-part structure and the substantive arguments that are 
advanced in each part. 
 
1.3 Overview of the study 
 
This study fractures the idea of distinction, presenting it in unfamiliar forms. It takes 
the view that distinction cannot be found in one place – particularly not, say, in the 
text of the Geneva Conventions or the dominant vision of distinction that circulates 
                                                
32  The organizations listed in brackets comprise a non-exhaustive set of examples of the actors 
scrutinized in this study. Police and private international actors, such as those engaged in business 
activities or employed by private military and security companies, are not considered in detail. 
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in Geneva and The Hague. An alternative vision is described: one that detaches 
civilianness from the civilian and accounts for the disrupted nature of distinction. 
The study shows how, on a daily basis, international actors break down distinction 
and build it back up. Through these everyday practices, they construct and 
reconstruct distinction in new ways.  
 
To illuminate how, where and why international actors draw the line, the study 
explores a number of global sites where the idea of distinction circulates. The 
selected sites are delineated according to separate yet overlapping groups of 
practices: Intellectual, Pedagogical and Kinetic. The following table provides an 
overview of the relevant sites and actors. 
 
Table 1. Overview of sites and actors 
 
Part  Site(s) Actors 
 
I. Distinction and the 
Intellectual 
 
Geneva; The Hague 
 
 
International 
lawyers; legal 
advisors; judges; 
legal academics; 
witnesses  
 
 
 
II. Distinction and the 
Pedagogical 
 
Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 
training by NATO, Italy; Civil–
Military Relations (CMR) training by 
the Swedish Armed Forces, Sweden; 
Comprehensive Approaches to 
Multi-Dimensional Peace 
Operations (CAMPO) training by 
the German Center for 
International Peace Operations 
(Zif), Germany 
 
 
International 
humanitarian actors; 
other international 
civilian actors; 
international military 
actors  
 
III. Distinction and 
 
South Sudan 
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the Kinetic  
 
 
1.3.1 Part I: Distinction and the Intellectual 
 
Part I explores how the idea of distinction circulates historically and doctrinally, as 
well as in the practices of international actors in Geneva and The Hague. The main 
international actors of interest are those who are more traditionally thought of as 
legal actors: lawyers, legal officials, judges and (legal) academics.33  
 
Chapter 2 opens with a snapshot of the dominant vision of distinction, which sets 
up a fixed, stable and bright line civilian–combatant binary. The discussion proceeds 
to demonstrate how this vision is unsettled and undermined, and it offers an 
alternative vision that captures these perpetual disruptions. Attention is paid to 
distinction in the conduct of hostilities, the rules of humanitarian assistance and 
crimes against humanity cases at the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Historical context is provided to show that distinction has never 
been stable as the mythical civilian figure suggests. In the alternative vision of 
distinction, qualities of civilianness and combatantness are shown to float around in 
the air, attaching to any given individual at any given moment. Whereas civilianness 
is signified by harmlessness, non-participation, innocence and vulnerability, 
combatantness is associated with dangerousness, complicity and guilt. As the notion 
of a unified civilian category crumbles, the civilian figure that emerges is beset by 
contradiction. The civilian is at once a cherished ideal, imbued with extraordinarily 
high expectations and aspirations, and a fragile entity – routinely questioned, 
beleaguered and undermined. These tensions provide a crucial clue as to why 
                                                
33 The inclusion of academic discourse here is uncontroversial, as academic writing is officially recognized 
as a source of public international law. See Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
18 April 1946, 3 Bevans 1179, 59 Stat 1055, TS No 993. 
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international humanitarian actors might carve out a special civilian status – the 
‘civilian plus’ – for themselves.  
 
Following this establishment of the disrupted nature of the civilian–combatant 
distinction, Chapter 3 introduces international humanitarian actors into the picture. 
It proposes that IHL’s vision of the humanitarian actor is embedded with a Red 
Cross fantasy, to the exclusion of other kinds of humanitarian actors. Identifying the 
enactment of AP I as the moment at which the humanitarian actor entered the legal 
scene, the chapter suggests that IHL may define (some) humanitarian actors as 
special civilians. The question of whether such a status is desirable is explored 
through a debate between two competing perspectives. First, the ‘help the helpers 
help’ position favours a special status for humanitarian actors, based on the social 
value of the tasks they perform in war. Second, the ‘humanitarian exceptionalism’ 
position warns that a special status could estrange humanitarian actors from others, 
including the populations they serve. This study espouses a qualified version of the 
second outlook, applying its relational logic to IHL’s civilian category. The concern 
is expressed that delineating a special status for humanitarian actors could mobilize 
law to downgrade the status of other civilians. Chapter 3 closes by looking ahead to 
the actual practices of international actors, which are explored in Parts II and III. At 
odds with IHL’s narrow conceptualization of the humanitarian actor, a wide swath 
of international actors make claims to humanitarianness on a daily basis. The 
practice-based law of distinction that this study elucidates aligns with the alternative 
vision of distinction introduced in Chapter 2.   
 
1.3.2 Part II: Distinction and the Pedagogical 
 
The Pedagogical realm has a strong normative aspect; in this sphere of practice, 
distinction is taught, learned and explicitly brought into question. In treating the 
Pedagogical realm as its own domain, this study makes the case that training reveals 
something new that cannot be gleaned from the doctrine, scholarship and practice 
 23 
of the Intellectual realm, or the day-to-day operations of the Kinetic realm. Part II 
considers the way in which unconventional actors such as NATO soldiers, UN 
peacekeepers and humanitarian NGO actors produce distinction at civil–military 
training programmes in Sweden, Italy and Germany. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, international institutions such as the EU, the UN 
and NATO have steadily moved towards comprehensive, integrated and multi-
dimensional international missions.34 These missions are imbued with values such as 
‘working together’ and are accompanied by imagery of walls coming down and 
boundaries being dismantled between international actors. 35 Chapter 4 presents the 
three training programmes that were selected for scrutiny in this study – all of which 
were designed to prepare actors for participation in comprehensive missions. The 
programmes are led, respectively, by NATO’s Multi-National Civil–Military 
Cooperation Group (CIMIC), the Swedish Armed Forces (SWEDINT) and the 
German Centre for Peace Operations (Zif). The training spaces also serve as venues 
where international actors learn about the importance of upholding IHL’s principle 
of distinction. This chapter expands on the concept of everyday distinction practices 
(see below), explaining how humanitarian actors imagine and assert their civilian 
status in the Pedagogical realm.  
 
Chapter 5 weaves together the original empirical findings from the three civil–
military training spaces. It explores the way in which international actors understand 
distinction and struggle over who draws the line, as well as how and where. When 
humanitarian actors lead training sessions, they ground the need for distinction in 
both international law and perceptions of the ‘phantom local’. They also explain 
that, by following the traditional humanitarian principles – humanity, impartiality, 
                                                
34 Joanna Macrae and Nicholas Leader, ‘Shifting Sands: The Search for “Coherence” Between Political 
and Humanitarian Responses to Complex Emergencies’, Humanitarian Policy Group Report, No. 8, August 
2000, p. 9. 
35 Jonathan Goodhand, ‘Contested Boundaries: NGOs and Civil–Military Relations in Afghanistan’, 
Central Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2013, pp. 287–305, 287. See also Victoria Metcalfe et al., ‘UN 
Integration and Humanitarian Space: An Independent Study Commissioned by the UN Integration 
Steering Group’, Stimson and Overseas Development Institute, 2011 (‘Stimson Report’). 
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independence and neutrality – humanitarian actors strive to be distinct and be seen to 
be distinct. Other – differently-situated – international actors fault humanitarian 
actors for implementing distinction too strictly or for doing so inconsistently. In 
particular, they resist the notion that humanitarianness corresponds with a higher 
degree of civilianness, or ‘civilian plus’ status. Meanwhile, international military 
actors are taught to foster interaction with civilians, as part of the comprehensive 
mission ethos. It is not until trainees embark on practical exercises that simulate the 
operational context that the goal of ‘working together’ overtly clashes with the 
commitment to ‘upholding distinction’. When (non-humanitarian) actors have to 
make choices between these competing ideals, distinction rarely comes out on top.  
 
1.3.3 Part III: Distinction and the Kinetic 
 
Unconventional actors are again at the forefront in Part III, which focuses on 
interactions between international humanitarian actors (NGOs, UN, ICRC), UN 
civilian actors and UN peacekeepers operating in South Sudan. Whereas 
Pedagogical practices have a very strong normative component, Kinetic practices 
tend to be more practical – and potentially reactive. As the Kinetic realm is where 
one finds distinction in motion, it sheds light on the way in which distinction is 
enacted as a day-to-day matter on the ground. Here, official policies and normative 
debates are brought into contact with the mundaneness of daily decision-making, 
revealing the nuances of what international actors actually do.36 It is also in the 
Kinetic realm that the most intense relationships between international actors are 
formed, as these actors routinely come into physical contact.37 Another crucial 
element of Kinetic practices is the relevance of optics. Distinction has a more 
explicit visual life in the operational context; the way in which signs and symbols are 
                                                
36 Kai Koddenbrock, The Practice of Humanitarian Intervention: Aid Workers, Agencies, and Institutions in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Routledge, 2016), pp. 59, 62 (to make sense of international intervention, 
operational practice must be taken seriously). 
37 Slim makes a similar point regarding civil–military policies; see Hugo Slim, ‘The Stretcher and the 
Drum: Civil–Military Relations in Peace Support Operations’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 3, No. 2, 
1996, pp. 123–140, 129, 131 (‘Stretcher’). 
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deployed reveals much about whose perceptions are being managed, and why. A 
final noteworthy aspect of the Kinetic realm is the way in which it exposes conflicts 
that are otherwise concealed. This is explained in more detail, below.  
 
Chapter 6 engages with the recent history of conflict and international intervention 
in South Sudan. South Sudan is a global site where international actors struggle with 
distinction in the context of an integrated UN mission with a robust Protection of 
Civilians (PoC) mandate. Civilianness is shown to be a beleaguered concept in South 
Sudan, and international humanitarian actors want to do everything they can to 
claim the highest degree of civilianness possible. As UN integration policies and 
structures encourage different kinds of international actors to work together 
towards a common goal of peace, many of the same dynamics explored in Part II 
arise. Additionally, humanitarian actors live and work inside displacement settings 
(‘PoC sites’) that are guarded by armed UN forces, and humanitarian actors must 
navigate daily decisions about military asset use. This chapter revisits previous 
discussions of humanitarian distinction practices, describing the specific form they 
take in the Kinetic realm. A key difference between the Pedagogical and Kinetic 
realms is that, in the operational context of the latter, the explicit appeal to law 
mostly slips away; international actors focus instead on the need to appease the 
‘phantom local’. Humanitarian signs and symbols play a crucial role here, and this 
study highlights two relevant critiques from the scholarly literature. First, there are 
charges that humanitarian actors visually distinguish themselves primarily for 
marketing or branding purposes. Second, there are allegations that safeguarding 
humanitarian symbols overshadows the importance of assisting populations in need. 
These critiques resurface in the empirical findings from South Sudan, and it is often 
humanitarian actors, themselves, who express these misgivings. 
 
Chapter 7 delves into the original empirical material from South Sudan. As at the 
civil–military training grounds, in South Sudan, international actors can be found 
struggling with each other over who draws the line, as well as how and where. The 
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findings from South Sudan build on the discoveries from the Intellectual and 
Pedagogical realms, providing a further layer of thick sociological description. 
Investigation of the operational context allows for deeper insights into intra-civilian 
tensions. When international humanitarian actors dissociate from UN civilian actors, 
they do so partly because of the latter’s affiliation with armed UN forces; 
humanitarian actors also wish to remind UN civilians that they have no legitimate 
claim to humanitarianness. The empirical material from South Sudan also introduces 
further nuance to the findings from the civil–military training grounds. While the 
explicit reference to law recedes markedly in the operational context, law is not 
entirely absent. The chapter shows that international actors in South Sudan self-
conceptualize according to the civilian and combatant categories of IHL. Rather 
than appealing to static civilian and combatant entities, however, international actors 
behave as though different degrees of civilianness and combatantness are available. 
These qualities are assigned to individuals by the ‘phantom local’, who observes the 
interactions of international actors. A conflict also emerges in the Kinetic realm 
between upholding distinction and implementing the traditional humanitarian 
principle of humanity. To capture the way in which humanitarian actors navigate 
this conflict, two Weberian ideal types are elucidated.38 The first type prioritizes 
distinction and takes a long-term view. The second type treats distinction as a 
principle that must be balanced with – and potentially subsumed by – the need to 
reach war-affected populations. What these two types battle over is nothing less 
than the meaning of humanitarianness. 
 
Chapter 8 brings the study to a close. It outlines the main contributions of the 
study to the relevant literature and reflects on the implications of the findings. It 
reiterates what is exposed through this investigation: that the idea of distinction, as 
it circulates in the practices of international actors, is perpetually disrupted. 
Contemplating the desirability of a special status for international humanitarian 
actors, the study reflects upon the potential winners and losers. A significant 
                                                
38 The term ‘ideal’ here does not have normative connotations.  
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downside of the ‘civilian plus’, it is proposed, is the fact that its existence is 
premised upon there being lesser forms of civilianness. This is to say that a special 
status for humanitarian actors downgrades the civilianness of other actors, at least in 
a relative sense. Perplexingly, war-affected populations are likely to find themselves 
on the losing side of this arrangement. This is a perverse outcome, especially when 
one considers that, without populations in need, there is no reason for humanitarian 
actors to exist. 
 
1.4 Discipline and methodology  
 
The present section situates the study in the relevant disciplines, articulates its 
definition of the field and outlines its key methodological moves. First, this study 
employs a socio-legal approach to understand how distinction is enacted from the 
bottom-up on an everyday basis. Second, the study’s definition of the field 
highlights the interactions of differently situated actors, so as to illuminate how 
struggles over distinction shape the relationships of interest. Third, the study draws 
on ethnographic methods in order to understand how distinction is seen through 
the eyes of international actors. 
 
1.4.1 A socio-legal study 
 
To shed light on the way in which international actors produce distinction, this 
study brings the disciplinary field of international law39 into contact with the field of 
humanitarian studies.40 It employs a socio-legal approach to understanding law in 
                                                
39 On international law as a field, see Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International 
Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
On IHL as a sub-field, see Frédéric Mégret, ‘Thinking about what International Humanitarian Lawyers 
“Do”: An Examination of the Laws of War as a Field of Professional Practice’, in Wouter Werner, 
Marieke de Hoon and Alexis Galán (Eds.), The Law of International Lawyers: Reading Martti Koskenniemi 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp.265-296 (‘IHL Lawyers’).  
40 Michael N. Barnett, ‘Humanitarian Governance’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 16, 2013, pp. 
379–398, 393 (designating ‘humanitarian studies’ as a field) (‘Governance’). See also Kjersti Lohne and 
Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, ‘Legal Sociology of Humanitarianism’, Oslo Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2017, pp. 
4–27 (treating humanitarian studies as a conglomeration of different disciplinary contributions). 
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everyday life, which finds its analogue in the study of everyday humanitarianism. In 
socio-legal studies, law is viewed as a historical and culturally-specific mode of social 
organization, taking different forms both within and across social strata.41 With this 
bottom-up approach to the study of law, it is a legitimate task to study how rules 
work in practice.42  One might ask, for example, how a given actor perceives, 
understands, experiences, uses or avoids law.43 This has the potential to reveal how 
individual actors engage with law in unexpected ways.44 Scrutiny of practice is also 
instructive because IHL rules are open to alternative – and potentially contradictory 
– meanings.45 Some IHL provisions may, in fact, be deliberately encoded with 
ambiguity, and a certain amount of indeterminacy may be deemed desirable. 46 
Focusing on practice can thus illuminate subtle dynamics that might otherwise be 
unaccounted for, such as the fact that that IHL civilian–combatant distinction is not 
the only fault line along which the relationships of international actors are 
organized.  
 
The international actors examined in Parts II and III identify, adopt, apply, develop 
and promulgate IHL norms and rules. However, their engagement with IHL is not 
simply instrumental; these actors also self-conceptualize according to IHL’s civilian 
and combatant categories. To understand this self-conceptualization, it is necessary 
to think about law’s constitutive role. The socio-legal study of law in everyday life 
is amenable to this kind of analysis, as it engages with law’s instrumental and 
                                                
41 As articulated by the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Oxford. 
42 On law from the ‘bottom up’ and from outside legal institutions, see: Susan Silbey and Ayn Cavicchi, 
‘The Common Place of Law: Transforming Matters of Concern into the Objects of Everyday Life’, 
in Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel (Eds.), Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2005), pp. 556–565; David Cowan, Linda Mulcahy and Sally Wheeler, ‘Introduction’, in 
David Cowan, Linda Mulcahy and Sally Wheeler (Eds.), Major Works in Socio-Legal Studies (London: 
Routledge, 2013), p. 5. 
43 Paraphrasing Cowan, Mulcahy and Wheeler, supra, p. 5. 
44 Susan Silbey and Austin Sarat, ‘Critical Traditions in Law and Research’, Law and Society Review, Vol. 21, 
1987, pp. 165–174, 173. Cited in Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, ‘Beyond the Great Divide: Forms 
of Legal Scholarship and Everyday Life’, in Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (Eds.), Law in Everyday 
Life (University of Michigan Press, 1993), p. 60. 
45 Alexander, supra, p. 14, (‘PhD Thesis’).   
46 Kinsella, supra, p. 189. Citing Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, ‘On Compliance’, International 
Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 175–205, 189 (on indeterminacy); Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes 
of Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 159 (on deliberate ambiguity). See also Chapter 2. 
 29 
constitutive aspects.47 This approach recognizes that law is shaped by the way in 
which actors use it, but that its constitutive power delimits the way in which actors 
are able to employ it.48  This introduces an important caveat to the approach 
delineated above – namely that actors cannot avoid or ignore law, entirely. Even if 
international humanitarian actors in South Sudan were to fail to cite IHL on a daily 
basis, their civilian identity would continue to shape their self-perception and the 
organization of their affairs. In their daily interactions with others, humanitarian 
actors constitute and reconstitute distinction – whether or not this distinction maps 
onto a civilian–combatant binary. A socio-legal examination of the everyday also 
invites a closer look at practices that might, on the surface, seem to have very little 
to do with law. 49  As Sarat and Kearns point out, ‘motives, needs, emotions, 
anxieties, aspirations that are not entirely fixed by legal meanings or by legal forces 
operate throughout without totally losing their identity to law’. 50  A focus on 
everyday practice also highlights the multiplicity of actors who engage with IHL, 
drawing attention to the role of unconventional actors.51 This last element is a 
crucial aspect of the present study’s effort to interrogate the traditional doctrine–
practice divide. 
 
As noted above, the study of law in everyday life finds a parallel in the concept of 
everyday humanitarianism.52 The latter occupies a corner of the broader literature 
on humanitarianism, situated in what some refer to as the field of humanitarian 
                                                
47 Sarat and Kearns, supra, pp. 29, 32. 
48 Ibid., p. 55; Barbara Yngvesson, ‘Inventing Law in Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal Culture’, 
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 98, No. 8, 1989, pp. 1689–1709. 
49 Sarat and Kearns, supra, p. 55. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Sally Engle Merry, ‘International Law and Sociolegal Scholarship: Towards a Spatial Global Legal 
Pluralism’, in Austin Sarat (Ed.), Special Issue: Law and Society Reconsidered (Studies in Law, Politics and Society), 
Vol. 21, 2007 (on the link between socio-legal studies and legal pluralism). See also Lianne M. Boer, ‘The 
Greater Part of Juriconsults: On Consensus Claims and their Footnotes in Legal Scholarship’, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, 2016, pp. 1021–1042, 1041–1042 (study of practice shows that ‘the law 
is “made” by those working with it, and there are very many people doing so, in many different 
capacities’). 
52 See, e.g.: Udan Fernando and Dorothea Hilhorst, ‘Everyday Practices of Humanitarian Aid: Tsunami 
Response in Sri Lanka’, Development in Practice, Vol. 16, No. 3/4, 2006, pp. 292–302; Anais Aresseguier, 
‘The Moral Sense of Humanitarian Actors: An Empirical Exploration’, Disasters, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2018, pp. 
62–80. 
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studies. 53  Relatively speaking, scholars of international law have been slow to 
embark on a comprehensively interdisciplinary engagement with humanitarianism.54 
As a consequence, the rich insights of the humanitarianism literature have not yet 
meaningfully infused what Drumbl terms the ‘international legal imagination’.55 
Where IHL scholars have taken up the issue of humanitarianism, a doctrinal and 
normative approach to law has predominated. This can be explained, in part, by the 
need to clarify IHL’s application to issues such as state consent for humanitarian 
activities, humanitarian access to beneficiaries and the deliberate targeting of 
humanitarian actors by violent actors. 56 Without denying the pressing nature of 
such concerns, much could also be learned from a (critical) socio-legal approach to 
the theory and practice of humanitarianism. 57  An important methodological 
contribution of the present study is to demonstrate the form that such an inquiry 
might take.  
 
Bringing these threads together, this study employs the concept of everyday 
distinction practices. These refer to the day-to-day competent performances that 
                                                
53 Contributions to the broader literature on humanitarianism have been generated by academics in a 
wide range of individual disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, political science and international 
relations. See, e.g.: Liisa H. Malkki, The Need to Help: The Domestic Arts of International Humanitarianism (Duke 
University Press, 2015); David Mosse (Ed.), Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in 
International Development (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2013); Silke Roth, Passionate Professionals: The Paradoxes 
of Aid Work (Routledge, 2015) (‘Paradoxes of Aid’); Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfini (Eds.), 
Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions (New York, NY: Zone 
Books, 2010); Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present (University of California 
Press, 2011) (‘Humanitarian Reason’); Krause, supra; Antonio Donini (Ed.), The Golden Fleece: Manipulation 
and Independence in Humanitarian Action (Virginia: Kumarian Press, 2012) (‘Golden Fleece’); Zoe Marriage, 
Not Breaking the Rules, Not Playing the Game: International Assistance to Countries at War (London: Hurst, 
2006).  
54 Lohne and Sandvik, supra, p. 5.  
55 Mark Drumbl, Re-imagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), p. 9 (a ‘normative, aspirational, and operational mix of international law, policy, and practice—
constituted as it is directly and indirectly by a broad constellation of actors’). 
56 See, e.g.: Claudie Barrat, Status of NGOs in International Humanitarian Law (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2014); 
Johanna Grombach Wagner, ‘An IHL/ICRC Perspective on “Humanitarian Space’’’, Humanitarian 
Exchange Magazine, No. 32, December 2005; Dapo Akande and Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, ‘Arbitrary 
Withholding of Consent to Humanitarian Relief Operations in Armed Conflict’, International Law Studies, 
Vol. 92, No. 483, 2016 (‘Consent’). 
57 On the need for a legal sociology of humanitarianism, see Lohne and Sandvik, supra. 
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international humanitarian actors engage in to operationalize distinction.58 Such 
practices materialize in the Pedagogical and Kinetic realms, assuming different 
forms to reflect the demands of each respective context. While South Sudan is 
perhaps more obviously a site of everyday life – albeit a conflict-affected one – 
professional training spaces are also venues where everyday life unfolds.59  
 
1.4.2 The field as a relational social space 
 
This multi-sited study interrogates the way in which international actors produce 
distinction through practice. The relevant field60 is defined as a relational social 
space where differently-situated international actors come into contact and struggle 
over distinction. This definition is loosely based on Lohne and Sandvik’s 
formulation of the field in their proposal for a legal sociology of humanitarianism, 61 
but with two key adjustments. First, the present study focuses on IHL and, more 
specifically, the enactment of a particular IHL rule. Second, the study emphasizes 
the role of non-humanitarian actors, scrutinizing their perception of and response to 
the distinction practices of humanitarian actors.  
 
A crucial aspect of this study’s articulation of the field is the relational nature of the 
social space. Although relational thinking is gaining momentum in the literature on 
humanitarianism,62 the choice to adopt a relational approach in a project concerned 
with distinction might seem curious. While the notion of relationship is likely to 
conjure images of embrace, connection and coming together, the idea of distinction 
is likely to evoke efforts to turn away, to separate and to be apart. Accordingly, it 
                                                
58 See Chapters 4 and 6. The reference to ‘competent performances’ comes from Emanuel Adler and 
Vincent Pouliot (Eds.), International Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 6, p. 15. 
Drawing more generally on Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), pp. 78–86 (‘Outline’). 
59 See Sarat and Kearns, supra, for a treatment of bureaucratic conferences and meetings as everyday life. 
60  For a general discussion of the field, see, e.g., Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) (‘The Field’). 
61 See Lohne and Sandvik, supra, pp. 10–11, 15 (also hinting at a role for non-humanitarian actors).  
62 Larissa Fast, Aid in Danger: The Perils and Promise of Humanitarianism (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2014), p. 8; Roth, supra, p. 91 (‘Paradoxes of Aid’).  
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might be tempting to conceptualize distinction practices as a form of disengagement. 
This impulse must be resisted, however, for the simple reason that it conceals the 
manner in which struggles over distinction shape the relationships of interest. Even 
as humanitarian actors strive to maintain separation from other international actors, 
they are often still intertwined and bound together with these actors.63 This study 
takes seriously humanitarian distinction practices as a legitimate form of engagement 
with others.64 
 
A concerted effort is also made to account for the practices and perspectives of 
non-humanitarian international actors who share the social space. These other 
actors have goals of their own, some of which directly conflict with the distinction 
that humanitarian actors propound. As this study uncovers, these other international 
actors can often be found erasing lines faster than humanitarian actors can draw 
them. To implement its relational approach, this study frames the actions of 
international actors as forms of interaction.65 At the centre of these interactions are 
conflicting interpretations of what distinction requires, and from whom. The 
interactions in question play a role in not only driving social reality,66 but also 
producing a law of distinction. Through its efforts to distil a law of distinction from 
the practices of international actors, this study avoids the pitfalls of the socio-legal 
‘gap study’. In such a study, socio-legal scholars simplistically set legal doctrine (law 
‘in the books’) against practice on the ground (law ‘in action’). 67 The present study 
                                                
63 See Matthew Desmond, ‘Relational Ethnography’, Theory and Society, Vol. 43, No. 5, 2014, pp. 547–579, 
554. Citing George Marcus, Ethnography through Thick and Thin (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1998), p. 90. 
64 This move is inspired by studies of detachment in the Science and Technology Studies literature, 
especially Matei Candea, Joanna Cook, Catherine Trundle and Thomas Yarrow, ‘Introduction: 
Reconsidering Detachment’, in Candea et al. (Eds.), Cultivating Detachment: Essays on the Limits of Relational 
Thinking (Manchester University Press, 2015), pp. 1–31, 2.  
65 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Small Places, Large Issues: An Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology 
(London: Pluto Press, 2010), p. 53 (‘conceptualising whatever people are up to as interaction calls 
attention to the reciprocal character of agency, and most acts are not only directed towards other agents, 
but shaped by the relationship’). 
66 See Robert Emerson, Rachel Fretz and Linda Shaw, Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes, 2nd edition (London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011/1995), p. 2 
67 Defined, respectively, in Trubeck, supra, as ‘the prescriptive rules of legal doctrine as authoritatively 
interpreted’ and the ‘actual behaviour of citizens’. See David Nelkin, ‘The Gap Problem in the Sociology 
of Law: A Theoretical Review’, Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, Vol. 35, 1981, pp. 35–61. 
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locates disorder at every level, in action as well as the books. The inclusion of the 
Pedagogical realm (Part II) is crucial in this respect. It introduces an also-messy site 
that resides somewhere in between the normative articulation of a legal rule and its 
implementation in conflict zones. 
 
 1.4.3 Qualitative empirical methods 
 
The empirical component68 of this study was developed through a grounded theory 
approach. 69 This approach is an iterative process that is primarily inductive, but has 
deductive aspects, as well.70 Although the research was guided by a foreshadowed 
problem (i.e. how the idea of distinction circulates) it did not begin with a specific 
hypothesis.71 Rather, it left open the possibility of adjusting the research plan in 
response to surprising discoveries.72 Riles describes the task of sorting out the 
relationships between various discoveries as a process of ‘unwinding’; in this 
process, the scholar faces an intellectual risk, as she must follow where the material 
leads her.73 In the present study, the empirical material led to the discovery of the 
‘civilian plus’ and the ‘phantom local’ (see Section 1.2, above). In terms of the 
concrete research methods employed, all three parts of this study rely on textual and 
discourse analysis.74 Parts II and III, which make up the main empirical component, 
                                                
68 On empirical approaches in international legal scholarship, see: Elena Baylis, ‘The Transformative 
Potential of Rigorous Empirical Research’, American Society of International Law Annual Meeting, Vol. 104, 
March 2010; Gregory Shafer and Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Empirical Turn in International Legal 
Scholarship’, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 106, No. 1, pp. 1–48. 
69 See Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis (SAGE, 
2006). 
70 Charmaz, supra, pp. 4, 188.  
71 Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the 
Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea (London: Routledge, 1922/1984), p. 9.  
72 Alan Bryman, ‘The Debate about Quantitative and Qualitative Research: A Question of Method or 
Epistemology’, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1984, pp. 75–92, 78; David Silverman (Ed.), 
Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook, 3rd edition (London: SAGE, 2010), p. 274. 
73 Annelise Riles, ‘Afterword: A Method More than a Subject’, in David Cowan and Daniel Wincott 
(Eds.), Exploring the ‘Legal’ in Socio-Legal Studies (London: Palgrave, 2016), pp. 257–264, 260; Annelise 
Riles, ‘Anthropology, Human Rights and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage’, American 
Anthropologist, Vol. 108, pp. 52–65, 2008. 
74  This includes international treaties and conventions, general principles of law, customary law, 
jurisprudence and academic writing. It also includes various manuals and ‘grey literature’ produced by 
international humanitarian, military and peacekeeping actors. 
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are further based on interviews, surveys, focus group discussions and participant 
observation, all of which were carried out at the field research sites.75 Informed by 
ethnographic approaches developed in the discipline of anthropology, these 
empirical methods aim to see through the eyes of international actors, describing 
and explaining their motivations, actions, interpretations, values and patterns of 
meaning.76 These empirical methods are elaborated upon in Chapter 4.     
 
 Conclus ion 
 
While this study problematizes the civilian–combatant distinction of IHL, the claim 
at its centre is not that distinction does not exist. Rather, it argues that many 
distinctions circulate in the practices of international actors. Although the 
international actors scrutinized in this study may not be lawmakers in the 
conventional sense of shaping treaties or legal conventions, they enact distinction 
on a daily basis. The present study can certainly shed light on whether and why a 
given actor might comply with an IHL rule, but the aim is to go beyond concerns of 
legal compliance.77 By attending to practices and perceptions, it offers insights into 
behaviours that might seem surprising from a legal perspective – such as 
international actors jostling with each other for a status that should not exist in 
international law. Rather than attempt to compartmentalize various dynamics into 
categories of law and non-law, this study illuminates the interplay of law, practice 
and perception across a range of international sites. While the actual practices of 
international actors are always at the forefront of the analysis, these practices are 
                                                
75 At the civil–military training grounds, over 200 hours of participant observation hours were logged. 
Furthermore, 38 interviews were conducted (mostly in the form of small focus group discussions) and 17 
perception surveys were administered to trainees. In South Sudan, 100 hours of participant observation 
were completed and 113 interviews were conducted; 55 of these interviews were with key informants and 
the rest took the form of focus group discussions. Ten expert interviews were carried out over Skype, 
and the rest took place in person. 
76 Bryman, supra, pp. 77–88. On methodological borrowing in socio-legal studies, see David Cowan and 
Daniel Wincott, ‘Exploring the “Legal”’, in Cowan and Wincott, supra, pp. 1–32, pp. 5, 14. For a socio-
legal study employing anthropological methods, see Nouwen, supra (‘Complementarity’).  
77 Koskenniemi, supra, p. 485 (a compliance focus ‘silently assumes that the political question—what the 
objectives are—has already been solved’). See also Kinsella, supra, p. 4 (identifying this as a problem with 
respect to the principle of distinction, specifically). 
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contextualized by a concerted engagement with questions of what the law of 
distinction is and what it should be.  
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PART I: DISTINCTION AND THE INTELLECTUAL  
 
Introduct ion to Part  I  
 
Part I of this study follows the idea of distinction to Geneva and The Hague, in 
order to explore the way in which it circulates in the practices of international actors 
at these sites. Two competing visions of distinction are introduced. The dominant 
vision sets up the civilian and the combatant as bounded entities, separated by a 
fixed and stable line. Although this vision is deeply disrupted on multiple levels, it 
remains the orthodoxy. To capture the myriad disruptions plaguing the idea of a 
bright line civilian–combatant binary, an alternative vision of distinction is 
elucidated. In this alternative vision, civilianness is shown to be a relative concept 
that can be pushed in competing directions. This study proposes that the alternative 
vision represents distinction as it actually is.   
 
Leaving the humanitarian actor waiting in the wings, Chapter 2 draws on legal 
treaties, conventions and the practices of actors at the ICTY to elucidate these 
competing visions of distinction. Chapter 3 then outlines the emergence of the 
humanitarian actor in international law, focusing on the relationship between this 
figure and the civilian category in IHL. Looking ahead to the latter parts of this 
study, the empirical findings demonstrate that humanitarian actors disseminate a 
‘civilian plus’ status in their everyday practice. While this special status relies upon a 
fragmentation of IHL’s civilian category, exploration of the Intellectual realm 
exposes how distinction is already characterized by messiness and disorder. 
 
  
 37 
CHAPTER 2: HOW THE IDEA OF DISTINCTION CIRCULATES  
IN GENEVA AND THE HAGUE  
 
Introduct ion  
 
This chapter opens with a snapshot of the dominant vision of IHL’s principle of 
distinction, which is based on the AP I formulation. This vision propounds a bright 
line civilian–combatant binary that is fixed and stable, accompanied by a unified 
civilian category. The principle of distinction is positioned as central to IHL as a 
body of law, and respect for it is deemed essential for IHL’s functioning. After 
establishing the dominant vision, the chapter proceeds to show how this bright line 
binary has been disrupted – both historically and doctrinally, and in the practices of 
international actors. An alternative vision of distinction is offered and three 
unfamiliar figures are introduced: the ‘civilian plus’, the ‘mere civilian’ and the 
‘civilian minus’. 
 
The disruptions in question are drawn from legal texts, doctrine and practice. First, 
the enactment of GC IV in 1949 is identified as a crucial legal moment when the 
civilian category splintered. Next, attention is drawn to AP I rules such as direct 
participation in hostilities (DPH), which impugn the dominant vision. Third, the 
treatment of civilianness in crimes against humanity cases at the ICTY is shown to 
push civilianness in different directions. While Martic introduces a potentially 
vulnerable combatant who might be protected like a civilian, Milosevic places a high 
burden on civilians to demonstrate that they are worthy of protected status. As 
these engagements with distinction are contemplated, the dominant vision becomes 
increasingly difficult to sustain.  
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2.1 The dominant vision of distinction 
 
When IHL’s principle of distinction is mentioned, the mind of the international 
lawyer is likely to instantly latch on to a bright line civilian–combatant distinction. 
While this thought may be accompanied by an awareness of the mythical qualities of 
this binary framework, the dominant vision continues to exert a strong pull on the 
legal imagination. In this section, three features of the dominant vision of 
distinction are examined. First, the dominant vision tracks along with the strict 
interpretation of the principle of distinction, as formally codified in AP I. Second, it 
ties observance of the principle of distinction to the implementation of IHL as a 
wider body of law. Third, it treats the AP I rule as the continuation of a longer 
history of civilian protection. 
 
 2.1.1 The AP I rule 
 
This discussion opens by considering the AP I distinction in some detail. As a 
‘second best’ to eradicating the use of force globally, IHL’s aim is to limit 
destruction and suffering in armed conflict.78 While contemporary international 
lawyers often use IHL, ‘laws of war’ or ‘laws of armed conflict’ interchangeably as 
translations of jus in bello, 79  the respective terms have symbolic and political 
implications that must be acknowledged.80 Though the present study employs the 
term IHL, this does not indicate a belief that concerns of humanity eclipse military 
imperatives in the relevant doctrine. 81  So long as an appreciation of military 
                                                
78 Gabriella Blum, ‘The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil”’, Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 35, No. 
1, 2010, pp. 1–69, 7 (‘Lesser Evil’). 
79 As in Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’, American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 94, No. 2, 2000, pp. 239–278. For a critique of this practice, see Amanda Alexander, ‘A Short 
History of International Humanitarian Law’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2015, pp. 
109–138, 112–113 (‘Short History’).  
80 David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 83 (‘War’); Blum, supra, p. 8 
(‘Lesser Evil’). 
81 Alexander, supra, p. 135 (‘Short History’). On the concept of unnecessary suffering, see Chris Jochnick 
and Roger Normand, ‘The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War’, Harvard 
International Law Journal, Vol. 35, No. 1, Winter 1994, pp. 49–95, 66. 
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imperatives is required for securing state buy-in, 82  it can be said that IHL is 
animated by a ‘push and pull’ between humanity and military necessity. 83 This 
balancing informs the principle of distinction, which allows parties to the conflict to 
kill those deemed legitimate targets, while protecting those outsight the fight.84 
 
As codified in AP I, the principle of distinction requires parties to the conflict to 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, as well as between 
civilian objects and military objectives.85 Article 48 states: 86   
 
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population 
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between 
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives. 
 
This rule offers protection to civilians and civilian objects, while opening up 
combatants and military objectives to attack.87 While combatants can be legally 
targeted in war, civilians who do not directly participate in hostilities cannot.88 AP I 
also provides that the ‘civilian population’ is comprised of all persons who are 
civilians, and that the presence of non-civilians in this population does not change 
its civilian character.89 However, this assertion has its limits, and, at a certain point, a 
large proportion of soldiers may change the status of the population.90 Civilians are 
                                                
82 Mégret, supra, p. 271 (‘IHL Lawyers’). 
83 Sivakumaran, supra, p. 26 (‘Who Makes IL?’). In this study, military necessity relates to achieving a 
legitimate military purpose or meeting an identified military objective. On debates about the status of 
humanity as an IHL principle, compare Meron, supra (arguing that humanity is at the centre of IHL), 
with, e.g.: Schmitt, supra, pp. 87–88 (‘Discriminate Warfare’); Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities 
under the Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 114 (‘CoH’), 
pp. 8–9.  
84 While there is some mention of civilian objects and IHL’s ‘protected persons’ in this study, the focus is 
on individual civilians and civilian populations. 
85 Sassoli, supra (‘Targets’). See also AP I and AP II.  
86 Article 48 of AP I. See also Article 52 of AP I. 
87 Yoram Dinstein, ‘The Principle of Proportionality’, in Larsen and Nystuen (Eds.), supra, pp. 72–85, 74 
(‘Proportionality’).  
88 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 109; Prosecutor v. 
Stanilav Galic, IT-98-29-A, Appeal Judgment, ICTY, 30 November 2006, para. 130. 
89 Art 50(1) and 50(3) of AP I.  
90 ‘Blaskic Appeal Judgment’, supra, para. 115.  
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referred to generically in AP I, regardless of the state to which they belong.91 While 
this treatment does not delineate a difference between a state’s own civilians and 
those belonging to the enemy state, protections are understood to have been 
designed with the latter in mind.92 At the same time, there are some rules that 
govern the state’s relationship with its own population, specifically. Article 58(b), for 
example, stipulates that a warring state must not locate military objectives in densely 
populated areas.93 
 
AP I defines a ‘civilian object’ as that which is not a military objective.94 Where there 
is doubt as to whether something constitutes a military objective, if it is normally 
dedicated to civilian purposes, it is presumed to be a civilian object.95 Article 50(1) 
also articulates a presumption in favour of civilian status for individuals 96  It 
stipulates that, in the event of doubt as to whether a person is a civilian, that person 
should be presumed to be so. This presumption is revisited later in this section. As 
an aside, the principle of proportionality does not modify the principle of 
distinction’s prohibition on the intentional targeting of civilians. However, it 
introduces the possibility that civilians can be lawfully killed in war if the harm they 
are expected to incur is not deemed excessive in relation to the military advantage 
anticipated from a given course of action.97 The immunity accorded to civilians 
under AP I is thus not without limits.  
 
Under Article 50, a civilian is defined in a negative manner as anyone who is not a 
combatant.98 As explained in the ICRC Commentaries to the APs, the drafters of 
                                                
91 Dinstein, supra, p. 159 (‘CoH’). 
92 Blum, supra, p. 58 (‘Lesser Evil’) (a state was deemed not to need a reason to protect its own people); 
Frits Kalshoven, ‘Civilian Immunity and the Principle of Distinction’, American University Law Review, Vol. 
31, 1982, p. 855.  
93 Article 58(b) of AP I; discussed in Blum, supra, p. 58 (‘Lesser Evil’).  
94 Art 52 of AP I. 
95 Art 52(3) of AP I. 
96 See also Article 13 of GC IV.  
97 Article 51(5) of AP I; discussed in Dinstein, supra, pp. 144–145 (‘CoH’). 
98 Art 50 of AP I. Discussed in Avril McDonald, supra; Hellestveit, supra, p. 102; Garbett, supra; 
Kinsella, supra. 
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AP I purposely chose to use a negative definition.99 The aim was to expand the 
breadth of coverage to all those who are not combatants, rendering the civilian 
category more – not less – precise. Beyond this, another stated benefit of the binary 
is that it does away with the problem of having an ‘undistributed middle’ between 
the civilian and combatant categories.100 The formulation is ostensibly alternative 
and exhaustive: every individual must fall into one of these two categories, and 
those who belong to one do not belong to the other.101 This approach espouses the 
benefits of comprehensiveness and clarity. It is viewed as a solution to defining the 
civilian that is clear, inclusive and ne varieteur.102 As it tracks closely with the text of 
the AP I distinction, the dominant vision espouses the same benefits of clarity and 
inclusion. 
 
This promise of clarity quickly fades as soon as one contemplates the contemporary 
basis of civilian protection in armed conflict. It is proposed that contemporary 
protection is based on the following characteristics: harmlessness, non-participation 
in war, innocence and vulnerability.103 As for how these four features fit together, it 
is submitted that the rationale for contemporary protection is primarily to protect 
those who are deemed harmless; this harmlessness relates to their non-participation 
in conflict, and the concept of innocence is folded into this. As is explained later in 
this chapter, the concept of vulnerability is also important: in the ICTY 
jurisprudence, there are debates over whether the vulnerability of a soldier hors de 
combat renders him ‘like’ a civilian. Further, in GC IV of 1949 and AP I, civilians 
deemed extra vulnerable receive special treatment. As is discussed below, many of 
these terms were used differently in past wars.104  
                                                
99 Claude Pilloud, Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski et al. (Eds.), ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocols 
of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: ICRC, 1987), pp. 609–611 (‘AP 
Commentary’). Discussed also in Kinsella, supra, p. 142. 
100 Dinstein, supra, p. 142 (‘CoH’). 
101 Andrew Alexandra, ‘Private Military and Security Companies and the “Civilianization” of War’, in 
Lovell and Primoratz (Eds.), supra, pp. 183–189, 187. 
102 Pilloud et al. (Eds.), supra, p. 610 (‘AP Commentary’). 
103 Historically, concepts of loyalty and value to society were also important bases for protection in war. 
See Section 2.1.3. 
104 See Section 2.1.3. 
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According to the ICRC Commentary on the APs, the protection of civilians under 
IHL is connected to ‘the inoffensive character of the persons to be spared and the 
situation in which they find themselves’.105 The implication is that protection is not 
solely based on an individual’s status as either civilian or combatant. Instead, 
protection under the APs of 1977 hinges on an individual’s conduct. 106 While the 
armed/unarmed marker may thus serve as an indicator of an individual’s civilian 
status in contemporary armed conflict, protection depends upon the nuances of 
actual participation. 107 The concept of DPH was introduced into IHL for this 
reason, and it now forms part of the dominant vision. At the same time, the fluidity 
introduced by the idea of DPH impugns the dominant vision, because it unsettles 
the notion of a fixed and stable line. This idea is picked up below, in Section 2.2.3. 
 
Scholars critique the AP I definition of the civilian in other ways. Dinstein observes 
that IHL does not ‘tell us who or what the protected persons and objects are’;108 
Crawford adds that the civilian is given ‘short shrift’ in this legal instrument.109 
Garbett proposes that the lack of visual markers or features to confirm civilian 
identity means that designating someone a civilian involves interpreting aspects of 
their appearance or conduct ‘that are understood not to characterize combatant 
status’.110 While Garbett emphasizes that the protections accorded to the civilian 
entity in AP I are limited, she also contends that AP I solves what was previously an 
                                                
105 Pilloud et al. (Eds.), supra, p. 610 (‘AP Commentary’). 
106 GC IV of 1949 implies that the primary basis for protecting civilians from harm is their lack of 
combatant status. See also Section 2.2.3. 
107 Hugo Slim, Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), p. 210 (‘Killing Civilians’). See also Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic et al., Case No. IT-95-9-T, Trial 
Judgment, ICTY, 17 October 2003, para. 659 (mere possession of a weapon does not create ‘reasonable 
doubt’ of civilian status); Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeal Judgment, ICTY, 17 July 
2008, paras. 167, 178 (emphasizing actual harm caused by the civilian who directly participates in 
hostilities).  
108 Dinstein, supra, p. 114 (‘CoH’). 
109 Emily Crawford, Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), p. 233. See also Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, ‘Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: 
The Politics of Distinction’, Michigan State Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2011, pp. 300–407, p. 
333. 
110 Garbett, supra, p. 100. 
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ambiguous civilian status.111 Alexander takes a different view, proposing that AP I 
introduces ambiguity. In her account, delegates to the AP conferences in the 1970s 
were able to codify broad protections for civilians by suggesting not only that they 
already existed, but also that they were at the core of IHL.112 Alexander proposes 
that the legal rules that were thereby introduced were in fact open to competing 
interpretations, containing a range of ‘cautious disclaimers and imprecise 
provisions’.113 Parts II and III of this study probe the ambiguity of distinction, 
illuminating empirically how competing interpretations of distinction materialize in 
the practices of international actors.  
 
2.1.2 The centrality of distinction 
 
The second aspect of the dominant vision is that it positions the principle of 
distinction at the centre of IHL. The ICRC Commentary on the APs of 1977 refers 
to the principle of distinction as ‘the basis for the law of armed conflict’.114 It states 
that the ‘entire system established in The Hague in 1899 and 1907 and in Geneva 
from 1864 to 1977’ is founded on this principle.115 The International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) describes the principle as a ‘fundamental’ component of IHL, and links 
this to the principle being ‘intransgressible’.116 Crawford describes this principle as 
                                                
111 Ibid., p. 69. 
112 Amanda Alexander, ‘International Humanitarian Law: Postcolonialism and the 1977 Geneva Protocol 
I’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2016, pp. 21–22 (‘Postcolonialism’).  
113 Ibid. 
114 Pilloud et al. (Eds.), supra, p. 438 (‘AP Commentary’).  
115 Ibid., p. 598. This study engages primarily with the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and the APs of 1977. The relevant citations are as follows: 1907 Hague Regulations, 
supra (for a list of the relevant Hague instruments, see: Final Act of the International Peace Conference, 
the Hague, 1899, Laws of Armed Conflicts 41, 42; Final Act of the Second International Peace 
Conferences, The Hague, 1907, Laws of Armed Conflicts 45, 45–6); Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, 
75 UNTS 31, Can TS 1965 No 20 (‘GC I’); Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85, Can 
TS 1965 No 20 (‘GC II’); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 135, Can TS 1965 No 20 (‘GC III’); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, Can TS 1965 No 20 (‘GC IV’). See also 
AP I and AP II, supra. 
116 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, International Court 
of Justice, 8 July 1996, para. 257. 
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the cornerstone of IHL – a fulcrum around which IHL revolves.117 While IHL 
instruments do not provide a civilian–combatant distinction in non-international 
armed conflicts, 118 Sassoli et al. propose that the principle of distinction must exist in 
NIACs if IHL is to be respected.119 They write: ‘Civilians can and will only be 
respected if government soldiers and rebel fighters can expect those looking like 
civilians not to attack them.’120 Here, again, respect for distinction is inextricably 
linked to the broader implementation of IHL.  
 
In a critique of the ICRC’s strict approach to the principle of distinction, Berman 
addresses the tendency to link the principle of distinction to IHL as a wider body of 
law. He contends: ‘The destabilization of jus in bello by means of its own 
categories…cannot be held back through avowedly counter-realistic fiats about the 
rigorous difference between combatants and civilians.’ 121  He holds that such 
decrees, in fact, facilitate the very destabilization that the ICRC is trying to avert.122 
This points to why disruptions to the dominant vision are often concealed or 
downplayed: they threaten to destabilize not only distinction, but also an entire body 
of law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
117 Crawford, supra, p. 1. Crawford also interrogates the dominant vision. See below.  
118 Ibid., pp. 15, 73. On the under-regulation of NIACs, in general, see: Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Re-
Envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed Conflict’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 
22, No. 1, 2011, pp. 219–264, 219 (‘Re-Envisaging’); Dino Kritsiotis, ‘Humanitarian Warfare: Towards an 
African Appreciation’ (‘Humanitarian Warfare’), in Jeremy I. Levitt (Ed.), Africa: Mapping New Boundaries 
in International Law (Oxford: Hart, 2008), pp. 149–180, 152. 
119 Marco Sassoli, Antoine Bouvier and Anne Quintin (Eds.), How Does Law Protect in War? (Geneva: 
ICRC, 2011), Chapter 5, p. 1 (‘Casebook’). The principle of distinction in NIACs is sourced in customary 
international law. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 3. 
120 Sassoli et al. (Eds.), supra, p. 89 (‘Casebook’). 
121 Nathaniel Berman, ‘Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction of War’, 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2004, pp. 1–71, 54 (discussing the ‘part-time 
combatant’). 
122 Ibid., p. 54. See also Nicholette Boehland, The People’s Perspectives: Civilian Involvement in Armed Conflict 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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2.1.3 A long history of civilian protection 
 
The third characteristic of the dominant vision of IHL’s principle of distinction is 
that it frames AP I distinction as the culmination of a long history of civilian 
protection. Thurer, for example, identifies GC I of 1864 as the earliest legal moment 
at which victims of war became the focal point.123 However, this legal instrument 
does not, in fact, mention the civilian; instead, it allocates protection to wounded 
combatants. While the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 are routinely cited as 
key components of the legal architecture of civilian protection in war, 124 these 
instruments primarily assign protection to prisoners and inhabitants of occupied 
territories. Moreover, the Hague Regulations do not prohibit the bombing or 
starvation of those outside the fight, nor do they prohibit reprisals.125 In 1949, GC 
IV was the first convention to elucidate explicit protection for the civilian as a legal 
entity. For example, GC IV prohibits the use of collective punishment, intimidation 
or terror against civilians,126 as well as the forcible transfer of civilians unless it is a 
temporary measure.127 GC IV also refers to the category of ‘protected persons’, 
which includes those taking no active part in hostilities. Fighters who have lain 
down their arms and soldiers hors de combat are included in this category.128 As noted 
in Chapter 1, GC IV does not, in fact, define the civilian.129 Moreover, it focuses 
primarily on civilians under occupation and those in enemy territory. It does not 
deal with citizens who are in a territory controlled by their own government; nor 
does it deal with the issue of targeting in the conduct of hostilities.  
 
                                                
123 Daniel Thurer, ‘Dunant’s Pyramid: Thoughts on the “Humanitarian Space”’, International Review of the 
Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 865, 2007, p. 50. 
124 Crawford, supra, pp. 14, 50 (as inferred in Pilloud et al. (Eds.), supra, p. 598 (‘AP Commentary’)); 
Judith Gardam, Non-Combatant Immunity as a Norm of International Humanitarian Law (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) (‘NCI’). See also Richard Shelley Hartigan, The Forgotten Victim: A History of the 
Civilian (Chicago, IL: Precedent Publishing, 1982). 
125 Jochnick and Normand, supra, p. 76; Alexandra, supra, p. 116 (‘Short History’). 
126 Article 33 of GC IV. 
127 Article 49 of GC IV. 
128 Article 3 of GC IV. 
129 Nabulsi, supra, p. 11; Crawford, supra, p. 233. See also Chapter 1. 
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Alexander challenges claims that AP I represents the culmination of a long history 
of civilian protection. She depicts the contemporary civilian as a 20th century 
project, with its immediate precursor being the private citizen.130 Law accorded little 
protection to the private citizen in earlier conflicts; this figure was seen not only as 
passive, but also as potentially dangerous, with her fate tied to that of her state.131 
Alexander connects the emergence of the contemporary civilian to the advent of 
aerial warfare, the engagement of the home front in war and the dissemination of 
propaganda regarding women and children.132 During WWI, ideology combined 
with technological advances to render the non-combatant population vulnerable, 
and yet also valuable as a target. 133 It was these twin features of vulnerability and 
value that came to define the contemporary civilian.134 In Chapter 3 it is argued that 
humanitarian actors disseminate a special status that both relies upon and seeks to 
transcend the civilian’s vulnerability.  
 
In sum, the dominant vision of a bright, fixed and stable binary distinction 
continues to exert a strong hold over international lawyers. While it contains within 
it the seeds of its own undoing, the clarity it promises remains appealing. In the 
remainder of this chapter, a number of disruptions to this vision are canvassed that, 
collectively, make the dominant vision all but impossible to sustain. 
 
2.2 Disrupting the dominant vision  
 
The present section engages with IHL doctrine and practices that impose a strain on 
a bright line civilian–combatant distinction. To provide some necessary context, the 
first section of this discussion considers the historical bases for protection in war. 
The second section contemplates uneven entitlements granted to civilians under GC 
                                                
130 Alexander, supra, p. 34 and Chapter 4 (‘PhD Thesis’). 
131 Alexander, supra, p. 375 (‘Genesis’). 
132 Amanda Alexander, ‘The Good War: Preparation for a War Against Civilians’, Law, Culture and the 
Humanities, 2016, pp. 1–26, 3 (‘Good War’).  
133 Alexandra, supra, p. 365 (‘Genesis’). 
134 Ibid. 
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IV, in terms of access to protection and assistance. The third section examines four 
IHL rules that implicate or interact with IHL’s principle of distinction. While the 
prohibition on perfidy is designed to police the civilian–combatant line, three other 
IHL rules – direct participation in hostilities, the presumption in favour of civilian 
status and the expansion of the combatant category – potentially imbue those in the 
civilian category with qualities of combatantness. The fourth section shifts to the 
ICTY, proposing that the adjudication of crimes against humanity pushes 
civilianness in different directions. The fifth and final section outlines an alternative 
vision of distinction, which is elaborated upon throughout the remainder of this 
study. 
 
 2.2.1 Historical approaches to protection in war 
 
This discussion begins with the concept of innocence, elucidating how its meaning 
evolved and how protection in war increasingly came to be associated with an 
individual’s harmlessness and non-participation in fighting. The aim is not to 
provide an extensive account of historical approaches, but to convey a general sense 
of how the rationale for protection changed over time. Attention is drawn to the 
absence of a binary configuration for organizing protection and the shifting 
relevance of an armed/unarmed marker. 
 
Historically, innocence was connected to internal sentiment. Going back to the 5th 
century, Saint Augustine of Hippo conceptualized innocence as an internal spiritual 
condition – one that would be difficult to ascertain from the exterior.135 In City of 
God,136 he elucidated a tentative guilt–innocence opposition upon which protection 
in war was to be based. 137 This did not map onto a soldier/not-soldier dichotomy. 
Instead, several types of actors were singled out for protection due to their imputed 
innocence: those not involved in fighting; those no longer involved in fighting; and 
                                                
135 Colm McKeogh, Innocent Civilians: The Morality of Killing in War (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2002), p. 26. 
136 Hartigan, supra, p. 29. 
137 Ibid., p. 36. 
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women and children.138 In practice, Augustine believed that very few individuals 
were, in fact, innocent. Members of those populations whose leaders had committed 
wrongs were seen to share the burden of (moral) guilt for their leader’s unjust 
acts.139  
 
Over time, innocence came to be associated more strongly with non-participation 
in fighting and an individual’s concomitant harmlessness. As articulated by 
Francisco de Vitoria in the 16th century, innocence could be determined through the 
presence or absence of objectively verifiable criteria such as the bearing of arms or 
conduct. 140 Those who were not involved in war fighting were deemed to pose no 
threat of harm and to lack responsibility for the war.141 Bearing arms triggered a 
presumption of guilt, as armed individuals posed an immediate threat;142  being 
unarmed, on the other hand, attracted a presumption of innocence.143 These were 
rebuttable presumptions, and the potential for guilt was always present. 144 
Protection was conceptualized as a contingent concept – an approach that also 
found favour in the medieval texts of Honore Bonet 145  and the writings of 
Grotius146 and Vattel.147  
 
Vitoria’s interpretation of innocence continued to influence more recent iterations 
of just war theory. For example, Walzer described innocent people as those who 
had done – and were doing – nothing too warlike so as to entail a loss of rights.148 
Despite this move to tie innocence to more objective criteria such as the bearing of 
                                                
138 Ibid., pp. 31, 36. 
139 McKeogh, supra, p. 65. 
140 Ibid., p. 85; Hartigan, supra, p. 90. 
141 Ibid. 
142 McKeogh, supra, p.86. 
143 Ibid., p. 87; Betcy Jose, ‘Would the Protected Please Stand Up? Historical Ambiguity and the 
Distinction Principle’, in Edward Lorenz, Dana Aspinall and J. Michael Raley (Eds.), Montesinos’ Legacy: 
Defining and Defending Human Rights for Five Hundred Years (London: Lexington Books, 2014), p. 58. 
144 Kinsella, supra, p. 68.  
145 Discussed in Alexander, supra, p. 33 (‘PhD Thesis’). 
146 Kinsella, supra, pp. 75–81. Hartigan, supra, p. 99. 
147 Jose, supra, p. 59. 
148 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York, NY: Basic 
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arms, the concern with internal sentiment did not disappear entirely after Vitoria’s 
time. An example of how it resurfaced later can be found in the 1863 Lieber 
Code,149 which introduced a hierarchy of protection based on loyalty.150 The Code 
delineated three sub-categories of unarmed citizens: loyal, disloyal (sympathizing 
with the rebellion) and manifestly disloyal (giving ‘positive aid and comfort’ to the 
rebellious enemy).151 Those deemed loyal citizens were to be protected as much as 
possible from war, while war’s burden was to be placed on those belonging to the 
latter two categories.152 The logic was that the external sign of (not) bearing arms 
only mattered if it was not contradicted by internal sentiment.153 What is noteworthy 
about the Lieber Code approach, for the purposes of the present discussion, is how 
it set up internal divisions within the category of unarmed actors.  
 
While innocence increasingly overlapped with harmlessness and non-participation in 
conflict, the latter also developed as separate bases for protection in war. The notion 
of sparing those who are harmless featured prominently in canonical decrees and 
chivalric codes; in the latter codes – as well as various medieval texts – harmlessness 
was equated with weakness.154 Under the canonical decrees of the 10th and 11th 
centuries, certain classes of people, their property and their actions were protected 
in war.155 Without going into the details of these approaches to protection, what is 
striking is their lack of reliance on a civilian–combatant binary. In the 17th century, 
Hugo Grotius carried forward the idea from the canonical decrees and chivalric 
codes that certain classes of people should be spared in war. He counted among 
                                                
149 Also known as General Orders, Number 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in 
the Field (War Department, Washington, DC, 24 April 1863) (‘Lieber Code’). Discussed also in Kinsella, 
supra, p. 86; Alexander, supra, p. 363 (‘Genesis’). For an argument that the Lieber Code is the prototype 
of contemporary IHL, see Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare: Modern History of the International Law of 
Armed Conflicts (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 171; Stephanie McCurry, ‘Enemy 
Women and the Laws of War in the American Civil War’, Law and History Review, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2017. 
150 Discussed in Kinsella, supra, pp. 86, 172. 
151  Article 155 of the ‘Lieber Code’, supra. See also Emily Camins, ‘The Past as Prologue: The 
Development of the “Direct Participation” Exception to Civilian Immunity’, International Review of the Red 
Cross, Vol. 90, No. 872, 2008, pp. 853-881, p. 863. 
152 Article 156 of the ‘Lieber Code’, supra. 
153 Kinsella, supra, p. 86. 
154 G.W. Coopland, The Tree of Battles of Honore Bonet: An English Version with Introduction by G. W. Coopland 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1949), p. 130. 
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them women, children, the elderly and those holding certain peacetime occupations 
such as merchants, clerics and farmers.156 The rationale for protection was grounded 
in these persons’ (in)ability to fight, as well as their value to society.157 A variation on 
this concept of value to society is introduced in Chapter 3, in connection with the 
special acts that humanitarian actors perform in armed conflicts. By the 18th century, 
the main criterion for claiming protection in war was non-participation in unjust 
acts. Emer de Vattel proposed that those offering no resistance and not 
participating in fighting – such as women, children, the aged and the sick – should 
not be harmed in war.158 Here, it was not individuals’ sex, age or occupation that 
formed the basis for immunity, but the assumptions these characteristics generated 
about their participation.159   
 
Reflecting on this brief historical discussion, the lack of a binary configuration for 
organizing protection is evident. As Kinsella illuminates, there is nothing inevitable 
about the civilian and combatant entities; IHL defines these entities and thereby 
produces the subjects it claims to protect.160  What is also noteworthy is how 
consistently a high burden to secure protection is imposed on those who are not 
engaged in fighting. It is only the most innocent, harmless, worthy and removed 
individuals – typically women, children and the elderly – who are deemed to merit 
protection.161 Furthermore, the concept of contingent protection means that an 
individual’s claim to protection can be forfeited if he or she behaves in a manner 
that is deemed (potentially) threatening. Without overstressing continuity between 
past and present approaches, many of these dynamics continue to play out in 
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contemporary wars. Enduring debates about women 162  and children 163  who 
participate in armed conflict offer an example. While these individuals may initially 
be deemed innocent due to assumptions about gender or age, this calculus changes 
the moment they join the fight.  
 
Having provided some historical context, the discussion now turns to the treatment 
of the civilian category in GC IV. 
 
 2.2.2 GC IV of 1949: The civilian disaggregated 
 
Before the civilian was defined in IHL, and before the principle of distinction was 
codified in AP I, GC IV of 1949 splintered the civilian category. It did this by 
allocating some civilians who were deemed especially vulnerable additional 
entitlements to protection and assistance that other civilians could not claim. This 
study proposes that this splintering rendered civilianness relative. That is, civilians 
who were singled out for special treatment acquired ‘civilian plus’ status, while those 
who were left behind were relegated to ‘mere civilian’ (and perhaps ‘civilian minus’) 
status. Recognizing that the civilian category was already fragmented before AP I is 
absolutely crucial for making sense of the everyday distinction practices that 
humanitarian actors engage in.  
 
As mentioned above, GC IV does not define the civilian entity that is supposed to 
be the object of legal protection. The overarching impression given by proponents 
of the dominant vision of distinction, however, is that GC IV contains a unified 
civilian category made up of those lacking combatant status. In fact, this legal 
instrument does something that significantly undermines the notion of a unified 
                                                
162  Judith Gardam, ‘Women and the Law of Armed Conflict: Why the Silence?’, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 46, 1997 (‘Women’); Orly Maya Stern, Gender, Conflict and International 
Humanitarian Law: A Critique of the ‘Principle of Distinction’ (Routledge, 2018); Garbett, supra, pp. 92–93. 
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civilian category: it disaggregates the civilian population for the purposes of 
receiving protection and accessing humanitarian assistance. 164 In some instances it 
does so on the basis of social characteristics such as age and gender. In the context 
of occupation, for example, Article 50 states that the Occupying Power shall not 
impede any preferential measures in regard to food, medical care and protection for 
children younger than 15 years, expectant mothers and mothers of children under 7 
years.165 There are further provisions in GC IV that single out certain civilians for 
special treatment. Some of these relate to setting up hospitals and safety zones to 
protect designated groups,166 granting the passage of essential supplies to pregnant 
women and children167 and providing members of listed groups with special access 
to evacuation.168 Article 16(2) further stipulates that the wounded and sick, the 
infirm and expectant mothers ‘shall be the object of particular protection and 
respect’.169 This last provision addresses not only those who would otherwise be 
categorized as civilians, but also fighters who have become vulnerable by virtue of 
being hors de combat. It is important to recall, here, that IHL’s protections were first 
designed for wounded soldiers on the battlefield, and that the concept of ‘wounded 
and sick’ was subsequently expanded to all those who are particularly vulnerable and 
in need of care.170  
 
From a relational perspective,171 the question that arises here is how IHL situates 
individuals who are accorded special treatment in relation to other members of the 
general civilian population. The ICRC Commentary to GC IV stipulates that 
granting something extra to certain segments of the civilian population is not 
                                                
164 Thanks to Dino Kritsiotis for this point, in response to the author’s presentation on the ‘Emotional 
Warfare’ panel at the conference ‘The Historicization of International Law’, 2016, Uppsala, Sweden.  
165 Article 50 of GC IV. 
166 Article 14 of GC IV (providing for hospitals and safety zones that aim at protecting certain groups 
from the effects of war). 
167 Article 23 of GC IV (granting passage to essential supplies for pregnant women and children). 
168 Article 17 of GC IV (granting special access to evacuation for members of listed groups). 
169 Article 16(2) of GC IV.  
170 Discussed in Sandoz, supra, p. 101 (‘Land Warfare’), citing the definition of ‘wounded and sick’ in 
Article 8(a) of AP I.  
171 See Chapter 1 for an overview of this study’s relational approach. 
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supposed to take anything away from others. 172  According special respect or 
protection to some individuals, it states, does not free belligerents from their 
obligation to respect and protect the wider civilian population. 173 The Commentary 
further asserts that special protections are ‘not instead of, but in addition to the 
protection given generally’.174 This study challenges such claims. It counters that, 
even if what is given is ‘in addition to’ general civilian protection, something is taken 
away from civilians who are not accorded special treatment. That is, allocating extra 
entitlements to some segments of the civilian category functions to render 
civilianness relative.175  
 
Weil contemplates the drawbacks of establishing different degrees of normative 
intensity in international law.176 He suggests that dropping the norm/non-norm 
distinction could interfere with the quality of a given international norm.177 Even if 
there are morally sound reasons to accord a higher position to certain norms, the 
prospect of unlimited gradation pushes international law in the direction of relativity 
and randomness.178 Applying these insights to the present investigation, the risk of 
singling out some civilians for special protection is that it fundamentally alters the 
concept of (general) civilian protection. It is proposed that those who are accorded 
special treatment acquire a ‘civilian plus’ status, while civilians who are not singled 
out take on ‘mere civilian’ status.179 There are also hints that a ‘civilian minus’ status 
is in circulation. This figure’s existence becomes more explicit in the discussion of 
DPH and other doctrinal engagements (see below). 
                                                
172 1958 Commentary to GC IV re: Art 16(2) of GC IV. 
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Combined with the other disruptions of the dominant vision that are discussed here, 
this fracturing of the civilian category illuminates why contests might occur along 
civilian–civilian lines. If civilianness is a matter of degree, then individuals seeking 
protected status will naturally wish to claim the most robust iteration with the 
highest level of entitlements. As Parts II and III of this study highlight, international 
(non-humanitarian) civilian actors express serious anxiety regarding the prospect of 
a spectrum – or hierarchy – of civilian actors. 
 
A few further remarks are merited here on how AP I delineates the populations that 
are entitled to receive assistance and protection in armed conflict. The relevant AP I 
rules deviate somewhat from the GC IV approach that has just been outlined.180 
Significantly, AP I expressly states that humanitarian assistance is for the entire 
civilian population, rather than only specified vulnerable groups.181 Nonetheless, AP 
I stipulates that certain members of the civilian population, including children, 
expectant mothers and nursing mothers, have priority access to assistance and 
protection. 182  Both women and children are again referred to in these AP I 
provisions as ‘the object of special respect’. 183  So, while AP I provides that 
humanitarian assistance should be given to the entire civilian population, it still 
engages in disaggregation of the sort envisioned in GC IV.  
 
2.2.3 AP I of 1977: The civilian in question 
 
Four AP I rules are examined here, in turn: the prohibition on perfidy, the concept 
of direct participation in hostilities, the presumption in favour of civilian status and 
the expansion of the combatant category. In the previous section, it was argued that, 
                                                
180 The humanitarian actor under AP I is discussed separately in Chapter 3. 
181 Articles 69 and 70 of AP I 
182 Articles 70 and 70(1) of AP I. See also Article 76 of AP I (additional protection for women); Article 77 
of AP I (additional protection for children); Article 76 of AP I (evacuation of children). 
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by setting up a sliding scale of entitlements, IHL defines civilianness in relative 
terms. The present discussion reiterates this point, bringing the prospect of a 
‘civilian minus’ status to the fore. Individuals assigned this status creep ever closer 
to the combatant category and the prospect of being considered a legitimate target 
in armed conflict.   
 
In contemporary armed conflict, the prohibition on perfidy functions to uphold 
IHL’s civilian–combatant distinction: it requires those engaged in fighting to stay on 
their side of the line. Briefly, this prohibition forbids those engaged in war fighting 
from feigning civilian status in an attempt to deceive or to secure concomitant 
benefits.184 Compliance with this rule is incentivized by the fact that a soldier who 
misleadingly wears civilian clothing may be legally targeted during this time.185 
Historically, this prohibition was grounded in concerns about the honour and 
dignity of the fighter. 186 Whatever the underlying motivation, perfidy is, in essence, 
about trust. It goes to the issue of whether one can have confidence that the person 
in front of them is who or what they appear to be. 187 The overall thrust of the 
prohibition on perfidy is to preserve and reinforce the notion of a binary civilian–
combatant distinction. It also puts a premium on authentic civilianness. That is, IHL 
outlaws the feigning of civilian status, while it treats many other forms of deception 
as lawful ruses.188 All of this suggests that the prohibition on perfidy stabilizes the 
dominant vision of distinction. To complicate that claim, however, it could also be 
argued that the prohibition on perfidy imposes a strain on the bright line binary by 
revealing the capacity for authentic and fake civilians. 
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While the IHL rules on perfidy bar combatants from feigning or simulating civilian 
status, the Article 44(3) exception provides that, in specified circumstances, 
combatants are relieved of the obligation to distinguish themselves from the general 
civilian population.189  While combatants must still carry weapons openly while 
engaging directly in hostilities, they are permitted to blend in with the civilian 
population between combat phases. 190  The effect of this provision, which 
accommodates the tactics of irregular fighters, is to expand the combatant 
category.191 Those who oppose this IHL rule argue that it leads parties to the 
conflict to regard civilians as potential combatants in disguise.192 This points again 
to the trust issue, suggesting that one’s appearance might not be an accurate 
indication of one’s status. It should be stressed that, when within sight of the 
enemy, persons are prohibited from feigning protected status in order to carry out a 
hostile act.193  Nonetheless, the Article 44(3) exception imbues the principle of 
distinction with compromise and has a destabilizing impact on the dominant vision 
of a civilian–combatant binary. 
 
Whereas the two provisions discussed thus far address combatants who look like 
civilians, the concept of direct participation in hostilities (DPH) is concerned 
with civilians who join in the fighting. While AP I provides for the most robust 
form of civilian immunity that has so far been codified in positive law, it also 
contains the crucial caveat that civilians who participate in war may lose their 
immunity.194  As stipulated in Article 51(3): ‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection 
                                                
189 Article 43(3) of AP I states that, where a combatant cannot distinguish himself due to the nature of 
hostilities, ‘he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms 
openly: (a) during each military engagement, and (b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary 
while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to 
participate’. 
190 Yves Sandoz, ‘Land Warfare’, in Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of 
International Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 91–117, 96 (‘Land 
Warfare’). 
191 Crawford, supra, pp. 41–42; Kinsella, supra, p. 6. 
192 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, JSP 383 
(2004), 4.5.1. Cited in Crawford, supra, p. 43. 
193 Sandoz, supra, pp. 95–96 (‘Land Warfare’). 
194 Article 51(3) of AP I; Crawford, supra, p. 233. See also comments above regarding the principle of 
proportionality, which also shows that civilian immunity has limits. 
 57 
afforded by this part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities.’195  While the dominant vision of distinction sets up the civilian and 
combatant categories as alternative and exhaustive, DPH introduces temporal 
fluidity. At any given time, there may be actors located in the civilian category who 
have recently engaged in fighting or are about to do so. These individuals, who 
would otherwise have civilian status, may be lawfully targeted on the basis of their 
conduct.196 Furthermore, unlike combatants, they are liable for prosecution due to 
their acts, as well as punishment by a Detaining Power. Civilians who directly 
participate are thus treated differently from combatants, as well as from civilians 
who do not DPH.197  
 
In the mid-2000s, international lawyers expected the concept of DPH to re-
invigorate IHL. 198 However, the intensive global discussions of DPH that ensued 
did not ultimately have the desired effect. On the contrary, delving into DPH drew 
attention to the fact that the principle of distinction was widely viewed as ‘a 
disputed concept, one that was open to multiple reasonable interpretations’.199 
Contemplating the implications of DPH for a binary distinction, some 
commentators suggest that it allows actors to cross the civilian–combatant line.200 
This view maintains the binary formulation but jettisons the notion of a bright line. 
                                                
195 Article 51(3) of AP I. See also Article 13(3) of AP II. On special problems with DPH in NIACs and 
the notion of a ‘continuous combat function’, see Dinstein, supra, p. 42 (‘CoH’). See also Rule 6 of ICRC 
Customary Law Study, supra (‘Civilians are protected against attack, unless and for such a time as they 
take a direct part in hostilities’). 
196 On the relationship between status and conduct, see Dinstein, supra, p. 42 (‘CoH’). 
197 A combatant is entitled to PoW status upon capture, and can engage in certain types of violent 
conduct. Discussed in Crawford, supra, p. 48. 
198 Naz Modirzadeh, ‘Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the Transformation of the Law of 
Armed Conflict to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War Governance’, Harvard National 
Security Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2014, pp. 225–304, 301 (‘Folk IL’). 
199 Ibid., p. 302. It also exposed the lack of agreement regarding what actually constitutes DPH. For the 
relevant ICRC guidance and critiques, see: International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law’, 
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90, No. 872, December 2008, pp. 991–1047 (‘ICRC Interpretive 
Guidance’); Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, ‘The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Forum’, NYU 
Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42, 2010, pp. 637–640. 
200 McKeogh, supra, pp. 138, 140 (arguing that AP I actually did away with a ‘no man’s land’ or gap 
between the civilian and combatant categories that had previously been occupied by irregular fighters). 
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Others contend that DPH sets up a third category of actor.201 While Hellestveit 
maintains that IHL’s principle of distinction has, in fact, ‘always been stretched’ to 
cover a third category,202 she goes on to characterize the distinction as ‘otherwise 
orderly’. 203  This latter view is not all unusual. Many commentators zealously 
disseminate the dominant vision, even as they acknowledge it is undermined in 
significant ways. This attests to the appeal of the dominant vision and the clarity 
that it promises.  
 
Further to the promise of clarity, Article 50(1) of AP I provides that, in cases of 
doubt, there is a presumption in favour of civilian status. Ostensibly, this 
supports the vision of a broad, unified civilian category populated by all those who 
are not combatants. Although it may be argued that all legal doctrine is imbued with 
some level of doubt or ambiguity, what is interesting here is the explicit inclusion of 
‘doubtful’ civilians in the civilian category. Reflecting on the function of doubt in 
Article 50(1), Kinsella proposes that it ‘becomes an integral attribute of the category 
itself as well as the basis for the injunction to extend the category’.204 Through this 
presumption, Kinsella argues, IHL admits that the distinction between combatant 
and civilian is imprecise.205 Put differently, IHL asserts that only some individuals in 
the civilian category are ‘definitely’ civilians.206  
 
In the previous discussion of access to protection and assistance under GC IV of 
1949, it was proposed that the allocation of special entitlements to particularly 
vulnerable civilians relativizes civilianness. The doctrinal engagements from AP I 
that are discussed here continue this process. While the prohibition on perfidy 
incentivizes combatants to stay on their side of a binary configuration, it also 
                                                
201 Kinsella, supra, p. 144 (DPH sets up a new category of civilian); Dinstein, supra, pp. 58, 175, 177 
(‘CoH’) and Richard Baxter, ‘So-Called “Unprivileged Belligerency”: Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs’, 
British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 28, 1951, pp. 323–345, 328 (on the concept of unprivileged 
belligerents). 
202 Hellestveit, supra, pp. 102–103.  
203 Ibid., p.103. 
204 Kinsella, supra, pp. 143, 144, 185.  
205 Ibid., p. 5. 
206 For a broader discussion of civilian ambiguity, see Slim, supra, pp. 182–184 (‘Killing Civilians’).  
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confirms that some individuals who appear to be civilians may be soldiers in 
disguise. Concepts such as DPH, the Article 44(3) exception and the presumption in 
favour of civilian status go further. They allow qualities of combatantness to attach 
to individuals who would otherwise be categorized as civilians. An individual 
assigned ‘civilian minus’ status is potentially dangerous and complicit – a participant 
in the fight. A ‘mere civilian’ not only lacks ‘civilian plus’ status, but also slides 
closer to ‘civilian minus’. Crucially, all of this fragmentation happens prior to, and 
apart from, anything international humanitarian actors do with distinction.  
 
 2.2.4 The ICTY: Civilianness pushed in different directions 
 
As a branch of international law, international criminal law (ICL) plays an important 
role in interpreting and enforcing IHL. 207  International criminal tribunals are 
significant forums where the figure of the civilian is constituted, articulated, 
produced and disseminated. However, it should be clarified at the outset that the 
‘civilian’ protected under ICL from offences such as crimes against humanity is not 
necessarily the AP I civilian accorded with target immunity in the conduct of 
hostilities.208 This is examined in more detail, below, with the cases of Martic209 and 
Milosevic210 used as entry points for a discussion of the way in which civilianness is 
pushed in different directions at the ICTY.211  These contests over civilianness 
impugn the dominant vision of distinction and the idea of a stable civilian category. 
As Garbett observes, the navigation of the concept of the civilian at the ICTY 
                                                
207 Claus Kress, ‘Towards Further Developing the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict: A Proposal 
for a Jus in Bello Interno and a New Jus Contra Bellum Internum’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 96, 
No. 893, 2015, pp. 30–44, 33; Sivakumaran, supra, pp. 232–233 (‘Re-Envisaging’). 
208 For a discussion of different definitions of terms in IHL and ICL, see Sivakumaran, supra, p. 239 (‘Re-
Envisaging’). For a discussion of why transposing the AP I definition of the civilian in ICL is potentially 
problematic, see Robert Cryer et al. (Eds.), An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 3rd 
edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 231.   
209 Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Case No. IT-95-II-A, Appeal Judgment, ICTY, 8 October 2008 (‘Martic 
Appeal Judgment’). 
210 Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgment, ICTY, 12 December 2007 
(‘Milosevic Trial Judgment’). 
211 The Court was established under UN Security Council (UNSC), Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), 
[International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)], 25 May 1992, S/RES/827. 
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undermines the IHL premise ‘that all persons are either civilian or combatant’.212 
Again, the fluidity that is shown sheds light on the reason why humanitarian actors 
might promulgate ‘civilian plus’ status. 
 
First, in Martic, soldiers hors de combat were found to be victims of crimes against 
humanity. The implication was that qualities associated with contemporary 
civilianness – particularly harmlessness and vulnerability – could attach to 
individuals who would otherwise be categorized as combatants, entitling them to be 
protected like civilians. What is more, ICTY judges entertained the possibility that 
solders hors de combat could also be classified as ‘civilians’ for the purpose of crimes 
against humanity. While the ICTY Appeals Chamber ultimately rejected this latter 
proposition, it may yet see the light of day in other international tribunals.  
 
The first issue to be considered here is the breadth of the civilian category in the 
context of crimes against humanity. While war crimes, as a category of offence, 
explicitly protect combatants, those rendered hors de combat and civilians, crimes 
against humanity are primarily designed to protect civilians. In brief, crimes against 
humanity are systematic crimes that are committed as part of a general policy of 
attacking a civilian population.213 In Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, this category of 
crime is constructed in such a way that certain underlying offences (i.e. murder) 
must be committed in the context of an attack directed against ‘any civilian 
population’.214 This latter requirement is referred to as the chapeau element, and it 
refers to an attack that is widespread or systematic in nature; 215  neither the 
nationality nor the ethnicity of the civilians against whom the attack is directed are 
relevant.216  
                                                
212 Garbett, supra, p. 149.  
213 Article 5 of the UN Security Council, 1993, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (as amended on 17 May 2002), 25 May 2003 (‘ICTY Statute’). 
214 Ibid. 
215 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, Case No. IT-94-I, Trial Judgment, ICTY, 7 May 
1997, para. 727 (‘Tadic Trial Judgment’).  
216 William J. Fenrick, ‘The Crime against Humanity of Persecution in the Jurisprudence of the ICTY’, 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 32, 2001, p. 86. 
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This construction of the offence prompts questions about: whether specific civilians 
must be the target of the underlying offence; whether and to what extent the civilian 
population must be composed entirely of civilians; and the meaning of the term 
‘civilian’ in both contexts. These issues came to the fore in the trial and appeal of 
Milan Martic. Martic had held various governmental positions within the Serbian 
Autonomous Region of Krajina, and subsequently became Commander of the 
Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) forces. He was accused of – amongst other 
offences perpetrated individually or as a member of a Joint Criminal Enterprise – 
planning and ordering the shelling of civilian areas and the civilian population of 
Zagreb in May 1995. Some, but not all, of the victims of these attacks were soldiers 
hors de combat. 
 
A key question that arose in the Martic appeal was how the term ‘civilian’ in Article 5 
of the ICTY Statute should be defined. In the trial judgment, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber had found that defining the civilian too expansively would ‘impermissibly 
blur’ the distinction between combatant and non-combatant.217 Following suit, the 
Appeals Chamber applied the narrow AP I definition of the civilian, 218 citing the 
‘fundamental character of the notion of the civilian’ in both IHL and ICL.219 The 
Chamber also noted that the AP I definition accords with the ordinary meaning of 
the term ‘civilian’, as a person who is not a member of the armed forces.220 The 
ICTY had not always hewn to such a narrow definition of the civilian, however. In 
Kordic and Cerkez, the Appeals Chamber appeared open to a more expansive 
interpretation of ‘civilian’ – one that could include members of the armed forces 
                                                
217 ‘Martic Trial Judgment’, supra, para. 56. A similar approach is followed in ‘Blaskic Appeal Judgment’, 
supra, paras. 113–114; ‘Galic Appeal Judgment’, supra, FN 437 (members of armed forces cannot claim 
civilian status); Prosecutor v. Mrksic et al., Case No. IT-95-I3/I-T, Trial Judgement, ICTY, 27 September 
2007, para. 461. 
218 ‘Martic Appeal Judgment’, para. 299. Following Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-
23/IT-96-23/I-A, Appeal Judgment, ICTY, 12 June 2002, para 91. 
219 ‘Martic Appeal Judgment’, supra, para. 91. 
220 Ibid., para. 297. 
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placed hors de combat.221 A number of ICTY trial judgments have also evinced a 
broader approach to defining the civilian. 222 In Prosecutor v. Kupresic, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber held that the word ‘civilians’ in Article 5 should be interpreted broadly, 
‘the more so because the limitation in Article 5 constitutes a departure from 
customary international law’.223  
 
The second key question in the Martic appeal was whether all individual victims of 
crimes against humanity must be civilians. Article 5 of the ICTY statute is silent on 
this point.224 While retaining the chapeau requirement of ‘any civilian population’, the 
Appeals Chamber found that, within the wider civilian population, each individual 
victim does not have to be a civilian in the IHL sense. 225 Accordingly, members of 
armed forces who have been rendered hors de combat may also be victims of crimes 
against humanity.226 One question that Martic left unresolved is what would happen 
in a scenario where every single individual targeted in an attack failed to meet the 
AP I definition of a civilian. This was clarified in the Mrksic appeal, wherein the 
Appeals Chamber found that a population composed entirely of those who were 
hors de combat – in that case, prisoners of war – did not meet the criteria of ‘any 
civilian population’.227 To date, most international tribunals have followed Martic in 
excluding soldiers hors de combat from the civilian population. 228 The Extraordinary 
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Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) will soon revisit the issue, in two 
cases involving attacks by the Khmer Rouge against its own soldiers in the 1970s.229 
 
In Martic, the ICTY Appeals Chamber established the category of a suddenly-
vulnerable combatant who merits the same protection as a civilian. This was the 
case, even if the Appeals Chamber did not go so far as to move the bright line by 
including soldiers hors de combat in the civilian population. Considering the rationale 
for protection in contemporary armed conflict, it is perhaps not so surprising that 
soldiers hors de combat have emerged as figures worthy of special protection. It is 
important to recall that IHL’s protections were originally designed for wounded, 
sick or captured combatants. 230  Kinsella reminds that the justifications for 
contemporary civilian protection have essentially been ‘grafted onto’ these 
protections for combatants. 231  Going back further, it was Rousseau who first 
articulated the idea that once a soldier becomes wounded, sick or captured, he 
ceases to be an instrument of the state; instead, he becomes an individual with rights 
that merit protection.232  
 
Turning now to the Milosevic trial, the issue of attacks directed at a civilian 
population arose in the context of crimes against humanity and the war crime of 
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2010, paras. 304–305; Case 002/01 (Prosecutor v. Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan), Case No. 002/19-09-
2007/ECCC/TC, Trial Judgment, ECCC, 7 August 2014. See also the more expansive approach of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial 
Judgment, ICTR, 2 September 1998, para. 582.  
229 Case No. 003/07-09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ, ECCC and Case No. 004/07-09-2009-ECCC-OCIJ, ECCC. 
Compare the Amicus Curiae submissions of Rachel Killean, Eithne Dowds and Amanda Kramer, 
‘Soldiers as Victims at the ECCC: Exploring the Concept of “Civilian” in Crimes Against Humanity’, 
Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 30, 2017, pp. 685–705 (articulating a human rights–based definition 
of the civilian); with Catherine Drummond, Philippa Webb and Dapo Akande, Amicus Brief for Cases 003 
and 004, submitted to the Co-Investigating Judges of the ECCC, 19 May 2016 (finding a narrower 
approach more consistent with law). 
230 Sandoz, supra, pp. 100–101 (‘Land Warfare’); Kinsella, supra, p. 122. 
231 Kinsella, supra, p. 122. 
232 Discussed in Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2011), p. 79 (‘Empire’). 
 64 
terrorizing the civilian population.233 It is suggested that the ICTY in this case 
imposed a heavy burden on civilians to demonstrate their worthiness of civilian 
status. They not only had to show that qualities of combatantness did not attach to 
them at the time of the attack, but they also had to make the case that qualities of 
civilianness did. The practices canvassed at this trial introduced further instability to 
the civilian–combatant distinction, setting high standards for appearance, 
comportment and behaviour for those claiming civilianness. This is relevant for 
thinking about how international humanitarian actors imagine and assert their own 
civilian status, and why they might seize onto particular civilian signifiers in their 
everyday practice. 
 
In Milosevic, the Trial Chamber explained that the term ‘civilian’ is defined negatively 
to include any person who is not a member of the armed forces or an organized 
military group belonging to a party to the conflict.234 The Trial Chamber also noted 
that, in some circumstances, it may be difficult to ascertain whether a given 
individual is a civilian.235 The Chamber highlighted the general requirement that 
combatants distinguish themselves by wearing a uniform (or distinctive sign) and 
carrying weapons openly. 236 It went on to list other factors that may be helpful in 
identifying civilians, such as the activities they were engaging in at the relevant time, 
their age and their sex. 237 When considering the legal status of one particular victim, 
the Trial Chamber cited an expert report stating that the victim’s clothing ‘would 
have enabled the shooter to identify her as civilian’.238 The Chamber proceeded to 
comment on the victim’s age (13 years) and height, concluding that these 
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characteristics gave ‘no reason to identify the victim as a combatant’. 239 When 
seeking to establish the civilian status of a particular witness, the prosecution in 
Milosevic routinely emphasized victim characteristics such as age, occupation, 
clothing and other aspects of appearance, as well as the individual’s actions at the 
relevant time.240 The defence rarely interrogated the civilian status of the witnesses 
who testified, except when they were young males – insinuating that their male 
gender and youthful age gave rise to the possibility that they could have been 
combatants.241 Significantly, the civilians who testified as witnesses at the Milosevic 
trial also claimed that they had not worn a military uniform or military insignia (as a 
combatant would have). Garbett identifies three further ways through which they 
asserted their civilian status: they emphasized their choice to not engage in military 
conduct or operations;242 they recounted their efforts to go about their everyday 
lives as normally as possible during the conflict;243 and they spoke of a shared 
experience of the conflict, connecting themselves to others who were beset by the 
same threats of harm.244  
 
At the Milosevic trial, the establishment of civilianness required something more than 
presenting as the combatant’s opposite. The emphasis on characteristics such as age, 
sex and conduct summoned signifiers of harmlessness, non-participation and 
vulnerability. When attention was drawn to the fact that a particular victim had been 
wearing a woman’s dress, for example, femaleness was linked to notions of 
vulnerability, harmlessness and a particular vision of civilianness.245 Based on her 
observations of this trial, Garbett finds that international actors at the ICTY 
delineate a positive definition of the civilian to supplant IHL’s negative one. 246 To 
do so, they introduce clear markers of civilian identity and draw on social 
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characteristics of group membership.247 Dinstein, for his part, views such efforts as 
an exercise in futility. He characterizes the attempt to identify unequivocal civilian 
markers as ‘chimerical’ and emphasizes the difficulty of ascertaining what 
constitutes normal life in times of armed conflict.248 While Dinstein’s point about 
the elusiveness of definitive markers is well taken, what is interesting for this study 
is the fact that international actors cast about for such markers.  
 
While it should be kept in mind that the civilian figure in ICL is not always one and 
the same as that in IHL, the Milosevic trial and Martic appeal show how civilianness 
and combatantness might attach to any given individual at any given moment.  
 
 2.2.5 Description of an alternative vision 
 
Having unsettled the dominant vision of distinction in numerous ways, the chapter 
now moves to elucidate an alternative vision. This study claims that the alternative 
vision captures what distinction actually looks like when it is investigated from all 
angles with due appreciation of multiplicity. In this alternative vision of distinction, 
the civilian and combatant figures are not arranged in a binary configuration as 
bounded, stable entitles. Indeed, they are no longer in the picture, as such – though 
the civilian figure is reintroduced subsequently in a strange new form. Letting go of 
these fixed categories for a moment, the first step is to move away from static 
entities and to think instead about the qualities of civilianness and combatantness. 
Each of these qualities is associated with a set of signifiers. Civilianness, as noted, is 
connected to harmlessness, non-participation, innocence and vulnerability. 
Combatantness, in contrast, is linked to danger, complicity and participation in 
conflict. These qualities can be affixed to any individual in accordance with their 
appearance and behaviour, as well as the surrounding context.  
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In this alternative vision, the civilian who directly participates in hostilities, for 
example, poses a threat of harm to those engaged in fighting. In the moment of 
participation, qualities of combatantness attach to this individual, who can be 
targeted like a combatant. Consider also the case of Martic at the ICTY, where the 
soldier hors de combat – who was a victim of crimes against humanity – was essentially 
treated as part of the civilian population. This wounded, sick or captured (former) 
fighter was deemed to merit the same protection as a civilian. Notably, 
commentators who argue that the ICTY’s approach in Martic was too narrow 
emphasize the harmlessness and vulnerability of soldiers hors de combat at the 
moment of targeting.249 As the suddenly vulnerable soldier hors de combat looks out at 
a suddenly dangerous civilian, they might find themselves sharing a status – one that 
is unfamiliar to IHL: the ‘civilian minus’.250 
 
When features of vulnerability and harmlessness attach to individuals who are 
already imbued with qualities of civilianness, another unfamiliar figure emerges. 
Under GC IV and AP I, civilians who are deemed especially vulnerable – such as 
pregnant mothers and young children – are accorded additional entitlements beyond 
what they would have if their civilianness were to only assume ordinary form. This 
produces another new figure, the ‘civilian plus’. This figure possesses the 
characteristics of the ordinary civilian, but it is entitled to special treatment due to 
ascribed innocence and vulnerability. In between the ‘civilian plus’ and the ‘civilian 
minus’, it is proposed that there is a middle status – the ‘mere civilian’. This status 
is available to those civilians who are not eligible for special treatment, but who do 
not present any of the features of combatantness. While the ‘mere civilian’ is not 
stripped of any core quality of civilianness, this entity may be relatively worse off 
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250 This study is primarily interested in civilians and not those categorized as ‘protected persons’ under 
IHL. 
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than both the ‘civilian plus’ and the mythical civilian figure associated with the 
dominant vision. It is important to emphasize the dynamism of this alternative 
vision of distinction. While the three new civilian figures are presented here as 
discrete entities, the process through which an individual claims (or is assigned) one 
of these designations depends upon shifting factors of self-presentation, behaviour 
and circumstance. 
 
Conclus ion  
 
This chapter opened by outlining the dominant vision of distinction. Tracking along 
closely with the AP I formulation of the rule, the dominant vision propounds a 
bright line that is fixed and stable, accompanied by a unified civilian category. The 
chapter then proceeded to disrupt this vision, drawing on IHL treaties and 
conventions and the practices of international actors at the ICTY. An alternative 
vision of distinction was elucidated – one in which any individual could be imbued 
with qualities of civilianness or combatantness, depending on the circumstances. 
The IHL principle of distinction was revealed to be an already-disrupted rule, with a 
civilian category characterized by fragmentation. The overarching point is that this 
messiness and disorder exists independently of anything that international 
humanitarian actors might do with the idea of distinction. The alternative vision also 
provides a crucial clue as to why international actors might jostle with each other 
along fault lines that do not appear to exist in international law. 
 
Given the myriad disruptions to the dominant vision that were canvassed in this 
chapter, one might ask why the dominant vision remains the orthodoxy. As a first 
observation, the stakes are high – this is so even before one considers issues relating 
to the material treatment of civilians in war. Because of distinction’s positioning at 
the centre of IHL, anything that destabilizes distinction is viewed as a threat to an 
entire body of law. Gordon’s insights on the power of legal regimes may also shed 
some light. Gordon locates this power in a given regime’s ability ‘to persuade people 
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that the world described in its images and categories is the only attainable world in 
which a sane person would want to live’.251 This study proposes that the main allure 
of the dominant vision of distinction is the clarity that it promises. This speaks to 
the appeal of a world in which there is a unified civilian category that extends the 
law’s protection to all those who are deemed worthy of it. Thus, belief in civilian 
and combatant entities is sustained, despite awareness that this vision is not even 
internally consistent; consider, for example, how IHL allows civilians who directly 
participate in hostilities to be targeted. The vision also persists despite proponents’ 
knowledge that it may ultimately be unattainable, as a matter of fact. By showing 
how the world appears through the prism of the alternative vision, the present study 
extends an invitation to contemplate the messiness of distinction. Whether or not 
the alternative vision represents a world in which we would like to live, the goal of 
this investigation is to expose what is concealed and to illuminate distinction’s 
already-disrupted nature.   
  
                                                
251 Robert W. Gordon, ‘Critical Legal Histories’, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 57, 1984, pp. 56–125, 
109. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE HUMANITARIAN ACTOR  
AND THE IDEA OF DISTINCTION 
 
Introduct ion 
 
In Chapter 2, it was proposed that contemporary civilianness is grounded in the 
following attributes: harmlessness, non-participation, innocence and vulnerability. It 
is submitted here that humanitarianness is based partly on these same qualities, but 
that humanitarian actors are imbued with additional characteristics that are not 
available to other civilians. This is the social value of the role they play in delivering 
humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts, and the virtue associated with this role. 
As stated in the ICRC Commentary on the APs, IHL gives personnel participating 
in relief actions status ‘to allow them to act effectively for the benefit of a civilian 
population lacking essential supplies’. 252 Second, and connected to this important 
role, humanitarian actors are viewed as admirable or virtuous for their sacrifice. This 
emphasizes their vulnerability and paints them as having esteemed moral character. 
Bringing this all together, the humanitarian actor is depicted as engaged in important 
tasks, vulnerable due to the exposure to harm that results from this kind of work 
and an agent who should be shielded from harm by virtue of being innocent and 
posing no danger to others.253  
 
This chapter examines how the idea of distinction circulates with respect to 
international humanitarian actors. The status of humanitarian actors in international 
law is considered from three angles. First, there is the question of how IHL 
constitutes humanitarian actors. The chapter argues that IHL has a narrow vision of 
humanitarianness: it is embedded with a Red Cross fantasy, and humanitarian actors 
who resemble the Red Cross figure may assert claims to higher degrees of 
                                                
252 Pilloud et al. (Eds.), supra, p. 832 (‘AP Commentary’).  
253 For an argument that an instrumentalist approach to protecting humanitarian actors gives way to a 
virtue ethics approach post-9/11, see Elise Leclerc-Gagné, The Construction of the Humanitarian Worker as 
Inviolate Actor (unpublished PhD thesis, 2014), p. 113. 
 71 
civilianness. Second, there is a separate normative question of what IHL should 
provide. This is explored through the prism of a debate between two perspectives: 
‘help the helpers help’ (favouring a special status) and ‘humanitarian exceptionalism’ 
(wary of a special status). On balance, this study supports a qualified version of the 
latter view. Third, there is the question of how humanitarian actors envision their 
own civilianness. It is argued that the distinction practices of humanitarian actors 
treat civilianness – and perhaps also humanitarianness – as a relativized and 
contingent concept.  
 
3.1 How IHL constitutes the humanitarian actor 
 
IHL is one of several bodies of law that are relevant to the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance in armed conflict. While the international community may be progressing 
towards a coherent law of humanitarian assistance,254 at this juncture, humanitarian 
assistance is regulated by a patchwork of laws. A number of domestic and 
international bodies of law set out the rights of war-affected individuals to receive 
humanitarian assistance, the obligations of warring parties to allow humanitarian 
assistance, the rules pertaining to humanitarian actors and the laws concerning third 
party states that are not participants in a given conflict.255 While an examination of 
international human rights law (IHRL) is outside the scope of this study, decisions 
about how IHL and IHRL, respectively, apply impact the legal classification and 
regulation of the practices of humanitarian actors.256 
                                                
254 See Zwitter et al. (Eds.), supra.  
255 Felix Schwendimann, ‘The Legal Framework of Humanitarian Access in Armed Conflict’, International 
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 884, 2011, pp. 993–1008, 995–996.  
256 On the relationship between IHL and IHRL with respect to humanitarian assistance, see: Rebecca 
Barber, ‘Facilitating Humanitarian Assistance in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law’, 
International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 874, 2009, p. 395; Ruth Stoffels, ‘Legal Regulation of 
Humanitarian Assistance in Armed Conflict: Achievements and Gaps’, International Review of the Red Cross, 
Vol. 86, No. 855, September 2004, pp. 515–546, 516; Emily E. Kuijt, ‘A Humanitarian Crisis: Reframing 
the Legal Framework on Humanitarian Assistance’, in Zwitter et al. (Eds.), supra, pp. 54–80, 61; Lohne 
and Sandvik, supra, p. 12. Humanitarian actors are also expected to comply with domestic laws in states 
in which they carry out their operations. See: David Fisher, ‘Domestic Regulation of International 
Humanitarian Relief in Disasters and Armed Conflict: A Comparative Analysis’, International Review of the 
Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 866, 2007, pp. 345–372; Emanuela Chiara-Gillard, ‘The Law Regulating Cross-
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Maintaining the focus on IHL, this section considers how IHL constitutes 
humanitarian actors with respect to the civilian category. It also addresses the related 
question of who is properly considered a protected humanitarian actor under IHL. 
It suggests that, by the time humanitarian actors were conceptualized as a category 
of actor in AP I, IHL had already set at least some humanitarian actors apart from 
the wider civilian population. Implicitly, humanitarianness is connected here to a 
higher form of civilianness. While there is little room for this prospect in the 
dominant vision of distinction, it is compatible with the alternative vision’s 
fragmented civilian category. The treatment of the humanitarian actor in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the public pronouncements of 
the UN further give the impression that a special status is carved out for 
humanitarian actors within the IHL civilian category. While the exact shape of this 
humanitarian actor is hazy, it refers to the Red Cross figure.  
 
 3.1.1 The emergence of the humanitarian actor  
 
While the provision of succour to certain individuals in war formed part of the first 
GC in 1864, it was not until the 1970s that IHL explicitly attended to the civilian 
actors delivering what would today be called humanitarian assistance. In this study, 
AP I of 1977 is identified as the first legal moment at which the humanitarian actor 
was codified as a category in its own right. It will be recalled that this was the very 
same moment that the civilian was first formally defined, albeit in a negative way. It 
was argued in Chapter 2 that, before IHL explicitly defined the civilian in AP I, GC 
IV of 1949 splintered the civilian category. It is proposed here that the category of 
the humanitarian actor was also effectively split apart before it was explicitly 
contemplated in AP I. The Red Cross figure, or someone bearing a likeness to this 
figure, was positioned as a paradigmatic humanitarian actor, while the status of 
other self-identifying humanitarian actors was left opaque.  
                                                                                                                                    
Border Relief Operations: A Legal Perspective’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95, No. 890, 2013, 
pp. 351–382, 353. 
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Henri Dunant’s mythical experience at the Battle of Solferino is typically cited as the 
birthplace of contemporary humanitarian assistance, but humanitarianism as a 
broader practice has much earlier antecedents.257 A social commitment to caring and 
providing for society’s most vulnerable can historically be identified in diverse 
societies and a plethora of world religions.258 In Europe, going back to the Black 
Death Pandemic of the Middle Ages, the introduction of Public Health Boards to 
care for those who were ill and to dispose of bodies may be considered an early 
version of European disaster medicine.259 The Western tradition of Christian charity 
is often cited as having played a central role, with the movement to abolish slavery 
in the mid-1800s deemed an early iteration of contemporary humanitarianism.260 
The humanitarians who came before Dunant did not limit their activities to 
emergency relief; rather, they took an expansive view of suffering and made no 
claims to be outside of politics.261  
 
Dunant’s vision of humanitarianism, which informed early IHL instruments, was a 
very specific one. In calling for an international convention that would create 
European societies dedicated to the care of wounded soldiers, Dunant is credited 
for having launched ‘the idea of a permanent, voluntary, and international 
organization that would care for victims of war’.262 Significantly, Dunant’s vision 
revolved primarily around military actors providing medical assistance to sick and 
wounded soldiers.263 States were the central actors providing relief at this time, and 
                                                
257 Barnett, supra, pp. 5–6 (‘Empire’). 
258 Elizabeth Ferris, ‘Faith and Humanitarianism: It’s Complicated’, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 24, No. 
3, 2011, pp. 606–623, 608. Again, the focus here is on the Western world. 
259 Discussed in Eleanor Davey, with John Borton and Mathew Foley, ‘A History of the Humanitarian 
System: Western Origins and Foundations’, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, June 2013, p. 6 
(‘History’).  
260 Discussed in John Ashworth, ‘The Relationship between Capitalism and Humanitarianism’, The 
American Historical Review, Vol. 92, No. 4, 1987, pp. 813–828. 
261 Barnett, supra, pp. 5–6 (‘Empire’). 
262 Antonio Cassese, ‘Current Challenges to International Humanitarian Law’, in Clapham and Gaeta 
(Eds.), supra, pp. 3–19, 4.  
263 Jean-Henry Dunant, A Memory of Solferino (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1986). 
Discussed in Christopher Greenwood, ‘Historical Development and Legal Basis’, in Dieter Fleck (Ed.), 
Handbook on International Humanitarian Law, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 1–43, 
 74 
there was little consideration of private actors engaged in relief activities. 264 
Dunant’s vision infused the GC of 1864, and the protection of religious and medical 
personnel belonging to the military was codified in positive law before any mention 
was made of civilian actors providing help.265 This emphasis on military actors as 
the providers and recipients of assistance continued in several IHL instruments that 
followed, with some exceptions.266 Article 15 of the Hague Conventions of 1899 
mentioned the ‘delegates of relief societies for prisoners of war’,267 and the Hague 
Convention of 1907 again referred to ‘relief societies for prisoners of war’.268 The 
GCs of 1929 also referred to ‘relief workers’, though the actors delivering relief were 
not addressed in further detail. Prior to WW II, there was no conception that all of 
the delegates delivering relief in war belonged to a common category. 269  The 
individuals who delivered assistance were typically connected to the relief societies 
they worked for, such as the ICRC (see below) or the Young Men’s Christian 
Association.270  
 
During WWI and – especially – WWII, a marked shift occurred with respect to 
practice on the ground. Civilian actors became more engaged in the provision of 
assistance, and civilians – particularly interned civilians and those in occupied 
territories – increasingly became the recipients of assistance. 271  This changing 
landscape was partially captured in GC IV of 1949, wherein IHL averted to the 
notion of civilian humanitarian actors providing assistance to civilian populations at 
                                                                                                                                    
22 (‘What shocked Dunant after the Battle of Solferino was the lack of any systematic effort by the 
armies concerned to care for the wounded’). On the national societies of the Red Cross as an auxiliary of 
state armies, see Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, ‘The (de)Militarization of Humanitarian Aid: A 
Historical Perspective’, Humanities, Vol. 3, 2014, pp. 232–243, 241. 
264 Nicholas Stockton, ‘The Accountable Humanitarian’, Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, 2005, 
available at: http://hapinternational.org/pool/files/the-accountable-humanitarian-2-12-05.pdf (arguing 
that it was the Great Powers that wanted humanitarian ‘neutrality’ due to fears that one-sided relief would 
be advantageous for opponents). 
265 Barrat, supra, p. 303. 
266 Prior to WW I, diaspora populations played a prominent role in assisting civilian populations. See 
Barnett, supra, p. 82 (‘Empire’). 
267 Article 15 of 1899 Hague Convention, supra. 
268 Article 15 of 1907 Hague Convention, supra. 
269 Leclerc-Gagné, supra, p. 52. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Ibid., p. 65. 
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risk.272 Crucially, the GCs of 1949 introduced a right of humanitarian initiative.273 
No express mention had yet been made of a humanitarian actor category,274 though 
actors providing assistance were said to be protected as ‘persons taking no part in 
hostilities’ under Common Article 3 to the GCs.275 In the GCs of 1949, the relevant 
provisions on protection and relief were explicitly concerned with the recipient 
populations, rather than the actors delivering assistance.276 The protection accorded 
to relief actors under these legal instruments may be viewed as akin to that provided 
to the general civilian population in armed conflict.277  
 
As of the GCs of 1949, neither the civilian nor the humanitarian actor had been 
defined in IHL. At this point in the discussion, a second thread will be woven into 
the account in order to introduce some complexity. Before the humanitarian actor 
was introduced as a category in AP I, IHL positioned one type of humanitarian 
actor as the object of special treatment and privilege. It is proposed that IHL’s 
vision of humanitarianness was shaped by its fantasy of the Red Cross278 figure as 
the paradigmatic humanitarian actor.279 Today, the ICRC enjoys international legal 
personality, and a range of privileges and immunities are ascribed to it under 
international and domestic law. 280  The ICRC has been described as a hybrid 
                                                
272 See, e.g., Article 142 of GC IV (obligations on the detaining power to assist relief societies in 
performing their tasks). Discussed in Kate Mackintosh, ‘Beyond the Red Cross: The Protection of 
Independent Humanitarian Organizations and their Staff in International Humanitarian Law’, International 
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 89, No. 865, March 2007, pp. 113–130. 
273 Article 9 of GC I; Article 9 of GC II; Article 9 of GC III; Article 10 of GC IV. On the role of human 
rights law in this respect, see Stoffels, supra. See also Article 30 of GC IV (the right of all protected 
persons to have access to ‘any organization that might assist them’) and Article 142 of GC IV. 
274 Helen Durham and Phoebe Wynn-Pope, ‘Protecting the “Helpers”: Humanitarians and Health Care 
Workers During Times of Armed Conflict’, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 14, December 
2011, pp. 327–346, 334.  
275 Common Article 3 of GC I-IV.  
276 Durham and Wynn-Pope, supra, p. 336. See also Chapter 2. 
277 Durham and Wynn-Pope, supra, p. 334.  
278 This refers to the ICRC, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) and the Red Cross 
national societies. 
279 Drawing on Mégret’s description of IHL’s treatment of warfare as a ‘fantasy of sameness’, wherein 
two opposing armies face each other on the battlefield, each in uniform and bearing arms. See Frédéric 
Mégret, ‘From “Savages” to “Unlawful Combatants”: A Postcolonial Look at International Humanitarian 
Law’s “Other”’, in Anne Orford (Ed.), International Law and its Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), pp. 265–317, 307 (‘IHL’s Other’). 
280 On the ICRC’s international legal personality, see Knut Dormann and Louis Maresca, ‘The ICRC and 
its Contribution to the Development of IHL in Specialized Instruments’, Chicago Journal of International 
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between a classic international – or intergovernmental – organization and an 
NGO.281 Returning briefly to Dunant’s experience at Solferino, Dunant imagined a 
Red Cross movement that would promote and safeguard humanitarian ideals.282 The 
Red Cross actor materialized in early IHL instruments as a twinkle in Dunant’s eye, 
informing GC 1864 and securing the Red Cross figure as the touchstone of 
humanitarian assistance.283 In the Geneva conferences of 1863–1864, the Red Cross 
emblem was the only humanitarian symbol accorded legal protection. At the time, it 
was deemed universal and easy to recognize, with its key stated role being to protect 
medical personnel and medical facilities in armed conflict.284 The GCs of 1949 also 
recognized the legitimacy of three further humanitarian emblems: the red crescent, 
the red lion and the red sun; a red crystal followed in 2003 in the Third Additional 
Protocol to the GCs.285 Use of these emblems was restricted to members of the 
ICRC family, as well as to medics and some military actors.286  
 
Staying with the GCs of 1949 for a moment, the Red Cross figure is treated as the 
benchmark for humanitarian relief in a number of ways. Common Article 3 of the 
GCs, for example, refers to an impartial humanitarian body ‘such as’ the ICRC.287 
Article 63 of GC IV stipulates that, in the context of occupied territories, the 
                                                                                                                                    
Law, Vol. 5, 2004–5, pp. 217–232, 217. See also: Article 4 of AP I (ICRC serves as a substitute for the 
Protecting Power, where appropriate); UNGA, General Assembly Resolution 45/6 (1990), A/RES/45/6 
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Formulation and Application’, Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Thematic Brief, 
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case-by-case basis); Els Debuf, ‘Tools to Do the Job: The ICRC’s Legal Status, Privileges and 
Immunities’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 897/8, 2016, pp. 319–344, 324. 
281 Debuf, supra, p. 324. While its mandate comes from states, the ICRC was founded in 1863 as a 
private organization named the International Committee for the Relief of Military Wounded. Since 1994, 
the ICRC has had international organization status in Switzerland. 
282 See, e.g., Greenwood, supra, p. 22.   
283 Debuf, supra, pp. 320–321.  
284  International Federation of the Red Cross, ‘The Emblem Debate’, available at: 
http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/the-movement/emblems/the-emblem-debate/. 
285 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Adoption of 
an Additional Distinctive Emblem, 8 December 2005 (AP III). 
286 Discussed in Mackintosh, supra. See also Baptiste Rolle and Edith Lafontaine, ‘The Emblem that 
Cried Wolf: ICRC Study on the Use of Emblems’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 91, No. 876, 
December 2009, pp. 759–778. 
287 See Common Article 3 of GC I-IV. 
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occupying power may not require any changes in the personnel or structure of relief 
societies such as the ICRC that could prejudice relief activities.288  A common 
provision of the GCs also stipulates that, with the consent of the parties to the 
conflict, the ICRC ‘or any other impartial humanitarian organization’ may undertake 
humanitarian activities to protect and provide relief to civilian persons.289 In the 
above examples, the actors covered are either Red Cross actors or organizations that 
resemble the Red Cross. Article 63(c) of GC IV opens out a bit further, according a 
right of humanitarian initiative to ‘special organizations of a non-military character’ 
that work to improve the living conditions of the civilian population.290  
 
While this expansion of the category was accelerated with AP I (see below), the 
positioning of the Red Cross as the relief provider par excellence has been an 
unchanging feature of IHL. It is not altogether surprising that this was the case in 
1949, given the state of practice on the ground at the time. What is striking, 
however, is how IHL’s fixation with the Red Cross continued in AP I, even though 
the practice of humanitarian assistance had begun to significantly transform. Of 
particular note, humanitarian NGO actors had started to emerge as key players in 
humanitarian responses prior to the codification of the APs.  
 
The first recognizable humanitarian NGO, the Save the Children Fund, was formed 
in 1919 out of the experience of WWI.291 There was an exponential increase in the 
number of humanitarian NGOs following WWII, with approximately 200 formed 
between 1945 and 1949.292 It was not until the Nigeria-Biafra conflict of the late 
1960s, however, that humanitarian NGOs came to truly dominate the international 
response. 293 De Waal describes the experience in Biafra as both totem and taboo 
                                                
288 Art 63(a)(b) of GC IV. 
289 Cited in Mackintosh, supra, pp. 115–116. See also above. 
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291 See Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell, Shaping the Humanitarian World (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 
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for humanitarian NGOs. 294 It was a groundbreaking logistical effort that demanded 
considerable courage, but humanitarian actors also found themselves mired in 
ethical issues relating to the diversion of aid and the prolonging of the war.295 The 
widely publicized nature of the Biafra conflict captured the attention of the 
international community. Media coverage not only highlighted the impact of the 
famine and the conflict, but it also showcased the role of non-state actors in the 
humanitarian response.296 Although the ICRC had, by this time, long been active in 
its work as IHL guardian and in delivering material relief to wounded soldiers and 
prisoners of war, Biafra marked its first large-scale relief operation.297 Perceived 
shortcomings in ICRC’s handling of this response – particularly the way in which it 
had interpreted its commitment to neutrality – also galvanized the formation of 
Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) in 1971.298 Despite this surge of engagement in the 
delivery of assistance by humanitarian NGOs, no direct mention of them was made 
in the APs of 1977. In the following section, the treatment of humanitarian actors 
under the APs is examined in more detail. 
 
 3.1.2 The humanitarian actor under AP I: Who is protected? 
 
The present section considers who is a humanitarian actor under AP I, and the 
following section examines how this humanitarian actor category fits with the 
civilian category. It is suggested that IHL – in the narrow sense of law ‘in the books’ 
– appears to constitute certain humanitarian actors as special civilians. While the 
ICRC and other members of the Red Cross family clearly fall into this special group, 
it is less certain whether other humanitarian actors, such as NGOs, should also. 
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Although the ICRC is one of the largest international humanitarian organizations 
operating today, 299  as an empirical matter, most humanitarian assistance in 
contemporary armed conflict is delivered by actors outside the Red Cross family.300 
The implication is that a significant number of self-identifying humanitarian actors 
may not be explicitly protected under AP I. 301 Because the humanitarianness of 
these other actors is illegible to IHL, they are relegated to ‘mere civilian’ status. 
There may also be a ‘civilian minus’ status in circulation. The Rome Statute, for 
example, allocates protection to humanitarian actors ‘as long as they are entitled to 
the protection given to civilians’.302 This idea is revisited below. 
 
Although this study finds that humanitarian actors were first contemplated as a type 
of actor in AP I, it merits emphasis that there is no category of ‘humanitarian actor’, 
as such, in IHL.303 The GCs of 1949 do not contain any special provisions relating 
to personnel participating in relief actions,304 and the draft version of AP I initially 
contained no separate provision for such personnel.305 As ultimately formulated, the 
APs introduce explicit protections for certain humanitarian actors – typically 
referring to them as ‘relief personnel’. Their protection is premised on their ability 
to deliver assistance in a manner that is humanitarian, impartial and without adverse 
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distinction.306  This emphasis on conduct and modalities of assistance helps to 
explain the slipperiness of the humanitarian actor category.  
 
Turning to the relevant provisions, Article 71(3) of AP I stipulates that relief 
personnel shall be assisted by each party to the conflict to the fullest extent 
practicable; their movements and activities are only to be limited in cases of 
imperative military necessity.307 Humanitarian actors are also entitled to humane 
treatment under Article 75 of AP I and Article 4 of AP II. 308  Furthermore, 
customary IHL affords them protection. Rule 31 of the 2005 ICRC Customary Law 
Study stipulates that ‘Humanitarian relief personnel must be respected and 
protected’.309 IHL further prescribes limits to the conduct of humanitarian actors: 
relief personnel must not exceed the terms of their mission, for example, and they 
must adhere to the security requirements of the party in whose territory they carry 
out their duties.310  
 
Turning first to Red Cross actors, the ICRC, IFRC and national Red Cross societies 
have a special position in IHL treaties,311 and they are mentioned by name in AP I. 
The continuing influence of the Red Cross figure can also be detected in the ICJ’s 
1986 Nicaragua decision,312 where the Court found: 
 
If the provision of humanitarian assistance is to escape condemnation as 
an intervention in the internal affairs of [another State], not only must it 
be limited to the purposes hallowed in the practice of the Red Cross, 
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humanitarian relief operations must be respected and protected’. 
310 Article 71(4) of AP I. For a discussion of the wider regulatory environment, see also Harvard Program 
on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, ‘Humanitarian Action under Scrutiny: Criminalizing 
Humanitarian Engagement’, Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Working 
Paper, February 2011 (‘HPCR’). 
311 Barrat, supra, p. 4.  
312 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits), Nicaragua v. United 
States, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 243. 
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namely to prevent and alleviate human suffering…it must also, and 
above all, be given without discrimination to all in need. 
 
While the central positioning of the Red Cross figure in contemporary IHL is 
beyond dispute, two other types of humanitarian actors are of concern to this study: 
humanitarian NGOs and UN humanitarian actors.  
 
In this section, humanitarian NGOs are considered first. Barrat catalogues a further 
13 categories in addition to Red Cross actors, under which humanitarian actors 
might claim protection in international armed conflict (IAC).313 The NGO MSF, for 
example, likely fits into the following categories: medical personnel, substitute 
protecting power, impartial humanitarian body, relief society, social organization 
and organization assisting protected persons.314 While Barrat’s forensic cataloguing 
of these categories is sound, her conclusion that humanitarian NGOs as a larger 
group are ‘comprehensively covered’ by IHL provisions comes with serious 
caveats. 315  She leaves out, for example, multi-mandate NGOs that engage in 
essential life-saving humanitarian activities but also work on human rights, 
statebuilding or peacebuilding. 316  In fact, in an era in which the international 
community pushes policies of coherence and integration that often draw 
humanitarian assistance into the fold of political or peacekeeping objectives (see 
Chapter 4), a potentially significant number of organizations are excluded in Barrat’s 
analysis. While a respected impartial humanitarian organization such as MSF may 
meet the criteria for a number of the categories contained in the APs, it is not clear 
how smaller or lesser known NGOs fare. Humanitarian NGOs do not have a 
                                                
313  Barrat, supra, p. 338, Table 1. The listed categories are: voluntary aid society, civil defense 
organization, medical personnel, religious personnel, substitute protecting power, impartial humanitarian 
body, organization assisting POWs, relief society, international religious organization, organization 
approved by parties, social organization, organization engaged in family reunion and organization 
assisting protected persons. The listed organizations in NIACs include: the ICRC, the IFRC, the national 
Red Cross Society, medical personnel, religious personnel, impartial humanitarian bodies and relief 
societies. 
314 Barrat, supra, p. 340, Table 2. 
315 Ibid., p. 343. 
316 Ibid., p. 344. 
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crystallized international legal personality,317 and their logos and emblems are not 
protected under IHL in the same manner as those of the Red Cross.318 It is thus 
proposed that the extent to which humanitarian NGOs are entitled to IHL 
protection often depends on their approximation of the Red Cross figure.319 In the 
same way that IHL’s traditional paradigm of war fails to encapsulate the dynamics 
of contemporary conflict,320 IHL’s treatment of the humanitarian actor neglects a 
wide swath of actors who are engaged in delivering assistance in environments of 
armed conflict. A limited number of humanitarian actors may be able to claim 
further protection as ‘associated personnel’ of the UN, if they sub-contract or act as 
implementers for the UN.321  Affiliation with the Red Cross may also provide 
humanitarian NGOs access to further protection. 322   
 
As for UN actors, they are in a different legal position from humanitarian NGOs,323 
and also from Red Cross actors. Many of the UN humanitarian agencies that 
operate in contemporary armed conflicts emerged after WWII. The UN Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which was extremely active in the years 
1943–1947, was subsequently split into separate agencies, including UNICEF and 
(what eventually became) UNHCR. 324  Aside from whatever protections UN 
                                                
317 Kuijt, supra, pp. 66–67. 
318 Koenrad Van Brabant, ‘Operational Security Management in Violent Environments’, Humanitarian 
Policy Network Good Practice Review, June 2000, p. 336; Demeyere, supra, p. 11.  
319 For an argument that NGOs that follow Red Cross–style principles may claim IHL’s protections, see 
Kuijt, supra, pp. 66–67.  
320 See Nicolas Lamp, ‘Conceptions of War and Paradigms of Compliance: The “New War” Challenge to 
International Humanitarian Law’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2011, pp. 225–262. See 
also Mégret, supra, p. 311 (the laws of war have ‘exported and universalized a highly particular form of 
inter-state conflict’) (‘IHL’s Other’). 
321 Erin Weir, ‘Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative’, 
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Monograph (June 2006), p. 44; Mackintosh, supra, p. 114; 
Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, ‘The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 44, 1995, pp. 560–590, 564–566. See also the 
discussion in Chapter 4 regarding affiliation with UN missions. 
322 Erin Weir, supra, p. 44.  
323 Fast attributes this to the state-centric nature of international law and the fact that the wider status of 
the UN is that of an institution composed of member states. See Fast, supra, p. 204. 
324 Davey et al., supra, p. 9 (‘History’). 
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humanitarian actors might claim under IHL, 325 the blue laurel wreath of the UN 
and its logo are explicitly protected under international law. 326  Additionally, 
individual UN humanitarian actors are covered by international legal instruments 
such as the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and 
the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. 327  
 
The next section considers the relationship between humanitarian actors as a 
bounded group and the IHL civilian category. 
 
3.1.3 The humanitarian actor under AP I: (Special) civilian status 
 
To examine how the humanitarian actor is constituted vis a vis the civilian category 
in AP I, it is helpful to bracket the differences between different kinds of 
humanitarian actors.328 Article 71(2) of AP I stipulates that, in IACs, those engaged 
in war fighting are required to respect and protect 329  humanitarian actors as 
civilians.330 When emphasis is put on the ‘as civilians’ language, it is suggested that 
IHL gives humanitarian actors civilian status, full stop. Fast and Barrat, respectively, 
                                                
325 Laurie R. Blank, ‘The Limits of Inviolability: The Parameters for Protection of United Nations 
Facilities During Armed Conflict’, International Law Studies, Vol. 93, 2017, pp. 45–101, 62 (on IHL as the 
lex specialis governing protection in armed conflict). 
326 On the treatment of the UN flag and logo in the Rome Statute, see Article 8(2)(b)(vii) of UN General 
Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998. 
327 UN Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 9 December 1994, 2051 
UNTS 363 (‘1994 Convention’); UN Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations, 13 February 1946, 21 UST 1418, TIAS No. 6900, 1 UNTS 15 (‘1946 Convention’). Discussed in 
Bourloyannis-Vrailas, supra; Blank, supra, p. 50. For debates about the application of the ‘1994 
Convention’ and its relationship to IHL, see Tristan Ferraro, ‘The Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law to Multinational Forces’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95, No. 891/2, pp. 
561–612. 
328 See also Demeyere, supra, p. 13. Demeyere frames the question about NGO status as follows: ‘Can 
“ordinary” NGOs have any more special status under IHL than that accruing to “ordinary” civilians, in 
recognition of the special assistance they are ready to deliver?’ 
329 The term ‘respect’ here is interpreted to mean ‘to spare, not to attack’, while protect means ‘to come 
to someone’s defence, to lend help and support’. See Jean Pictet (Ed.), Commentary: IV Geneva Convention, 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva: ICRC, 1958), p. 146 (‘Commentary’). 
Discussed in Durham and Wynn-Pope, supra, p. 337. 
330 Article 71(2) of AP I. There is no equivalent rule in AP II, though medical relief is clearly protected 
under Article 9 of AP I. Protections for humanitarian actors in NIACs ‘as civilians’ can be derived from 
customary law. Mackintosh, supra, p. 118. 
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agree with this line of reasoning.331 Barrat further highlights that the APs extend the 
requirement of ‘respect and protect’ to all non-combatants.332 Alternatively, one can 
emphasize the fact that the APs explicitly attend to personnel engaged in the 
provision of relief, and that this aims to remedy what was previously a lack of 
protection under IHL. Durham and Wynn-Pope take this view, contending that the 
AP I obligation to ‘respect and protect’ humanitarian actors provides these actors 
with ‘more substantial footing and a specific status’ under IHL than what they 
previously had under the GCs.333 This study is persuaded by the latter view, though 
it maintains that only Red Cross actors and actors resembling the Red Cross figure 
are legible to IHL in this way. In the following section, this is fleshed out with 
support from sources both within and beyond IHL.  
 
To begin, scholars often promulgate the claim that humanitarian actors have special 
status without explaining the specific legal basis of this claim. In an examination of 
crimes against humanity, for example, Fernandez and Estapa mention as an aside 
that humanitarian personnel have ‘differentiated status’ from other civilians. 334 In 
other instances, scholars flag a special status but do not refer to humanitarian actors 
who do not belong to the Red Cross. In a discussion of IHL rules on perfidy and 
the misuse of emblems, Bartels remarks that IHL accords special protection to Red 
Cross actors, while ‘a “regular” civilian “only” enjoys regular/standard 
protection’.335 Bartels hangs a question mark around these findings, intimating a lack 
of clarity in IHL on this matter. The special status of the Red Cross figure also 
receives attention in the ICRC Commentary to the APs. The authors of the 
Commentary find:336  
                                                
331 For an argument that IHL protects humanitarian actors as civilians, see Fast, supra, p. 197; Barrat, 
supra, p. 323. 
332 Barrat, supra, p. 323. 
333 Durham and Wynn-Pope, supra, p. 337.  
334 Rosa Fernandez and Jaume Estapa, ‘Towards a Single and Comprehensive Notion of “Civilian 
Population” in Crimes Against Humanity’, International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 17, 2017, pp. 47–77, 51. 
335 Rogier Bartels, ‘Killing with Military Objects Disguised as Civilian Objects is Perfidy’, Just Security 
blog, March 2015, available at: https://www.justsecurity.org/21285/disguising-military-weapons-civilian-
equipment-perfidy-or-be/. 
336 Pilloud et al. (Eds.), supra, p. 832 (‘AP Commentary’). Referring to GC I-IV of 1949, AP I and AP I. 
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Apart from the personnel involved in actions under the responsibility of 
the ICRC, who consequently enjoy the protection of the red cross 
emblem, personnel participating in relief actions are only protected, 
outside the régime of the Protocol, by general rules applicable to 
civilians of States which are not Parties to the conflict. Such persons 
certainly enjoy the general protection of populations against certain 
consequences of war, and, as civilians, may not be attacked, but not all 
of them are covered by the Fourth Convention which excluded certain 
categories from its field of application…. 
 
In this account, the entitlements of non–Red Cross humanitarian actors are not 
clear; but it does appear that ICRC personnel are granted something more than 
civilian status.337  
 
The possibility that humanitarian actors are constituted as special civilians finds 
some support in international criminal law. Article 8(2)(e)(ii) of the Rome Statute 
prohibits intentional attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport 
systems, as well as personnel using the ‘distinctive emblems of the Geneva 
Conventions in conformity with international law’.338 Further, Article 8(2)(b)(iii) 
prohibits intentional attacks against ‘personnel, installations, material, units or 
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission’ in 
accordance with the UN Charter, ‘as long as they are entitled to the protection given 
to civilians or civilian objects’ under IHL.339 This latter provision merits careful 
scrutiny for its treatment of the humanitarian actor in relation to the civilian of 
IHL.340 Of note, the Rome Statute also deems intentional attacks against the general 
civilian population war crimes.341 If humanitarian actors were protected as members 
of the wider civilian population, one might expect that they would be amply covered 
                                                
337 The only other humanitarian actors who have unambiguous claims to special protection are UN 
humanitarian actors (see above) and medical personnel of the armed forces. See Brooks, supra, p. 10.  
338 Article 8(2)(e)(ii) of the Rome Statute, supra. Schwendimann, supra, p. 1005 (noting that a nexus with 
an armed conflict is required). 
339 Article 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute, supra. See also Article 4 of the Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, 2178 UNTS 138, 145; 97 AJIL 295; UN Doc. S/2002/246, Appendix II.  
340 See Durham and Wynn-Pople, supra, p. 339 (‘relief workers who maintain their civilian status 
according to the Geneva Conventions are better protected than ever before’). 
341 Article 8(2)(b)(i) of the Rome Statute, supra (prohibiting ‘Intentionally directing attacks against the 
civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities’). 
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by that provision. The separate provision thus appears to treat humanitarian actors 
as a category of actor that is separate from the wider civilian population.342  
 
While the general civilian population is protected from targeting under IHL, and 
attacks against civilians are also prohibited as war crimes, the treatment of 
humanitarian actors conveys that humanitarianness is associated with a higher form 
of civilian status. This is further amplified in the Resolutions and public 
pronouncements of the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly and other 
UN leadership regarding attacks on humanitarian actors.343 Ultimately, this study 
takes the view that Red Cross actors and those who resemble them are treated as 
‘civilian plus’ actors in international law. The protections that IHL accords other 
humanitarian actors are, comparatively speaking, opaque. These latter actors might 
be able to claim ‘civilian plus’ status, or they might be allocated ‘mere civilian’ status. 
The Rome Statute language (‘as long as they are entitled to the protection given to 
civilians’) also highlights the fact that humanitarian actors can lose civilian protection. 
This might happen, for example, if an individual humanitarian actor were to directly 
participate in hostilities. 344  It has been argued that participation in peace 
enforcement operations may generate the same result.345 Thus, it may be that a 
‘civilian minus’ status – if not a recategorization as a combatant – can be assigned to 
some humanitarian actors. As a point of clarification, humanitarian actors who 
                                                
342 Leclerc-Gagné also highlights that the prohibition on attacks against the wider civilian population 
appears only two clauses prior to Article 8(2)(b)(iii). Leclerc-Gagné, supra, pp. 137–139. 
343 United Nations Security Council, ‘Increased Attacks on Aid Workers Due to Lack of Respect for 
International Humanitarian Law, Deputy Secretary-General Tells Security Council’, United Nations 
Meetings Coverage, 19 August 2014, SC/11524. Resolutions calling for those engaged in war-fighting to 
respect and protect humanitarian actors include: UNSC, Security Council Resolution 2139 (2014), 22 
February 2014, S/RES/2139; UNSC, Security Council Resolution 1894 (2009), 11 November 2009, 
S/RES/1894; UNSC, Security Council Resolution 1502 (2003), 26 August 2003, S/RES/1502. See also: 
UNGA, General Assembly Resolution 52/167 (1997), A/RES/52/167 (condemning any act or failure to act 
‘which obstructs or prevents humanitarian personnel from discharging their humanitarian functions’); 
UNGA, General Assembly Resolution 53/164 (1998), A/RES/53/164; UNGA, General Assembly Resolution 
54/192 (1999), A/RES/54/192. 
344 See Chapter 2 for a discussion on DPH. 
345 Humanitarian actors and personnel involved in peacekeeping missions are protected, as opposed to 
those involved in peace enforcement. A.P.V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 3rd edition (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2012), p. 319.  
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operate without (state) consent do not lose civilian status under IHL.346 When 
consent is withheld, no duty arises to facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of 
relief supplies, equipment and personnel.347 
 
It has been suggested here that a special civilian status for some humanitarian actors 
may be found in IHL. While such a status is not available in the dominant vision of 
distinction, given its unified civilian category, the alternative vision of distinction 
reveals how the distinction line dims and moves, and how civilianness is relativized. 
Viewed through the prism of this alternative vision, special civilian status for 
humanitarian actors constitutes simply one more carve-out from the civilian 
category. This prompts an important normative question, which is discussed in the 
next section. 
 
3.2 Whether a special status for humanitarian actors is desirable 
 
Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that the role played by humanitarian actors in 
armed conflict is socially valuable; it imbues humanitarian actors with virtue and 
shows them as embodying esteemed moral character. This section presents two 
competing views on whether these characteristics should ground a special (civilian) 
status for humanitarian actors. As a point of clarification, although the first outlook 
is perhaps the favoured view of international lawyers, it is in fact aligned with the 
alternative vision of distinction elucidated in Chapter 2. The second outlook is a 
more marginal view, but it is compatible with the dominant vision of distinction 
because it supports a unified civilian category. Complicating matters, individual 
commentators might explicitly subscribe to the dominant vision as it applies in the 
conduct of hostilities, yet still come out in support of a special status for 
humanitarian actors.348   
 
                                                
346 Akande and Gillard, supra, p. 51 (‘Oxford Guidance’). 
347 Ibid. 
348 Durham and Wynn-Pope serve as one example. 
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 3.2.1 Two competing perspectives 
 
First, the ‘help the helpers help’ 349  position is grounded in the belief that 
humanitarian actors should have an extra layer of inviolability that protects them 
and enables them to execute their tasks. 350  In short, a special status enables 
humanitarian actors to save lives and assist war-affected populations without 
becoming targets, themselves.351 Special protections are viewed here as a means to 
an end – that of ensuring that war-affected populations receive humanitarian 
assistance and protection. 352 Observing how the GCs of 1949 accord humanitarian 
actors the same protection as other civilians under the principle of distinction, 
Durham and Wynn-Pope submit that ‘it is questionable whether such general 
protection would be adequate’.353 Additional protection is merited, they suggest, 
because humanitarian actors often face greater risk to their personnel, supplies and 
facilities than the general civilian population.354 This perspective embeds global 
efforts to develop further protection for humanitarian actors in the years following 
the APs, such as through all of the relevant UN resolutions and the Rome Statute 
provisions cited above (see Section 3.1). Implicit support for a special status can also 
be detected in claims that the protection problems humanitarian actors face can be 
remedied through further laws, or by strengthening compliance with existing laws.355  
 
A significant drawback of the ‘help the helpers help’ position is that it fails to 
contextualize the status of humanitarian actors alongside other members of IHL’s 
civilian category. To get at this missing piece, this study engages with the more 
relational approach of the ‘humanitarian exceptionalism’ perspective. Although 
                                                
349 Based on the ‘protecting the helpers’ language of Durham and Wynn-Pope, supra.   
350 This tracks along with Durham and Wynn-Pope’s arguments in Durham and Wynn-Pope, supra. 
351  Fiona Terry, ‘The International Committee of the Red Cross in Afghanistan: Reasserting the 
Neutrality of Humanitarian Action’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 881, March 2011, pp. 
173–188; Demeyere, supra, p. 4. 
352 Durham and Wynn-Pope, supra, p. 340. 
353 Ibid., p. 334. 
354 Ibid., pp. 334, 329, 339.  
355 Ashley Jackson, ‘Protecting Civilians: The Gap between Norms and Practice’, Humanitarian Policy 
Group, Policy Brief No. 56, April 2014 (‘Then as now, the problem remains that neither states nor armed 
groups sufficiently or consistently comply with these provisions’, p. 2). See also Brooks, supra, p. 11. 
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much of this literature is not explicitly concerned with international law, this study 
identifies a number of fruitful contact points between the ‘humanitarian 
exceptionalism’ view and the legal view of the civilian. 
 
Proponents of the ‘humanitarian exceptionalism’ perspective356 greet the idea of a 
special status for humanitarian actors with wariness. Scholars in the field of 
humanitarian studies have engaged extensively with the figure of the humanitarian-
as-outsider.357 In this literature, the humanitarian actor appears separate, distant and 
perhaps even estranged from other actors in her midst – as well as from the wider 
context in which she works.358 Through their attempts to set themselves apart, 
humanitarian actors may drift further and further away from the very people who 
legitimize their presence in conflict zones.359 An important argument advanced in 
this literature is that the altruistic humanitarian act of ‘saving lives’ relies upon an 
imbalance. While the life of the humanitarian actor is freely risked, the life of the 
vulnerable individual is treated as a bare life in need of saving.360 Through a routine 
calculus, these lives are weighed against each other, as humanitarian actors decide 
whether a given course of action falls within the limits of acceptable sacrifice.361 Fast 
queries the expectation that humanitarian actors should receive exemption from 
violence. 362  She problematizes the legal treatment of humanitarian actors as a 
‘special category of civilians deserving attention and protection’363 and asks whether 
this treatment might undermine legal protection for the broader civilian 
                                                
356 While this is a composite perspective, this phrase is employed in Fast, supra, p. 112. 
357 A term used in Didier Fassin, ‘Inequality of Lives, Hierarchies of Humanity: Moral Commitments and 
Ethical Dilemmas of Humanitarianism’, in Ilana Feldman and Miriam Ticktin (Eds.), In the Name of 
Humanity (Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 239–255 (‘Inequality of Lives’). 
358 Fast, supra, p. 5. 
359 Building on a point made by Fassin, supra (‘Inequality of Lives’). 
360 Didier Fassin, ‘Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life’, Public Culture, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2007, pp. 499–520, 
500 (‘Politics of Life’). Citing Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Daniel Heller-
Roazen (Trans.) (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). See also Fassin, supra (‘Inequality of 
Lives’).  
361  Monique J. Beerli, ‘Saving the Saviors: Security Practices and Professional Struggles in the 
Humanitarian Space’, International Political Sociology, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2018, pp. 70–87, 70. 
362 Fast, supra, p. 112. 
363 Ibid., pp. 22, 197.  
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population.364 These are the very dynamics that the present study aims to expose 
through its introduction of the ‘civilian plus’, ‘mere civilian’ and ‘civilian minus’ 
figures. Sometimes, what is privileged might not be the life of the humanitarian 
actor, but the symbols of humanitarianism – of which the Red Cross emblem is the 
paradigmatic example. The risk is that preserving the purity of these symbols may 
become an end, in itself.365  
 
Benthall suggests that the larger narrative of humanitarianism is akin to a moral fairy 
tale, with its main characters being the victim in distress, the villain and the 
humanitarian saviour figure.366 Slotting these characters into the dominant vision of 
distinction, the (civilian) humanitarian saviour would be situated in a category 
alongside the (civilian) victim in distress. Together, these two entities would be 
juxtaposed with the combatant, who would be characterized as a ‘villain’ and 
positioned on the other side of the distinction line.367 Taking the alternative vision 
of distinction, a different picture would materialize. Qualities of combatantness and 
civilianness would hover around. The combatant ‘villain’ would attract features of 
combatantness, while the humanitarian actor would attract the highest degree of 
civilianness and the victim in distress would attract a lower degree of civilianness. In 
this picture, the humanitarian actor and the victim would not share the same status. 
One would be legible as a ‘civilian plus’ while the other would be a ‘mere civilian’. 
When civilianness is relativized as per the alternative vision of distinction, it is easier 
to see how granting something special to some civilians takes something away from 
those who are not singled out for special treatment.  
 
                                                
364 Ibid., p. 205. 
365 Krause, supra, pp. 113, 144; Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2014), pp. 37–38.  
366 Jonathan Benthall, Disasters, Relief and the Media (London: I.B. Taurus, 1993). Discussed also in de 
Waal, supra, pp. 82–83. On humanitarian heroism, see also: Hugo Slim, Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the 
Morality of Aid in War and Disaster (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 73 (‘Humanitarian Ethics’); 
David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), p. 15 (‘Dark Sides’). 
367 While there is not space to do so here, much could be said about the position of the combatant as a 
villain in this vision. The painting of members of war-affected population as victims in distress also 
merits scrutiny.  
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When considered in a vacuum, granting a special status to humanitarian actors may 
seem merited and morally sound. Doing so could potentially enhance the safety of 
humanitarian actors and improve their access to beneficiaries. However, when one 
considers the possibility that humanitarian virtue may be founded upon the 
devaluation of the lives of populations in need, the prospect of a special status 
acquires a different hue. In the logic of the ‘humanitarian exceptionalism’ 
perspective, giving something extra to humanitarian actors marshals IHL to further 
entrench pre-existing inequalities between humanitarian actors and the populations 
they serve. On a more practical note, there is one further aspect of the ‘help the 
helpers help’ viewpoint that is potentially problematic: the assumption that a special 
status would actually enable humanitarian actors to do their work without becoming 
targets, themselves. As discussed in Chapter 2, Alexander characterizes the twin 
features of the civilian as vulnerability and value; value, in this account, refers to the 
civilian’s appeal as a target.368  Contemplating a special status for humanitarian 
actors, one might wonder whether a special status could have the perverse effect of 
making them even more valuable as targets. To the extent that violence against 
humanitarian actors is intentional as well as performative, 369 this prospect merits 
serious consideration. This issue is revisited in the empirical component of this 
study.370 
 
 3.2.2 A special status for humanitarian actors: Qui bono?  
 
A question that lingers on the edges of this discussion is: Who benefits from 
granting a special status to humanitarian actors? Here, it is important to consider 
which interests are furthered and which interests are stifled or supressed. As a 
general matter, designating the recipients of assistance as ‘beneficiaries’ might 
                                                
368 See Chapter 2. See also Alexander, supra, p. 365 (‘Genesis’). 
369 As argued in Laura Hammond, ‘The Power of Holding Humanitarianism Hostage and the Myth of the 
Protective Principles’, in Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss, Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, 
and Ethics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 172–195. Discussed also in Roth, supra, p. 32 
(‘Paradoxes of Aid’). See also Section 5.2.1. 
370 See, e.g., Section 5.4. 
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impede an investigation of who the actual beneficiaries are. 371  Proponents of 
granting a special status for humanitarian actors extol the benefits for the receiving 
populations, first and foremost. The ‘help the helpers help’ position, as outlined 
above, posits that secure access for humanitarian actors translates into the delivery 
of assistance to populations in need. Thus, the beneficiaries of humanitarian 
assistance are the beneficiaries of a special status for humanitarian actors. Those 
who take this view highlight the heightened risks faced by humanitarian actors and 
the value of their social role, positioning humanitarian actors as vehicles or 
instruments for assistance. The virtue of humanitarian actors and the sacrificial 
nature of their duties implicitly inform this outlook.  
 
Consider now the ‘humanitarian exceptionalism’ perspective, which draws attention 
to the way in which human lives are valued. As a baseline, this perspective frames 
the relationship between humanitarian actors and war-affected populations as one 
that is unequal. If humanitarian actors are able to claim a special status in 
international law, they may mobilize law to imbue their lives with (extra) value. 
Humanitarian actors are already set apart from the populations they serve, and a 
special status would give legal imprimatur to this imbalance. The figure of the ‘mere 
civilian’ conveys these implications. Civilian populations with this designation have 
something less than those with ‘civilian plus’ status, and something less than they 
would have under a unified civilian category wherein all civilians are considered 
equal. It is in part because the civilian as an idea is beleaguered, undermined and 
questioned at every turn (see Chapter 2) that there is an impetus for humanitarian 
actors to escape the vulnerability of the civilian – however illusory such an escape 
might be. Setting up civilian populations as having ‘mere civilian’ status further 
compounds this fragility, as well as the imbalance between humanitarian actors and 
other civilians.  
                                                
371 For critiques of the beneficiary category, see Krause, supra, p. 40. Krause makes two key arguments 
regarding beneficiaries: first, only a subset of populations in need receive services, in practice, or benefit 
from an intervention; second, beneficiaries form part of a commodity that is sold to donors in a quasi 
market). See also Roth, supra, p. 9 (‘almost everyone involved in the aid sector could be considered a 
beneficiary’) (‘Paradoxes of Aid’). 
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Having outlined why this study espouses a qualified version of the ‘humanitarian 
exceptionalism’ outlook, the next section considers the actual practices of 
humanitarian actors. 
 
3.3 The special status humanitarian actors actually produce 
 
The present section distils a practice-based law of distinction from activities in the 
Pedagogical and Kinetic realms. Reserving an empirical examination of actual 
practice for Parts II and III, the discussion works backwards from such practice to 
elucidate how the idea of distinction circulates. To simplify matters, humanitarian 
actors are mostly treated as a bounded group. 
 
 3.3.1 The ‘civilian plus’ 
 
The way in which international humanitarian actors conceptualize their own 
humanitarianness basically aligns with the alternative vision of distinction elucidated 
in Chapter 2. Humanitarian actors understand civilianness to be a relative and 
contingent concept, and they perceive varying degrees – or kinds – of civilianness 
that might be claimed. The status that they imagine themselves to have, which they 
seek to promulgate and safeguard, is ‘civilian plus’ status. 372 While the civilian 
aspect of the ‘civilian plus’ figure attracts the same target immunity accorded to all 
civilians in armed conflict, the ‘plus’ aspect is intended to provide humanitarian 
actors with something more – an added layer of inviolability in a legal, as well as a 
                                                
372 The term ‘civilian plus’ is not to be confused with Hilhorst’s concept of the ‘humanitarian plus’. The 
latter refers to humanitarian actors who engage in development activities that go beyond life-saving 
humanitarian services. In Hilhorst’s conceptualization, the ‘plus’ indicates that the actor in question has 
overstepped the bounds of traditional humanitarian action. In the present study, the ‘plus’ modifies a 
given actor’s civilian status and sets the relevant individual up as a sort of super-civilian. See Dorothea 
Hilhorst, ‘Dead Letter or Living Document? Ten Years of the Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief’, 
Disasters, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2005, pp. 351–369, 359. 
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practical, sense.373 The public pronouncements that humanitarian actors make about 
their special status closely mirror those of the ‘help the helpers help’ perspective, 
outlined previously (see Section 3.2). Humanitarian actors highlight the social value 
of the role they play in armed conflicts, suggesting that anything extra that is given 
to them will ultimately translate into the delivery of assistance to populations in 
need. They also draw attention to the risks they face in armed conflicts, depicting 
‘civilian plus’ status as a shield against those who might harm them. In light of these 
stated functions, this study argues that the ‘civilian plus’ figure is grounded in the 
heroism and vulnerability of humanitarian actors. As is shown in the proceeding 
sections, some of the other international actors who encounter humanitarian actors 
on an everyday basis question the stated rationale for a special status. With notable 
echoes of the ‘humanitarian exceptionalism’ outlook, they contend that 
humanitarian actors merely seek to secure their position as virtuous saviours. They 
suspect the ‘civilian plus’ is grounded in both exclusivity and superiority. These 
allegations, and other misgivings about a special status, are revisited in Parts II and 
III.  
 
3.3.2 The corollaries: ‘Mere civilian’ and ‘civilian minus’ 
 
The status that humanitarian actors wish to transcend is that of the ‘mere civilian’ 
– a default status that is assigned to individuals who are ‘only’ ordinary civilians. On 
a daily basis, humanitarian actors deploy ‘civilian plus’ status to differentiate 
themselves from those with ‘mere civilian’ status. Humanitarian NGO actors may 
try to distance themselves from other civilian actors, for example, because they 
believe that the ordinary civilianness of these actors is inadequate to meet their 
needs. A further possibility is that humanitarian actors deploy a special status in the 
service of turf wars and intra-civilian competition.  
 
                                                
373 Practical and juridical aspects of inviolability are also discussed in Lisa Smirl, Spaces of Aid: Post Disaster 
Relief and Reconstruction (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015), pp. 31, 40, 94–95. 
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The status that humanitarian actors are most fearful of being assigned is that of 
‘civilian minus’. This latter status may attach to humanitarian actors when they are 
treated as ‘force multipliers’ or a second front in armed conflict.374 Humanitarian 
actors who are seen to lack competence and humanitarian credentials, or who are 
viewed as helping the ‘other side’, may also be seen to have tainted civilianness.375 
When humanitarian actors are faced with the prospect of ‘civilian minus’ status, the 
‘civilian plus’ status may perform a cleansing or purifying function. In such 
situations, humanitarian actors assert the highest degree of civilianness in the hopes 
of staving off any qualities of combatantness that might attach to them. When 
operating in the same space as international military forces, for example, 
humanitarian actors may be anxious that they will be tainted through proximity. 
Although IHL does not explicitly require civilian actors to physically distance 
themselves from combatants, humanitarian actors understand that such strategies 
are necessary for safeguarding their (special) status. As the prospect of 
contamination looms, the ‘civilian plus’ can eradicate any suggestion that the 
humanitarian actor in question is a combatant, or is complicit in what combatants 
do. When the ‘civilian plus’ is deployed in this way, it can be said that humanitarian 
actors are not trying to transcend the (mere) civilian so much as they are attempting 
to claw back the promise of ordinary civilianness.  
 
Looking ahead to the empirical findings that are explored in Parts II and III, this 
discussion has distilled a law of distinction from the practices and interactions of 
international actors. While this practice-based law relies upon a fragmented civilian 
category and a relativized concept of civilianness, the civilian category – as 
emphasized – is already fragmented. Though the ‘civilian plus’ and its corollaries 
serve as analytically useful concepts, the law of distinction depicted here – similar to 
                                                
374 As when Colin Powell referenced the role of humanitarian NGOs in the global war on terror as ‘A 
force multiplier for us. Such an important part of our combat team’. Cited in Martin Woollacott, 
‘Humanitarians Must Avoid Becoming Tools of Power’, The Guardian (2 April 2004). See also Sarah 
Kenyon Lischer, ‘Military Intervention and the Humanitarian “Force Multiplier”’, Global Governance, Vol. 
13, No. 1, 2007, pp. 98–118.  
375 See Chapters 5 and 7. 
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the alternative vision it echoes – is dynamic, rather than static. This captures the way 
in which, on an everyday basis, international humanitarians exert themselves to 
attract the qualities of civilianness they hope to embody and to repel the qualities of 
combatantness they wish to disclaim.  
 
Conclus ion  
 
As this chapter has shown, the relationship between humanitarianness and 
civilianness is far from straightforward – whether one looks to legal texts or the 
practices and perceptions of international actors. The first part of this chapter 
entertained the possibility that IHL constitutes some humanitarian actors as special 
civilians. It was argued that IHL is embedded with the fantasy of the Red Cross 
figure, which limits the types of humanitarian actors who are legible to IHL. In the 
second part of this chapter, it was recognized that a special status for humanitarian 
actors might seem warranted, given that it would incentivize the role they play in 
war. However, concern was also expressed that such a special status could come at 
too dear a cost. Not only could it perpetuate exceptionalism and further distance 
humanitarian actors from the populations they serve, but it could also mobilize law 
to downgrade the civilianness of others. It was submitted that, whichever position 
one takes on the desirability of a special status, humanitarian actors, as a matter of 
daily practice, promulgate ‘civilian plus’ status. A practice-based law of distinction 
was introduced to capture these dynamics. Reliant upon a relativized version of 
civilianness, this law tracks along with the alternative vision of distinction. 
 
With respect to the question of what drives the distinction practices of humanitarian 
actors, it was suggested that both heroism and vulnerability are at play. 
Humanitarian actors are seen as more vulnerable than other civilians due to the risks 
that accompany their tasks. By dint of their role as helpers, they are also deemed 
more worthy of protection. While humanitarianness may be performed as an 
exaggerated or elite form of civilianness, this should not obscure the extent to which 
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it is tied up with anxiety and fear. The ultimate fear may be one of physical attack, 
but there is also a more immediate anxiety provoked by the everyday encroachment 
from – and contamination by – actors imbued with qualities of combatantness or 
the wrong kind of civilianness. It is also important to consider whether 
humanitarian actors are afraid of the very populations they seek to help – a 
possibility that casts the ‘civilian plus’ in an unflattering light. 
 
* 
 
Conclus ion to Part  I  
 
Part I of this study considered the treatment of distinction in traditional legal 
sources such as treaties and conventions, and the way in which competing visions of 
civilian status materialize in the practices of international actors. It also examined 
how the antecedents of IHL’s civilian–combatant distinction circulated, historically. 
An alternative vision of distinction was articulated, exposing the instability of 
distinction and challenging the dominant vision of a bright, fixed and stable line. 
According to the alternative vision, different degrees of civilianness can be 
distributed and claimed, translating into ‘civilian plus’ status and its corollaries. 
When a practice-based law of distinction is distilled from the everyday practices of 
international humanitarian actors, it resembles this alternative vision. A point that 
merits constant repetition is that the chaos of distinction is not only located in the 
operational context, but, as this exploration of the Intellectual realm has 
demonstrated, also in legal doctrine; it also has historical precursors. Given that the 
practices of international actors in Geneva and The Hague are characterized by 
messiness and fragmentation, it would be misguided to think that actors at civil–
military training grounds and in South Sudan introduce instability. This should be kept 
in mind as the discussion leaves the Intellectual realm and follows the idea of 
distinction to a new set of global sites, where unconventional actors make and 
remake distinction on a daily basis. 
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PART II: DISTINCTION AND THE PEDAGOGICAL 
 
Introduct ion to Part  II 
 
As the discussion enters Part II, it moves into the Pedagogical realm. This domain 
of activity occupies a middle space between theory and practice – a significant in-
between place where those who are expected to implement the relevant rules are 
trained and taught. This sphere of activity is often overlooked when high-level 
concepts, norms, rules and aspirations are juxtaposed with day-to-day operational 
dynamics on the ground. This study establishes civil–military training spaces as 
important venues where humanitarian distinction practices come into contact with 
the practices and perceptions of other international actors. These dynamics are 
framed as having legal significance, and law’s reach is felt here in two main respects. 
First, law shapes the international actors who attend the trainings and their 
interactions with each other. Not only is their conduct governed by IHL and the 
various rules and norms of civil–military interaction that are disseminated, but these 
actors also self-conceptualize as belonging to IHL’s civilian or combatant categories. 
Second, a practice-based law of distinction can be distilled from the practices and 
interactions of these international actors. At the three civil–military training grounds 
investigated in the discussion, a ‘civilian plus’ status for humanitarian actors is 
promulgated and contested, and this special status is as disrupted as the civilian 
figure who humanitarian actors seek to transcend. Contests over distinction ensue: 
international actors struggle over who draws the line to delineate their relationships 
with each other, and how and where this line should be drawn. The ‘phantom local’ 
figure serves as a crucial reference point in these encounters, as international actors 
quarrel over how their interactions are perceived by onlookers. The first chapter in 
this part, Chapter 4, lays the foundation for the exploration of the original empirical 
findings, which follows in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 4: CIVIL–MILITARY TRAINING SPACES 
 
Introduct ion  
 
Leaving behind the courtrooms and other Geneva- and Hague-based practices, Part 
II of this study explores how the idea of distinction circulates at training venues in 
Sweden, Germany and Italy. The international training programmes examined here 
deal with one variant of civil–military relations, which is the interaction of external 
or international civilian and military actors who are involved in international 
missions in armed conflicts.376  While the selected trainings are all delivered in 
Europe, they have a global dimension, as they prepare a diverse set of international 
actors to deploy to a variety of conflict contexts. The civil–military training grounds 
also present a challenging site for humanitarian actors to enact their vision of 
distinction, because the main thrust of the programmes is to encourage civilian and 
military actors to interact and work closely together. 
 
The discussion opens by briefly outlining the relevant methodology employed in the 
empirical component of this study. It then explains the rationale for studying 
training venues, in general, and civil–military training venues, in particular. Next, it 
outlines the training programmes that are examined in this study and provides a 
birds-eye view of the distinction practices that humanitarian actors implement in the 
Pedagogical realm. Three aspects of these practices are addressed: humanitarian 
actors’ appeals to IHL and civil–military guidelines; their formation of a distinct 
identity through adherence to the traditional humanitarian principles; and their 
summoning of the perceptions of an omnipresent observer – the ‘phantom local’.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
376 Michael Pugh, ‘The Challenge of Civil–Military Relations in International Peace Operations’, Disasters, 
Vol. 25, No. 4, 2001, pp. 345–357, 346 (‘Civil–Military Relations’). 
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4.1 Research methods, design, ethics 
 
The present section elaborates on the discussion of research methods in Chapter 1, 
whilst also touching on issues of research design and ethics.377   
 
 4.1.1 Research methods 
 
In addition to engaging with textual and discourse analysis, Parts II and III of this 
study draw on findings from interviews, focus group discussions, perceptions 
surveys and participant observation. In research, interviews and focus group 
discussions serve as important tools when a researcher seeks specific information.378 
Focus groups are useful for testing general sentiments and gathering feedback on 
points that have arisen elsewhere. Simple perceptions surveys supplement interview 
findings and inform interview planning, and participant observation enables the 
researcher to learn things that come up in natural conversation. The latter method is 
especially useful when the researcher seeks to make sense of complex social 
relationships or patterns of interaction, as was the case in the present study.379 
Participant observation also gives the researcher access to practical non-verbal 
knowledge, which can reveal disconnects between what people claim to do and 
what they actually do.380  This technique is invaluable for illuminating the tacit 
                                                
377 This methodological discussion covers both Part II and Part III. The main difference in the methods 
used in these two realms is that participant observation formed the primary method in the Pedagogical 
realm (Part II), whilst interviews were the primary method in the Kinetic realm (Part III). 
378 The interviews carried out for this study were semi-structured; they typically lasted between 1 and 1.5 
hours each and were guided by a series of prompts. For the research conducted for Part II, interviewees 
were selected to represent a range of backgrounds (e.g. military actors, peacekeeping actors, political 
actors, security forces, humanitarian actors) and levels (e.g. front-line operator, trainer). For the research 
conducted for Part III, the interviewees in South Sudan were primarily selected through a modified 
snowball sampling process. 
379 Bryman, supra, p. 81.  
380 Michael Burawoy et al., Ethnography Unbound: Power and Resistance in Modern Metropolis (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1991), p. 2; Kathleen DeWalt and Billie De Walt, Participant 
Observation: A Guide for Fieldworkers, 2nd edition (Plymouth: AltaMira Press, 2011), Chapters 7 and 8. 
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practices and assumptions of international actors, including those relating to 
distinction.381 
 
 4.1.2 Research design  
 
In terms of epistemology, this study falls closer to the interpretive end of the 
positivist–interpretivist spectrum. It thus aims not to explain so much as to 
engender understanding.382  For this reason, it focuses on descriptive inference, 
which permits high levels of authenticity, richness and trustworthiness in the 
findings.383 In order to enhance the reliability of the research, a well-defined and 
vigorous coding frame involving precise coding rules was developed. 384  To 
strengthen the validity of the research, both data triangulation (i.e. drawing on 
different sources of data) and method triangulation (i.e. drawing on mixed methods) 
were employed. 385 In terms of the falsifiability of the research, it should be pointed 
out that this study does not concentrate on causal relationships. However, the 
intention is not to ignore potential causal relationships, but to keep the causal aspect 
open-ended.386  Finally, as for the generalizability of the research,387  the study’s 
multi-sited approach permits a certain level of typicality and transferability. In 
particular, the inclusion of three different civil–military training sites helps to situate 
and contextualize the findings from South Sudan.  
 
 
                                                
381 This links to Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. See Bordieu, supra (‘Outline’). See also Krause, supra, p. 
37 (the taken-for-granteds of humanitarian actors play a crucial role in their decision-making).  
382 John Macionis and Linda Gerber, Sociology, 7th edition (Toronto: Pearson, 2011), p. 33. 
383 On the value of a descriptive approach in the study of law, see Anne Orford, ‘In Praise of 
Description’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, 2012, pp. 609–625, 616; Drumbl, supra, Preface 
and Acknowledgments. 
384 As per Lee Epstein and Gary King, ‘The Rules of Inference’, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, 
No. 1, Winter 2002, p. 85.  
385 Uwe Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research (SAGE, 2009), pp. 136, 443–453.  
386 Anna MacDonald, ‘Local Understandings and Experiences of Transitional Justice: A Review of the 
Evidence’, Justice and Security Research Program, Paper No. 6, July 2013, p. 7. 
387 On ethnographic methods and generalizability, see John Gerring, ‘Mere Description’, British Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2012, pp. 721–746, 726. See also Desmond, supra, p. 573 (the most 
important part about generalizability is being right). 
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 4.1.3 Research ethics 
 
This section will briefly consider issues of informed consent, reflexivity and 
positionality in connection with the empirical research. First, informed consent was 
obtained by all research participants, in writing or – as in the case of less literate 
populations – orally.388 Concerted efforts were made in terms of data storage and 
encryption to prevent sensitive information from being disclosed – especially to 
authorities in South Sudan.  
 
Second, reflexivity refers to a researcher’s scrutiny of the experience of conducting 
research, and concerns how the researcher interacts with research participants and 
represents them in written reports.389 In research connected to armed conflict, it is 
particularly important to reflect on how combatants are approached, how violence is 
written about and how the views of vulnerable individuals are represented.390 In the 
present research, specific issues arose in terms of reflexivity at the NATO CIMIC 
training site, where I also served as a trainer.391 Recognizing that the power structure 
of the instructor–student relationship might carry over into the interviews 
conducted for this study, myself and the NATO hosts emphasized to trainees that 
interviews were voluntary and in no way a quid pro quo. In order to minimize any 
problems that may have arisen from wearing this extra hat, I decided to act strictly 
as a trainee-observer at the training venues in Sweden and Germany.392  
 
Third, concerns of positionality require a researcher to confront the ways in which 
aspects of identity such as gender, age, race and class influence the experience of 
                                                
388 As per Annex A of the Research Ethics Policy and Procedures of the London School of Economics.  
389 Charmaz, supra, pp. 188–189.  
390 Dyan Mazurana, Lacey Andrews Gale, and Karen Jacobsen, ‘A View from Below: Conducting 
Research in Conflict Zones’, in Dyan Mazurana, Lacey Andrews Gale and Karen Jacobsen (Eds.), 
Research Methods in Conflict Settings: A View from Below (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) pp. 
3–23. 
391 Training sessions led by the author at NATO are not included in this study. 
392 A fourth civil–military training, which took place at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping 
Training Centre in Accra, Ghana, serves as background for this study but is not explicitly addressed. 
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fieldwork and the observations made.393 My status as a white Canadian female from 
a well-known UK educational institution inevitably influenced the way in which I 
interacted with others, how others viewed me and the conclusions I drew from what 
I saw and heard.394 Furthermore, at the outset of the field research, I recognized that 
my professional background as a humanitarian actor was potentially accompanied 
by a personal bias against – or poor appreciation of – actors using violent means. I 
thus knew that it would be important for me to spend time with and get to know 
military actors working for the EU, UN and NATO, so as to confront the way in 
which humanitarian actors are seen from the other side. Interacting informally with 
military actors through shared meals and lodging at the training grounds was 
immensely helpful in this respect. Ultimately, my developing understanding of the 
perspectives and motivations of non-humanitarian actors significantly influenced the 
final research product. Instead of looking through the eyes of the actor for whom I 
feel the most affinity, this investigation situates humanitarian actors in a shared 
social space with those holding competing goals and priorities. 
 
4.2 Following distinction in three civil–military training programmes 
 
Civil–military training programmes can offer unique insights into the circulation of 
the idea of distinction amongst international actors. While few of the actors who 
participate in these training programmes are traditionally thought of as legal actors, 
IHL permeates the training venues and the day-to-day practices of participants. 
Trainees identify as civilians and combatants, offer competing visions of the idea of 
distinction and engage in contests over who should draw the line. Given that civil–
military training venues are often overlooked as a legal research site, their value is 
outlined here in some detail.  
                                                
393 Eriksen, supra, p. 29. See also Rahel Junz, ‘Reflexive Inquiry’, in Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu 
(Eds.), Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), pp. 63–
66. 
394 On reflexivity and positionality in socio-legal research in conflict, see Sarah Nouwen, ‘As You Set Out 
for Ithaka: Practical, Epistemological, Ethical and Existential Questions about Socio-legal Empirical 
Research in Conflict’, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2014, pp. 227–260 (‘Ithaka’). 
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4.2.1 Rationale for studying civil–military training programmes  
 
In this section, three benefits of studying civil–military training venues are 
highlighted: they are sites where legal rules and norms are disseminated; they 
complement investigations of the operational context; and their artificiality creates 
unusual opportunities for research.  
 
First, civil–military training grounds are venues where overt attempts are made to 
disseminate international rules and norms and to shape the behavioural ideals of 
international actors. Given that the training programmes are explicitly designed to 
address the contact point between civilian and military actors, they inevitably put 
IHL’s civilian–combatant distinction in issue. The three training programmes 
investigated here were designed to help military and peacekeeping actors navigate 
their relationships with civilians, in general, and humanitarian actors, in particular. 
This is not to say that the goal of the programmes is to engender respect for the 
distinction between different actors. On the contrary, the CIMIC, SWEDINT and 
CAMPO programmes transmit the message that it is appropriate – and indeed 
desirable – to merge different spheres of activity. Their cherished mantra is not 
‘safeguarding distinction’, so much as ‘working together’. Shaped by the 
comprehensive push and its attendant emphasis on demolishing boundaries, 395 
these training programmes showcase the external forces that push back against the 
distinction practices of humanitarian actors. The CIMIC approach propounded at 
NATO poses additional problems for distinction. Under this rubric, the explicit aim 
of civil–military contact is to dominate the landscape and win the military 
mission.396 
 
To accede to the vision of distinction that humanitarian actors promulgate, 
international military actors must often adapt their mindset, as well as their 
                                                
395 Goodhand, supra, p. 297. 
396 See Section 4.1.2. 
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behaviour. Humanitarian actors might, for example, ask military actors to stay out of 
certain spaces with their weapons, or warn them against presenting themselves as 
humanitarian actors. A significant finding of this study is that military actors often 
experience such entreaties as a demand made by humanitarian actors, rather than 
the fulfilment of their own obligations under international law. It should be clarified 
that few of the military actors who attend the three training programmes under 
study are soldiers engaged in strictly traditional combat roles. When the military 
trainees deploy to their respective operational contexts, most are explicitly tasked 
with engaging with civilians in some form. Given this, it might be expected that they 
would be better acquainted with demands for distinction than the average soldier. 
As Chapter 5 illustrates, however, such familiarity with the civilian sphere does not 
automatically translate into receptivity to the need to uphold the civilian–combatant 
distinction. On the contrary, these military actors are especially keen to foster 
contact with civilians, as they understand that sustained interaction with civilian 
actors can help them meet their own goals. 
 
The second reason to examine civil–military training spaces is that doing so enriches 
and complements the investigation of civil–military interaction in operational 
contexts. As mentioned, this study is primarily interested in frontline actors, rather 
than high-level policymakers or elites. Almost all of the actors in the civil–military 
training programmes are returning from frontline work in the field, on a break 
between stints, or preparing for a new mission. At their most useful, the 
programmes establish a temporary space where these international actors can take 
stock of and make sense of their experience in the field. Trainees bring their 
knowledge and experiences with them from the operational context, and their 
unique individual experiences also shape their engagement with the lessons. In this 
respect, there is a natural overlap with Part III of this study. Trainees’ first-hand 
accounts of their experiences in deployment zones offer granular, thick descriptions 
of how contests over distinction materialize in the operational context.397 To varying 
                                                
397 Some stories from the field that relate to South Sudan have been shifted to Part III of this study. 
 106 
degrees, these training grounds also bring civilian and military actors together in 
face-to-face interaction. 
 
Third, rather than measuring how well the training programmes mimic the ‘real’ 
world, the present study looks at the artificial aspects of the training, showcasing 
facets of distinction that are often hidden from view. Simulation exercises, for 
example, afford an opportunity to observe complex patterns of interaction as if in 
slow motion. Trainees can literally pause the action as a simulation exercise unfolds, 
and they might even be granted a chance at a do-over. This kind of iterative process 
is rarely witnessed in other contexts. It is also through these types of exercises that 
tensions between competing ideals start to emerge: commitments that seem possible 
to uphold simultaneously in the relevant texts, or in the classroom, suddenly rub up 
against each other, and trainees must negotiate this friction. This aspect of training 
thus begins to edge closer to the operational context.  
 
On a final note, while their topical focus renders these training programmes 
especially relevant for the present study, there is another benefit to having the civil–
military paradigm track along with the civilian–combatant distinction in IHL. The 
alignment could potentially bolster compliance with the legal rules on targeting in 
the conduct of hostilities, as the civil–military dichotomy orders actors in war into 
an approximation of IHL’s civilian–combatant distinction. 398  Undermining this 
prospect, however, is the fact that the civil–military paradigm is not imbued with an 
ethos of separation, but of bridged spheres. There is also a sense in which this 
alignment might actually be problematic. That is, because the civil–military paradigm 
resonates so well with the dominant vision of distinction, it perpetuates the deeply 
embedded assumption that the civilian–combatant divide is the most important 
distinction in operation. The awkward terminology of ‘humanitarian civil–military 
                                                
398 On military training and IHL compliance, more generally, see Elizabeth Stubbins Bates, ‘Towards 
Effective Military Training in International Humanitarian Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 96, 
No. 895/6, 2015, pp. 795–816. 
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relations’399 encapsulates this attempt to graft everything onto a binary logic, as does 
the treatment of humanitarian–peacekeeper interactions as a form of civilian–
military relations (see below). This kind of thinking elides other important contests, 
such as those cutting along a civilian–civilian fault line. 
 
4.2.2 Overview of the training programmes 
 
At each of the three training grounds examined here, trainers disseminate civil–
military guidelines that govern the conduct of international actors in armed conflict. 
These guidelines contain operational guidance drawn from IHL and other bodies of 
law, and the guidelines, themselves, are typically regarded as a form of non-binding 
or ‘soft’ law.400 The most widely cited guidelines are: the ‘Oslo Guidelines’ on the 
use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief;401 the ‘MCDA 
Guidelines’ on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United 
Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies; 402 the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC) Reference Paper on Civil–Military Relationship in 
Complex Emergencies;403 and the IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of 
Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys. 404  While civil–military 
guidelines have traditionally been developed with respect to international military 
interventions (e.g. the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan), they 
                                                
399 Used primarily by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 
400 See, e.g., Gabriella Venturini, ‘International Disaster Response Law in Relation to Other Branches of 
International Law’, in Andrea de Guttry, Marco Gestri and Gabritella Venturini (Eds.), International 
Disaster Response Law (Asser Press, 2012), pp. 45–64, 53 (treating the IASC guidance as soft law). 
401 UN OCHA, Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, November 
2007, available at: 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Oslo%20Guidelines%20ENGLISH%20(November%2
02007).pdf (‘Oslo Guidelines’). 
402 UN OCHA, Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian 
Activities in Complex Emergencies (March 2003), available at: 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/01.%20MCDA%20Guidelines%20March%2003%20R
ev1%20Jan06.pdf (‘MCDA Guidelines’). 
403 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Civil–Military Relationship in Complex Emergency: A Reference Paper 
(2004), available at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4289ea8c4.pdf (‘IASC Reference Paper’). 
404 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian 
Convoys (February 2013), available at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/523189ab4.pdf (‘IASC 
Guidelines’).  
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are increasingly generated in connection with UN peacekeeping missions.405 This 
context-specific guidance engages directly with the global guidelines cited above, 
often identifying the most relevant aspects of the international guidelines.406 In the 
proceeding sections, the three training programmes are briefly outlined. 
 
NATO CIMIC training 
 
In terms of contemporary global trends, international governments are tying 
humanitarian assistance ever more closely to political and security goals while, at the 
same time, military forces are increasingly receiving mandates and funding to work 
closely with humanitarian actors. 407 More and more, military forces are interacting 
with the same local populations that humanitarian actors typically engage with to 
deliver assistance. 408  The NATO CIMIC training programme examined here 
responds to all of these trends and prepares actors to adapt to this state of affairs.  
 
The one-week Functional Specialist CIMIC course is run by the NATO Multi-
National Civil–Military Cooperation Group (MNCG) and takes place in Motta di 
Livenza, Italy. It has the stated goal of providing trainees with a basic understanding 
of NATO CIMIC policies, principles and tasks.409 The training is specifically geared 
towards ‘functional specialists’ – soldiers with a civilian area of expertise, such as 
medicine or psychology. Serving as ‘CIMIC personnel’ in NATO missions, these 
individuals bridge the gap between military institutions and civilian organizations. 
CIMIC, or civil–military cooperation, is the main rubric under which NATO 
                                                
405 These have been developed in contexts including Haiti, the DRC, Sudan and South Sudan. For access 
to publically available guidelines, see UN OCHA, Civil–Military Coordination Co-ordination Tools, available at 
http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/publications. Discussed in 
Victoria Metcalfe and Michelle Berg, ‘Country-Specific Civil–Military Coordination Guidelines’, 
Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, August 2012. 
406 Metcalfe and Berg, supra, p. 1.  
407 Lisa Schirch, ‘Research Gaps on Civil–Military Policy Trends’, Humanitarian Practice Network, May 
2014, available at: http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-61/research-gaps-on-
civil–military-policy-trends. 
408 Schirch, supra. 
409  NATO Multi-National CIMIC Group, Functional Specialist Course, available at: 
http://www.cimicgroup.org/Cimic%20Courses/cimic_courses/cimic_functional_specialist_course_cfsc. 
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soldiers engage with civilian actors. CIMIC is a specific variant of civil–military 
relations – one that presupposes cooperation between the relevant actors. This 
terminology, and that of ‘civil–military dialogue’,410 is also employed to govern 
interactions with (civilian) humanitarian actors.  
 
NATO’s approach to civil–military relationships is organized around the 
achievement of military objectives. Military actors learn about, and work closely 
with, civilian actors in order to fulfil the military mission.411 The civilian activities 
that CIMIC units engage in are considered part of a range of non-combat tools a 
commander may employ ‘to dominate whatever landscape is being faced’.412  A 
landscape might refer to the media, the civilian population, intelligence or even 
broader nation-building objectives.413 When military actors deliver services to the 
local population as part of CIMIC, they do not do so to provide assistance to those 
in need, per se, but to ensure force protection and to win ‘hearts and minds’.414 The 
aim is to ‘create civil–military conditions that will offer the Commander the greatest 
possible moral, material and tactical advantages’.415  
 
 Civi l–mil i tary re lat ions at  SWEDINT 
 
The Swedish Armed Forces offer a two-week training programme on Civil–Military 
Relations (CMR) at the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT), 
located on a military base an hour outside of Stockholm. The course aims at 
                                                
410 Simone Haysom and Ashley Jackson, ‘“You Don’t Need to Love Us”: Civil–Military Relations in 
Afghanistan, 2002–2013’, Stability, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2013, p. 2. 
411 Michael Pugh, ‘Civil–Military Relations in Peace Support Operations: Hegemony or Emancipation?’, 
Overseas Development Institute Seminar on Aid and Politics, February 2001, available at: 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/events-documents/3774.pdf (‘ODI Seminar’). 
Citing Western European Union, WEU 1999 – WEU (1999), WEU Draft Concept on Civil–Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC), WEU Brussels, WEU- DMS 99246, 17 February 1999.  
412  Raj Rana, ‘Contemporary Challenges in the Civil–Military Relationship: Complementarity or 
Incompatibility?’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86, No. 855, 2004, pp. 565–591, 573–574. 
413 Ibid., p. 574. 
414 Georg Frerks, ‘Who Are They? Encountering International and Local Civilians in Civil–Military 
Interaction’, in Gerard Lucius and Sebastiaan Rietjens (Eds.), Effective Civil–Military Interaction in Peace 
Operations: Theory and Practice (Springer, 2016), pp. 29–44, 31. 
415 WEU Draft Concept on CIMIC, supra. 
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preparing international civilian, military and police actors to cooperate and 
coordinate with each other in international peace support operations under the aegis 
of the UN, the EU or NATO. The relations of interest in this training programme 
are those between soldiers or peacekeepers working for an international mission, on 
the one hand, and the wide array of local and international civilian actors in the 
conflict context, on the other. The training also responds to the fact that 
international military forces play an increasingly prominent role in crisis response 
and peace support operations. In an effort to help trainees learn the requisite skills, 
the training makes use of innovative ‘mixed reality’416 simulation exercises.   
 
The CMR training is not a course run by, or devoted to the practices of, the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). However, many of 
the trainees are preparing to serve as peacekeepers in UN missions. The SWEDINT 
training thus provides some coverage of the OCHA approach to civil–military 
relations, which is very different from the NATO CIMIC approach outlined 
previously. OCHA is tasked with overseeing the relationships between various 
international UN actors, and it plays a particularly active role in settings with an 
integrated UN mission. 417  OCHA is also the UN agency responsible for 
humanitarian coordination, and it guides what the UN terms ‘humanitarian civil–
military’ relations. As noted previously, this terminology fuses the humanitarian 
sphere with the traditional civil–military relations paradigm. In contrast to NATO’s 
CIMIC approach, OCHA uses the framework of civil–military coordination, or CM-
Coord. While CIMIC presupposes cooperation – which can include joint planning 
and shared assets – OCHA keeps the level of interaction open. Typically, OCHA 
aims for a more modest arrangement of coordination, or simple co-existence. Co-
existence involves, at most, information sharing about the needs of the local 
                                                
416 ‘Mixed Reality’ brings together virtual reality exercises with other forms of simulation, such as live role 
play.  
417  UN OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Civil–Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord)’, available at: 
http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/overview. 
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population and the movements of humanitarian actors.418 Unlike CIMIC, UN CM-
Coord emphasizes civilian leadership; when it brings civilian and military actors into 
dialogue, its aim is not to win a military mission.  
 
 Comprehensive  approaches at  Zi f  
 
The final training programme analysed here is the Comprehensive Approach in 
Multi-Dimensional Peace Operations (CAMPO). This week-long programme is run 
by the German Centre for International Peace Operations (Zif),419 and it takes place 
at the Akademie Schmöckwitz outside of Berlin. It is facilitated by training staff 
from Zif and the Command and Staff College of the German Armed Forces in 
Hamburg, and involves guest lectures by high-level actors such as UN diplomats. 
The stated aim of the CAMPO training programme is to prepare trainees to follow a 
comprehensive approach when deploying multi-dimensional peacekeeping 
operations. Participants include a mixture of civilian and military actors, most of 
whom are engaged in EU or UN missions. Because of the dominant presence of 
UN peacekeeping actors at the CAMPO programme, trainees also engage quite 
heavily with the UN OCHA CM-Coord approach. 
 
At all three of the training grounds, civilian and military trainers deliver the 
classroom sessions. Both NATO and SWEDINT invite international humanitarian 
actors who are active practitioners to supplement the lessons delivered by non-
humanitarian trainers. Some of the (non-humanitarian) civilian trainers have either 
previously worked as humanitarian actors or have extensive experience of engaging 
with humanitarian actors. It is the invited humanitarian trainers who do most of the 
work of imparting a vision of distinction to the trainees. They hope to deepen the 
military’s appreciation for humanitarian principles and to enrich the military’s 
                                                
418 Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer (Eds.), ‘Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in 
Military–Humanitarian Relations’, Humanitarian Policy Group Report, March 2006, p. 13. 
419  In German: Zentrum fur Internationale Friedenseinsatz (Zif). English description of course: Zif, 
‘Comprehensive Approaches to Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Operations’, available at: 
http://www.zif-berlin.org/en/training/zif-training-courses/specialization-courses/campo.html. 
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understanding of the diversity of international civilian actors. 420 While some of the 
trainers are of a more academic bent, very few have extensive formal legal training. 
421 This reflects the fact that these civil–military training programmes are designed 
to practically prepare international actors to engage in comprehensive missions.  
 
4.3 Everyday distinction practices in the Pedagogical realm 
 
This study introduces the concept of everyday distinction practices, which refers to 
the day-to-day competent performances that international humanitarian actors 
engage in to operationalize distinction.422 There are important differences between 
the performance of these distinction practices and their materialization in the 
Pedagogical and Kinetic realms, and it is partly because of this variation that each 
realm produces a unique insight about distinction. The present discussion outlines 
in broad strokes the form that everyday distinction practices take at the civil–
military training grounds, highlighting the appeal to law, the adherence to principles 
and the invocation of local perceptions. The focus is primarily on the way in which 
humanitarian actors articulate their vision of distinction; other actors are brought 
more fully into the discussion in Chapter 5. 
 
 4.3.1 The appeal to law 
 
The explicit appeal to law assumes two forms at the civil–military training grounds. 
First, humanitarian actors make direct references to international law, IHL or the 
Geneva Conventions. Second, they draw on operational civil–military guidelines. 
There is evident slippage in these appeals between a civilian–combatant binary and 
iterations of distinction that depart from this binary – the foremost example being a 
humanitarian–military distinction. This study argues that the ‘civilian plus’ circulates 
                                                
420 This is reminiscent of humanitarian actors who engage in joint doctrine development exercises with 
military actors. Discussed in Metcalfe and Berg, supra. 
421 Across the three training programmes, the ICRC, MSF and OCHA trainers at CIMIC stand out as 
having the strongest grasp of international law and legal principles. 
422 See also Chapter 1. 
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in such reconceptualizations of distinction. When humanitarian actors appeal to a 
humanitarian–military fault line, they do not depict themselves as ‘mere civilians’ 
who are separated from combatants by a bright line. Implicitly, and in some 
instances overtly, they carve out space for themselves from the wider civilian 
category. As they do so, they draw on IHL for authority.423 It is important to 
recognize that this muddling of distinction can be detected in research reports, high-
level pronouncements and public communications. A report by the Overseas 
Development Institute, for example, discusses how integrated missions and ‘hearts 
and minds’ initiatives are seen by humanitarian actors as ‘challenging the distinction 
between humanitarian and military action required by international humanitarian 
law’.424 This same report refers to the distinction between ‘military, civilian, and 
humanitarian functions’, as well as ‘the distinction between humanitarian and 
politico-military responses’.425 It is thus not only in the utterances of humanitarian 
actors at the training grounds that different iterations of distinction proliferate. 
 
Turning now to the public communication of humanitarian organizations, 
humanitarian actors – ranging from the ICRC to UN humanitarian actors and 
humanitarian NGOs – routinely make appeals to IHL’s principle of distinction. 
Such direct appeals can primarily be found in policy and strategic documents, as well 
as public communications addressing issues of humanitarian access and security. 
Amongst all international humanitarian actors, the ICRC most consistently cites 
IHL and explicitly ties the protection of humanitarian actors to IHL’s principle of 
distinction. This makes sense, given the ICRC’s positioning as the custodian of 
IHL.426 An emblematic ICRC statement is the following: ‘the fundamental principle 
                                                
423 Although the focus here is on the civilian category, note also that the combatant and military 
categories are often used interchangeably. Not all members of armed forces are combatants under IHL – 
a key example being medical and religious personnel. Also, there is no combatant status, as such, in 
NIACs. See Rule 3 of ‘ICRC Customary IHL Database’, supra; see also Chapter 2. In a practical sense, 
equating all ‘military actors’ with combatants may generate confusion about the status of civilian 
members of military or peacekeeping forces; it may also mislead about the status of armed peacekeepers 
belonging to a UN mission that is not deemed a party to the conflict. 
424 Wheeler and Harmer (Eds.), supra, p. 2.  
425 Ibid., pp. 14, 46. 
426 See Chapter 3. 
 114 
of [IHL] according to which a distinction must always be made between combatants 
and non-combatants is the cornerstone of the protection afforded to the personnel 
of humanitarian organizations’.427 The preamble to the Red Cross Code of Conduct 
also states that, in the event of armed conflict, the Code will be interpreted in 
accordance with IHL.428  
 
Amongst UN actors, UN-OCHA makes the clearest pronouncements on 
distinction. It also frequently swaps a civilian–combatant distinction for a 
humanitarian–military one. OCHA’s ‘CM-Coord Handbook’ has a section entitled 
‘Distinction between Humanitarian and Military Actors’. It provides: ‘Humanitarian 
organizations are civilian organizations and unarmed. They rely on the protection 
provided by IHL and the acceptance of their humanitarian mandate by all parties.’429 
OCHA also cites the Geneva Conventions as the source of the principle of 
distinction ‘between combatants and non-combatants’, equating the latter with those 
no longer participating in hostilities. OCHA further describes the civilian–military 
distinction used in CM-Coord as having been derived from the IHL principle of 
distinction, and notes that it ‘specifically refers to the distinction between military 
and humanitarian actors’. Finally, the OCHA CM-Coord guidance stipulates that, if 
military and humanitarian actors ‘carry out similar activities, the distinction between 
them and their mandates becomes very difficult to maintain, even if humanitarians 
are not cooperating directly with the military’.430 
 
As for humanitarian NGOs, the Humanitarian Charter associated with the Sphere 
Handbook 431  explicitly cites IHL’s principle of distinction and frames it as a 
                                                
427 ICRC, ‘Respect for and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organizations’, ICRC Report, 
ICRC Resource Centre, 19 September 1998. 
428 ICRC, Red Cross Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (ICRC, 1996), Preamble. 
429 UN OCHA, Civil–Military Coordination Handbook (OCHA, 2015), available at: 
https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/CMCoord%20Field%20Handbook%20v1.0_Sept2015_0.p
df (‘OCHA CM-Coord Handbook’). 
430 Ibid. 
431 The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, 2011 edition 
(Practical Action Publishing, 2011) (‘Sphere Handbook’).  
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civilian–combatant distinction. However, it refers solely to the protection of the 
local civilian population in armed conflict, and not to the status of humanitarian 
actors, as such. The same Charter also affirms the primacy of the humanitarian 
imperative, which holds that ‘action should be taken to prevent or alleviate human 
suffering arising out of disaster or conflict, and that nothing should override this 
principle’. 432  Nothing is said explicitly about the compatibility of upholding 
distinction and delivering on the humanitarian imperative. While these ideals are 
successfully held in balance in the civil–military training programmes, they begin to 
diverge in the Kinetic realm (see Part III). Coming back to public communications, 
individual humanitarian NGOs also draw on the principle of distinction and 
disseminate a humanitarian–military divide. One large NGO, CARE, refers to 
distinction as the central principle guiding its engagement with military actors.433  
 
The civil–military guidelines mentioned previously also highlight the importance 
of distinction, often citing the need for separation between military and civilian 
(including humanitarian) spheres. 434  The guidelines stipulate that distinction is 
achieved by: avoiding the co-location of humanitarian and military actors; ensuring 
that military actors wear a uniform at all times; clearly identifying vehicles as civilian 
or military; and promoting distinction in public communication and conduct.435 The 
guidelines reiterate that military engagement in humanitarian assistance is only 
permitted in exceptional or unavoidable circumstances. 436  They also include a 
number of other rules that implicate distinction, such as: ‘last resort’ rules pertaining 
to the use of military assets, including armoured vehicles, air assets and weapons, by 
humanitarian actors; the ‘red lines’437 of humanitarian actors; and rules regarding the 
creation of ‘area security’ by military actors. Despite this concrete engagement with 
                                                
432 ‘Sphere Handbook’, supra, p. 20.  
433 CARE International, Policy Framework for CARE International’s Relations with Military Forces, 2009, 
available at: http://expert.care.at/downloads/careexpert/CARE_CIV-MIL_Policy.pdf. 
434 Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies, ‘VOICE Position on Civil–Military 
Relations in Humanitarian Action: Recommendations to the European Union’, 2009 (‘VOICE Paper’).  
435 Metcalfe and Berg, supra, p. 1. 
436 Ibid., p. 2. 
437 This typically refers to an upper limit of violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities or activities 
that humanitarian actors are not willing to tolerate 
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distinction, a conflicting theme running throughout the guidelines is the 
interdependency of diverse international actors operating in armed conflict.438 At the 
level of the text, these ideas of interdependency and distinction seem possible to 
observe simultaneously. International actors can take what they need from each 
other whilst also remaining safely ensconced in their respective spheres. There are 
moments in all three training programmes, however, when this notion starts to 
strain. While international humanitarian actors call for limited contact, other 
international actors are keen to discover the possibilities that exist for collaboration. 
 
Notably, none of the sources canvassed here imposes the burden of implementing 
distinction on humanitarian (or other civilian) actors. Further, many distinction-
related rules in the civil–military guidelines explicitly demand something of military 
actors. The latter are to wear uniforms, identify their vehicles, communicate their 
combatant status and restrict direct involvement in humanitarian assistance. This 
squares with IHL rules. As noted in Chapter 1, IHL explicitly puts an onus on 
military actors and combatants to uphold distinction; the requirements of civilians in 
this respect tend to be more implicit. However, as an empirical matter, this study 
finds that international humanitarian actors frequently take the initiative to perform 
distinction practices. Intuiting that military actors have little incentive to maintain 
separation, humanitarian actors take it upon themselves to dissociate and physically 
distance themselves from military actors.  
 
 4.3.2 Adherence to the traditional humanitarian principles  
 
In addition to grounding their distinct status in international law, humanitarian 
actors draw upon the traditional humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, 
independence and (sometimes) neutrality to assert their humanitarianness. While an 
in-depth examination of these principles lies outside the scope of this study, the 
principles are outlined here in their traditional formulation in order to orient the 
                                                
438 ‘VOICE Paper’, supra. 
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reader. 439  First, humanity denotes that human suffering must be addressed 
wherever it is found.440 This is sometimes also referred to as the ‘humanitarian 
imperative’. In Pictet’s original formulation of the principles, humanity is positioned 
as the core principle at the top of a hierarchy.441 Today, the more common practice 
is to place the principles on equal footing. Second, the principle of neutrality 
requires that a humanitarian actor ‘may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any 
time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature’.442  In 
Pictet’s words: ‘Like the swimmer, who advances in the water but who drowns if he 
swallows it, the ICRC must reckon with politics without becoming a part of it.’443 
Third, the principle of impartiality denotes a commitment to focusing on the needs 
of individuals and the urgency of their distress, rather than discriminating on the 
basis of nationality, race, religious belief, class or political opinion.444 It is the needs-
based nature of humanitarian assistance that distinguishes it from other, politically 
oriented, activities. Finally, the principle of independence holds that it is not 
permissible for an outside power to influence or cause a humanitarian actor to 
deviate from his or her ideals. 445  Although the principle of independence 
emphasizes autonomy, the delivery of humanitarian assistance inevitably forces 
humanitarian actors to make contact with – or rely upon – warring parties, 
beneficiaries, donors and others. 446  
 
                                                
439 See: Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, Commentary (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 
1979) (‘Principles’); Denise Plattner, ‘ICRC Neutrality and Neutrality in Humanitarian Assistance’, 
International Review of the Red Cross, No. 311, 1996; Francois Bugnion, The International Committee of the Red 
Cross and the Protection of War Victims (Geneva: Macmillan, 2003). 
440 ‘IASC Reference Paper’, supra. 
441  Pictet, supra (‘Principles’). Listing the seven fundamental principles hierarchically as humanity, 
impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality. 
442 See IFRC, ‘The Seven Fundamental Principles: Neutrality’, available at: http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-
we-are/vision-and-mission/the-seven-fundamental-principles/neutrality/. 
443 Quoted in Slim, supra, p. 67, FN 7 (‘Humanitarian Ethics’).  
444  See IFRC, ‘The Seven Fundamental Principles: Impartiality’, available at: 
http://www.ifrc.org/en/who-we-are/vision-and-mission/the-seven-fundamental-
principles/impartiality/. See also: Article 70(1) of AP I; Article 18(2) of AP II. 
445 Pictet, supra, pp. 61–62 (‘Principles’). 
446 Slim, supra, p. 73 (‘Humanitarian Ethics’). 
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The ICRC commits to following the humanitarian principles in all of its 
humanitarian work, and these principles are enshrined in its Code of Conduct.447 
Hundreds of humanitarian agencies aside from the ICRC espouse the same general 
commitment, having signed up to the Code of Conduct and subscribed to a Red 
Cross meta-narrative.448 It was proposed in Chapter 3 that IHL’s narrow vision of 
humanitarianness is shaped by its Red Cross fantasy. When non–Red Cross actors 
exert themselves to demonstrate their likeness to Red Cross workers, their bid for 
humanitarianness, in some respects, perpetuates the very Red Cross fantasy they 
seek to surmount. A more general observation is that there is considerable variation 
across the humanitarian community with respect to commitment to the 
principles.449 This is the case at the most abstract and rhetorical level, even before 
one attends to the complexities of on-the-ground implementation. 450  In 
contemporary practice, many humanitarian actors do not claim to be neutral. 451 A 
commitment to humanity, impartiality and independence is shared by a wide array 
of humanitarian actors, but it is evident that these terms mean different things to 
different people. What is primarily of interest for the present discussion is how the 
traditional humanitarian principles connect to IHL’s principle of distinction. 
 
This study contends that international humanitarian actors cultivate a certain 
amount of ambiguity around the relationship between distinction and the 
traditional humanitarian principles. It is only once one enters the Kinetic realm 
that tensions between distinction and the humanitarian principles become 
impossible to ignore; a wedge materializes between competing ideals.452 Staying with 
                                                
447 See: Peter Walker, ‘Cracking the Code: The Genesis, Use and Future of the Code of Conduct’, 
Disasters, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2005, pp. 323–336; Hilhorst, supra, pp. 353, 361 (discussing the difference 
between the traditional humanitarian principles and the code of conduct). 
448 Katherine Davies, Continuity, Change and Contest: Meanings of ‘Humanitarian’ from the ‘Religion of Humanity’ 
to the Kosovo War (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, 2012); Urvashi Aneja-Bod, Contesting the 
Humanitarian Regime in Political Emergencies: International NGO Policies and Practices in Sri Lanka & Afghanistan, 
1990– 2010 (unpublished DPhil thesis, 2013), p. 7; De Waal, supra, p. 135. 
449 On the Dunantist/Wilsonian typology, see Stoddard, supra.  
450 Discussed also in Koddenbrock, supra, pp. 57, 63. 
451 On neutrality, see Hugo Slim, supra, p. 70 (‘Humanitarian Ethics’); de Waal, supra, pp. 76–77. 
452 Leaving the principle of distinction aside, a recognized dilemma in humanitarian assistance is that 
between the principle of humanity, on the one hand, and a commitment to impartiality and neutrality, on 
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the Pedagogical realm for now, humanitarian actors in the civil–military training 
programmes frame commitment to the humanitarian principles as compatible with 
distinction. More than this, adherence to the humanitarian principles is seen to set 
them apart from other kinds of actors, because these principles are not – at least in 
theory – designed for non-humanitarian actors.453 Further in this vein, the principles 
can be described as part of a distancing discourse that enables the defence of 
boundaries.454 They comprise the ‘long spoon’ that humanitarian actors use in order 
to avoid being corrupted by other actors. 455 These dynamics are explored in a wider 
literature that grapples with how, or whether, humanitarian actors might ever be 
separated from politics.456  
 
A final issue to consider is the precise legal status of the traditional humanitarian 
principles. This study treats the traditional principles as quasi-legal.457 While they 
form part of a larger legal regime relating to humanitarian assistance,458 they are 
largely moral values that guide operational practice rather than strict legal 
requirements. The legal status of the principles is debated by (legal) scholars. Some 
take the view that following the humanitarian principles is an IHL requirement459 or 
that following the principles allows humanitarian actors to claim IHL protections.460 
These arguments can easily be discerned with respect to the principle of impartiality, 
because IHL explicitly requires humanitarian assistance to be impartial in 
character.461 However, it is less clear what IHL requires from humanitarian actors in 
terms of neutrality and independence. Further, the concept of ‘humanity’ as a 
                                                                                                                                    
the other. Sometimes, providing assistance to populations in need (humanity) may require humanitarian 
actors to accept conditions imposed by the parties to the armed conflicts, thus violating neutrality and 
impartiality. Discussed in Barrat, supra, p. 344.  
453  Joost Herman, ‘International Law and the Humanitarian Space in the Twenty-First Century: 
Challenged Relationships’, in Zwitter et al. (Eds.), supra, pp. 11–32, p. 31; Macak, supra, p. 447.  
454 Fernando and Hilhorst, supra, p. 300. 
455 Nicholas Leader, ‘Proliferating Principles; or How to Sup with the Devil Without Getting Eaten’, 
Disasters, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1998, pp. 288–308. 
456 See Barnett and Weiss (Eds.), supra, Chapter 1.  
457 Herman, supra, p. 31. See also Macak, supra, p. 447. 
458 See Aneja-Bod, supra. 
459 HPCR, supra, p. 4. 
460 Kuijt, supra, pp. 66–67. 
461 See Chapter 3. 
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traditional humanitarian principle refers to a very specific idea, and it is not to be 
confused with the IHL concept that governs the conduct of hostilities.462 On the 
other side of the debate, some scholars contend that there is nothing legal about the 
traditional humanitarian principles. These scholars depict the principles as having 
been developed in isolation from law,463 and as bureaucratic slogans.464 As stated 
above, this study takes the middle ground between these opposing perspectives. It 
does not espouse the view that the four main humanitarian principles are strictly 
required under IHL, nor does it claim that they have nothing to do with law. This 
outlook suggests that, if a conflict emerges between IHL’s principle of distinction 
and the traditional humanitarian principles, from a legal perspective, distinction 
should be prioritized. However, as the discussion of South Sudan in later chapters 
shows, distinction does not necessarily serve as a trump, in practice. 
 
It merits emphasis that international humanitarian actors who espouse the 
traditional humanitarian principles do not always (or only) rely upon them for legal 
protection. Rather, humanitarian actors believe that these principles offer moral 
guidance, ensure services are provided appropriately, and afford them actual 
protection on the ground. With regard to this last point, humanitarian actors wish to 
demonstrate that their agenda is purely a humanitarian one, and that they are not 
implicated in the conflicts in which they operate.465 This latter aspect alludes to the 
important role of perception, which is elaborated upon in the following section.  
 
 4.3.3 The invocation of local perceptions: The ‘phantom local’ 
 
This study proposes that humanitarian distinction practices have a performance 
component that is geared towards influencing the perceptions of local onlookers. 466 
                                                
462 As explained in Chapter 2, the principle of humanity in IHL is balanced with military necessity in the 
conduct of hostilities. 
463 De Waal, supra, p. 153. 
464 Koddenbrock, supra, p. 63. 
465 Mackintosh, supra, p. 129. 
466 The term ‘local’ is employed very loosely, referring to someone other than a fellow international actor 
who intervenes in or responds to a conflict. It can refer to national, regional or foreign actors. 
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The important role assigned to perception is reflected in pronouncements that 
neutrality is ‘in the eye of the beholder’467 and that impartiality and independence 
must be ‘experienced and perceived by the outside world’.468 Whatever the complex 
interests, needs, thoughts, experiences and desires of the local actors in armed 
conflicts, they are effectively subsumed when the humanitarian performance of 
distinction positions them as an audience. More than this, routinized humanitarian 
distinction practices tend to replace the actual perceptions of these local actors with 
the imputed perceptions of an amorphous local spectator. To capture the way in 
which humanitarian actors collapse a plurality of local audiences into a composite 
observer, this study introduces the figure of the ‘phantom local’. 469  As 
conceptualized here, the ‘phantom local’ embodies three sets of observers: armed 
actors (attacker-perceivers), local authorities (authority-perceivers) and war-affected 
populations (beneficiary-perceivers).470 This merger effectively conflates those who 
might use violence against humanitarian actors, those who might impede the 
delivery of humanitarian services and those who might not trust humanitarians to 
deliver appropriate life-saving services. Scholars note how the fear of attack and 
violence shapes the humanitarian imagination,471 and how humanitarian actors can 
be fearful and mistrustful of even the individuals they seek to help.472   
 
While the Pedagogical realm is a step removed from the operational context, local 
perceptions are routinely invoked at the civil–military training grounds. Typically, 
                                                
467 Hilhorst, supra, p. 358. 
468 Thurer, supra, p. 60. 
469 Inspired by Walter Lippman, The Phantom Public (Transaction Publishers, 2006[1926]) (referring to a 
monolithic public with mythical and fictional qualities); Meredith Rossner et al., The Process and Dynamics of 
Restorative Justice: Research on Forum Sentencing (Sydney: University of Western Sydney, 2013), p. 43 (referring 
to the phantom magistrate); Kennedy, supra, p. 29 (referring to the imaginary bystander of human rights 
initiatives) (‘Dark Sides’). 
470 Other important audiences that are not discussed here include donors and the media. See, e.g.: 
Alexander Cooley and James Ron, ‘The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political 
Economy of Transnational Action’. International Security, Vol. 27, 2002, pp. 5–39; Krause, supra, p. 48; 
Koddenbrock, supra, pp. 56–57. 
471 Fast, supra, p. 3 (the security practices of humanitarian actors ‘help to create a situation in which fear 
threatens to eclipse the humanitarian imagination’). See also Chapter 3. 
472  Mark Duffield, ‘Risk-Management and the Fortified Aid Compound: Everyday Life in Post-
Interventionary Society’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 4, 2010, pp. 453–474, 471; Roth, supra, 
p. 183 (‘Paradoxes of Aid’); Hilhorst, supra, p. 361. 
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humanitarian actors pair the appeal to law with an emphasis on the need to appease 
local onlookers. In the Kinetic realm, the ascribed perceptions of the ‘phantom 
local’ do most of the heavy lifting when humanitarian actors urge other international 
actors to support their vision of distinction.  
 
It should be underscored that, as individuals and a collective, humanitarian actors 
are intellectually aware that there is no such thing as a monolithic observer 
witnessing their every move. The promulgation of the ‘phantom local’ in everyday 
practice co-exists with concerted attempts by practitioners, scholars and 
policymakers to understand the actual views of different local actors.473 Generating 
definitive findings on whether, when, and how local actors draw distinctions 
between different kinds of international actors has proven to be an enormous 
challenge. Perceptions of distinction are transient, context-specific and ever-shifting; 
they are highly dependent not only on how a humanitarian organization presents 
itself in a given moment, but also on the constellation of international actors who 
were historically active or are currently active in the setting in question.474  
 
This study argues that there is a cognitive dissonance at play with respect to 
humanitarian actors’ wielding of local perceptions.475 Whatever humanitarian actors 
might know to be true about the multiplicity of local actors tends to be suppressed 
in their day-to-day implementation of distinction practices. As this study’s empirical 
findings attest, there is something about distinction – or, more precisely, the way in 
which local perceptions are rallied to distinction’s end – that engenders a flattening 
of local actors. When humanitarian actors invoke the ‘phantom local’, they hold up 
                                                
473 See: Abu-Sada (Ed.), supra (‘Eyes of Others’); Francois Cooren and Frederik Matte, ‘At the Limits of 
Perception: Humanitarian Principles in Action’, in Caroline Abu-Sada (Ed.), Dilemmas, Challenges, and 
Ethics of Humanitarian Action: Reflections on Médecins Sans Frontières Perception Project (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 2012), pp. 29–47 (‘Dilemmas’); Antonio Donini et al., ‘Mapping the 
Security Environment: Understanding the Perceptions of Local Communities, Peace Support Operations, 
and Assistance Agencies’, Feinstein International Famine Centre, June 2005 (‘Security’).  
474 Caroline Abu-Sada, ‘Introduction’, in Abu-Sada (Ed.), supra, p. 5 (‘Dilemmas’). Hugo Slim, ‘How We 
Look: Perceptions of Humanitarian Action’, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Presentation April 2004, 
available at: http://www.hugoslim.com/Pdfs/How%20We%20Look.pdf (‘How We Look’).  
475 For an application of theories of cognitive dissonance to the field of humanitarian assistance, more 
broadly, see Marriage, supra. 
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the mirror of local perceptions to see how they, themselves, are reflected. These 
dynamics are captured nicely in Cooley’s concept of the ‘looking glass self’, which 
describes an individual’s ability to think about how he or she is perceived by 
others.476 There is insufficient evidence at this juncture to make definitive claims 
about the overall accuracy of what humanitarian actors see in the mirror.477 It is not 
the ambition of this study to fill this gap. Instead, the modest aim is to shed light on 
the ascribed perceptions of local actors – to offer a thick sociological description of 
what are, in essence, perceptions of perceptions. The primary concern is not 
whether a given perception is objectively correct, but that humanitarian actors 
believe something to be true and act accordingly.478 There are further layers to this 
excavation, as this study takes an interest in the hidden and ambiguous elements of 
humanitarian distinction practices. In her study of the Mende in Sierra Leone, 
Ferme describes how a mirror ‘mimetically doubles that which is in front without 
giving away that which is behind the reflection’.479 Understanding what is concealed, 
Ferme observes, is crucial to making sense of the visible.480 This highlights an 
immense advantage of integrating the perspectives of other (non-humanitarian) 
international actors into the present investigation. The suspicions these other actors 
voice, and even the way in which they gossip about humanitarian actors, bring 
hidden aspects of humanitarian distinction practices to the surface. This goes some 
distance to illuminating the actual functions of distinction. 
 
 
                                                
476 Charles Horton Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (New York, NY: Scribner, 1902). 
477 Swann and Ely’s notion of a ‘battle of wills’ speaks to this. The battle unfolds when there is a clash in 
perceptions between the ‘perceiver’ and the ‘target’ individual about the target’s self-conception. William 
Swann and Robin Ely, ‘Battle of Wills: Self-Verification versus Behavioral Confirmation’, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 46, pp. 1287–1302. See also Schirch, supra (citing the need for more 
evidence on actual local perceptions of distinction). 
478 This outlook is grounded in subjectivist ontology. It is informed by W.I. Thomas’ ‘Thomas theorem’, 
which stipulates that if we believe something to be real, its consequences are real enough because we 
behave as though it does exist. See W.I. Thomas, ‘The Relation of Research to the Social Process’, in 
Morris Janowitz, (Ed.), W.I. Thomas on Social Organization and Social Personality (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1966 [1931]), pp. 289–305. See also Mark J. Smith, Social Science in Question (London: Open 
University Press/SAGE, 1998). 
479 Mariane Ferme, The Underneath of Things: Violence, History and the Everyday in Sierra Leone (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2001), p. 7. 
480 Ferme, supra, p. 2. 
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Conclus ion  
 
This chapter has established that civil–military training grounds illuminate facets of 
distinction that cannot be discovered elsewhere. The conceptual alignment between 
the civil–military paradigm and the civilian–combatant distinction of IHL was 
presented as both a risk and an opportunity. While this setup is amenable to 
bolstering compliance with the IHL rule, the organizing framework also draws the 
eye towards the civilian–combatant divide, to the exclusion of other fault lines. An 
important contribution of this study is thus its investigation of how civilian–civilian 
tensions arise in these training settings. The chapter also introduced the everyday 
distinction practices that international humanitarian actors engage in, depicting three 
interwoven elements of law, principle and perception.  
 
As discussed, the conceptual messiness of distinction is apparent in the high-level 
communications of humanitarian actors. The ‘civilian plus’ circulates whenever 
humanitarian actors promulgate a binary that singles them out from other civilians; 
the humanitarian–military distinction constitutes the prime example of this. Further, 
at the level of text it may seem as though competing goods can be simultaneously 
achieved. Distinction can be respected, the guidelines imply, even as some actors are 
incentivized to demolish boundaries. It was also argued that humanitarian actors do 
not make clear and consistent claims about the relationship between distinction and 
the traditional humanitarian principles. This allows conflict to fester between 
distinction and the principle of humanity, until it subsequently erupts in the Kinetic 
realm. Finally, when humanitarian actors advocate for distinction, they often 
supplement legal arguments with an invocation of the ‘phantom local’. Here, they 
invite other international actors to look in the mirror that they hold, urging them to 
see the same reflection as they do. What they want, ultimately, is for other 
international actors to agree to the course of action that is dictated by these 
perceptions. While the invocation of an omnipresent observer is useful in this way, 
this study interrogates the manner in which it transforms local actors into an 
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audience for the performance of distinction. While this may not be the intention of 
humanitarian actors, the move interrupts and potentially overrides the actual needs 
and desires of local populations who are caught up in war. By taking seriously how 
other international actors critique the distinction practices of humanitarian actors, it 
is possible to discern what lies beneath these distinction practices – behind the 
reflection, so to speak. Chapter 5 delves into these dynamics in greater detail, 
exploring the empirical findings from the three civil–military training grounds. 
 
  
 126 
CHAPTER 5: THE CIRCULATION OF DISTINCTION  
AT THE CIVIL–MILITARY TRAINING GROUNDS 
 
Introduct ion 
 
This chapter investigates the way in which humanitarian distinction practices are 
implemented in the Pedagogical realm, exploring how qualities of humanitarianness, 
civilianness and combatantness are thought to attach to individuals. In the shared 
social space of civil–military training venues, humanitarian distinction practices are 
put to the test. Most of the actors at the training spaces do not espouse the same 
goals as humanitarian actors. They may entertain different visions of distinction or 
rank distinction further down their list of priorities. It is because of these varied 
outlooks that the training grounds are sites of struggle, and it is through these 
struggles that distinction is constituted and reconstituted. Eschewing the 
assumption that the most important divide is a civilian–combatant one, this chapter 
investigates a wide range of line-drawing practices and captures numerous 
distinctions at play. The discussion is organized into five main sections, addressing: 
(1) what the civilian–combatant distinction is; (2) who draws the line; (3) how the 
line is drawn; (4) where the line is drawn; and (5) how the line is erased. The 
question of why, which aims to uncover the underlying motivations of humanitarian 
distinction practices, is touched on at various points throughout the discussion. 
 
The chapter begins with an extended introductory section, which provides an 
overview of the empirical findings from the civil–military training grounds. A 
discovery that emerges early in this discussion is the haziness around the term 
‘distinction’, as deployed by international actors. When the IHL rule is disseminated 
to participants in the three training settings, it becomes clear that many actors view 
it as a negotiable concept rather than a hard and fast rule. As a power struggle 
ensues over who should forge distinction in practice, humanitarian actors proceed 
to implement the everyday distinction practices that were introduced in Chapter 4. 
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When they try to persuade other international actors to accede to their vision of 
distinction, they draw authority from IHL, soft law principles from civil–military 
guidelines, and the quasi-legal traditional humanitarian principles. Legal rules are 
thus explicitly cited, but law’s authority is routinely sublimated to concern about 
appearances. This escalates in the Kinetic realm, as explained in Part III. The 
‘phantom local’ serves as an important pivot point here, and the way in which local 
perceptions are leaned on highlights the instrumental function of distinction. A 
more general observation is that humanitarian actors enact distinction for more than 
simply a desire to comply with law or to secure legal protection. 
 
Further complexities come to light when the perspectives of other international 
actors are brought into the picture. International civilian and military actors detect a 
stubborn sense of exceptionalism underlying humanitarian distinction practices. 
They fault humanitarian actors for performing distinction too strictly, for doing so 
unevenly or for misrepresenting what the ‘phantom local’ sees. These other 
international actors accuse humanitarian actors of carving out a special status for 
themselves. Here, non-humanitarian actors downplay the extent to which they, too, 
actively single out humanitarian actors from the wider civilian category. The 
circulation of the ‘civilian plus’ figure attracts consternation from international 
civilian actors who cannot make legitimate claims to humanitarianness, as they fear 
their own civilianness might be undermined. This pushback gives more concrete 
form to the theoretical discussion in Part I about the relativization of civilianness. 
Meanwhile, some military actors imply that characteristics of combatantness can 
attach to humanitarian actors, especially when they become entangled in armed 
conflicts. Humanitarian actors who are seen to lack proper humanitarian credentials 
or standards of professionalism are also viewed as having the status of ‘civilian 
minus’. Significantly, even as international military actors argue that humanitarian 
actors are too enmeshed in the conflict, they actively foster contact with 
humanitarian actors and even engage in humanitarian-like tasks, themselves. 
Through such practices, these other international actors effectively dim, erase or 
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move the lines that humanitarian actors draw. It should be reiterated that the picture 
that is painted is not one of static statuses, though the ‘civilian plus’ and its 
corollaries are analytically helpful. Instead, international actors behave as though 
qualities of civilianness and combatantness float around, and the ‘phantom local’ 
assigns these qualities to individual actors as it sees fit.  
 
Each part of this discussion opens with an encounter between international actors. 
Drawing inspiration from Goffman, these encounters condense the practices and 
interactions of international actors into concentrated form.481 The vignettes anchor 
the analytical discussion that follows, foreshadowing the themes that are addressed. 
While the international humanitarian actor is, in a sense, the main character of this 
study, what is actually followed in this empirical investigation is the idea of 
distinction. This idea manifests in the lines that are drawn to differentiate between 
the various actors, and these processes of line-drawing reveal much about the 
shape-shifting nature of distinction.482 
 
5.1 The civilian–combatant distinction 
 
An enormous advantage of the Pedagogical realm is that it explicitly engages IHL’s 
principle of distinction, presenting an opportunity to investigate how various 
international actors understand this legal rule. When international actors reach for 
the bright line binary distinction associated with the dominant vision – and they do 
reach for it, repeatedly – what they tend to find in its place is a confused, fuzzy and 
fragmented idea. This complicated engagement with distinction, as it relates to the 
conduct of hostilities, serves as the shaky foundation upon which the status of 
international humanitarian actors is overlaid. 
                                                
481 Goffman defines an encounter as the ‘natural unit of social organization in which focused interaction 
occurs’. See Erving Goffman, Encounters; Two Studies in the Sociology of Interaction (Eastford, CT: Martino 
Fine Books, 2013[1961]), p. 8. 
482 This approach is guided by Desmond’s articulation of relational ethnography. See Desmond, supra, p. 
548. See also Krause, supra, p. 110 (on the need to examine such line-drawing practices in the 
humanitarian field, specifically). 
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‘ I t ’ s  very rough to say “c iv i l ians”’  
 
In the elaborate fictional land of the Batari people, an armed conflict is being fought between 
state armed forces and the Batari Liberation Army fighters. Members of the Batari civilian 
population are caught in between, and they are in urgent need of life-saving humanitarian 
services as well as protection from the ongoing violence. It is into this context that the 
CAMPO trainees are plunged, tasked with designing and implementing an international 
response to the unfolding crisis. Initially, the trainees are arranged into ‘mixed’ groups of 
international actors; each group contains a police officer, a peacekeeper, a human rights 
officer and so on. The groups are tasked with identifying who is a civilian in the land of 
Batari. Remarks on the haziness of the civilian category fly around the room, as trainees 
struggle in earnest to come to a consensus. In an earlier training session, the CAMPO 
trainees have learned that ‘It’s very rough to say “civilians”’, and that the civilian is ‘not 
that easy to describe’. Now, they wonder: Is it only the members of the local Batari 
population who are truly civilians under international law? What about individuals 
belonging to the non-Batari population who also reside in the area? Might some of the 
Batari Liberation Army fighters who do not carry weapons be civilians? To cope with this 
complexity, one group establishes different compartments in the civilian category. They 
differentiate unarmed liberation fighters from members of the local population, labelling them 
as different kinds of civilians. The other groups mostly arrive at indeterminate answers to 
this question. At the outset of the next exercise, the CAMPO trainer instructs trainees to 
leave their ‘mixed’ groups behind and gather in what he jokingly refers to as their ‘single 
ethnicities’. He tells them to sort themselves into four groups representing four possible 
categories of international actor: Group 1: humanitarian and development; Group 2: 
civilian; Group 3: military; and Group 4: police. The civilian group, the CAMPO trainer 
explains, includes international civilian actors who are ‘political and diplomatic and 
everything’. Everything, evidently, except for humanitarian (or development) actors.483 After 
Group 1, comprised of humanitarian actors, concludes their presentation, the military trainer 
invites Group 2, comprised of civilians, to the front of the room with the following prompt: 
‘OK, now it’s the civilians, since we are already in that sector.’  
 
This part of the discussion explores how the frontline practitioners who attend 
civil–military training programmes learn about, and conceptualize, IHL’s civilian–
combatant distinction. In the scholarly literature on civil–military relations, civilian 
actors are generally treated as a bounded group, juxtaposed with military actors as 
                                                
483 Two further issues that are not examined here include: (1) the pairing of humanitarian actors with 
actors carrying out long-term development work; and (2) the treatment of police actors as civilians or 
combatants. 
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their ‘other’. This is not to say that there is a complete lack of nuance: some scholars 
and practitioners who engage with civil–military relations do, in fact, nod to plurality 
within the civilian and military categories.484 As is shown here, many actors identify 
or cast around for a bright line in the hopes of slotting everyone into a stable 
civilian–combatant binary.485 The dominant vision of distinction thus serves as a 
favoured starting point for some. Ultimately, however, international actors tend to 
perceive blurred lines and a confusion of categories – disruptions that are more in 
line with the alternative vision of distinction. 
 
 5.1.1 Civilian sub-categories at CAMPO 
 
In the vignette from the CAMPO training programme, above, trainees grapple with 
IHL’s civilian category in different ways. When the trainees are immersed in the 
land of the Batari, they strain to fit every actor on the ground into the civilian–
combatant binary. While most groups find themselves at a loss, one group forges 
ahead by delineating sub-categories of civilians. This does not contravene the formal 
lessons of the CAMPO training, but instead amplifies a trainer’s earlier observation 
that the category of the civilian is something of an approximation. As the focus 
shifts to international actors, the fuzziness around the civilian category is carried 
forward. A number of unstated assumptions about the international civilian are 
discernible in the second exercise. First, the move to establish Group 1 (the 
humanitarian and development group) as a separate category from Group 2 (the 
civilian group) notionally splits the humanitarian actor from the civilian. When the 
trainer jokingly invites trainees to leave their ‘mixed’ groups behind and return to 
their ‘single ethnicities’, this insinuates that humanitarian actors might even belong 
to a different ethnicity from other international civilians.486 But then, when the 
humanitarian group finishes delivering their presentation, the trainer treats them as 
                                                
484 See, e.g.: Slim, supra, pp. 126, 128 (‘Stretcher’); Pugh, supra, p. 2 (‘ODI Seminar’). 
485 See Chapter 2. 
486 Garbett finds that some civilian witnesses at the ICTY sub-divide the civilian population into different 
ethnic groupings and other affiliations. Garbett, supra, p. 130. See also Chapter 2. 
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part of the civilian sector. This latter framing suggests that the humanitarian actor is 
not in a category of its own so much as it is a sub-set of the wider civilian category. 
This endorses the suggestion of another CAMPO trainer, who transmitted in an 
earlier session: ‘Within the civilians, we have humanitarians.’ This comment was 
made during a CAMPO lesson on the different ‘categories’ of international civilians 
that the CAMPO trainees needed to be familiar with. Waving a hand at the 
multitude of actors falling within the broader civilian category, the trainer advises 
that trainees ‘have to understand and distinguish the different things’. There is a nod 
to diversity within the humanitarian category, as well. A trainer states, ‘There is not 
one humanitarian community with the same interests’, and notes that there are ‘an 
enormous number of humanitarian organizations’. 
 
In the various formulations articulated above, the presence of the ‘civilian plus’ is 
discernible. As a perceptual matter, the possibility of a carve-out for humanitarian 
actors is rendered plausible by this shaky interpretation of the civilian category. The 
trainers and trainees at CAMPO do not treat IHL’s civilian–combatant distinction – 
as it relates to the traditional conduct of hostilities – as a fixed, bright line binary. 
Instead, they understand it as a point of departure that is both unsatisfactory and 
malleable. On a further note, in another CAMPO exercise, international actors are 
divided not into civilians and combatants, but into state and non-state actors. A 
trainer suggests that various non-state actors can be differentiated according to a 
metric of ‘niceness’: ‘On the nice side we have NGOs. On the not-too-nice side, we 
have armed actors and privatization of violence.’ While humanitarian NGOs are 
given a high ‘niceness’ ranking in this formulation, their positioning in a category 
with armed actors is also treated as unproblematic. Notably, no mention is made of 
the civilian–combatant distinction in connection with this. While trainees often 
claim that humanitarian actors demand a special status for themselves, it is evident 
that the former also treat humanitarian actors differently from other civilians.  
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 5.1.2 In search of a bright line at SWEDINT 
  
During a training session at SWEDINT, a military trainer asks trainees what they 
would do in situations of hybrid warfare where they cannot discern between 
civilians and combatants. A UN civilian trainee responds that, following the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) policy for UN missions, ‘when in 
doubt, assume someone is civilian’. When the same question arises with respect to 
international actors, a military trainee proposes dividing international actors into 
‘armed versus unarmed’. He points out that this fits with the framework of civil–
military relations and ‘it’s the best term we have’. He goes on to note the difficulty 
of drawing this line when civilian security actors are armed, or when politicians and 
donors take on the appearance of military actors. Still, he believes that the preferred 
approach is to situate all international civilians together in one unified category; he 
includes humanitarian actors in this category, as well. Later, during a chat in the 
hallway outside the classroom, a civilian trainer at SWEDINT reflects on these 
exchanges. He proposes that, in theory, anyone should be able to look at 
international actors and say ‘You’re either a combatant or you’re not’. However, he 
laments that there are blurred lines in practice, especially where military forces 
engage in humanitarian activities or humanitarian actors use military assets and start 
to resemble a military force. He describes a photograph he once took of a military 
officer wearing civilian clothes, recalling: ‘It was a conflict area and he wanted to 
melt into the population. I know that is illegal, but you also have humanitarians 
dressing up in field gear…and you start asking, who is who?’ He identifies a ‘grey 
zone’ of relationships between international humanitarian actors and other civilian 
actors. He proposes that this is not a legal issue to be resolved by IHL, but a matter 
of ‘what our respective organization means’.487  
 
Several SWEDINT trainees also weigh in on the civilian–combatant distinction. 
One military trainee pronounces: ‘Not all civilians are civilians. There are different 
                                                
487 See Section 5.4. 
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kinds.’ Another military trainee vociferously opposes this splitting, and his 
comments reflect an important strand of critique against the ‘civilian plus’. He 
alleges that the humanitarian actors he encounters in conflict zones seek special 
treatment. In his words: ‘They don’t want to associate with the military...but again 
they want an extra distinction.’ He offers the example of the MSF hospital bombing 
in Kunduz Afghanistan by US forces.488 ‘They want to say the hospital in Kunduz is 
MSF, to be seen as special. But all I know, they are civilians.’ He ventures: ‘Next 
thing you will have special groups, like “MSF civilian”.’ His colleague backs him up, 
stating resolutely that all non-military actors are just ‘civvies’. For both of these 
SWEDINT trainees, the dominant vision of a bright line civilian–combatant binary 
leaves no room for the ‘different kinds’ of civilians their colleague proposes. They 
suggest that, if humanitarian actors were to draw a line in the civilian category, they 
would do so in order to be special. This interpretation captures the essence of the 
‘humanitarian exceptionalism’ outlook outlined in Chapter 3. 
 
 5.1.3 Competing visions of distinction at NATO 
 
At the NATO CIMIC training, trainees also learn about what NATO terms the 
‘civil dimension’ of the operational context. They are taught that it encompasses a 
plethora of actors, including NGOs, governmental organizations, donors, 
international organizations, media, internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, 
civilian populations and local authorities. With a faint echo of the CAMPO trainer’s 
‘niceness’ metric (see above), one NATO military trainer sorts actors into good and 
bad – leaving room for a disorderly in-between. In conflict zones, he proposes, ‘We 
have good guys and bad guys. Everything in the middle is a mess, including NGOs’. 
Contemplating who is civilian amongst international actors, one NATO trainer 
reaches for a bright line binary that positions civilians who DPH on the combatant 
side. He asserts: ‘It is very simple. You’re civilian if you are not carrying a weapon 
                                                
488 See Section 5.2. 
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and you’re not participating in hostilities.’489 When asked in a subsequent interview 
how this perspective translates in comprehensive international missions, he ponders, 
‘Now that is interesting….This is so hard, this is the nub edge of it. It’s about 
perceptions’.  
 
At another point in the NATO training, international civilian actors are configured 
similarly to Russian nesting dolls. First there are international humanitarian actors, 
who are nestled within international civilian actors, who are nestled within the larger 
civilian landscape. In this conceptualization, humanitarian actors are depicted as a 
sub-category of civilian actors, much as in the conceptualization at CAMPO 
described previously. Intriguingly, one of the military trainers at NATO also refers 
to humanitarian actors as ‘civilian civilians’. Expanding on this, she says that when 
military actors use the word ‘civilian’ in the context of a UN peacekeeping mission, 
they typically use it as shorthand for UN police; they do not digest it as a reference 
to humanitarian actors. Another military trainer at NATO counters that the term 
‘civilian’ is meant to capture all international civilian actors. Here, again, is potential 
pushback against the notion of a special civilian status for humanitarian actors. First, 
he emphasizes that, under international law, ‘humanitarians are just civilians. There 
is no other kind of civilian’. Following this, he suggests that if humanitarian actors 
were to say otherwise, ‘this must be something special the humanitarians have 
created for themselves, because that’s not the law’.  
 
As with the SWEDINT trainee who scoffs at the notion of the ‘MSF civilian’ (see 
above), this NATO trainer depicts humanitarian actors as clamouring to claim a 
special status for themselves. The possibility that international law allocates such a 
status to humanitarian actors is foreclosed, as is the prospect that other (non-
humanitarian) international actors might actively participate in the dissemination of 
a carve-out for humanitarian actors. Meanwhile, some international military actors 
who participate in the civil–military trainings do exactly that. Several examples of 
                                                
489 As discussed in Chapter 2, civilians who DPH still have formal civilian status under IHL, but are 
treated differently from civilians who do not directly participate. 
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this were offered above, such as the reference at the CAMPO training to the 
separate ethnicity of humanitarian actors. In addition, the NATO military trainer 
who uses the term ‘civilian civilians’ casually refers to ‘our civilian and humanitarian 
colleagues’ during a coffee break. When asked to expand on this remark, she 
attributes it to unconscious impulse. She simply thinks of them as two separate 
groups.  
 
 5.1.4 Concern for local perceptions 
 
The ‘phantom local’ circulates in the commentary from the three civil–military 
training programmes. For example, when the civilian trainer at SWEDINT speaks 
of politicians taking on the appearance of military actors, or the blurring of lines 
between humanitarian and military actors, he leaves it opaque just who it is that 
observes international actors and draws these conclusions. He is not a humanitarian 
actor, himself, but his concern for optics sounds very much like the anxiety 
humanitarian actors express regarding the ways in which they are perceived. This 
attests to the fact that other, non-humanitarian international actors share the sense 
that local populations observe them and draw conclusions about who is who. 
Accordingly, there is receptiveness to the importance of local perceptions and, 
potentially, shared concerns about optics. As is shortly demonstrated, attention to 
perceptions can sometimes have unintended consequences. If optics pose the main 
concern, then some military actors reason they must find ways to get close to 
humanitarian actors without being seen. 
 
* 
 
While the focus of this discussion is on the civilian category, it should be noted that 
peacekeeping trainees at CAMPO and SWEDINT also struggle to locate themselves 
on the civilian–combatant divide. Unlike the military trainees at NATO, who can 
cleanly be slotted into IHL’s combatant category, peacekeeping actors might have 
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formal civilian or combatant status under IHL.490 When this issue arises at the 
CAMPO training, the formal training sessions teach that (UN) peacekeepers should 
be categorized as combatants. As one trainer explains, peacekeeping actors are 
increasingly being given Chapter VII mandates under the UN Charter and Rules of 
Engagement. This renders them military contingents, and the peace operations they 
engage in are, in essence, combat operations – even if softer-sounding terms are 
employed. The implication is that the peacekeeping trainees are to think of 
themselves as combatants from whom humanitarian actors seek to distinguish 
themselves. Another CAMPO trainer adds that it is not only the robust mandate 
and the use of force that create tensions between humanitarian actors and 
peacekeeping, but also a (perceived) lack of impartiality on the part of 
peacekeepers.491  
 
This opening section of the empirical discussion has demonstrated that the 
international military actors who participate in civil–military training programmes 
struggle to locate a bright civilian–combatant line. While perceptions of blurring and 
confusion abound, international actors nonetheless set about forging the distinction 
in practice. It is not the case that the dominant vision of distinction is initially intact 
but then suddenly falls apart when actors consider the status of international 
humanitarian actors. Rather, distinction is formulated in a blurry and fragmented 
way at the outset, and this vision is carried forward or superimposed on 
international humanitarian actors.  
 
 
 
                                                
490 Members of peacekeeping operations benefit from the protection afforded to civilians by IHL, except 
where: (1) the operation becomes a party to the conflict; or (2) the individual member of the operation 
directly participates in hostilities. Civilian personnel of a peacekeeping operation will continue to benefit 
from IHL’s protection to civilians even if the operation becomes a party to the conflict (so long as they 
do not directly participate in the hostilities). See International Group of Experts, Leuven Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Peace Operations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 97–99.  
491 On impartiality in peacekeeping, more generally, see Emily Paddon Rhoads, Taking Sides in Peacekeeping: 
Impartiality and the Future of the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). See also Chapter 7. 
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5.2 Who draws the line?  
 
This section of the discussion explores the question of who, amongst international 
actors, is responsible for forging IHL’s civilian–combatant distinction in practice. It 
is demonstrated that international humanitarian actors take the lead on this, 
entreating other international actors to accede to their vision. The discussion is 
broken into two parts: the first part advances the claim that humanitarian actors take 
charge with distinction; the second part examines the perspectives of other 
international actors on this point. A power struggle is uncovered here, as distinction 
practices threaten the balance of power in the humanitarian–military relationship. 
 
‘This i s  real ly  IHL’ 
 
It is early spring in Motto di Livenza, Italy, and a group of front-line functional specialists 
is gathered at the NATO CIMIC training to hear from humanitarian actors. At the 
beginning of her session, the MSF trainer grabs the edge of her shirt between her thumb and 
forefinger. ‘Normally I speak to the Italian military with my uniform on; today is my first 
time without my uniform. I have my T-shirt, that is my uniform. It’s the thing that protects 
us. For us it is a white T-shirt with a logo.’ This mention of a uniform elicits appreciative 
nods around the classroom. The MSF trainer takes pains to elaborate on why humanitarian 
actors must position themselves neutrally in the conflict. She states: ‘It is a matter of 
perception: the military is part of the conflict and NGOs will be in danger if seen in this 
way.’ She elaborates on how MSF’s strict approach to distinction has also ensured its 
continued access to populations in need. It has enabled the organization to safely operate in 
insurgent-controlled parts of Afghanistan, for example, ‘where even NATO wasn’t able to 
go’. Later in the training session, she broaches the delicate issue of the then-recent bombing of 
the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, by US coalition forces. She implores the 
trainees – some of whom are US soldiers – to explain to her how this happened. Staving off 
charges that she is letting her emotions get the best of her, she reiterates that her concerns 
about the bombing are legally grounded. As she phrases it: ‘This is really IHL. We 
approach this all from IHL.’ Reflecting on the session, a trainee who is a military doctor 
voices approval; he refers solemnly to MSF as ‘my brother in uniform’. Another trainee 
grasps why MSF is upset about the bombing, but he also senses that MSF is seeking special 
treatment. ‘What makes that an MSF hospital, as opposed to other hospitals they don’t call 
an MSF hospital? It would still be civilian…’ Contemplating MSF’s emphasis on 
neutrality, one of the military trainers states ‘Yes! We get it, totally. But just MSF or 
ICRC’. 
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International military actors492 hold varying perceptions of humanitarian distinction 
practices and their stated justification. While some are receptive, others question 
why humanitarian actors should be the ones to draw the line. The final comment 
from the above vignette (‘But just MSF or ICRC’) exemplifies the circulation of the 
Red Cross fantasy. International military actors tend to treat the ICRC – and often 
MSF, as well – differently than other humanitarian actors. 
 
 5.2.1 Who forges the distinction? 
 
The present discussion begins with an examination of the way in which 
humanitarian actors communicate the need for distinction at civil–military training 
venues. At the training sessions facilitated by humanitarian actors at NATO, it is 
striking how consistently the reference to international law is twinned with an 
appeal to local perceptions. At some point in their respective training sessions, the 
humanitarian trainers from MSF, ICRC and OCHA identify international law as the 
source of the civilian–combatant distinction. They mention international law in 
general terms or refer, more specifically, to IHL and the Geneva Conventions. 
However, the appeal to law’s authority rarely stands on its own. Consistently, it is 
accompanied by a reference to perceptions. Here, the ‘phantom local’ can be found 
hard at work. In some instances, it is summoned as a monolithic entity (as when a 
humanitarian actor refers generically to the prospect of ‘being seen’); at other times, 
one of the more specific manifestations of the ‘phantom local’ is summoned to 
make a particular point. When a humanitarian actor intimates that the ‘bad guys’ 
monitor the interactions of international actors, for example, she invokes the 
attacker-perceiver to ground anxieties about personal safety. Although participants 
at the civil–military training programmes are sometimes persuaded by arguments 
about safety issues, they often disagree about the modalities of violence against 
humanitarian actors. One point of contention is whether the blurring of lines 
between different international actors actually endangers humanitarian actors. 
                                                
492 The perceptions of other international civilian actors are examined in Section 5.4. 
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Hammond articulates a lucid critique on this front, underscoring what she terms the 
‘trope of confusion’.493  She contends that the focus on blurring suggests that 
humanitarian actors are targeted by mistake or through misunderstanding. 494 
Instead, she argues that the intentional violence against humanitarian actors is 
performative – designed to elicit media attention and to send a message about 
security levels and a disregard for humanitarian principles.495 These dynamics are 
revisited in Part III of this study.496  
 
Turning now to the lessons delivered by humanitarian actors at the NATO CIMIC 
training, the MSF trainer’s session is examined first. In her discussion of the 
Kunduz bombing (see opening passage, above), the MSF trainer is emphatic: ‘This 
is really IHL. We approach this all from IHL.’ A few moments before she utters 
this, however, she also conveys: ‘It is a matter of perception.’ Although she does not 
specify whose perceptions pose a concern, the mention of danger suggests that it is 
the attacker-perceiver who is watching. She draws on the traditional humanitarian 
principles to clarify the logic of her argument, tacitly putting distinction on the same 
plane as these principles. She explains that humanitarian actors uphold the 
humanitarian principles as both a legal obligation and a ‘moral and operational 
necessity’, and states that adhering to the principles enables humanitarian actors to 
access war-affected populations and to keep themselves safe. Elsewhere in her 
session, she imparts: ‘Distinction is hard; we are all in white cars. This is why the 
bad guys sometimes target us.’ Here, she suggests that local observers cannot 
discern between a car with an MSF flag and a car with a UN logo, nor between the 
black and blue UN. For this reason, MSF painted their cars pink in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). ‘Pink to make the difference. Pink! OK?!’497  This 
                                                
493 Hammond, supra, p. 176. 
494  Ibid. See also: Silke Roth, ‘Aid Work as Edgework: Voluntary Risk-Taking and Security in 
Humanitarian Assistance, Development and Human Rights Work’, Journal of Risk Research, Vol. 18, No. 2, 
pp. 139–155, 141 (‘Edgework’); Roth, supra, p. 32 (‘Paradoxes of Aid’). 
495 Hammond, supra, p. 177 (‘It is thus perhaps aid agencies themselves who are most confused about 
their own role in armed conflict and unable to prevent themselves from being implicated in it’).  
496 See Chapter 6; see also Section 7.3.2. 
497 On emblems and logos, see Chapter 4. 
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reference to the black UN refers to UN forces and their affiliates; the blue UN 
refers to UN humanitarian and development actors. Humanitarian NGOs, as a 
larger group, express concern about the adverse impact on local perceptions when 
black UN actors accompany blue UN actors, or when black UN actors use 
equipment that is branded blue UN.498 In these accounts, qualities of combatantness 
– signifying guilt, complicity and participation in the conflict – are seen to hover 
around black UN actors. This leads blue UN actors – and other humanitarian actors 
not belonging to the UN – to fear that these qualities might affix to them, as well, if 
they were to get too close.  
 
At the NATO CIMIC training, the ICRC trainer explains that, according to IHL, ‘if 
you are in the convoy you are the military objective’. For this reason, the ICRC will 
usually ‘bluntly refuse military escorts, because we do not want to be integrated into 
the military’. In the same breath as he invokes IHL, the trainer hastily adds ‘And 
then there is the issue of image – how you are seen on the other side. It’s all based 
on acceptability, we have to walk the talk, live it on a daily basis, so there is no 
misrepresentation’. He also explains that the intentional targeting of ICRC staff ‘is 
where we cross the red line. It’s not collateral damage, by chance the shell has 
landed next to our office’. The attacker-perceiver is activated in this account. Here, 
again, it is as though the ‘phantom local’ plucks qualities of combatantness from the 
air and assigns them to humanitarian actors – rendering the latter legitimate targets. 
The ICRC trainer also conveys the importance of maintaining a purely humanitarian 
image, without which the organization cannot ensure ‘acceptance’.499  
 
During her session at the NATO CIMIC training, the OCHA trainer extols the 
importance of maintaining distinction in the operational context. She states: ‘This 
                                                
498 Han Dorussen and Marian de Vooght, ‘Putting Civilians First: NGO Perceptions and Expectations of 
UN Peacebuilding’, Folke Bernadotte Academy Brief 01, 2018, p. 3 (‘FBA Report’). 
499 On ‘acceptance’ and humanitarian security practices, see, e.g.: Jan Egeland, Adele Harmer and Abby 
Stoddard, To Stay and Deliver: Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments (OCHA, 2011); 
Ruben Andersson and Florian Weigand, ‘Intervention at Risk: The Vicious Cycle of Distance and Danger 
in Mali and Afghanistan’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 9, 2015, pp. 519–541. 
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distinction comes from IHL, between combatant and non-combatant, between the 
military and the non-military humanitarian aid worker.’500 Immediately before she 
cites IHL, she says: ‘For the humanitarian community it is not possible to be seen 
closely interacting with military actors or armed actors that may be seen as parties to 
the conflict or [as committing] violence against the local population.’ This reference 
to parties to the conflict summons the authority-perceiver and the attacker-
perceiver. It is also insinuated that the beneficiary-perceiver will harshly judge any 
humanitarian actor who fails to stay away from armed actors who harm civilian 
populations. 
 
In these training sessions, international humanitarian actors do not solely entreat 
other actors to comply with international law; they also consistently invoke the 
‘phantom local’ as the animating force of their distinction practices. This local 
spectator witnesses the patterns of interaction amongst international actors, 
assigning qualities of civilianness and combatantness to individuals. Turning now to 
the perspectives of other international actors participating in the training 
programmes, the proceeding section shows that some are persuaded by the appeal 
to international law while others are sympathetic to the need to appease the 
phantom local and still others reject both rationales. 
 
 5.2.2 The perspectives of other international actors 
 
When it comes to the question of who should draw the distinction line, some 
military actors refuse to accept that humanitarian actors should be in control. As 
Pugh notes, military actors generally hold the position of power in the 
humanitarian–military relationship. 501  When humanitarian actors delineate 
boundaries in the name of distinction, they may be seen to disturb this arrangement. 
Although a humanitarian NGO actor in South Sudan depicts humanitarian actors as 
the Ginger Rogers to the military’s Fred Astaire (see Chapter 7), the distinction 
                                                
500 See Chapter 4. 
501 Pugh, supra p. 5 (‘ODI Seminar’); Pugh, supra, p. 349 (‘Civil–Military Relations’). 
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practices of humanitarian actors may lead military actors to feel as if they are the 
ones on the back foot.  
 
During a focus group discussion at NATO, a military trainer argues that the 
complaints of humanitarian actors about the blurring of lines are misguided. She 
contends: ‘What we’re trying to figure out is where the line is. It’s not a blurring, it’s 
the location.’ Although her search for a line seems to conjure the dominant vision of 
distinction, her insistence that the line is not static also constitutes a departure from 
this vision. From this trainer’s vantage point, the question should always be about 
what arrangement works best in a given setting. She cannot fathom why 
humanitarian actors would have a monopoly on deciding the location of this line. 
Listening in, another military trainer gently pushes back: ‘You have to respect the 
distinction between military and civilians. We have to create the environment for 
military and civilians to do their work.’ While he agrees that the line is not static, he 
is sympathetic to the argument that humanitarian actors should be in control. 
Invoking the ‘phantom local’, he says if there is a ‘mix up’ in the eyes of local actors, 
it is international civilian actors and humanitarian NGOs who are put at risk. What 
is remarkable in these exchanges is how the military trainers (do not) engage with 
IHL. Neither of these NATO trainers believe that one can find the civilian–
combatant line ‘in the books’ of law. Rather, they feel this line is forged anew by 
international actors in response to the demands of a particular operational context.  
 
During a classroom session at the NATO CIMIC training programme, a military 
trainer primes trainees for learning about distinction. When teaching them why they 
need to understand humanitarian actors as a group, he explains: ‘Maybe you are 
working together, maybe it’s people you cannot target; your targeting officer needs 
to know. You can’t target their buildings and if you are bombing nearby, you might 
need to use a special type of bomb.’ He elaborates: ‘We want to avoid collateral 
damage, targeting of humanitarian facilities or personnel, or civilians in need, and 
this is very much in line with IHL.’ Other military trainers at NATO link appeals to 
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distinction by humanitarian actors to a commitment to the traditional humanitarian 
principles. One military trainer says of humanitarian actors, ‘especially in theatre, 
they don’t want to link…they want to remain impartial’. Touching on the principles 
as well as optics, another trainer states ‘NGOs, international organizations, 
sometimes they won’t meet up. If they share a room and coffee with us, they can be 
seen as taking sides by people outside. We need to respect their neutrality, 
independence’. In this depiction, the ‘phantom local’, taking hazy form as the 
‘people outside’, assigns qualities of combatantness to humanitarian actors who 
interact with military actors. As discussed below, some military actors conclude that 
if the concern is with appearances, they must simply avoid detection when trying to 
get close to humanitarian actors.502 
 
At the SWEDINT training venue, one trainer points to perceptions as the reason 
why it makes sense to let humanitarian actors forge the distinction. This trainer 
advises military actors to think carefully about why humanitarian actors would assert 
a separation between actors. He explains that if military actors are themselves targets 
and meet with humanitarian actors, they put the former ‘in harm’s way’. Invoking 
the ‘phantom local’ in the form of the attacker-perceiver, he urges military actors to 
be careful about meeting with humanitarian actors because ‘everyone knows’. At the 
CAMPO training, a trainee reflects on similar lessons about distinction. This trainee 
is baffled by the notion that humanitarian actors need to keep their distance from 
military actors. He speculates: ‘Shouldn’t humanitarians be right there with the 
military so that their own personnel can be safe, and they can get access to people in 
need?’ A civilian UN trainee responds that humanitarian actors do not see it in this 
way: ‘No, they refuse to be close to [military actors], they are just separate.’ If a 
particular humanitarian actor uses a military escort, this trainee explains, other 
‘humanitarians say you are endangering the lives of the relief workers’. In these 
exchanges, trainees essentially debate whether the distinction humanitarian actors 
enact satisfy the ‘phantom local’, who mostly appears in the form of the attacker-
                                                
502 See Section 5.5. 
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perceiver. The first CAMPO speaker believes that the physical protection military 
actors offer eclipses whatever qualities of combatantness might be bestowed upon 
the humanitarian actor by the ‘phantom local’.  
 
Returning to the SWEDINT training, local perceptions are once again at issue, but 
this time the concern is not about protecting humanitarian actors from violence. 
One military trainee suggests that the main audience for distinction is, in fact, the 
‘customers’ of humanitarian projects.503 He says of humanitarian actors: 
 
It is like if they associate with military they will get less customers. If you 
are in a village and you see NGOs talking to tanks and helicopters, you 
might be a bit scared of them – even doctors or people who bring you 
food…so maybe you won’t be pushed towards these people. 
 
In this trainee’s view, beneficiary populations can tell the different actors apart and 
they adapt their behaviour accordingly. It is important to scrutinize exactly how the 
concept of association works here. One reading is that local ‘customers’ deem a 
humanitarian actor standing near a tank to attract signifiers of combatantness such 
as participation and complicity. Alternatively, given that the main concern in this 
particular account is trust, it may be that these humanitarian actors fail to exhibit 
sufficient levels of civilianness – certainly not the degree required to ground a claim 
of humanitarianness. At the CAMPO training, a military trainer also connects 
distinction to beneficiary trust. He suggests that, when humanitarian actors struggle 
with other international actors over drawing the line, it is because humanitarian 
actors ‘don’t want to lose their privileged position with vulnerable groups’. In 
contrast to the SWEDINT trainee, however, he doubts that local populations can 
discern the identity of a given international actor. ‘For them, it’s all the same.’ In this 
depiction, the ‘phantom local’ looks on at the blur of international actors and finds 
its counterpart: the ‘phantom foreigner’.504 The figure of the ‘phantom foreigner’ 
                                                
503 On donors as the customers of humanitarian projects, see Krause, supra. 
504 An account of international actors in Iraq following the 2003 intervention also alludes to the ‘phantom 
foreigner’, proposing that there was ‘almost no possibility of distinction’. See Alexandre Carle and Hakim 
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makes another appearance in the comments of a police trainee at SWEDINT. The 
trainee also feels that local populations generally cannot tell who is who amongst 
international actors, though he is confident that international actors can make an 
impression if they try. When deployed as an EU police officer in Afghanistan, he 
often conversed casually with local actors about how they saw the passing vehicles 
of international actors. He relays: ‘Some thought they were military, ISAF, NATO, 
UN…only the few who were interested in the different actors in Afghanistan knew 
who was who.’ 505 From this he concludes: ‘If we didn’t have time to introduce 
ourselves and speak to them, they might not know.’ A military trainee chimes in: 
‘Whoever goes near to the people, is the one who will be known.’ Solving the 
problem of identification, of course, does not dispose of the issue of association. As 
conveyed in the previous story about talking to tanks, local actors may be able to 
identify a humanitarian actor, but they may see this actor as part of the conflict 
because of their proximity to military actors or objectives. 
 
Beyond protesting that humanitarian actors should have a monopoly on drawing the 
distinction line, military actors also express misgivings about how humanitarian 
actors draw the line. The following section explores two specific strands of this 
critique. 
 
5.3 How the line is drawn 
 
When international military actors fault humanitarian actors for how, when and 
where they enact distinction, the underlying message is that military actors want to 
be in charge of drawing the line. If they were in this position, then they would not 
be subject to the proclivities of humanitarian actors. Of course, humanitarian actors 
do not see themselves as simply drawing the line on a whim. What others adjudge as 
                                                                                                                                    
Chkam, ‘Humanitarian Action in the New Security Environment: Policy and Operational Implications in 
Iraq’, Humanitarian Policy Group Background Paper (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2006), p. 7. 
505 On local perceptions of international actors in Afghanistan, see Larry Minear and Antonio Donini, 
‘International Troops, Aid Workers, and Local Communities: Mapping the Perceptions Gap’, 
Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, No. 32, December 2005 (‘Perceptions’). 
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equivocation is, for humanitarian actors, often a nuanced recalibration based on the 
changing nature of a situation. To understand this practice it is useful to keep in 
mind the alternative vision of distinction, which is characterized by dynamism and 
fragmentation. Humanitarian actors worry that if they fail to express their 
civilianness to a sufficient degree, they may be viewed as having ‘mere civilian’ or 
‘civilian minus’ status.    
 
‘We have magical  f ront l ines ’  
 
In a training session at CAMPO, a military trainer shares a story from Haiti where he 
offered to arrange a military convoy for humanitarian NGOs. Initially, the NGOs turned 
him down: ‘The humanitarians refused to associate.’ Subsequently, however, it became clear 
that there was no other way for them to travel safely and they changed their minds. All of the 
logistical arrangements were worked out and the necessary preparations were made. When it 
ultimately came time to travel, however, the humanitarian NGOs ‘fought over how much 
distance to have between the cars, because they didn’t want to be seen with [the military]’. 
This dismayed the CAMPO trainer. He had viewed the agreement to join the convoy as an 
explicit decision to associate; he was incredulous that humanitarian actors would insist on 
avoiding an association that they had already agreed to. Weighing in, another CAMPO 
military trainer proposes that whether a given humanitarian request for distinction is 
reasonable is contingent on the pressures of the operational context. In a major conflict area 
with clear frontlines, he understands when humanitarian actors say ‘I do not want to mingle 
because my only protection is to be seen as non-partisan’. In less fraught settings, however, he 
thinks such refusals to mingle are misguided. He elaborates: ‘It’s hard when you say, “We 
have magical frontlines that aren’t real on the ground”.’  
 
This discussion highlights two grievances on the part of military actors with respect 
to the way in which humanitarian actors draw the line: first, military actors accuse 
humanitarian actors of taking an overly strict approach to distinction; second, 
military actors fault humanitarian actors for being inconsistent in their distinction 
practices. Whichever critique is activated, it is apparent that military actors often 
digest humanitarian distinction practices at the individual level. They experience the 
enactment of distinction as a personal affront and believe it to be motivated by anti-
military bias.  
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 5.3.1 The strict performance of distinction 
 
The topic of information sharing is a contested matter in the field of military–
humanitarian interaction,506 and it is a key avenue through which distinction is 
addressed at all three civil–military training grounds. When it comes to dialogue, 
other international actors accuse humanitarian actors of instituting the bottleneck. 
To be sure, humanitarian actors often make no attempt to hide their reluctance to 
share information with military forces. Humanitarian actors cite fears that any 
information they provide could be used for military purposes,507 or could more 
generally interfere with their ability to operate. This stance positions humanitarian 
actors as the withholding party in the relationship. As is shown here, military actors 
understand this reticence to share information – and to associate, more generally – 
to be fuelled by anti-military sentiment.  
 
At the NATO CIMIC training, the ICRC trainer outlines the ICRC’s approach to 
dialogue with the military. He acknowledges that understanding the local context 
may require some form of proximity to international military actors, perhaps in 
order to receive warnings about dangerous areas. This depiction holds that, 
whatever risk is incurred by getting closer to military actors, the danger that is averted 
through such contact is of bigger concern. A number of NATO trainees still voice 
dissatisfaction with this approach. They view it as limited because humanitarian 
actors do not offer to share anything in return. At the SWEDINT training, a 
military trainee argues that humanitarian actors communicate poorly with other 
international actors in conflict zones. He suggests that this is because humanitarian 
actors lack appropriate training, but he also notes that such training might be for 
naught, as ‘some don’t care’. The insinuation is that the reticence of humanitarian 
actors stems from a distaste for military actors.  
                                                
506 Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), ‘The Concept of Protection: Towards a Mutual Understanding’, 
Humanitarian Policy Group and ICRC Roundtable on Civil–Military Coordination, December 2011, p. 9.  
507 FBA Report, supra, p. 5. Humanitarian actors also fault military actors for not sharing with them – for 
example, with respect to the ‘caveats’ under which some peacekeeping forces operate. 
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Using the case of Afghanistan as an example, one trainee at SWEDINT says of the 
ICRC: 
 
I can see why they want to stay away from uniforms. The only way they 
could work in harsh places was because they weren’t doing police, 
military, or spy [activities]….So imagine if the Taliban sees the uniforms, 
especially foreign military, having connection with ICRC. They will think 
they are all carrying information, reporting on insurgents, and ICRC 
could no longer work there. 
 
This trainee deems the refusal to share information and to be seen near people in 
uniform an appropriate interpretation of the demands of distinction. In this 
account, ICRC actors simply seek to ensure that their humanitarianness is not 
compromised by contact with actors who attract qualities of combatantness. A 
military trainee at SWEDINT further suggests that asking a humanitarian actor for 
information about ‘bad guys’ is like ‘asking a journalist to reveal their source for a 
story’. If humanitarian actors provide military forces with information about a target 
and this target is subsequently hit, ‘The rebels will know where it came from, and 
this puts them at risk’. His colleague at SWEDINT concedes this point, but argues 
that humanitarian actors could at least engage in ‘trusted information sharing’. They 
could, for example, pass along their assessments of the needs of local populations. 
Other trainees at SWEDINT insist that, if the primary concern is the safety of 
humanitarian actors, then this would surely be bolstered, rather than undermined, 
by such actors talking to military actors. One military trainee proposes: ‘The 
situation has changed, this era of terrorism. Hospitals and NGOs themselves can be 
targeted. So they need to talk to us, meet with us.’ Another military trainee 
contributes: ‘We never know where the civilians are going, it could be a rebel area.’ 
Over at NATO, a military trainee has the impression that humanitarians simply 
think that ‘as military we are going to harass them, for information, and nothing 
else’. In these last few accounts, military actors insist that the physical protection 
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they can provide for humanitarian actors outweighs the risks engendered through 
information sharing. 
 
The issue of withholding information flows seamlessly into the broader refusal of 
humanitarian actors to associate with military actors. A SWEDINT trainee laments 
that there is simply no relationship between humanitarian actors and military actors, 
because the former decline to meet. During the delivery of a group presentation at 
CAMPO, a police trainee mimics a military actor, performing robotic and machine-
like moves with his hands. This performance draws knowing titters from around the 
room, but the laughter belies a deep-seated resentment. In subsequent conversation, 
a number of military actors express distress that others view them as mindless 
perpetrators of violence. A CAMPO trainer suspects that the operating 
humanitarian mindset is as follows: ‘I never talk to you because you’re a killing 
machine.’ A trainee offers that he has no problem with humanitarian actors seeking 
to avoid association in the field, so long as it is for reasons he can understand. If it is 
simply done out of ideological motivations, however, ‘then I am angry’. Another 
CAMPO trainee adopts his trainer’s choice of words (see opening vignette, above) 
to mimic a humanitarian actor saying ‘We don’t want to mingle with you, you’re 
military’. He cannot shake the feeling that humanitarian actors believe ‘You’re the 
killer and I’m the peace angel’. One military trainer at NATO proposes that 
humanitarian actors are driven away not by loathing, but by fear. He says that they 
are ‘often instinctually scared of military and rank and uniform’. A military trainee at 
NATO corroborates this: ‘at tactical level, NGOs look afraid to talk to you’. This 
combination of fear and loathing resonates with a suggestion made previously, that 
the ‘civilian plus’ status embodies both heroism and vulnerability.508 Whatever the 
underlying reasons may be for the refusal to associate, a NATO trainee protests the 
result: ‘It is a cold liaison!’ Evoking the notion of the ‘long spoon’, a NATO trainer 
adds, ‘What they will put in your face is the humanitarian principles’. 
 
                                                
508 See Chapter 3. 
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Evidently, military actors often experience humanitarian distinction practices as a 
move to push them away. However, as is demonstrated in the following section, 
military actors also fault humanitarian actors for pushing and pulling.  
 
5.3.2 The inconsistent performance of distinction 
 
One SWEDINT trainee describes the relationship with humanitarian actors in 
conflict zones as ‘non-symbiotic’, and even ‘parasitic’. This generates ‘frustration 
and dislike from uniformed personnel’. His colleague elaborates, with more than a 
hint of exasperation, ‘They want to stay far away from us when it suits them, but 
they use us when they want [something]’. Growing palpably irritated, he protests: 
‘How am I supposed to take you seriously when you reject me and don’t want to 
talk to me, but ask for help a week later?’ Sounding now like a spurned lover, he 
likens humanitarian NGOs to an ex-girlfriend who ‘only calls when she wants to 
cuddle’. A military trainee at SWEDINT paints the following picture: humanitarian 
actors ‘don’t always run away from us, but they sometimes don’t want to associate 
with us, but also sometimes they need us’. His colleague depicts the relationship 
with humanitarian actors as one of love and hate. ‘When humanitarians have armed 
men around them, they love them because they need their help. But when they 
don’t need them in this way, they hate them.’509 At the CAMPO training, a military 
trainer addresses an imaginary humanitarian actor: ‘First you don’t like us, but then 
you want us when you need us later.’ In his experience, the smaller the humanitarian 
organization is, the more challenging this dynamic. This alludes to issues of 
competence and professionalism, which are explored in Section 5.4, below. Another 
CAMPO trainer chimes in, saying of international military forces: ‘Shit hits the fan 
and, last minute, NGOs do want them.’  
 
It comes to light here that military actors take humanitarian distinction practices 
personally. From the perspective of these training participants, humanitarian actors 
                                                
509 See also Slim, supra, p. 133 (‘Stretcher’) (humanitarian NGOs who strove to distance themselves from 
US military forces in Somalia in the 1990s were ‘just appalled’). 
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do not legitimately draw on the protections afforded to civilians under international 
law. Nor do they simply try to appease the ‘phantom local’, avoiding contamination 
through contact with those who fail to embody the right kind of civilianness. 
Instead, they are like mercurial ex-lovers who love their armed partner when 
needed, but are prepared to discard the partner until the inevitable point at which 
‘shit hits the fan’ again. As in the previous discussion of who draws the line,510 issues 
of power and control are activated. The possibility that humanitarian actors might 
deem themselves superior is especially enervating for military actors. Lest the 
impression be given that this is all one-sided, it is shown later that military actors 
view humanitarian actors through the prism of their own grievances.  
 
During their respective sessions at the NATO CIMIC training, the ICRC and MSF 
trainers appear carefully attuned to such sensitivities. For her part, the MSF trainer 
stresses that MSF is not anti-militaristic. She opines: ‘Being a soldier is no less noble 
than being a humanitarian worker.’ She goes on: ‘We have nothing to say against 
war in itself.’ Following the jus in bello, humanitarian assistance is solely concerned 
with ‘who needs help because of the war’. When explaining why military and 
peacekeeping actors must leave their weapons outside MSF programme sites, she 
underscores ‘Our problem is not with you’; it is rather with ‘your uniforms, your 
colours, but activities too’. She adds: ‘This is why it’s so important to dialogue with 
you but make sure the distinction is clear.’ The ICRC trainer also engages in a bit of 
relationship damage control. He says of the connection between the military and the 
ICRC: ‘It’s historic. From the very beginning we have had the same working 
environment. We’ve always been present during warfare.’ He continues: ‘So it’s 
important to have a dialogue. You are operators but also potential victims: the 
wounded dead [this elicits snickers from the soldiers in the room]…so you can benefit from 
a relationship with us.’ In the discussion of the treatment of civilianness at the ICTY 
in Chapter 2, it was noted that the injured soldier might be deemed to merit 
                                                
510 See Section 5.2. 
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protection like a civilian. In a similar vein, in this ICRC account, the combatant 
‘operator’ becomes subject to the care of humanitarian actors, once wounded. 
 
As elucidated above, other international actors sometimes experience the distinction 
practices of humanitarian actors as a personal affront. This might happen not only 
when humanitarian actors cleave to a strict implementation of distinction, but also 
when they enact distinction in what appears to be an erratic manner. When 
humanitarian actors strive to physically distance themselves or they change their 
minds about what distinction requires in a given scenario, other actors read into 
these moves feelings of hostility as well as a sense of superiority. Further 
complications emerge when humanitarian actors are found to draw lines within the 
civilian category, as discussed next.   
 
5.4 Where the line is drawn  
 
Drawing on the everyday distinction practices of international actors, this two-part 
discussion unearths the existence of fault lines within the civilian category. The first 
part focuses on how international humanitarian actors delineate boundaries between 
themselves and international civilian actors. The second part examines allegations 
that humanitarian actors should instead have a lesser civilian status, akin to ‘civilian 
minus’. All of these practices are compatible with the alternative vision of 
distinction, and it is important to keep the dynamism of this vision in mind. To 
claim the highest degree of civilianness available, humanitarian actors showcase their 
non-participation, harmlessness, innocence and vulnerability. They also emphasize 
the social value of their role in war, and the fact that it is this role that separates 
them from other civilians. Meanwhile, other international actors question whether 
certain humanitarian actors can make authoritative claims to humanitarianness, or 
even civilianness. 
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 5.4.1 The ‘civilian plus’ 
 
At the training places, international humanitarian actors ground their ‘civilian plus’ 
status explicitly in the social value of their role in war. They bolster this effort by 
invoking the ‘phantom local’ and stressing how hard they must work to influence 
local perceptions. They do not tend to overtly extol their own virtue or moral 
uprightness in explicit terms, as they are perhaps aware of the alienation this might 
engender. Nonetheless, other international actors read feelings of superiority into 
such distinction practices. In a world where civilianness is relative and the civilian 
category is broken up into pieces, (non-humanitarian) international civilian actors 
find themselves in a precarious position. As civilians, they do not wish to be 
affiliated with actors belonging to IHL’s combatant category. When international 
humanitarian actors produce a special civilian status for themselves, it activates fears 
on the part of other civilians that their own claims to civilianness are under threat. 
International civilian actors also resent the notion that humanitarian actors might be 
positioned above them in a hierarchy.  
 
‘ I  know you are a l l erg i c  to  the uni forms bes ide me’  
 
Having been allocated roles as part of a joint international assessment mission in a mythical 
conflict zone, SWEDINT trainees gather in a virtual reality exercise room. Each team 
encompasses a diverse set of international actors, including military forces and civilian 
members of a UN political mission. Their assigned task is to conduct an assessment of local 
needs, and their virtual journey begins with a drive in a UN vehicle to the headquarters of a 
local humanitarian NGO named HELP. As the lights dim, the action unfolds on a large 
screen at the front of the room. Before long, the virtual HELP representative appears before 
the vehicle and greets the joint assessment team; he is friendly, wearing a blue T-shirt, black 
trousers and a black hat. Once this virtual encounter is underway, the lights come on and the 
trainees relocate to another training room. There they are faced with a live actor, now in 
female form, who serves as the real (though simulated) HELP representative. The team 
takes their seats, and the UN civilian leading the team introduces himself. He states that he 
is from the UN mission, then hastily appends ‘but we are civilian’. Gesturing to his military 
counterparts, he says: ‘I know you are allergic to the uniforms beside me.’ The NGO 
representative nods, and confirms that her commitment to independence does indeed require 
that she keep her distance from the military. She takes this a step further, now alleging that 
the entire UN is ‘a military of sorts’. Bristling at this, the UN civilian tries to salvage the 
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encounter. He assures her that he will not bring his military and police team members to 
their next meeting. The prospect of being jettisoned does not sit well with the rest of his team. 
Teetering on the edge of her seat, a military team member admonishes: ‘Don’t apologize for 
the military, we are part of the team!’ Her military colleague rallies to her side, lamenting: 
‘If we continue to put up the boundaries between us, we are never going to function together.’  
 
As explained previously, humanitarian actors might promulgate a ‘civilian plus’ 
status when interacting with international actors, be they civilian or military.511 
Nonetheless, it is at the humanitarian–civilian contact point that the circulation of 
this special status is easiest to discern. In such encounters, it becomes apparent that 
humanitarian actors stake a claim to a different kind of civilianness than that which 
is available to other civilian actors. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, lawyers 
and scholars routinely overlook these intra-civilian tensions. In the literature on 
civil–military relations and humanitarianism, there is also a tendency to assume that 
the humanitarian–civilian relationship is warmer than the humanitarian–military 
relationship.512 It may certainly be the case that, overall, humanitarian actors have 
more in common with UN civilians than they do with UN military actors. 
Nonetheless, this study’s empirical findings suggest that humanitarian–civilian 
relationships may sometimes be the prickliest.513 Further, humanitarian actors are 
more likely to be confused for international civilian actors than uniformed soldiers 
or peacekeeping actors. This discussion begins with a brief examination of divisions 
within the civilian category before moving on to an analysis of how other 
international civilian actors react to the ‘civilian plus’. 
 
Drawing l ines  within the c iv i l ian category 
 
During the role play exercise at SWEDINT (see opening passage, above), the 
humanitarian NGO representative from HELP calls for separation not only from 
                                                
511 See Chapter 3. 
512 See ‘FBA Report’, supra, p. 4. An NGO respondent states: ‘Our best ties are with the civilian section 
for sure because most of the time with civilian affairs and human rights and political affairs, but mostly 
civilian affairs actually, we have common interests.’ 
513 See also Barnett, supra, pp. 16–17 (‘Empire’) (citing a veteran humanitarian actor who would rather 
have a beer with a soldier than with a human rights activist). 
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international military actors, but also from international civilian actors belonging to 
the UN. This is a clear example of the dissemination of the ‘civilian plus’ figure, and 
the humanitarian actor assigns ‘civilian minus’ status to UN civilians, painting them 
as ‘military’. This encounter is tinged with artificiality, especially as a volunteer actor 
plays the role of the HELP representative. Still, this volunteer has been instructed to 
act in this way and her behaviour emulates the posture that international 
humanitarian actors in South Sudan adopt with respect to the UN integrated 
mission.514 During the SWEDINT exercise, the UN civilian who is leading the joint 
assessment team is placed in an awkward position. In order to successfully move the 
meeting forward, he needs to ingratiate himself with the humanitarian actor. He 
believes he can achieve this by burnishing his civilian credentials, but doing so also 
requires him to distance himself from the military members of his assessment team. 
When he attempts this delicate move, his military colleagues lash out. The thrust of 
their outbursts encapsulates the mentality of comprehensive missions. ‘We are part 
of the team’, they claim, before pronouncing that erecting boundaries will impede 
them from getting things done. This encounter perfectly captures the tension 
between the ‘working together’ mantra of comprehensive missions and the need to 
implement distinction. The heated nature of this encounter also exhibits how the 
emotions of individual actors shape these exchanges, and how some actors take the 
distinction practices of humanitarian actors personally.  
   
At all three civil–military training venues, military actors draw attention to conflicts 
between civilian actors. At the NATO CIMIC training, several participants describe 
humanitarian actors as being in competition with other civilians, such as those 
working for UN missions or the US State Department. They argue that the ‘bigger 
battle’ amongst international actors is along this humanitarian–civilian divide. 
Alluding to the existence of a ‘civilian plus’ figure, a military trainee contends that, 
when humanitarian actors separate themselves from other civilian actors, ‘This 
divides the civilian population into castes’. From this individual’s perspective, ‘UN, 
                                                
514 See Chapter 7. 
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NGOs…everyone should be the same’. At CAMPO, a military trainer argues that if 
the concern is about meeting the needs of war-affected populations, then ‘It’s the 
relationship amongst the civilian actors that is decisive’. This outlook is essentially a 
variation of the ‘working together’ mantra, focusing on civilians. Another CAMPO 
trainer is wary of depicting any given relationship as more consequential than 
another. He calls instead for a more holistic conversation that captures the overall 
diversity of international actors.  
 
Evidently, military actors detect considerable friction between different kinds of 
international civilian actors. When they allude to line-drawing practices within the 
civilian category, military actors tend to imply that such practices are something that 
civilian actors bring about. It was shown here, however, that military actors often 
participate in the relativization of civilianness.515  
 
 The perspec t ives  o f  o ther internat ional  c iv i l ian actors  
 
A preliminary point is that other international civilian actors, such as humanitarian 
actors, see themselves as outside of the fight; they, too, fear being targeted with 
violence. They believe that all the features of civilianness – harmlessness, non-
participation, innocence and vulnerability – attach to them, and they might even see 
themselves as having some claim to a ‘civilian plus’ status, given that they also 
perform an important social role in armed conflicts.516 The ‘civilian minus’ status is 
one that they are eager to avoid, and it looms large when they participate in 
comprehensive or integrated missions alongside military actors. A special civilian 
status for humanitarian actors thus generates fears in these other civilians that their 
own civilianness will be downgraded. 
 
                                                
515 See, e.g., Section 5.1. 
516 The present study does not investigate whether non-humanitarian international civilian actors have a 
special status under IHL. For a brief examination of this issue, see Smirl, supra, pp. 40, 94–95.  
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As a civilian trainer at SWEDINT confides, when he has previously worn clothing 
with a UN logo or travelled in UN vehicles in conflict zones, he has felt at best 
‘identified, but not protected’. He does not feel immune from violence as a UN 
civilian, he says, ‘because the UN is a target’. He is alarmed by the possibility that 
humanitarian actors might seek to position him on the other side of the distinction 
line, closer to the military actors he tries to distance himself from. His commentary 
attests to a tacit assumption that there are multiple distinctions in practice, not just a 
civilian–combatant divide. The following passage is also instructive. It shows how a 
UN civilian might link his fate to humanitarian actors, and highlights the twin 
features of vulnerability and value that Alexander deems characteristic of the civilian 
figure.517 A civilian trainee at SWEDINT contends that attacks against humanitarian 
actors are rarely due to confusion. Instead, ‘there are bandits who do not respect the 
law, and they will target people, kidnap humanitarians and demand ransom, for 
economic reasons’. It is a serious concern, this individual adds, ‘because we can be 
killed’. This ‘we’ is striking. The individual who is speaking is not a humanitarian 
actor, but a civilian actor who deploys with UN political and peacekeeping missions. 
Nonetheless, he aligns himself with humanitarian actors because he shares their 
fears about being seen as complicit or as participating in the conflict. Similar to the 
SWEDINT trainer, above, who feels unprotected by the UN logo, this individual 
may feel even more at risk than humanitarian actors that qualities of combatantness 
will fasten to him. It was suggested previously that the extra protection engendered 
by a special status might, in fact, heighten the appeal of humanitarian actors as 
targets. 518 While it is unclear whether a special status would help UN civilian actors 
in a practical sense, being downgraded to ‘mere civilian’ or ‘civilian minus’ status 
would surely not assist them.  
 
Contemplating how events unfolded in the simulated encounter with the HELP 
representative, a UN civilian trainee at SWEDINT says the dynamics resonated with 
her experience of working with the UN mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). When 
                                                
517 See Chapters 2 and 3. 
518 See Chapter 3. 
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she introduces herself to humanitarian actors in the operational context, she is 
always careful to emphasize her civilian status. In fact, she takes the very same 
approach her fellow trainee did in the simulation exercise. ‘We are from 
MONUSCO, but we are civilians.’ A civilian trainer at SWEDINT describes an 
incident in which humanitarian actors rebuffed him when he was working for the 
UN mission: ‘I was slapped on my fingers by UNHCR, and I was UN mission so I 
thought we were UN as much as them…the feeling of being told off that I had 
nothing to do here, that was the first time I had the feeling, “Yeah, right! We are not 
the same.”’ Sounding very similar to the military actors who accuse humanitarian 
actors of implementing distinction unevenly, 519  a civilian trainee says that 
humanitarian actors ‘don’t like us until they need us. And they will always need us’. 
Another civilian trainee asserts that humanitarian actors can be ‘so focused on what 
they do that they forget we are not there to babysit them’. This depiction of 
humanitarian actors as a burden also arises in South Sudan, where humanitarian 
actors live under UN protection in the Protection of Civilian sites.520 A UN civilian 
trainee suspects that humanitarian actors look down on those of his ilk. ‘The 
humanitarians never liked us because we did not deliver the goods. We are too 
bureaucratic, people don’t have time and energy to stomach our bureaucracy.’ This 
comes back to the caution offered previously against assuming that there is greater 
affinity between humanitarian actors and other civilians. Even when humanitarian 
actors work with the same populations as UN civilians, for example, their 
approaches differ in important ways. Further, although one might expect greater 
alignment between UN civilians and humanitarian actors who also work for the UN, 
the story of the SWEDINT trainee being rebuffed by UNHCR in the field attests 
that this is not always the case. One UN civilian trainee warns that if humanitarian 
actors constantly criticize or struggle with UN mission actors, then humanitarians 
might find that the UN mission does not help them when they need it. A colleague 
disputes this last claim, countering that the UN mission is more likely to try to 
foster the relationship, in case humanitarian actors eventually become useful.  
                                                
519 See Section 5.3. 
520 See Chapter 7. 
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The commentary of the last two speakers highlights the peril of dismissing what 
might appear to be bickering or idle gossip between different kinds of international 
actors. The first UN civilian actor hints that constant criticism by humanitarian 
actors could adversely impact the way in which UN actors interpret their obligations 
to assist the latter under international law. This shows how interpersonal spats can 
inform and potentially overshadow the observance of legal mandates, such as the 
requirement that UN mission actors facilitate humanitarian access. As a matter of 
day-to-day reality, these two speakers are evidently concerned with avoiding the 
criticism of, and extracting information from, humanitarian actors. As is now 
explained, humanitarian claims to superiority prove especially irksome for other 
civilian actors.  
 
At the CAMPO training, a number of international civilian actors have the 
impression that humanitarian actors look down on them. A UN civilian trainee says 
she only recently discovered prejudice against the UN mission. At a training event 
she attended, a humanitarian actor professed the view: ‘I think all UN people are 
assholes.’ She adds: ‘It feels personal, how can you talk like this?’ A civilian trainee 
also has the feeling that humanitarian actors ‘think they are superior to everybody 
else – military, police, but even amongst civilians’. This individual says that MSF and 
other ‘hardcore’ humanitarians see UN civilians as essentially useless, and rank 
military actors and peacekeepers ‘down at the bottom’. One UN civilian trainee 
suspects that humanitarian actors write her off when she drives in a UN mission 
vehicle. Another civilian trainee adds that, in social settings, humanitarian actors 
‘will talk to you as friends, but when you come to work they will freeze you. They 
are just separate’.521 One civilian trainee says she has to deal with similar tensions 
inside the civilian component of the UN mission, as well. She proposes that each 
part of the civilian side elaborates ‘a specific nationalism. Within the mission, can 
you imagine? This is mine, this is yours. Everybody wants the lead’. This mention of 
                                                
521 Incidentally, this last speaker from the CAMPO training programme works for the UN Mission in 
South Sudan. See also Chapter 7. 
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occupational nationalities resonates with the CAMPO trainer’s reference to the 
‘ethnicities’ of different actors and the claim that civilian actors arrange themselves 
into castes.522 It also serves as an important reminder that international missions are 
replete with power struggles and perceived hierarchies, only a limited portion of 
which are examined in this study.  
 
In the previous commentary from the CAMPO training, the demarcation of 
boundaries between humanitarian actors and other international civilian actors is 
overtly linked to value judgments. Other civilians have the sense that humanitarian 
actors who set themselves apart judge them harshly or look down on them. Some 
civilian actors report having positive social experiences with humanitarian actors 
outside of work, but feel frozen out by them at the office. In these scenarios, it is 
difficult to discern whether the relevant dynamics should be categorized as a simple 
turf spat or whether these actors can be said to be jostling for a better kind of (legal) 
civilian status. It is proposed here that the construction of civilianness by 
international actors, according to differing degrees and gradations, is inflected with 
emotions as well as value judgments. One UN civilian trainee at CAMPO speculates 
on the way in which humanitarian actors see her versus the way in which they view 
her fellow trainee, who is a UN police actor in the DRC. She draws attention to the 
issues of gender and visual signifiers. ‘Humanitarians probably see your police 
uniform. You are MONUSCO and you have a weapon and you are a man.’ She 
remarks, however, that ‘You see masculinity in humanitarian aid too’. Recounting 
her experience as a UN civilian actor in the DRC, she describes the humanitarian 
actors who would arrive in Goma, where they had a ‘nice apartment and pool, but 
one to two hours away from real conflict. These guys, these cowboys, they come 
and go’. To conjure an image of these humanitarian actors, she puffs herself up and 
pulls back her shoulders. ‘They are the hero of Oxfam. Oh, we say, “Another hero 
is coming”. He thinks he is the most interesting man in Goma…Sometimes I see 
the cowboys, I just smile.’ This gendered account offers an interesting counterpoint 
                                                
522 See Section 5.1 and earlier in this section. 
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to the traditional association of the military with masculinity, and humanitarian 
assistance with femininity.523 While there is not space within this study to address 
these issues in more detail, the overarching point is that international civilian actors 
also bring their own biases, misgivings and grudges to their encounters with 
humanitarian actors.  
 
It was noted previously that international civilian actors who deploy with political or 
peacekeeping missions risk being associated with military actors working for the 
same mission. Similar to humanitarian actors, these other international civilian 
actors are curious about whether local populations can distinguish between the 
various international actors. They, too, hold up the mirror of local perceptions and 
try to imagine how observers see them. Alluding to the prospect of a ‘phantom 
foreigner’, a civilian trainer at SWEDINT suspects that local actors cannot tell who 
is who because so many international actors come from Western countries. 
Invoking an angry beneficiary-perceiver, one UN civilian trainee reports that when 
local populations become embittered with UN military actors in the DRC, UN 
civilian actors are also faced with protests and marches. A UN civilian trainee 
disagrees, arguing that local actors in the DRC know very well who is who. He 
claims that it is ‘easy to identify MONUSCO, with their white and black vehicles. 
OCHA has the emblems, every organization has their emblem and logo, even the 
NGOs’. 524  In his experience, locals are also able to identify the different 
humanitarian actors: ‘This one is Merlin, this one is IRC, this one is Save the 
Children, this one is ICRC, this one is MSF.’ These distinctions are accompanied by 
value judgments. He goes on: ‘Locals know MSF, who is in the bush, we know they 
do not fight, they come with medicine…we know also that the Red Cross cannot be 
attacked.’ This perspective offers yet another example of the circulating Red Cross 
                                                
523 To date, there has been insufficient scholarly attention devoted to gender in the (historical) study of 
humanitarian practice, as argued in Esther Moller, Johannes Paulmann and Katharina Stornig, ‘Call for 
Proposals for Conference on “Gender and Humanitarianism: (Dis) Empowering Women and Men in the 
Twentieth Century”, 2017, available at: http://www.ieg-
mainz.de/media/public/Call%20for%20Papers/CfP_Gender_and_Humanitarianism_2017.pdf. 
524 French to English translation carried out by the author. 
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fantasy, wherein – once again – MSF is accorded the same special status. Here, an 
international civilian actor propagates the fantasy, and he says nothing of whether 
the other named humanitarian actors – OCHA, IRC, Merlin and Save the Children 
– cannot be attacked. 
 
On a further note, a UN civilian trainee at CAMPO suggests that UN civilian actors 
are unreasonably hard on humanitarian actors. When her colleagues say to her, ‘Be 
careful with the humanitarians’, she takes this with a grain of salt. As an individual, 
she has developed various techniques for warming relations with humanitarian 
actors: she engages them on a personal level, maintains an open attitude and shares 
information generously. Another UN trainee at CAMPO takes care not to defend 
the UN when speaking to humanitarian actors: 
 
I have this feeling that I want to get sympathy from the humanitarians 
and get close to them, so I can do that by separating myself from [my] 
institution…but you have to be careful, if you want to stay in your 
organization. So I’ll criticize [the UN mission] while giving an option of 
collaboration. 
 
When confronted by the distinction practices of humanitarian actors, these UN 
civilian actors find ways to engage with humanitarian actors and engender 
proximity. In some instances, they make headway by shrugging off their institutional 
affiliation and fostering interaction at the individual level. In so doing, they assure 
humanitarian actors that if they (the UN civilian actors) possess the wrong kind of 
civilianness, it will not be transmitted to the humanitarian actors. These techniques 
have interesting parallels with military actors’ ‘rush to the intimate’525 – a practice 
that is expanded upon, below. 
 
 
 
                                                
525 See Section 5.5. The phrase comes from Ann Laura Stoler and David Bond, ‘Refractions Off Empire: 
Untimely Comparisons in Harsh Times’, Radical History Review, Vol. 95, 2006, pp. 93–107. 
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 5.4.2 The ‘civilian minus’ 
 
The Red Cross fantasy is alive and well in the above discussion of the ‘civilian plus’, 
and one military trainee at SWEDINT offers a twist on this. He respects the ICRC’s 
desire to maintain separation from others because ICRC actors are not ‘total 
humanitarians…I would even say they are translating military language into civilian 
language’.526  While this is clearly intended as a compliment, the allegation that 
humanitarian actors might edge into the military sphere is more often articulated as 
a critique. International military actors believe that some humanitarian actors attract 
qualities of combatantness because of their entanglement in the conflicts in which 
they operate. While the impugned activities very rarely comprise direct participation 
in hostilities under IHL,527 they often create a perception that humanitarian actors 
might be complicit. Humanitarian actors who are seen to lack humanitarian 
credentials are also seen as dangerous. As is shown below, international military 
actors do not tend to view their own efforts to engender proximity with 
humanitarian actors as problematic. 
 
‘You are f eeding the armed groups’  
 
A white Land Rover emblazoned with a black UN on its side comes to a stop a few metres 
in front of a checkpoint manned by local armed actors. After a few terse exchanges, the 
vehicle drives slowly away and one of the men at the checkpoint can be heard muttering 
‘There is no need for the UN here, we provide security’. While this encounter takes place on-
screen as part of a virtual reality simulation exercise, it galvanizes a heated discussion 
amongst SWEDINT trainees about humanitarian actors who pay at checkpoints. Noting 
how armed actors set up roadblocks and checkpoints as a tactic to garner resources, one 
trainee reproaches humanitarian actors who pay to reach populations on the other side. He 
charges: ‘You are feeding the armed groups…trying to be special and giving money to armed 
groups, you’re fuelling the armed conflict.’ Although the intentions of humanitarian actors 
may be noble, another trainee asserts, this does not give them a free pass in dealing with 
armed actors. When they pay at checkpoints, give food, treat the wounded and provide other 
forms of aid, humanitarian actors ‘bring care to the enemy’ and ‘prolong the rebellion’. 
Further, their sheer presence in the conflict zone renders them part of the conflict. 
                                                
526 For a reference to the ICRC and MSF as the ‘military of the humanitarians’, see Section 7.2. 
527 See Chapter 2. 
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Humanitarian actors inevitably become part of the wars in which they operate, one trainee 
says, ‘even if they are in the middle’. One trainee recounts an incident in which, as a member 
of the international military forces in Afghanistan, he was called to assist a humanitarian 
NGO who was stuck at a roadside. When he and his colleagues arrived at the scene, the 
first question from the NGO was whether they had to bring their guns. ‘I couldn’t believe it. 
Do you grasp the severity of the events happening around [you]? They act like it’s a fairy 
tale and we’re fucking being shot at.’ Another trainee bemoans: ‘We are not the enemy.’  
 
The following three-part discussion considers humanitarian actors who accept 
political funds and help the ‘other side’; who are deemed to lack competence and 
credentials, and; who become too close with international military actors. While the 
first two issues are explored from the perspective of military actors, it will be argued 
that the third issue constitutes a blind spot for the latter.   
 
Too c lose  to  the conf l i c t  – Pol i t i ca l  funding and he lping the ‘o ther  s ide ’  
 
A first sticking point for trainees at the three training grounds is how humanitarian 
actors garner resources for their programming in conflict zones. Many trainees 
cannot fathom how humanitarian actors are able to accept money from – but not be 
beholden to – (political) donors. At the NATO CIMIC training, military trainees 
fixate on the fact that humanitarian actors accept funding from the very same 
organizations they claim to distance themselves from. After the ICRC trainer 
delivers a training session on the traditional humanitarian principles, a trainee alights 
on the ICRC’s use of government funding. He inquires: ‘Are you not too close with 
government?’ The trainer responds that government donors are not permitted to 
dictate where assistance is delivered, or how. Unconvinced, a number of trainees 
shake their heads in disbelief. Equally, NATO trainees are bewildered by MSF’s 
extremely strict funding policies. When the MSF trainer explains that her 
organization does not accept money from Coca Cola, given its link with health 
problems, a trainee sputters ‘You….are too complicated!’ Over lunch in the 
cafeteria, another military trainee voices incredulity: ‘As if people in Afghanistan 
care about Coca Cola.’ As summoned by the military actors, the ‘phantom local’ 
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faults humanitarian actors for their reliance on political donors, but is not bothered 
by the use of resources from corporate purveyors of unhealthy products. 
 
Allegations of ‘civilian minus’ status become more glaring when participants discuss 
how humanitarian actors perpetuate armed conflicts. Critiques of this nature are not 
new, and in the 1990s they galvanized the development of the ‘Do No Harm’ 
agenda inside the humanitarian community. The central insight of Do No Harm is 
that ‘when international assistance is given in the context of a violent conflict, it 
becomes a part of that context and thus also of the conflict’.528 It is also recognized 
that, while humanitarian actors may adopt a neutral position with respect to the 
parties to an armed conflict, their actions and the aid they provide inevitably interact 
with the conflict context. 529  Contemporary humanitarianism is embedded with 
responses to such critiques, such as the move to professionalize the humanitarian 
sector.530 Still, international military actors view humanitarian actors as working 
against them when they provide assistance to all. As flagged in Chapter 4, what 
international military actors fault here is not a violation of the traditional 
humanitarian principles, but the effort to uphold principles of neutrality and 
impartiality.531 Such activities are anathema for international military actors because 
they potentially help their adversaries win the war.  
 
At the NATO CIMIC training, a military trainee outlines a hypothetical scenario in 
which a suicide bomber badly injures one of his fellow soldiers in battle. If a doctor 
working for MSF provides care that allows this bomber to return to the fight, 
international military forces will become hostile towards MSF, as well as other 
humanitarian actors. In such instances, the trainee believes that military discipline 
                                                
528 Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War (London: Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, 1999). 
529 Anderson, supra, p. 1. 
530 See, e.g., Peter Walker and Catherine Russ, ‘Fit for Purpose: The Role of Modern Professionalism in 
Evolving the Humanitarian Endeavour’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 93, No. 884, 2011, pp. 
1193–1210. 
531 This is different from the aforementioned critiques about funding, which essentially go to a breach of 
independence or neutrality. 
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plays a crucial role, because ‘It’s harder to stay rational’. A NATO military trainer 
corroborates this, adding that when a soldier’s unit comes under attack, the most 
difficult thing is to not blame international humanitarian actors who have helped 
‘the other side’. As the humanitarian actor participates in or becomes complicit in 
the conflict, his or her status is downgraded to ‘civilian minus’. What is striking 
about such accounts is how characteristics of combatantness are seen to attach to 
humanitarians doing quintessentially humanitarian activities. Unlike the issue of 
political funding, which could potentially compromise the independence and 
impartiality of humanitarian actors, the provision of services based on need is at the 
heart of the humanitarian endeavour. Moreover, such activities are consistent with 
the role of civilian humanitarian actors under IHL.532 This is one clear example of 
dissonance between what IHL provides and what international actors perceive.  
 
The MSF trainer confronts this last issue directly at the NATO CIMIC training. She 
explains that, when MSF treats a wounded combatant in an armed conflict, ‘In that 
moment he’s not a combatant, really. He’s a human.’ Reflecting on this, a civilian 
trainee at NATO notes that the MSF trainer ‘got everyone going’ in her session. He 
surmises: ‘It’s good for these guys in uniform to see someone like her talk about 
what it would be like on the other side, how they understand the humanitarian 
principles.’ The implication here seems to be that humanitarian actors may have one 
interpretation of the humanitarian principles, but other international actors are 
entitled to have another. At the CAMPO training, a military trainer refers to 
humanitarian NGOs as ‘unguided missiles’ during a session. A humanitarian actor 
who is present balks at this, protesting: ‘Are you calling me a weapon system?’ Most 
trainees take this to be an amusing joke, but the humanitarian actor does not laugh. 
While the imagery of a missile depicts the humanitarian actor as nudging closer to 
the combatant category, the use of the word ‘unguided’ dovetails with the next 
strand of critique that is examined here: the allegation that some humanitarian 
                                                
532 Note that IHL explicitly empowers those who qualify as humanitarian actors to assist all parties to the 
conflict. 
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actors lack the competence and credentials to make authoritative appeals to 
distinction. 
 
 Quest ioning humanitar ian credent ia ls  
 
Aside from the ICRC and MSF actors, the other international humanitarian actors 
who operate in armed conflicts are evidently something of a mystery to military 
actors.533 More than this, military actors doubt that the smaller or lesser known 
humanitarian actors possess the requisite competence, professionalism or 
humanitarian credentials to perform distinction. These humanitarian actors are also 
alleged to pose a potential danger to those around them.  
 
Returning to the virtual reality exercise at SWEDINT,534 a UN civilian trainee recalls 
how the local NGO HELP faced resistance when trying to execute her vision of 
distinction. This trainee surmises that an ICRC actor would have had an easier time. 
‘If we compare someone who is famous and not famous, this is it. The Geneva 
Conventions is basically them. And HELP, what does this organization stand for, 
what do they do? ICRC has worked hard for their fame in comparison.’ At the 
CAMPO training, a military trainer says that the ICRC is the only humanitarian 
actor ‘I really respect. The rest, it’s a political thing’. She describes the individuals 
who work for small, lesser known NGOs as ‘funny figures’ and ‘strange characters’. 
By sending young people ‘who have no idea’ to work in dangerous conflict zones, 
she argues that ‘NGOs can cause danger…these guys are idealistic, emotional. They 
don’t grasp the complexity, politically, of the place they’re going to’. Another 
CAMPO trainer proposes that ‘bigger organizations are more professional. You also 
have the exotic guys on the side, who can be a problem’. His colleague adds: ‘Yes, 
it’s an old stereotype but for sure still applies to the small ones. They barely have 
mission statements, and the necessity to get money leads them to this activity and 
that.’ Humanitarian actors who engage in human rights work are also viewed as 
                                                
533 See also Weir, supra, p. 41. 
534 See also Section 5.4.1. 
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problematic. One military trainer at CAMPO says this kind of activity leads 
humanitarian actors to ‘burn their fingers’. A police trainee confesses that she is 
generally wary of humanitarian actors. There is ‘always a suspicion that maybe they 
are working for someone else’. Smirking at this, another trainee questions whether 
one can trust that humanitarian actors are who they appear to be. She submits, with 
a raised eyebrow, ‘Maybe they are not really humanitarian’. As is discussed in Part 
III, humanitarian actors who fail to stay away from the human rights arena in South 
Sudan are also seen to be playing with fire.535  
 
One military trainer at the NATO CIMIC training says exasperatedly of 
humanitarian organizations that there are ‘millions of them. We only know the 
hugest ones’. A trainee suggests that less organized NGOs endanger people and risk 
injury to their staff. At the SWEDINT training, a military trainee also proposes that 
some NGOs are simply in conflict zones on holiday. He is suspicious of 
humanitarian actors who ‘want freedom, no responsibility, and not to be like 
military or diplomatic [actors]’. Another military trainee calls for humanitarian actors 
to prove that they can ‘deliver the goods’. In a subsequent CAMPO training session, 
a trainer induces laughter when he introduces a new use for the acronym CIA: 
‘Confused International Agencies’. Later, over dinner, the same trainer softens his 
view. He confesses: ‘I find I miss the messy humanitarians, who care about 
people.’ 536  His colleague dismisses this as overly sentimental. ‘You don’t go 
somewhere as a professional and try to save [people]. You have to be cool-headed 
and rational. Otherwise you will cause trouble.’ There is overlap here with claims 
that some humanitarian actors are too idealistic or emotional to behave with 
adequate professionalism in conflict zones (see above). This denigration of the 
effort to ‘save lives’, however, is not consistently espoused by CAMPO trainers. At 
other junctures in the training, trainees are reminded that humanitarian actors are 
                                                
535 See Chapter 7. 
536 This outlook encapsulates a key strand of pushback against the move to professionalize humanitarian 
assistance. Discussed in Eric James, ‘The Professional Humanitarian and the Downsides of 
Professionalization’, Disasters, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2016, pp. 185–206. 
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not the only ones in conflict zones who save people. Indeed, there is a mixed 
message in this respect in all three of the civil–military training programmes. Even 
as they fault humanitarian actors for being naïve, military actors at the CAMPO and 
NATO trainings also express an earnest desire to help.537 
 
Reminiscent of the previous discussion of international civilian actors, the way in 
which international military actors understand the distinction practices of 
humanitarian actors is shaped by a larger set of grievances. While international 
military actors express concern that humanitarian actors are anti-military, they also 
bring their own prejudgments and misgivings to their encounters with humanitarian 
actors.538 The crucial difference, of course, is that while humanitarian actors want to 
disassociate from international military actors, military actors seek to foster 
proximity. Here we arrive at a significant blind spot of international military actors: 
they do not appear to grasp how their efforts to engage with humanitarian actors 
could undermine the latter’s civilianness.  
 
 Too c lose  to  the conf l i c t  – Proximity to  internat ional  mi l i tary ac tors 
 
The final way in which humanitarian actors might attract a ‘civilian minus’ label is 
through contact with international military actors. Although this prospect is 
something that few international military actors concede, others are quick to flag it. 
A SWEDINT trainer, who previously held the position of humanitarian–military 
coordinator, explains how this association can taint the civilian status of 
humanitarian actors: 
 
[T]he moment you get too close to the military, you are sort of lost…I 
noticed when I was advising people in the field, people would say ‘It’s so 
great, I was invited to a military BBQ’. You have to be really cautious 
and tell them ‘The military is likely to open their arms and invite you to 
everything, and these are the people you need distance from’.  
 
                                                
537 See Section 5.5.2. 
538 See Sections 5.3 and 5.4.2. 
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While acceding to military advances in the social sphere might seem innocuous to 
humanitarian NGOs, the trainer argues that this familiarity and comfort spills over 
into operational decision-making. When humanitarian actors happily accept military 
support, he says, ‘I feel like asking them, putting them in a chair and saying, “Are 
you out of your mind?!” There is no thinking about what the consequences would 
be’.539 To flesh out the way in which humanitarian actors become tainted, he offers 
two stories of affiliation. In the first story, the humanitarian actor becomes tainted 
in the eyes of the phantom local. In the second story, the concern is not optics so 
much as actual influence.  
 
The first example comes from Darfur, where some humanitarian NGOs acquired 
the habit of carelessly relying on UN assets. The SWEDINT trainer describes an 
incident in which an NGO in Darfur asked the UN/AU hybrid mission, UNAMID, 
to recover the NGO’s broken vehicle. OCHA recommended that this NGO refrain 
from direct communication with UNAMID and advised that if the decision were 
made to accept help from UN forces, the NGO’s logo should be removed from the 
car. The NGO, however, disregarded this advice. As a result, ‘UNAMID was 
driving a convoy with a broken NGO car on top of it’. This generated concerns 
with respect to the visual optics, as humanitarian NGOs in Darfur would be 
associated with the UN mission. In this account, the ‘phantom local’ spots the 
convoy as it makes its way along the sandy road in Darfur. It sees the UNAMID 
and NGO logos juxtaposed and assigns qualities of combatantness to the 
humanitarian actors. 
 
The SWEDINT trainer’s second story demonstrates that affiliation concerns will 
not always be about what is externally observed. Instead, proximity might lead one 
to become inappropriately influenced as a matter of actual fact. The context of this 
story is an intervention in the Middle East,540 wherein members of an international 
                                                
539 In Part III, two ideal types of humanitarian actor are introduced. This individual aligns with the first 
ideal type, which takes a long-term view and prioritizes distinction over other goals. See Chapter 7. 
540 Location withheld to protect confidentiality. 
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military coalition developed a close relationship with the UN humanitarian–military 
coordinator. As the SWEDINT trainer explains, this coordinator became so friendly 
with the military that he started to advocate on their behalf with the wider 
humanitarian community. Having developed sympathy for the military perspective, 
this UN humanitarian coordinator over-identified and ‘took that line’. He began 
telling UN humanitarian agencies to deliver services in places where the coalition 
forces wanted them to work for strategic reasons. As the conflict progressed, other 
humanitarian actors grew uncomfortable with the coordinator’s positioning and 
showed increasing reluctance to approach the UN mission. In the end, there was 
considerable professional fallout for this individual as a result of his missteps. The 
message is that one’s humanitarianness can become compromised even when there 
are no witnesses to it. The SWEDINT trainer’s parting advice to humanitarian 
actors is as follows: ‘You need to know what game you’re playing in.’  
 
The final section expands on some of the dynamics introduced in the present 
discussion.  
 
5.5 How the line is erased 
 
While international humanitarian actors are depicted in this study as taking the lead 
on forging distinction, they do not have a monopoly on this role. There is a myriad 
of ways in which international military actors try to bend, move or erase the lines 
that humanitarian actors draw. This two-part discussion explores how lines get 
erased through comprehensive approaches to international missions and the direct 
engagement of military actors in humanitarian-like tasks.  
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 5.5.1 The comprehensive approach 
 
The present section returns to the tension between ‘working together’ and 
‘upholding distinction’, delving into the implications of the comprehensive 
approach. 
 
‘Are you not  here? You are here ! ’  
 
At the NATO CIMIC training, an experienced member of the ICRC finds himself 
standing at the front of the classroom, facing a group of uniformed trainees whom he must 
convince about the importance of distinction. Broaching the issue of comprehensive missions, 
he breaks the bad news. ‘It’s beautiful, fantastic, but we are not part of it. We are not part 
of the end state; our job is not to have peace and security. This is your job, and [the job] of 
politicians and governments. Our job is to take care of victims of armed conflict. We’re in the 
picture, but not contributing.’ Plunging forward, he notes that when humanitarian actors 
make such pronouncements to their military counterparts in war zones, they are typically met 
with denial. Soldiers will say: ‘Great to have you on board. Are you not here? You are here! 
So great to have you as part of the comprehensive approach.’ He softens his tone now, 
perhaps recognizing the looming prospect of trainee alienation. He allows: ‘They have the 
right to have this perception.’ Concessions made, he returns firmly to his original course. 
Perceptions are invoked again, but this time it is those of an undefined omnipresent observer 
– the phantom local. ‘But in the end the issue is this perceived neutrality: we are not going to 
plan, analyse, deploy together.’ Intimating that the trainees sitting before him will get it right, 
he concludes ‘As far as this is understood, life is beautiful and everything is happy’.  
 
As discussed previously, attendees of civil–military training programmes are taught 
the importance of simultaneously ‘working together’ and ‘upholding distinction’. 
The overall impression is one of humanitarian actors scrambling to draw and 
safeguard lines faster than other international actors can erase or move them.  
 
 The inevi tabi l i ty  o f  comprehensive  approaches  
 
A uniting theme that cuts across the three civil–military training programmes is the 
inevitability of comprehensive and integrated approaches to international missions. 
At the outset of the NATO CIMIC training, a military trainer asserts that resistance 
is an exercise in futility. ‘We don’t have a choice. We operate in the same 
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environment…we have to interact with each other. We have a dialogue, it must take 
place at all levels, so it’s better for us to prepare for this and get ready for it.’ At the 
CAMPO training site, a trainer likewise notes that, in any global contemporary 
intervention, international military and civilian actors find themselves together, and 
international humanitarian actors must simply ‘swallow the pill’ that peacekeeping, 
military and police actors are involved. Ultimately, the trainer explains, the 
comprehensive approach requires every participant to know the ‘whole picture’. A 
high-level UN guest speaker at the CAMPO training also encourages trainees not to 
let their individual roles take on undue importance. ‘It’s not really about being a 
police officer, a political affairs officer…it’s about being part of a political process.’ 
 
Once the vision for the wider mission is intact, a CAMPO trainer explains, room 
can be made for different perspectives, clear definitions of the scope of work for all 
parties and the delineation of boundaries. The trainer imposes the following 
temporal sequence: work together first, enact distinction second. Another CAMPO 
trainer proposes that upholding the civilian–combatant distinction should not 
constrain attempts to collaborate with humanitarian actors. On the contrary, military 
actors should actively pursue joint planning and coordination. These teachings do 
not avert to the possibility that qualities of combatantness might attach to 
humanitarian actors through such contact. Seen in this light, the refusal of 
humanitarian actors to interact with international military actors is both disagreeable 
and surmountable. With ominous implications for the distinction humanitarian 
actors forge, this trainer advises ‘Don’t think about boundaries, “this I cannot 
cross’’’. A CAMPO peacekeeping trainee deduces from these training sessions that, 
when international actors adopt competing mindsets, this entrenches divisions and 
generates friction in the mission. The trainee surmises that international actors must 
find better ways to relate with humanitarian actors, for the simple reason that they 
need each other. Although humanitarian actors insist that they are not part of the 
comprehensive approach, another trainee adds that they still need to ‘know its 
results’.  
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International humanitarian actors grasp the inevitability of comprehensive 
approaches.541 They are well aware that both blue UN and black UN actors will be 
present in any conflict zone in which they operate, and that they will need to find 
ways of navigating relationships with these persons. 542  This is not to imply, 
however, that they entertain the same visions as other international actors regarding 
the kinds of relationships that are desirable.543 When a humanitarian trainer from 
OCHA leads a training session at NATO, she articulates the perspective of UN 
humanitarian actors regarding comprehensive approaches.544  Echoing comments 
that the ICRC trainer made during his session (see opening vignette, above), she 
states: ‘We say to NATO, do not include us under your umbrella because we are 
nearby and maybe working in the same environment or doing the same things. We 
are not part of this comprehensive approach.’ She explains that humanitarian actors 
handle civil–military relations in a different way, guided not by CIMIC but instead 
by CM-Coord.545 The latter approach, the OCHA trainer explains, is not about 
succeeding in a military mission. Instead, it aims to ‘protect and promote the 
humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when 
appropriate, pursue common goals’.  
 
The trainer from MSF quizzes the trainees on whether a military commander can sit 
with a humanitarian actor (such as one from MSF) at a table in a conflict zone and 
give orders: ‘You do a hospital here, change that convoy time.’ When the NATO 
trainees tentatively answer this question in the negative, the MSF trainer responds 
emphatically: ‘MSF will never sit at [a] table with military partners.’ It becomes clear 
later in her training session that she does not intend this literally, because MSF 
actors do, in practice, engage with military actors discreetly behind the scenes. Her 
                                                
541 This comes across in the ‘FBA Report’, supra. 
542 ‘FBA Report’, supra, p. 3. 
543 See also Chapter 4. 
544 This session is delivered via Skype, rather than in person. 
545 Also discussed in Chapter 4. 
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point is that the advent of comprehensive missions does not make MSF a ‘partner’ 
of military actors in any sense of the word. 
 
The SWEDINT training also includes a series of sessions facilitated by invited 
representatives of humanitarian organizations, all of whom extol the importance of 
distinction. Reflecting on these sessions, one SWEDINT military trainee shares: ‘I 
was so surprised when MSF and ICRC came in on day one of training and said “No 
contact”. Why not?’ On further reflection, she says that she could ‘sort of 
understand’ where the humanitarian actors were coming from. Her military 
colleague offers: ‘I found it a bit provocative. It’s like you have your goal, and we 
have our goal and we can’t cooperate. But we do have the same goal, we’re all here 
for the country to get better.’ In this trainee’s view, the humanitarian trainer who 
calls for separation between actors is ‘making it too easy for himself to distinguish 
himself. It should be an integrated mission – see how flexible the military are’. When 
he deploys to conflict zones, he shares: ‘We do CIMIC hugs in my team.’ This 
mention of a ‘CIMIC hug’ offers an appropriate jumping off point for considering 
the active steps that international military actors take to erase the lines drawn by 
humanitarian actors. 
 
 A ‘rush to the int imate ’  
 
The efforts military actors make to learn about, get to know and approach 
humanitarian actors are reminiscent of what Stoler and Bond term a ‘rush to the 
intimate’ in counter-insurgency operations.546 Participants in the NATO CIMIC 
training express a sincere desire to foster proximity with civilians; in particular, they 
are keen to increase contact with international humanitarian actors. Depicting the 
humanitarian sphere as part of a crowded landscape of international civilian actors, a 
military trainer at NATO proposes: ‘We need to fight complexity with knowledge.’ 
One trainee offers: ‘The goal is to have positive feelings between military and 
                                                
546  Stoler and Bond, supra. Discussed also in Derek Gregory, ‘The Rush to the Intimate: 
Counterinsurgency and the Cultural Turn’, Radical Philosophy, Vol. 150, 2008, pp. 8–23. 
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NGOs.’ A NATO trainer highlights the importance of building friendships and 
advises trainees to ‘show them who you really are, as military and humans’. Another 
NATO trainer recommends that trainees draw attention to commonalities between 
humanitarian and military actors, such as a mission-first focus, courage and an 
emphasis on getting things done. Ultimately, trainees learn, the onus to foster 
interactions with humanitarian actors is on military actors. As one NATO trainer 
puts it: ‘We have the gun and uniform, so it’s for us to open the door.’  
 
During another training session at NATO, a military trainer explains that smaller 
and less organized humanitarian actors lack the ‘absorptive capacity’ to engage with 
military actors. Another military trainer urges trainees to distinguish between 
individuals and institutions when fostering relationships in conflict zones. 
Individuals, it is intimated, offer leverage points for entry. By way of example, the 
trainer tells the story of a humanitarian organization that initially refused to speak 
with international military forces in a conflict zone.547 Eventually, ‘one employee 
said he would talk to me in his brother’s shop if [we] didn’t tell his boss, so that 
worked’. The lesson imparted is that what cannot be accomplished at the 
organizational level can be achieved through one-on-one interaction. This resonates 
with the techniques that UN civilian trainees at CAMPO say they have developed 
for improving relations with humanitarian actors.548 One reservist trainee at NATO, 
who splits his time between military service and civilian life, says it is easy for him to 
gain the trust of humanitarian actors because he can ‘speak civilian’. He refrains 
from using acronyms, makes an effort to be less ‘aggressive’ and strives to put every 
message in a ‘way they want to hear it’. He is adamant that, even when a military 
actor behaves in this way to get humanitarian actors on side, still, ‘you are a soldier’.  
 
Participants in the SWEDINT training also discuss the value of fostering 
relationships at the individual level. One trainee looks for international humanitarian 
actors of his own nationality in a conflict zone, so ‘we can talk’. Another trainee 
                                                
547 Location withheld to protect confidentiality. 
548 See Section 5.4.1. 
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submits: ‘It’s all personality. If you connect with someone, it’s easy to exchange 
information.’549 His fellow trainee adds: ‘It’s one thing to communicate with the 
organization as a whole, but easier one on one.’ A SWEDINT trainee also proposes 
that established international humanitarian organizations are easier to work with 
than new, smaller NGOs because the former are more professional. This comment 
squares with the previous discussion of how smaller and lesser known NGOs are 
seen to lack professionalism.550 At the same time, it is at odds with the NATO 
trainer’s story of how a humanitarian actor hid his interaction with the trainer from 
his boss (see above). It was not professionalism that made the contact possible, but 
the willingness of the individual humanitarian actor to bend his organization’s rules. 
Moving on, a SWEDINT military trainee who deploys as a UN peacekeeper adds 
that UN humanitarian actors are ‘easier for military’ to deal with than NGOs, 
because the former are part of the UN family. Another military trainee is heartened 
by potential disconnects between the official pronouncements of humanitarian 
actors and what they are, in practice, willing to do behind closed doors. He explains 
that humanitarian actors sometimes speak with him in private, and that when they 
face security problems, ‘they even stay in our camp’.  
 
These efforts to erase the line sit uneasily with accusations that humanitarian actors 
are too close to the conflict. As discussed (see Section 5.4.2), international military 
actors accuse humanitarian actors of feeding and caring for the enemy. These same 
military actors grow frustrated when humanitarian NGO actors do not want to be 
seen with them and their guns on the roadside. Not only this, but they actively strive 
to get close to humanitarian actors and foster interaction. This suggests that, when 
international military actors protest against entanglement with humanitarian actors 
in armed conflict, they are narrowly concerned with conflict actors who fight for the 
other side. The exception to this is where international military actors take issue 
with humanitarian actors who receive funding from donors on the ‘good’ side of the 
                                                
549 See also ‘FBA Report’, p. 4 (direct experience with individuals influences humanitarian actors’ views of 
particular organizations or actors). 
550 See Section 5.4.2. 
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conflict. Perhaps this problem is easier for military actors to see because they do not 
feel personally implicated. Ultimately, these military actors are primarily fixated 
upon how they might achieve their own goals through contact with humanitarian 
actors. Notably, some of the measures these military actors adopt – such as 
‘speaking civilian’ – downplay their own combatantness. 
 
Not all military trainees think that engendering proximity to humanitarian actors is 
the right move; some recognize that it can also compromise the civilianness of 
humanitarian actors. One NATO trainee allows: ‘We have a different mission than 
the humanitarians, and we approach the local population differently.’ When another 
trainee, befuddled, inquires, ‘Why can’t we work together?’ his colleague proffers: 
‘Because humanitarians think we endanger them. We are military and we are 
political, we are not there for the same reason as humanitarians.’ Another trainee 
contributes: ‘When I hear them say they need to stay impartial, it’s a challenge for 
me. But if that’s what keeps them safe, I guess they have to use that.’ Thus, 
separation from humanitarian actors is simply something ‘we’ll have to respect’. In 
these latter accounts, the ‘phantom local’ takes the form of the attacker-perceiver, 
viewing humanitarian actors who get too close to military actors as meriting ‘civilian 
minus’ status.  
 
These pronouncements regarding the need to reinforce – or at least not interfere 
with – the lines drawn by humanitarian actors represent the minority view at the 
training grounds. The next section examines an aspect of military activity that 
generates more mixed feelings amongst military actors: their direct engagement in 
humanitarian-like tasks. 
 
 5.5.2 Military actors do humanitarian things 
 
This section shows that participants in the civil–military training programmes are 
divided on whether military actors should engage in activities that exceed the scope 
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of the traditional combat role. When military actors assume a more expansive role, 
their claims to humanitarianness undermine the distinction practices of 
humanitarian actors. 
 
‘What you br ing to  the f ight ’  
 
During one of the NATO CIMIC training sessions, a military trainer advises that when 
trainees arrive in a new area of operation, they should take immediate steps to show ‘what 
you bring to the fight’. It is evident that the battle in question does not take place on the 
conventional battlefield, and the training sessions on ‘CIMIC projects’ illuminate the true 
arena. CIMIC projects are focused and time-bound projects that are designed to have an 
immediate and tangible impact, thereby increasing acceptance of foreign troops, ensuring force 
protection and – in some cases – supporting intelligence gathering. Practitioners sometimes 
refer to them as quick impact projects, or QIPs. To prepare trainees to implement such 
projects, a military trainer shares his experiences working with fishing cooperatives in the 
Horn of Africa. Testing the trainees, he inquires: ‘Why would I work with fishing 
cooperatives?’ Going for laughs, one trainee ventures facetiously: ‘Because you like fish?’ 
After allowing a brief moment of levity, the trainer provides the real answer. The end game 
is to empower the capacity of the fishermen so they won’t join the pirates. ‘I made some QIPs 
for them, courses in mending fishing nets, materials, teaching skills…’ Another benefit of 
the contact this fostered, he says, is that fishermen shared information about weapons 
smuggling in the area. When he asks trainees why certain kinds of CIMIC projects are 
executed in particular locations, it prompts a chorus of: ‘CIMIC is in support of the military 
mission.’ During another training session, a military trainer depicts the daily duties he 
carried out on a recent afternoon in the conflict zone where he was deployed. He checked on 
the refurbished water pumps in the internally displaced persons camps and approved the 
release of funds for the water pumping station. Next: ‘There were soccer uniforms to be 
dropped off for a community team, heated disputes to resolve, an influential Mullah to visit.’ 
He concludes: ‘It is surely my fight in my area of operation.’ 
 
Discussions about the militarization of humanitarian assistance flow in one of two 
directions: they either refer to direct engagement by military forces in the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance or they refer to the use of military logistical, security and 
other assets by humanitarian actors.551 The present discussion, which focuses on 
                                                
551 Peter Hoffman and Thomas Weiss, Sword and Salve: Confronting New Wars and Humanitarian Crises 
(Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006), p. 20. See Pugh, supra, p. 352 (‘Civil–Military Relations’). 
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findings collected from research on the NATO and CAMPO training programmes, 
is concerned with the former variant.552  
 
 A more expansive ro le  for  the mi l i tary  
 
Most participants in the three civil–military training programmes agree that the 
comprehensive approach is a good thing. However, the more specific issue of 
military actors stepping away from their traditional combat role elicits apprehension. 
One moment, trainees are taught that humanitarian actors are not the only ones 
who can help local populations caught up in war. At another moment, they are 
reminded that they are soldiers first, and that every single thing they do is about 
winning the military mission. While some training sessions convey the desirability of 
soldiers carrying out CIMIC projects (NATO) and having peacekeeping actors 
implement QIPs (CAMPO), there is palpable anxiety about mission creep. 
 
The present section elucidates the expansive conceptualization of the military’s role 
on the contemporary battlefield before attending to the pushback and calls for a 
narrower approach. During a CAMPO training session, it is suggested that the 
military’s job in contemporary conflict should be interpreted broadly. Trainees learn 
that international military forces are increasingly engaged in stabilization and 
counter-insurgency tasks that involve humanitarian-like activities. One CAMPO 
trainer emphasizes that, however much these tasks might look humanitarian, they 
remain combat operations. At the NATO training, participants are also reminded 
that, even if they ‘do a lot of the same things’ as humanitarian actors, this does not 
make them humanitarian actors. Citing the example of military forces building 
schools, a NATO military trainer tests the trainees: ‘Do we have a military NGO?’ 
The trainees respond with an unambiguous collective ‘No’. The difference, all agree, 
is that everything NATO does is designed to achieve its military mission. The 
trainers convey that humanitarian NGOs primarily seek to support the civilian 
                                                
552 The issue of military asset use by humanitarian actors is examined in Part III. 
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population and that, unlike NATO, they do not have a military ‘second mission’. A 
military trainee later explains what this means to him: ‘In the end we’re all soldiers 
first….If I’m doing humanitarian relief in a war zone, my hand will be on my 
weapon. That’s a big mental thing. I’m here to help you, but don’t try anything, I 
will kill you.’ Still, it bothers him that humanitarian actors might see him as itching 
to pick up a gun. Having emphasized the centrality of combatantness to his identity, 
he insists that ‘No one hates war more than a soldier’. 
 
While military actors are frequently reminded that they are not humanitarian actors, 
many depict themselves as being in a helping role or sharing a concern for ‘common 
humanity’. Contemplating the sessions led by humanitarian trainers on this topic 
(see below), several NATO trainees are irritated by the concern for the motivations 
of military actors. One military trainee insists: ‘We really can provide a service. 
Don’t worry about what our motives may be, in the end we’re helping somebody.’ 
His fellow trainee chimes in: ‘I can help you help these people, but you’re not letting 
me help them by providing whatever I can provide.’ A NATO trainer validates such 
reactions: ‘Our underlying thing is humane: we stop the conflict. Most missions, the 
most bullets are shot on the range.’ Likewise, another trainer submits: ‘The military 
is not just killing people, or hurting civilians. We are even looking after civilians.’ A 
trainer adds: ‘We have in common the humanity…we do it with kinetic force, they 
do it by helping.’ Here, combatantness and humanitarianness are folded together as 
though the commonalities outweigh the differences. 
 
As highlighted previously, one CAMPO trainer emphasizes that humanitarian-like 
activities are combat tasks when performed by military actors – including 
peacekeeping actors. Undermining this message, another CAMPO trainer asserts 
that humanitarian actors are not the only ones here ‘to save the world’. The armed 
actors who engage in multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, this trainer 
contends, want the very same thing. Over lunch, the trainer recalls a civil–military 
training programme for EU actors that he had attended. He reports: ‘They reassured 
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each other why they cannot work together, while people drown. No one answered 
the question “What can I contribute?”’ He thinks this is preposterous. ‘You’re 
arguing over the colour of the life belt, while people are drowning.’ For this trainer, 
humanitarianness is nothing more or less than saving lives.553 Similar dynamics 
unfold in South Sudan, where there is discernible friction between humanitarian 
actors and UNMISS actors regarding technical expertise.554 
 
 A narrower ro le  for  the mi l i tary  
 
The international humanitarian community explicitly recognizes the experience and 
resources that military actors can bring to a context.555 However, in addition to 
questions of capability, there are also doubts that military actors can deliver aid 
appropriately while engaged in fighting war or carrying out peace enforcement 
tasks.556 For this reason, humanitarian actors tend to vociferously oppose the direct 
engagement of military actors in humanitarian-like activities in conflict settings.557 
Although CIMIC projects or QIPs might appear humanitarian on the surface, 
humanitarian actors take issue with the underlying aims of such work.558 The goal of 
winning ‘hearts and minds’, for example, clashes with humanitarian commitments to 
deliver needs-based aid in a neutral and impartial manner.559  
 
During a training session at NATO, the OCHA trainer notes that humanitarian 
actors are troubled by ‘the association, mobilization and utilization of humanitarian 
assistance to achieve other objectives’. When military actors engage directly in so-
called humanitarian activities, she contends, this generates confusion. ‘The goal is 
different. Is the population understanding that? Do you think I will still have access 
                                                
553 The reference to the colour of a life belt alludes to the issue of humanitarian signs and symbols, which 
is addressed in Part III. 
554 See Chapter 7. 
555 ‘Sphere Handbook’, supra, p. 60. 
556 Pugh, supra, p. 352 (‘Civil–Military Relations’).  
557 This refers only to armed conflicts; natural disasters and public health emergencies may be different.   
558 Weir, supra, p. 41. 
559 Also discussed in ibid. See also ‘FBA Report’, supra. 
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to the Taliban side?’ The risk of misunderstanding, she explains, is heightened by a 
priori local ideas that all foreigners are the same. Both humanitarian and military 
actors are foreign, have means, operate in times of crisis and say they are ‘here to 
help’. When military forces and peacekeepers perceive and present their tasks as 
complementary to humanitarian actors, they fuel the underlying confusion. She 
reiterates: ‘What’s important for us is distinction.’  
 
This passage touches upon many of the themes that have already been woven 
throughout this empirical discussion. First, while the trainer brings everything back 
to distinction in this lesson, she does not lean primarily on IHL for authority. No 
mention is made, for example, of what IHL might permit or require of military 
actors in connection with these humanitarian-like projects. Instead, the prospect of 
‘confusion’ is invoked in an attempt to persuade military actors to stay within their 
proper sphere of activity. The insinuation is that humanitarianness cannot survive 
the claims upon it that military actors impose. While it is initially unclear whose 
confusion the OCHA trainer is referring to, she soon calls on the ‘phantom local’. 
This figure shapeshifts, assuming the form of the ‘population’, the ‘Taliban side’ 
and, finally, ‘locals’. The ‘phantom foreigner’ appears, as well. The starting point is 
that ‘all foreigners are the same’, and that muddling deepens when military or 
peacekeeping actors engage in tasks that are the purview of (civilian) humanitarian 
actors. It is important to note that the ‘association’ the speaker problematizes is 
both actual and perceived.560 This has parallels with the SWEDINT trainer’s two 
stories about affiliation that were discussed above.561 It will be recalled that the first 
story of perceived affiliation involved an NGO in Darfur that allowed UNAMID to 
recover its broken down car, which led to the NGO logo being visibly displayed 
alongside the black UN logo. The second story went to actual influence: a 
humanitarian actor ended up compromising his values when he became too close to 
international military forces. The direct engagement of military actors in 
                                                
560 As evident from the delivery of the full session, which is not cited in full here. 
561 See Section 5.4.2. 
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humanitarian assistance, it follows, potentially compromises humanitarianness in 
ways that go beyond optics.   
 
In training sessions run by military and peacekeeping actors there is a detectable – 
albeit marginal – thread arguing for military actors to swim in their appropriate lane. 
Coincidentally, at both CAMPO and NATO, this thread revolves around the 
construction of schools. At the CAMPO training programme, one trainer makes a 
disparaging reference to international military forces building schools in the Balkans 
in the 1990s. The trainer elaborates: ‘We now understand this is not our role…so we 
first ask: Is this our job?’ Similarly, at NATO, a military trainer describes a scenario 
in West Africa wherein NATO accidentally damaged a local school. NATO 
arranged for local civilian contractors to repair the school while NATO forces took 
care to stay ‘out of sight’. In this trainer’s view, it would not have been appropriate 
for soldiers to fix the school themselves. ‘That should be the distinction: so you 
shouldn’t see military working on civilian [things].’ While the CAMPO trainer, 
above, focuses on what properly falls within the military sphere, the NATO trainer 
anchors distinction in visibilities. A distinction problem was thus averted in the case 
of the school repairs, because NATO forces remained out of sight.  
 
It is important to pay close attention to trainees’ interpretation of the emphasis on 
optics. If the concern is interpreted as being about being seen together, then some 
military actors may believe that their ‘rush to the intimate’ may continue so long as it 
takes place outside of the public eye. NATO trainees thus swap stories of how they 
make headway with humanitarian actors ‘behind the scenes’ and without ‘being seen 
together’. At the SWEDINT training, one trainee advocates downplaying the 
differences between military and humanitarian actors. The uniforms that military 
actors wear, he proposes, are really just ‘a piece of cloth’. At the NATO training, it 
is proposed that military actors should remove their uniforms altogether. Recalling 
the reservist trainee at NATO who says he is able to ‘speak civilian’, the suggestion 
is also floated in that training programme that military actors might make progress 
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by looking civilian – that is, by donning civilian clothing. In one of the training 
sessions, a trainer shows a photo of himself participating in a running race organized 
by a UN humanitarian agency in the Horn of Africa. Referring to the green military 
uniform of a NATO soldier, he notes that humanitarian NGOs are usually opposed 
to ‘interacting with people dressed like a vegetable’. He advises, however, that 
trainees can ‘easily take down the wall’ by removing their ‘vegetable or salad dress’. 
In subsequent conversation, several trainees voice discomfort with the notion of 
removing their uniforms. One trainee likens this to cheating, ‘especially in civilian 
perceptions’. It will be recalled from the earlier examination of civil–military 
guidelines562 that military actors are also expected to wear uniforms in order to 
uphold IHL’s principle of distinction. 
 
The NATO trainer described above essentially advocates that military actors should 
renounce the trappings of combatantness to foster interaction with humanitarian 
actors. While military actors might expect that meeting in secret or shedding 
uniforms will dispel anxieties about association, this will only go to the optics part 
of the equation.563  Although the everyday distinction practices of humanitarian 
actors have a clear performance component that pertains to influencing the 
phantom local – being seen to be distinct – this does not eclipse the fact that 
humanitarian actors equally aim at being distinct.  
 
Conclus ion  
 
A central finding of this empirical investigation is that non-humanitarian 
international actors are not very receptive to the distinction(s) that humanitarian 
actors enact. From the perspective of these other actors, humanitarian actors appear 
either overly strict or inconsistent in their appeals to distinction. It is evident that 
some international military actors take distinction personally; they see it not as 
something the law requires, but something that humanitarian actors demand from 
                                                
562 See Chapter 4. 
563 See above in this section; see also Section 5.4.2. 
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them. Also, some military actors portray humanitarian actors as ‘civilian minus’ 
actors who are part of the conflict. Meanwhile, military actors encroach upon 
humanitarian actors in various ways: they participate in the comprehensive 
approach, they directly engage in humanitarian-like activities and they embark on a 
‘rush to the intimate’ in order to foster interaction. International civilian actors 
express their own misgivings about humanitarian distinction practices, and the 
prospect of a ‘civilian plus’ status for humanitarian actors does not sit well with 
them. Problematizing the common assumption that humanitarian actors get along 
better with civilian actors than with military actors, this chapter has identified 
marked intra-civilian tensions in the Pedagogical realm.  
 
By empirically describing and analysing the existence of a series of distinctions 
amongst international actors, the chapter has demonstrated that the civilian–
combatant divide is not the only – or even the most significant – distinction at play. 
Overall, practices at the civil–military training grounds map onto the alternative 
vision of distinction (see Chapter 2), characterized by dynamism and a fragmented 
civilian category. While individual actors self-conceptualize as civilians or 
combatants in a general sense, their everyday organization of relationships belies the 
notion of discrete entities with static statuses. They might reach for a bright line 
distinction and its promise of clarity, but they may also behave as though individuals 
might be imbued with qualities of both civilianness and combatantness. An 
exception here is the ‘rush to the intimate’ that military actors engage in, which 
ignores how (their own) characteristics of combatantness might be transmitted to 
humanitarian actors through contact or proximity. Further, although international 
humanitarian actors seek to tie humanitarianness to the highest degree of 
civilianness available, there is a shared understanding amongst international actors 
that the ‘phantom local’ has the final say. And yet, international actors are the ones 
who project ascribed perceptions onto the ‘phantom local’ in its various 
manifestations. In the everyday encounters of international actors, it often seems as 
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though the main function of the ‘phantom local’ is to provide an avenue through 
which international actors might speak to each other about distinction. 
 
* 
 
Conclus ion to  Part  II  
 
Part II of the study has followed the idea of distinction to the Pedagogical realm, 
illuminating how an important IHL rule is disseminated at global civil–military 
training spaces. It has demonstrated that the training programmes reveal something 
unique about the idea of distinction that cannot be distilled from the Intellectual and 
Kinetic realms. At the same time, these other two realms naturally spill into this one. 
The lessons taught in the training programmes draw on an intellectual formation of 
distinction, but trainees understand the lessons through the prism of their 
operational experiences. The empirical discussion in this part has illuminated not 
only how distinction is taught, but also how this teaching is received and contested 
by the international actors who are expected to operationalize it upon deployment. 
In all three of the training programmes examined here, the ‘civilian plus’ and its 
corollaries circulate. While the reality of the Pedagogical realm is undeniably messy, 
the discussion in Part I established that IHL’s principle of distinction is 
characterized by disorder at every level. 
 
In the empirical investigation conducted in Chapter 5, other actors could be found 
to question the harmlessness, innocence and vulnerability of humanitarian actors. 
Many also were shown to express reservations that the role humanitarian actors play 
in war merits a special status. When humanitarian actors disseminate the ‘civilian 
plus’ status in the name of providing help to war-affected populations, other actors 
see them as seeking to promote a heroic, virtuous and exclusive identity. When 
humanitarian actors call for distinction, others see them as craving ambiguity. On 
balance, non-humanitarian international actors are more inclined to see 
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humanitarian actors as the actual beneficiaries of a special civilian status for 
humanitarian actors – not populations in need. While the perspectives of other 
international actors help to expose the hidden functions of distinction as enacted by 
humanitarian actors, these perspectives cannot simply be taken at face value. As has 
been stressed throughout this discussion, other international civilian and military 
actors have priorities that differ from those of humanitarian actors. Thus, the 
distinction practices of humanitarian actors may represent, for these other actors, an 
inconvenience or an impediment to achieving their goals. This part has also 
proposed that the affective dimension of these relationships should not be 
overlooked. When other international actors believe that humanitarian actors look 
down on them, feelings of resentment and hostility are engendered that impact on 
their treatment of humanitarian actors and their interpretation of their obligations 
under international law. The empirical findings from the Pedagogical realm suggest 
that the answer to the ‘why’ question – as in, why humanitarian actors produce 
distinction in a particular manner – ultimately depends on who is asked.  
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PART III: DISTINCTION AND THE KINETIC 
 
Introduct ion to Part  III 
 
South Sudan offers another challenging context in which humanitarian actors strive 
to enact their vision of distinction: it is the site of both an armed conflict and an 
integrated UN mission with a robust Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandate.564 
Building on the discoveries from the Intellectual and Pedagogical realms, Part III of 
this study follows the idea of distinction to the Kinetic realm. Its focus is on 
international actors working on the frontlines of armed conflict – particularly 
international humanitarian actors (primarily NGO, UN and ICRC actors), UN 
civilian actors and UN peacekeeping actors.  
 
In the Kinetic realm, international actors come into direct physical contact with 
each other and engage in contests over distinction. In contrast to the Pedagogical 
realm, which has a strong normative bent, the Kinetic realm tends to be more 
practical and reactive. In the operational context, classroom lessons about IHL’s 
principle of distinction are not routine. The relevant rules might be disseminated to 
individual frontline actors by Heads of Mission or staff at the headquarters, or 
perhaps not at all.565 Although international actors may not explicitly cite a legal rule, 
they continue to perpetuate the idea of distinction. Through their practices and 
interactions, international actors in South Sudan constitute and reconstitute 
distinction on a daily basis. The distinction they produce relates strongly to the 
alternative vision of distinction outlined in Chapter 2. The ‘phantom local’ is at the 
centre of things in the Kinetic realm, dispensing degrees of civilianness (or 
combatantness) to international actors. Issues of appearance are at the fore, and 
humanitarian actors deploy signs and symbols to signal their separateness. A 
significant twist is the conflict that emerges between enacting distinction and 
implementing a particular traditional humanitarian principle – the principle of 
                                                
564 See Section 6.1.2. 
565 See Section 7.1. 
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humanity. Suddenly, humanitarian actors can be found to erase lines or argue that 
they never should have been drawn in the first place. The first chapter in this part, 
Chapter 6, lays the foundation for the empirical investigation that follows in 
Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 6: SOUTH SUDAN AS A SITE 
 
Introduct ion  
 
This chapter explains the rationale for devoting attention to the operational context, 
in general, and South Sudan, in particular. It begins with a brief overview of South 
Sudan’s recent conflict history, as well as the history of UN intervention in South 
Sudan. It then elaborates on how the everyday distinction practices of humanitarian 
actors materialize in the Kinetic realm. The first way in which they are materialized 
is through an appeal to law. In the operational context, explicit appeals to IHL and 
the Geneva Conventions mostly drop away; instead, humanitarian actors appeal to 
operational rules contained in civil–military guidelines. As is shown in this chapter, 
the ‘civilian plus’ and ‘phantom local’ figures circulate in these guidelines. The 
second way in which distinction practices are materialized in the Kinetic realm is 
through adherence to the traditional humanitarian principles. In contrast to the 
Pedagogical realm, in the Kinetic realm in South Sudan, the traditional humanitarian 
principles no longer appear to align with the implementation of distinction. To 
capture this disconnect, this chapter sorts the approaches of humanitarian actors 
into two ideal types: the first ideal type prioritizes distinction and views it as a trump 
and the second ideal type balances distinction with other, competing, ideals. The 
third element of humanitarian distinction practices in the Kinetic realm pertains to 
the use of humanitarian signs and symbols. In this chapter, important criticisms are 
canvassed regarding the way in which humanitarian actors deploy their emblems, 
with the most debilitating critiques voiced by humanitarian actors, themselves.  
 
6.1 Following distinction to South Sudan 
 
For international lawyers, South Sudan may appear to be a very different site from 
Geneva and The Hague – a far cry from IHL texts and the courtroom decisions of 
the Intellectual realm. This socio-legal study treats South Sudan as a site where the 
everyday life of law unfolds. Even if international actors in South Sudan do not 
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receive the teachings of distinction in the same way as those in the Pedagogical 
realm, they still cite the ‘rule book’ – although a minority of humanitarian actors are 
willing to toss it aside. Furthermore, international actors in South Sudan make and 
remake distinction on the ground as they go about their daily routines. 
 
 6.1.1 Rationale for studying the operational context 
 
In armed conflict zones, different kinds of international actors cross paths with each 
other as they execute their respective tasks. In such settings, international legal rules, 
norms and high-level policies come into contact with the pressures of day-to-day 
operations. Koddenbrock argues that the visible and public face of international 
intervention is sustained by disregard for operational practice.566 He observes that 
normative debates about the traditional humanitarian principles tend to treat the 
relevant principles as free-floating – untethered by what goes on ‘on the ground’. 567 
Marriage also highlights the need to look beyond official discourse: humanitarian 
actors may invoke rules or principles at the same time as they ignore or breach 
them, in practice. 568  Koddenbrock and Marriage each refer specifically to the 
traditional humanitarian principles (see Chapter 4), but it is worth contemplating 
how these insights might also apply to IHL’s principle of distinction. More 
precisely, it is important to consider what the relationship between distinction and 
the traditional humanitarian principles might look like in the context of on the 
ground practice. A further question that was raised in Chapter 2 is why the 
dominant vision of distinction is preserved when it is so obviously under strain. One 
possibility was advanced in this respect: we want to live in a world where there is a 
bright line civilian–combatant distinction. Adding to this, it can be said that 
disregard for operational practice helps to sustain distinction in its dominant form. 
This points to the value of following the idea of distinction to conflict zones, where 
it is supposed to be upheld by international actors. 
                                                
566 Koddenbrock, supra, p. 59. 
567 Ibid., p. 68. 
568 Marriage, supra, p. 10.  
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A central reason why South Sudan was selected as the operational site is that South 
Sudan is a difficult place for humanitarian actors to implement their vision of 
distinction. When international actors arrive in South Sudan to work for UNMISS 
or an international humanitarian organization, their identities interact with the 
murky civilian–combatant dynamics that are already in place. South Sudan is a 
context where the civilian status of local populations – and indeed the very concept 
of civilianness – is questioned and undermined at every turn. No one is ever seen to 
be fully outside the fight. Even before the outbreak of conflict in 2013 (see below), 
there was a long history in South Sudan of intentionally targeting civilians – 
especially those seen to sympathize with the opposition.569 While the international 
community treats the internally displaced persons (IDPs) residing in South Sudan’s 
‘Protection of Civilian’ (PoC) sites as civilians, the Government of South Sudan and 
various non-state armed actors routinely question the civilian status of these IDPs. 
They allege that (ex-)combatants flow in and out of the sites on a daily basis and 
that UN forces do not fulfil their gatekeeping role. There is empirical evidence to 
support these claims. 570 For example, it is widely acknowledged that IDPs have 
been smuggling weapons into the PoC site in Bentiu, Unity State, typically hiding 
them in charcoal and firewood.571 One respondent for the present study proposes 
that this activity goes undetected because UNMISS lacks the capacity to search all 
130,000 IDPs living on-site. It is also recognized that some segments of the South 
Sudanese population move seamlessly between civilian life and armed vigilante 
practice or opportunistic criminality.572  
 
                                                
569 Michael Arensen, If We Leave We Are Killed: Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilians Sites 
(International Organization for Migration, 2016), p. 15. 
570 See, e.g., Caelin Briggs, Protection of Civilians Sites: Lessons from South Sudan for Future Operations 
(Norwegian Refugee Council, 2017), pp. 64–66 (emphasizing the need to maintain the civilian character 
of the PoC sites). 
571 Arensen, supra, p. 58.  
572 Field interviews, 2015. On criminality in the PoC sites, see Flora McCrone, Field Notes on Criminality 
and Insecurity in South Sudan’s UN Protection of Civilian Sites (Justice Africa, 2016). 
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In this fraught setting, humanitarian actors fear that the ambiguity of the civilian 
status of local populations will be grafted onto them. They hope to escape the 
civilian as a compromised idea, and they strive to avoid the material treatment that 
has befallen local civilian populations. The successful dissemination of a ‘civilian 
plus’ status, whether to cleanse them of qualities of combatantness or to distance 
them from those with lower degrees of civilianness, acquires high stakes in South 
Sudan. As mentioned previously, however, such an escape might be illusory; a 
special status for humanitarian actors might turn them into more enticing targets. 
Aspects of the international intervention that generate further anxieties about 
distinction are explored in Section 6.1.2, below. 
 
The discussions of methodology in Chapters 1 and 4 of this study also apply in the 
Kinetic realm.573 The bulk of field research in South Sudan was carried out in 
August and September 2015. The capital, Juba, in Central Equatoria State, served as 
the main base, and trips were made by a UN Humanitarian Air Service helicopter to 
‘deep field’ sites in Bor, Jonglei State and Bentiu. Field observation and interviews 
were conducted in and around the PoC sites where IDPs reside, in Juba, Bor and 
Bentiu. While the Kinetic realm offers a form of authenticity that cannot be found 
elsewhere, it also has its drawbacks. In addition to posing challenges for ethics and 
access, the Kinetic realm also presents difficulty for researchers trying to make sense 
of complex patterns of interaction as they unfold in real time in an unstable context. 
These drawbacks were partially averted by the author’s familiarity with South Sudan 
and extensive network of contacts in the area.574  
 
 
 
 
                                                
573 As noted previously, interviews and focus group discussions were the core research methods used in 
South Sudan; they were supplemented by participant observation.  
574 Previous work experience in this setting in 2010, 2011 and 2014 made South Sudan the preferred 
choice over similar conflict-affected contexts that host international missions.  
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 6.1.2 Overview of South Sudan: Conflict and intervention 
 
Between 1983 and 2005, the country that was then called Sudan was engulfed in a 
violent north–south conflict. The two main parties were the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Sudanese government, based in 
Khartoum.575 The official end to the conflict was signalled by the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005; this agreement provided for, 
among other things, a future referendum on southern Sudanese independence.576 In 
July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan came into being, following a referendum in 
which 99 per cent of residents in Southern Sudan voted in favour of 
independence.577 Back in 2005, in order to oversee the implementation of the peace 
ushered in by the CPA, the multi-dimensional integrated UN Mission in the Sudan 
(UNMIS) was installed with headquarters in Khartoum.578 Following the Republic 
of South Sudan’s independence in 2011, this mission was officially replaced by the 
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).579 Authorized under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, this integrated mission’s mandate was to ‘consolidate peace and 
security and to help establish conditions for development’ in South Sudan.580 As 
stated in the Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) signed by UNMISS and the 
Government of South Sudan (GoSS), UNMISS committed to following the 
international legal rules regarding the conduct of military personnel, including the 
1949 GCs and the Additional Protocols.581  
 
                                                
575 Wendy Fenton and Sean Loughna, ‘The Search for Common Ground: Civil–Military Coordination 
and the Protection of Civilians in South Sudan’, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, December 2013, 
p. 5. 
576 Fenton and Loughna, supra, p. 5.  
577 Ibid.  
578 As per UNSC, Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005), 24 March 2005, S/RES/1590. 
579 UNSC, Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011), 8 July 2011, S/RES/1996. 
580 Ibid. Chapter VII entitles UN forces to engage in robust use of force, and to use ‘all necessary means’ 
to protect civilians and humanitarian actors, and for self-protection. See Koddenbrock, supra, p. 79. 
581  See Section Four of the Status of Forces Agreement between the United Nations and the 
Government of the Republic of South Sudan Concerning the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, 
available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/documents/unmiss_sofa_08082011.pdf. South 
Sudan ratified GC I-IV of 1949 and AP I-III in 2013. 
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The initial jubilation that greeted South Sudan’s independence was short-lived. In 
December 2013, there was a serious spike in armed violence as different factions of 
the SPLA began to fight – first in the capital, Juba, then elsewhere throughout the 
country.582 At the root of this conflict was a struggle for power between President 
Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar. The conflict also took on an ethnic 
dimension, pitting the country’s two main ethnic groups – the Dinka and the Nuer 
– against each other.583 When civil war erupted in South Sudan in December 2013, 
tens of thousands (and eventually hundreds of thousands) of IDPs sought refuge at 
UNMISS bases. At several sites, UNMISS staff opened the gates and allowed in 
those seeking physical protection from the armed violence.584 These sites came to be 
referred to as ‘Protection of Civilian’, or PoC, sites. By not referring to them as IDP 
camps, international actors hoped to emphasize their temporary status. 585  In 
response to the December 2013 violence, the UN Security Council Resolution 2155 
of May 2014 reinforced UNMISS and ‘reprioritized’ its robust PoC mandate, as well 
as: its human rights monitoring activities; support for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance; and oversight of the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities 
(COH) agreement.586 In terms of the conflict status, it is generally agreed that South 
Sudan has been in a non-international armed conflict since December 2013.587 
While peace agreements were signed in 2015 and 2017, they did not hold and, at the 
date of writing, the conflict situation continues. The next section of the discussion 
addresses UN integration in more detail, and elaborates on the UN mission’s PoC 
mandate. 
 
                                                
582 Lauren Ploch Blanchard, ‘Conflict in South Sudan and the Challenges Ahead’, Congressional Research 
Service Report, 2016.  
583 For background on the conflict, see African Affairs, Making Sense of South Sudan, Virtual Issue (2016), 
available at: https://academic.oup.com/afraf/pages/south_sudan_virtual_issue. 
584 See Briggs, supra, p. 12.  
585 Arensen, supra, p. 12; Damian Lilly, ‘Protection of Civilians Sites: A New Type of Displacement 
Settlement?’ Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, No. 62, September 2014, available at: 
http://odihpn.org/magazine/protection-of-civilians-sites-a-new-type-of-displacement-settlement/. 
586 UNSC, Security Council Resolution 2155 (2014), 27 May 2014, S/RES/2155. 
587 See, e.g., Geneva Academy, Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts (RULAC) project, ‘Non-International 
Armed Conflict in South Sudan’, available at: http://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-
armed-conflict-in-south-sudan#collapse4accord.  
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 An integrated UN miss ion 
 
To some extent, integration policies have already been addressed in this study. Such 
policies overlap with comprehensive approaches to international missions, and 
many of the participants in the civil–military training programmes are deployed as 
part of an integrated mission. A few more remarks will be made here on the UN 
variant of integration. 
 
With the release of the landmark Brahimi Report in 2000, there was a shift in the 
UN towards more robust peace support operations, greater emphasis on PoC 
mandates and the introduction of Integrated Mission Task Forces.588 Integration, as 
a general concept, gained momentum in subsequent years. There was an explicit 
linkage of development and security by the mid-2000s, 589  and increasing 
conceptualization of a relief–development continuum.590 The integrated approach 
was to apply to all contexts where the UN had a country team and multi-
dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission. For UN actors, the 
integrated presence entailed: a shared vision of strategic objectives; closely aligned 
or integrated planning; a set of agreed results, timelines and responsibility for 
delivering tasks relating to the consolidation of peace; and agreed mechanisms for 
monitoring and evaluation.591  
 
Until 2008, much of the wider conversation about UN integration was concerned 
with structural issues.592 Since that time, the focus has gradually shifted towards 
strategic planning and issues of implementation. A question that has yet to be 
satisfyingly resolved is where humanitarian actors – especially NGOs – should fit in 
                                                
588 United Nations, UN Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Report A/55/305 – 
S/2000/809, August 21 2000, pp. 34–37 (‘Brahimi Report’). 
589 United Nations, UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility (New York, NY: United Nations, 2004), p. viii. 
590 United Nations, UN Report of the Secretary General’s High Level Panel: Delivering as One (2006). Available at: 
http://www.un.org/events/panel/resources/pdfs/HLP-SWC-FinalReport.pdf.  
591 Metcalfe et al., supra, p. 1 (‘Stimson Report’). 
592 For a discussion of the ‘triple hat’ approach to UN leadership and co-location under UN integration, 
see OCHA, Policy Instruction: OCHA’s Structural Relationships within an Integrated UN Presence (OCHA, 2009). 
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relation to the civilian and military components of these missions. Through 
integration and the coordination mechanisms that accompany it, such as the Cluster 
system, humanitarian assistance has drawn closer to UN missions.593 Proponents of 
a closer relationship between the humanitarian sphere and UN missions emphasize 
the overall aim of attaining peace and the importance of coordination and unified 
action.594 Essentially, the ‘working together’ mantra of the comprehensive approach 
applies to UN integrated missions.595  
 
Opponents of a close relationship between humanitarian actors and UN integrated 
missions contend that integration: leads to blurred lines between different spheres 
of activity; undermines the ability of humanitarian actors to access and earn the trust 
of beneficiaries; increases threats to aid worker security; subordinates humanitarian 
action to political agendas; and dilutes humanitarian leadership.596 Concerns about 
distinction are implicit in these accounts, and they are sometimes voiced more 
overtly, as well. In a 2015 survey, humanitarian actors reported a perceived ‘lack of 
distinction’ between humanitarian actors and integrated peacekeeping operations (or 
special political missions) in six countries, including South Sudan.597  
 
                                                
593 Barrat, supra, p. 345. 
594 Discussed in Daniel Philpott and Gerard Powers (Eds.), Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a 
Violent World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 280; Sylvain Beauchamp, ‘Humanitarian Space 
in Search of a New Home’, in Benjamin Perrin (Ed.), Modern Warfare: Armed Groups, Private Militaries, 
Humanitarian Organizations, and the Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012), pp. 199–234, 207. See also IASC, 
IASC Reference Group on Principled Humanitarian Action: Summary of Report on Integration’, 
available at: 
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_files/IASC%20Paper%20on%20Integrat
ion_1%20July%202013.pdf. 
595 See Part II. 
596 See Metcalfe et al., supra (‘Stimson Report’). See also: Schirch, supra; Marit Glad, A Partnership at Risk? 
The UN-NGO Relationship in Light of Integration (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011), p. 5; Steering 
Committee for Humanitarian Response, Some NGO Views on the Humanitarian Implications of Implementing the 
Brahimi Report (Geneva: Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, 2000); Antonio Donini, 
‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Integration or Independence of Humanitarian Action’, International 
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 92, No. 880, 2010, p. 52 (‘Integration’); Cecilia Hull, Integrated Missions: A 
Liberia Case Study (Division of Defence Analysis, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2008). 
597 The six countries cited are Afghanistan, South Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Sudan and the Central African Republic. See IASC, ‘Review of the Impact of UN Integration on 
Humanitarian Action’, 2015, pp. 36–37, available at: 
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/150908_un_integration_review_-
_iasc_pha_tt_2015.pdf.  
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 A Protec t ion o f  Civi l ians (PoC) mandate  
 
Most UN peacekeeping missions deployed globally since the 1990s have had PoC 
tasks included in their mandate.598 The PoC agenda can be understood as separate 
from the coherence or integration agendas, though they are not mutually exclusive 
and PoC mandates often give rise to similar issues.599 Under a robust Chapter VII 
PoC mandate, international peacekeeping, military and police actors are tasked with 
using force to protect civilians. They may also be assigned the task of creating 
security conditions ‘conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance’.600 In the 
context of PoC agendas, international humanitarian actors are often engaged in 
protection activities alongside a range of other international actors, who interpret 
the term ‘protection’ in very different ways.601  
 
As for the phenomenon of the PoC site, it is not entirely new.602 However, it is 
generally regarded as an exceptional solution for protecting displaced populations. 
What differentiates PoC sites from other displacement settings is the fact that they 
are guarded by armed UN peacekeepers and located on or around UN bases. At the 
time that field research was conducted in 2015, the displaced populations residing in 
the sites showed little sign of moving out. In December 2017, more than 200,000 
IDPs resided in South Sudan’s PoC sites. 603  While UNMISS has emphatically 
                                                
598 Koddenbrock, supra, p. 75, FN 20. On the historical development of the UN PoC mandate, see Haidi 
Willmot and Scott Sheeran, ‘The Protection of Civilians Mandate in UN Peacekeeping Operations: 
Reconciling Protection Concepts and Practices’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 95, No. 891/2, 
2013, pp. 517–538, 519–524. 
599 For a historical perspective on the overlap and cyclical recurrence of stabilization and integrated 
intervention modes, see Sultan Barakat, Sean Deely and Steven Zyck, ‘“A Tradition of Forgetting”: 
Stabilization and Humanitarian Action in Historical Perspective’, Disasters, Vol. 34, No. S2, 2010, pp. 
297–319. 
600 This is the case with the UNMISS Mandate in South Sudan. 
601 Eva Svoboda, ‘The Interaction between Humanitarian and Military Actors: Where Do We Go from 
Here?’, Humanitarian Policy Group, Policy Brief No. 58, 2014, p. 2. See also Chapter 7. 
602 Lilly, supra. 
603 As of December 2017, approximately 210,000 IDPs were residing in South Sudan’s PoC sites. The 
first PoC site was closed in December 2017, in Melut, Upper Nile. See UNMISS, ‘First Protection of 
Civilians Site Successfully Closed in South Sudan as Families Choose to Return Home’, UNMISS Press 
Release, 20 December 2018, available at: https://unmiss.unmissions.org/first-protection-civilians-site-
successfully-closed-south-sudan-families-choose-return-home.  
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insisted that a more sustainable approach is needed, the sites continue to serve as a 
visible protection outcome in line with the mission’s PoC mandate.604  
 
Despite UNMISS’s robust Chapter VII mandate, UN forces in South Sudan have 
earned a reputation for inactivity and risk aversion.605 They are accused of being 
reluctant to leave their bases and to use force to protect civilians.606 Since the 
establishment of the PoC sites, a particular concern has been the concentration of 
international protection resources at the sites. One UN humanitarian actor describes 
the PoC sites as the ‘visible eyesore of the conflict’, and another individual notes 
‘there’s 201,000 in PoCs, but four point something million outside PoCs, and the 
latter are not being served’.607 A UN humanitarian actor adds: ‘There are places we 
want to go…but we can’t. We want to ensure safety and dignity of people in the 
PoC [site] but the forces can only do perimeter protection, not the details. It’s very 
limited.’ Tellingly, in interviews conducted for this study, UN mission actors 
consistently interpreted questions about their wider PoC mandate as referring only 
to the PoC sites.  
 
The enforcement of the Chapter VII mandate in South Sudan also varies as 
UNMISS commanders come and go. As one UNMISS actor explains, the 
implementation of the Rules of Engagement (RoE) is ‘not constant or linear, you 
sensitize the mission on it, and then you start again’. A UNMISS military actor adds: 
‘A battalion commander might be around for a year; you need to explain to them 
that they need to push RoE to the limit, so they feel they can act also outside the 
PoC site.’ The way in which UN forces respond to threats of violence against IDPs 
is attributed to individual personalities and, many suggest, the national origin of 
particular battalions. While certain nationalities are perceived as ‘going the mile’, 
                                                
604 Field interview, 2015. 
605 See Arensen, supra, p. 33. 
606 United Nations, Evaluation of the Implementation and Results of Protection of Civilians Mandates in United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (A/68/787, 2014), pp. 7–8 
(finding UNMISS peacekeepers used force less than 10 per cent of the time when civilians were 
attacked). 
607 Field interview, 2015.  
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other nationalities are rumoured to have a ‘no body bag policy’. The latter are 
deemed to lack the will to respond robustly to threats against civilians.608  
 
Since the outbreak of violence in December 2013, many international humanitarian 
actors have been housed ‘inside the wire’ of the PoC sites. Co-location with a UN 
peacekeeping mission in this manner is unusual for humanitarian actors. Generally 
speaking, global guidance on civil–military interaction discourages humanitarian 
actors from co-locating with military actors in armed conflict zones or complex 
emergencies.609 As part of the response to December 2013, however, the UN 
Humanitarian Country Team for South Sudan (HCT) approved the use of (military) 
force protection by humanitarian actors so they could be based in the sites.610 This 
formed a blanket clearance for the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets 
(MCDA) by humanitarian actors within the sites, avoiding the need for case-by-case 
clearance, as is usually required.611 Apart from this, general rules regarding the use of 
military assets as a ‘last resort’ are in place.612 In 2015, the HCT asked to be 
informed of future decisions by humanitarian actors to co-locate in the PoC sites, 
noting that the behaviour of one agency ‘may have an impact on the perception of 
the broader humanitarian community’.613 In parallel with the accusations noted 
above that UNMISS has been reticent to work outside the PoC sites, humanitarian 
actors – with the exception of the ICRC and MSF – have also been faulted for 
concentrating staff and resources within the PoC sites.614   
 
                                                
608 See also ‘Sudan Accuses U.N. Peacekeepers of Killing Seven Civilians in Darfur’, Reuters, 27 April 
2015, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/27/us-sudan-darfur-unamid-
idUSKBN0NI1SC20150427?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&rpc=69. 
609 South Sudan Civil–Military Advisory Group, Guidelines for the Coordination between Humanitarian Actors 
and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), endorsed 6 December 2013 (‘Humanitarian–
UNMISS Guidelines’). 
610 UN OCHA, ‘Frequently Asked Questions: UN Humanitarian Civil–Military Coordination, Military 
Civil Defense Assets and the Use of Military Escorts in South Sudan’ (‘Humanitarian Civil–Military 
Guidelines’). See also UN, Agreement of Division of Roles and Responsibilities between UNMISS and the 
Humanitarian Country Team in UNMISS POC Sites, February 2014. 
611 ‘Humanitarian Civil–Military Guidelines’, supra; ‘Oslo Guidelines’, supra. 
612 See Chapter 4, and below. 
613 ‘Humanitarian–UNMISS Guidelines’, supra. 
614 As discussed in Arensen, supra, p. 40.  
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6.2 Everyday distinction practices in the Kinetic realm 
 
Chapter 4 provided an overview of everyday distinction practices, outlining how 
international humanitarian actors appeal to IHL, profess adherence to the traditional 
humanitarian principles and invoke local perceptions. In the Pedagogical realm, 
humanitarian actors treat the production of distinction partly as a matter of legal 
compliance and partly as a matter of appeasing local onlookers. This picture changes 
in the operational context of South Sudan. Here, local perceptions are the main 
reference point for the vision of distinction that humanitarian actors propound. 
Furthermore, adherence to the traditional humanitarian principles is no longer seen 
to (only) reinforce a distinct humanitarian identity. In some instances, upholding the 
traditional humanitarian principle of humanity and strictly implementing distinction 
appear to be mutually exclusive propositions. A further difference in the operational 
context is the deployment of humanitarian signs and symbols to assert distinction 
visually. These points are elaborated upon in the proceeding sections. 
 
 6.2.1 The appeal to law 
 
In comparison with the Pedagogical realm, in the Kinetic realm of South Sudan, one 
is much less likely to hear a frontline actor citing the Geneva Conventions – though 
some individuals certainly do. As noted in Chapter 4, in numerous global mission 
settings, international actors come together to draft their own fit-for-purpose civil–
military guidelines. When humanitarian actors in the Kinetic realm mention the rules 
or the ‘rule book’, they are often referring to these context-specific civil–military 
guidelines.  
 
This part of the discussion considers how the idea of distinction circulates in two 
civil–military guidance documents from South Sudan: South Sudan guidelines for 
the humanitarian–UNMISS relationship and South Sudan humanitarian civil–
military coordination guidance. As is demonstrated, the civilian–combatant 
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distinction is only one of the distinctions mentioned in these guidelines. References 
are also made to a civilian–military distinction,615 a humanitarian–military distinction 
and a humanitarian–UNMISS distinction. This last iteration is important to 
scrutinize for the way in which it positions UNMISS civilian actors. This study 
proposes that it pushes them to the other side of the line in a fragmented civilian 
category, allocating them a lower degree of civilianness. The implication is that, 
when frontline humanitarian actors in South Sudan enact distinction with respect to 
the wider UN mission, they do not break the rules so much as follow them. In both 
sets of civil–military guidelines that are examined here, the ‘phantom local’ also 
circulates. Vague references are made to the ‘neutral perception’ of humanitarian 
actors and the prospect of ‘any perception’ that humanitarian actors may be 
affiliated with the military.  
 
As with the international civil–military guidelines examined in Chapter 4, the civil–
military guidance reviewed here is treated as non-binding guidelines or soft law. The 
focus of this inquiry is not on the (lack of) formal penalties that flow from breaches 
of these civil–military guidelines, but on the attitudes of international actors to 
alleged breaches of the rules.  
 
First, the South Sudan guidelines for the humanitarian–UNMISS relationship 
outline rules for the use of UNMISS assets and UNMISS armed escorts by 
humanitarian actors. It is stipulated that ‘UNMISS will evaluate and respond to each 
request on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with its own priorities and capacities’. 
There is also guidance against allowing weapons, military equipment or uniformed 
personnel to be transported on humanitarian assets, ‘except when uniformed 
personnel are afforded IHL protected status’ – for example, when conflict casualties 
are evacuated by air.616  UNMISS civilian staff are permitted to travel on UN 
                                                
615 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of slippage between the military and combatant categories. 
616 This is referred to as CASEVAC. See ‘Humanitarian–UNMISS Guidelines’, supra. 
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Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) flights with UNMISS approval, but ‘UNMISS 
shall not charter UNHAS branded aircraft for use by the peacekeeping mission’.617  
 
This guidance document also follows global guidelines on ‘last resort’,618 and the 
reference to a humanitarian–military distinction is again noteworthy here. The rules 
are also important to the empirical discussion that follows, in which attention is 
drawn to an incident in which humanitarian actors flew in a helicopter without 
going through the proper channels.619 The guidance stipulates: ‘As a general rule, to 
promote distinction between military and humanitarian actors, humanitarian actors 
should not use UNMISS’ assets or armed escorts.’ Humanitarian actors are to 
consider such use only as a last resort in exceptional circumstances, when the 
following criteria are met: the objective of the mission is humanitarian ‘and the 
mission clearly maintains its humanitarian and civilian character’; there is an urgent 
and immediate humanitarian need; there is no comparable humanitarian alternative; 
the use of the asset/escort is limited in time and scale, with a clear exit strategy; and 
the use does not compromise the capacity of humanitarian actors to operate safely 
and effectively in the longer term.620  
 
The guidance also states that these rules are in place ‘to prevent a blurring of lines 
between the humanitarian community and UNMISS’. 621  The guidance further 
emphasizes that both humanitarian actors and UNMISS actors must ‘ensure 
distinction of each other’s activities’. As required by the global UN DPKO Civil–
Military Coordination policy,622 UNMISS is only to engage in relief assistance as a 
last resort. The military’s main role is to help create a safe and secure environment 
so as to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to enable the 
protection of civilians. The South Sudan Humanitarian–UNMISS guidance also 
                                                
617 ‘Humanitarian–UNMISS Guidelines’, supra. 
618 See also Chapter 4. 
619 See Chapter 7. 
620 ‘Humanitarian–UNMISS Guidelines’, supra. 
621 As demonstrated in Chapter 7, frontline actors often use these two distinctions interchangeably. 
622 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Civil–Military Coordination Policy, September 2002, 
available at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/451ba7624.pdf.  
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instructs UNMISS to avoid engaging directly in humanitarian assistance to ‘win 
hearts and minds’.  
 
Under the heading ‘Distinction of Activities’, the guidance stipulates that ‘civil–
military principles’ require a ‘clear distinction of the identities, functions and roles of 
humanitarian actors and those of UNMISS’. It outlines specific measures, such as: 
‘Arms should never be carried in humanitarian premises or means of transport; 
Identification of staff, relief supplies, premises, vehicles, boats, and aircraft should 
promote distinction of respective identities; Communication materials and strategies 
as well as public statements should ensure clarity of purpose and/or mandate.’ For 
example, the guidelines instruct that, if UNMISS actors are asked about 
humanitarian issues, UNMISS should redirect these inquiries to OCHA or ‘the most 
relevant aid agency present’. The importance of perceptions is further highlighted in 
the following statement, in which the ‘phantom local’ circulates: ‘Any perception 
that humanitarian organizations may have become affiliated with the military could 
impact negatively on the security of their staff and on humanitarian access.’623  
 
Second, there are the South Sudan humanitarian civil–military coordination 
guidelines.624 This guidance says the following of the civilian–military distinction: ‘At 
all times, a clear distinction must be maintained between combatants and civilians, 
who are granted immunity from attack by IHL. Military personnel must refrain from 
presenting themselves as civilian/humanitarian workers, and vice versa.’ While this 
framing tracks more closely with the civilian–combatant distinction than the 
humanitarian–UNMISS guidelines (see above), it is noteworthy that the 
humanitarian actor is singled out from other civilians – both as an object and a 
subject of simulation. The guidance provides that, in complex emergencies such as 
South Sudan, ‘the flexibility to use MCDA is greatly constrained and the importance 
                                                
623 ‘Humanitarian Civil–Military Guidelines’, supra. 
624  ‘Humanitarian Civil–Military Guidelines’, supra. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of how the 
humanitarian sphere is grafted onto the civil–military paradigm. 
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of distinction becomes paramount as outlined in [IHL]’. 625  This depiction of 
distinction as ‘paramount’ is important, as it suggests that distinction should outrank 
or overpower other rules. The empirical discussion demonstrates, however, that 
distinction does not always serve as a trump in the operational context of South 
Sudan. 
 
Perception is also allocated an important role in the civil–military coordination 
guidance: ‘In complex emergencies, the risks to perception of humanitarian 
assistance, access and acceptance, as well as security of affected people and 
humanitarian workers must be examined thoroughly.’626 The guidance also advises 
that, rather than using armed escorts and other ‘deterrence’ measures, humanitarian 
actors should request ‘area security’ from UNMISS, in order to enable them to 
maintain some separation from military actors. Area security might involve: 
UNMISS ‘clearing’ and patrolling important road networks; maintaining a presence 
in an area where humanitarian actors need to operate; or providing aerial flyovers. 
In such scenarios, UNMISS actors are not supposed to be visible, nor are they to 
supposed to accompany the convoy. This is what separates the concept of area 
security from more direct reliance on military assets. Finally, the guidance provides 
that humanitarian actors are to develop mitigating measures when the use of 
UNMISS assets or armed escorts could ‘have a negative impact on the neutral 
perception of humanitarian workers’. With regard to the need to Do No Harm,627 
the guidance acknowledges that military assets ‘can provide unique advantages in 
terms of capability, availability, and timeliness’; however, ‘the immediate positive 
effects must be carefully balanced with long-term negative effects’.628 This temporal 
horizon is significant. Chapter 7 explores how humanitarian actors who adopt short-
                                                
625 Here the guidance directs readers to the ‘MCDA Guidelines’, supra. 
626 This guidance document does not use the language ‘no comparable humanitarian alternative’ when 
discussing resort to military assets. Instead, it refers to a lack of appropriate civilian assets. See 
‘Humanitarian Civil–Military Guidelines’, supra. 
627 See Section 5.4.2. 
628 ‘Humanitarian Civil–Military Guidelines’, supra. 
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term versus long-term thinking arrive at different decisions about using UNMISS 
assets. 
 
The main points to take away from the guidance perused here are as follows. First, 
the guidelines are informed by, and infused with, IHL rules. Second, the distinction 
being promulgated is only sometimes a civilian–combatant binary aligned with the 
dominant vision of distinction. Even at the level of text, the ‘civilian plus’ figure and 
its corollaries circulate. While nothing is said of qualities of civilianness and 
combatantness floating around, the treatment of the civilian category most 
resembles the alternative vision of distinction. Third, even at this normative level, 
the emphasis on perceptions is marked and the presence of the ‘phantom local’ is 
discernible. How things appear, and what onlookers witness, is given concerted 
attention. When humanitarian actors resort to the use of a UNMISS asset without 
following the proper ‘last resort’ guidance, they are likely in contravention of these 
civil–military guidelines. This point becomes important with respect to the story of 
the unauthorized helicopter trip in Chapter 7. This study proposes that, apart from 
such breaches, when humanitarian actors in South Sudan promulgate the ‘civilian 
plus’ or direct their performance of distinction towards the ‘phantom local’, they 
follow these rules, rather than contravene them.  
 
 6.2.2 Adherence to the traditional humanitarian principles 
 
To reiterate an argument that was made previously, this study proposes that 
humanitarian actors cultivate a certain amount of ambiguity around the relationship 
between distinction, on the one hand, and the traditional humanitarian principles, 
on the other.629 As discussed in Part II, treating the humanitarian principles as a 
‘long spoon’ or a ‘distancing discourse’ gives the impression that upholding 
distinction and implementing the principles go hand in hand. While leaving a certain 
amount of wiggle room at the level of abstract principles may enable humanitarian 
                                                
629 See Chapter 4. 
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actors to defend a range of practices on the ground, there comes a point when it is 
impossible to uphold all commitments at once. 630  In the Kinetic realm, the 
pressures of the operational context drive a wedge between commitments to 
distinction and commitments to the traditional humanitarian principle of humanity. 
It will be recalled that the principle of humanity requires actors to address human 
suffering wherever it is found. This entails going to hard-to-reach places in order to 
deliver humanitarian services. In some cases, getting to these places safely requires 
humanitarian actors to use military assets or other military resources. Such reliance 
undermines distinction, because it allows for the intermixing of civilian and military 
spheres.  
 
To capture the way in which humanitarian actors grapple with this dilemma in the 
Kinetic realm, this study characterizes humanitarian actors according to two ideal 
types. The first ideal type takes a strict approach to distinction, treating it as a 
lynchpin of humanitarianness. These humanitarian actors narrowly interpret ‘last 
resort’ policies on military asset use and take a long-term view of the implications of 
their everyday choices for their future operations. For the first ideal type, distinction 
serves as a trump; this aligns with the paramount status of distinction in the civil–
military guidelines (see above). The second ideal type is typified by a more flexible 
approach to the performance of distinction, treating it as a norm that should be 
balanced with other objectives. These actors typically take a short-term view of the 
consequences of their choices, and they ground humanitarianness in the 
humanitarian imperative. They view the first ideal type as out of touch with the 
values that should motivate humanitarian actors, while the first type faults them for 
being short-sighted. In Chapter 7, the split between these two types is brought into 
stark relief in episodes of decision-making about the use of UNMISS assets.  
 
 
 
                                                
630 See also Koddenbrock, supra, p. 66 (making a similar point with respect to the humanitarian 
principles, more generally). 
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6.2.3 The invocation of local perceptions  
 
Both physically and metaphorically, humanitarian actors use signs, symbols and 
spatial referents in their distinction practices. This discussion highlights the 
differences in the legal protection of Red Cross, UN and humanitarian NGO 
emblems; compares the signifiers of humanitarianness with those of civilianness; 
and examines two critiques relating to the deployment of humanitarian symbols. 
The more general point is that there is a strong visual (or optical) life of distinction 
in the Kinetic realm. International humanitarian actors invest considerable resources 
to manage the way in which the ‘phantom local’ perceives their interactions with 
other international actors. It is suggested that this has adverse implications for war-
affected populations, flattening them out into an audience for the performance of 
distinction. 
  
 Humanitar ianness  and humanitar ian symbols 
 
A first observation is that the symbols of various humanitarian actors receive 
different levels of protection under international law. It remains the case that there 
is no humanitarian symbol more powerful or widely recognized than the Red Cross 
emblem.631 This emerges from, and perpetuates, the Red Cross fantasy that was 
introduced in Chapter 3. Revisiting earlier arguments about humanitarian 
exceptionalism, it may be more appropriate here to speak of Red Cross 
exceptionalism. According to the dominant narrative of the ICRC, IHL serves as 
the primary authority for the legal protection of humanitarian assistance; the Red 
Cross emblem serves as the visible manifestation of this legal protection.632 On this 
account, the misuse of the emblem threatens to dilute the power of humanitarian 
symbols by blurring the lines between persons and objects that fall within IHL’s 
                                                
631 The focus here is on the Red Cross emblem, specifically, rather than the sun, crescent, lion or crystal.  
632 Rolle and Lafontaine, supra, p. 763, FN 10.  
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protective remit and those that do not.633 The policing of the Red Cross emblem 
suggests that if the emblem is used by the wrong person or in the wrong way, there 
will be a threat of contamination. Again, a crucial feature of the legal treatment of 
the Red Cross emblem is exclusivity: humanitarian NGO actors, for example, 
cannot expect the same treatment of their own symbols. Many humanitarian NGOs 
express concern about this disparity.634 Some even call for a new humanitarian 
symbol or legal emblem to visibly signify NGOs’ adherence to the humanitarian 
principles.635 While no such symbol has yet materialized, observers suggest that a 
number of processes and objects already serve as emblems for humanitarian NGOs. 
Examples range from organizational logo signs,636 T-shirts, car stickers and flags637 
to the standard operating procedures of humanitarian actors, including their manner 
of dress and the white Land Cruisers they drive.638 The emblems and logos of UN 
humanitarian actors are better protected than those of NGOs, as the blue laurel 
wreath of the UN and its logo are explicitly protected under international law. 639 
Bracketing these disparities in the law’s treatment of different humanitarian 
emblems, a separate question is how the visual cues of humanitarianness relate to 
those associated with civilianness. As mentioned in Chapter 2, IHL provides little 
indication of the visual signification of civilianness.640 Starting from the assumption 
that civilians do not wear military uniforms and do not bear arms, it can be said that 
humanitarian actors present differently.641  The most crucial discrepancy is that 
                                                
633 Ibid., pp. 759–761. See Article 37 of AP I (perfidy); see also Articles 23 and 27 of the 1906 GC 
(misuse or abuse of the emblem). The UN has also condemned misuse of the emblem. See Article 9.7 in 
UN Secretary-General (UNSG), Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of 
International Humanitarian Law, UN Doc ST/SGB/1999/13, 6 August 1999, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/451bb5724.html. See also Rule 59 of the ICRC Customary Law 
Study, supra. 
634 Demeyere, supra, p. 11. See also Rolle and Lafontaine, supra. See Chapter 3. 
635 Mackintosh, supra, p. 126. 
636 Linda Polman, War Games: The Story of Aid and War in Modern Times (Viking, 2011), p. 20.  
637 Nicholas Stockton, ‘In Defence of Humanitarianism’, Disasters, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1998, pp. 352–360, 
358. 
638 See Smirl, supra; Mackintosh, supra. 
639 See Chapter 3. 
640 See Chapter 2. 
641 As Barker observes: ‘For one thing, aid workers look like aid workers and not like civilians.’ Camilla 
Barker, ‘Aid Workers Could Secure Better Protection Under the Protection of Civilians Mandate’, 
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humanitarian actors have recourse to an arsenal of signifiers that the wider civilian 
population cannot use, such as the aforementioned T-shirts with logos, car stickers 
and flags. Of course, humanitarian actors do not tend to simply emblazon the word 
‘humanitarian’ on their clothing, equipment and facilities. More often, they signify 
the particular organization they belong to, such as UNICEF, Mercy Corps or World 
Vision. This brings us to the first critique of humanitarian symbols. 
 Two cr i t iques o f  humanitar ian symbols  
The first critique pertains to whether the distinction humanitarian actors promulgate 
is an alibi for hidden interests. In an operational context such as South Sudan, the 
very same logos and emblems that humanitarian actors emblazon themselves – as 
well as their equipment, facilities and projects – with to assert distinction are often 
used for marketing purposes and to achieve ‘visibility’ for donors.642 It can be 
exceedingly difficult to discern where the effort to disseminate civilian status ends 
and where economics-driven marketing begins. In some instances, the individuals 
who deploy these symbols may not be certain, themselves. Similar issues arise with 
respect to the demarcation and policing of ‘humanitarian space’643 by humanitarian 
actors. Although humanitarian actors claim that safeguarding the humanitarian 
space is about serving the victims of war, counter-arguments are articulated that it is 
about organizational survival 644  or excluding outsiders from the humanitarian 
                                                                                                                                    
International Law Grrls, 15 August 2014, available at: https://ilg2.org/2014/08/15/aid-workers-could-
secure-better-protection-under-the-protection-of-civilians-mandate/.  
642 On humanitarian branding and marketing, see: Anne Vestergaard, ‘Humanitarian Branding and the 
Media: The Case of Amnesty International’, Copenhagen Business School, Working paper No. 81, 2006; 
Leclerc-Gagné, supra, pp. 59–60 (discussing branding activities in WWI); Barnett, supra, p. 387 
(‘Governance’); Cooley and Ron, supra; Hugo Slim, ‘Marketing Humanitarian Space: Argument and 
Method in Humanitarian Persuasion’, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, May 2003 (‘Marketing’); Krause 
p. 48; Koddenbrock, supra, pp. 56, 63; James, supra, p. 192.  
643 This study does not directly intervene in the perennial debates on humanitarian space because it aims 
at reconceptualizing the relationships of international actors. On humanitarian space, see: Beauchamp, 
supra, p. 2; Sarah Collinson and Samir Elhawary, Humanitarian Space: A Review of Trends and Issues (London: 
Overseas Development Institute, 2012); Marcos Ferreiro, ‘Blurring of Lines in Complex Emergencies: 
Consequences for the Humanitarian Community’, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 24 December 2012. 
644 Nicholas Leader, ‘The Politics of Principle: The Principle of Humanitarian Action in Practice’, 
Humanitarian Policy Group, Report 2 (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2000); Collinson and 
Elhawary, supra; Hilhorst, supra, p. 357. 
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establishment.645 In South Sudan, humanitarian actors are accused of deploying 
distinction, in the IHL targeting sense, as a cover for turf spats and competition for 
donor resources.646 
The second critique that merits examination is that which claims that humanitarian 
actors treat the protection of humanitarian symbols as an end in itself, rather than a 
means to the end of helping populations in need. Hopgood picks up this thread, 
critiquing the ICRC’s claim about the relationship between IHL and the Red Cross 
emblem (see above).647 Hopgood proposes that it was not IHL, but the suffering of 
the victims of war, that originally empowered the Red Cross emblem.648  This 
suffering, in turn, gave the law moral authority.649 The true aim of policing the 
emblem, he alleges, is not to preserve the emblem’s protective functioning, as the 
ICRC claims. 650 Rather, it is to uphold the sacred value of the symbol, itself.651 
Bringing this perspective into conversation with the ‘humanitarian exceptionalism’ 
outlook,652 the ultimate concern is that protecting the humanitarian symbol may take 
on more importance than protecting the victims of war.653  
A related criticism, which also emerges in the empirical discussion, is that 
distinction’s main function is to protect or privilege the lives of humanitarian actors. 
Hammond’s articulation of the ‘trope of confusion’654 points to the importance of 
asking what the signs and symbols of humanitarian actors actually represent. It may 
be that what is symbolized is actually a state of exception, inequality or hypocrisy.655 
Humanitarian actors, themselves, are alert to this possibility, and there are some 
operational contexts in which they seek to make no impression at all. They remove 
                                                
645 Collinson and Elhawary, supra, pp. 3–4. Fast, supra, pp. 6, 10.  
646 See Section 7.3.1. 
647 Hopgood, supra, p. 38.  
648 Ibid.  
649 Ibid., p. 38 (also arguing that this suffering serves as a totem). 
650 Ibid., pp. 38–40 
651 Ibid., pp. 38–40. 
652 See Chapter 3. 
653 Hopgood, supra, p. 37. See also Krause, supra, p. 113. 
654 See Section 5.2. 
655 Smirl, supra, p. 95. 
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branding and logos and drive in local vehicles, all in an attempt to maintain a low 
profile and achieve invisibility.656 These practices are revisited in Chapter 7.657 
 Impl i cat ions for  war-af f e c t ed populat ions 
Recognizing that populations in need ostensibly serve as the raison d’etre for 
humanitarian actors and justify their presence in armed conflicts, it is important to 
scrutinize how summoning the ‘phantom local’ affects these populations. This study 
depicts the ‘phantom local’ as a composite figure that collapses the beneficiary-
perceiver, the attacker-perceiver and the authority-perceiver. 658  When this 
amorphous entity is invoked, the actual lives, desires and perspectives of war-
affected populations are flattened. The recipients of humanitarian assistance might 
take on the specific form of the beneficiary-perceiver or be folded together with the 
attackers and the authorities. In either scenario, the main role assigned to beneficiary 
populations is to serve as an audience for the performance of distinction. Coming 
back to the ‘humanitarian exceptionalism’ perspective, such treatment of war-
affected populations exacerbates inequalities that already characterize the 
humanitarian-beneficiary encounter. When this point is considered alongside 
allegations that distinction serves as an alibi for other interests, or that protecting 
humanitarian purity is prioritized over alleviating suffering, the implications of 
humanitarian distinction practices for populations in need appear rather bleak. This 
is a significant finding, especially given how humanitarian actors claim that their 
distinction practices enable them to alleviate the suffering of war-affected 
populations. 
 
 
 
                                                
656 Eggleston and McDougall, supra p. 3. 
657 See Section 7.3.2. 
658 See Chapter 4. 
 214 
Conclus ion  
 
This chapter has provided a broad overview of the conflict context and touched on 
several elements of international intervention in South Sudan. It was emphasized 
that, over many years of violent conflict in South Sudan, the idea of the civilian has 
been undermined and transgressed. International humanitarian actors who conduct 
operations in South Sudan are concerned that the ambiguity of civilianness in this 
context might be grafted onto them. They also fear encroachment by international 
actors operating in the same space, and are anxious that qualities of combatantness 
– or the wrong kind of civilianness – might affix to them if they do not maintain 
separation. They assert a claim to ‘civilian plus’ status, hoping to avoid the prospect 
of being assigned ‘mere civilian’ or ‘civilian minus’ status by the ‘phantom local’. It 
was also highlighted that there are few explicit appeals to IHL in the Kinetic realm. 
However, frontline actors do engage with civil–military guidance, and this guidance 
supports many distinctions. A clash was also flagged in the operational context 
between distinction and adherence to the traditional humanitarian principles. The 
two ideal types of humanitarian actor address this conflict in different ways, and 
their disagreement implicates the very meaning of humanitarianness. Humanitarian 
actors belonging to the second ideal type join other international actors in asking 
whether the aims underlying distinction practices are less than virtuous. Many of 
these conflicts are worked out through the deployment of – and reaction to – 
humanitarian symbols on a daily basis. Moving on, Chapter 7 explores how contests 
over distinction shape the everyday encounters of international actors in South 
Sudan. 
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CHAPTER 7: HOW THE IDEA OF DISTINCTION  
CIRCULATES IN SOUTH SUDAN 
 
Introduct ion 
 
This chapter follows the idea of distinction to a final global site, examining how it 
circulates in the operational context of South Sudan. While every effort is made to 
bridge the Kinetic and Pedagogical realms, some of the material from South Sudan 
warrants slightly different treatment to reflect the realities of the operational 
context. Unlike at the civil–military training grounds, for example, in South Sudan, 
IHL rules are not a habitual topic of conversation for international actors. 
Nonetheless, distinction influences frontline actors’ self-conceptualization and 
encounters with each other. It is activated when humanitarian actors put up a ‘no 
weapons’ sign at a site where they deliver services, or when a humanitarian actor 
travels on a UNMISS helicopter and everyone gossips about it. With these 
adjustments in mind, the present chapter explores four main topics: (1) who draws 
the line; (2) how the line is drawn; (3) where the line is drawn; and (4) how the line 
is erased. One again, reflections on the ‘why’ question are woven throughout the 
discussion. 
 
The discussion begins with a brief overview of the empirical findings. It 
demonstrates that, as at the civil–military training grounds, in the context of South 
Sudan, international humanitarian actors take the lead in forging distinction. They 
lean heavily on the ascribed views of the ‘phantom local’ to ground their vision of 
distinction, and this figure sometimes assumes tangible form (e.g. as the GoSS, 
SPLA soldiers or IDPs in a PoC site). A new dimension to charges of inconsistency 
also arises in South Sudan, as humanitarian actors often draw a line in circumstances 
where distinction is already compromised. The attempt to construct a ‘humanitarian 
hub’ within the confines of the PoC sites, which are armed by UN peacekeepers, 
epitomizes these dynamics. This thick description of how the line is drawn in 
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everyday practice brings to light a conflict between upholding the principle of 
distinction, on the one hand, and meeting the needs of war-affected populations, on 
the other. While the first ideal type of humanitarian actor chooses distinction every 
time, others view this as a misguided interpretation of what humanitarianness is 
about.  
 
As in the Pedagogical realm, in the Kinetic realm of South Sudan, humanitarian 
actors behave as though IHL’s civilian category is fragmented. They imagine and 
disseminate a ‘civilian plus’ status in their routine practices, seeking to claim the 
highest degree of civilianness available. The move to enact distinction vis a vis 
UNMISS civilian actors generates palpable tensions with these other civilians. 
International humanitarian actors also draw lines within the humanitarian category, 
behaving as though there are different kinds of humanitarianness to be distributed, 
as well. Such practices attract accusations that distinction serves as a cover – 
perhaps for garnering donor resources or excluding others. As in the Pedagogical 
realm, in the Kinetic realm, some humanitarian actors are accused of having ‘civilian 
minus’ status due to their entanglement in conflict dynamics or lack of competence 
and credentials. Similar to the military actors in the civil–military training 
programmes, UNMISS actors contest the vision of distinction that humanitarian 
actors espouse. These UN actors are motivated by the same ‘working together’ 
ideals that shape the civil–military training programmes, and, from their vantage 
point, distinction is an impediment. The discussion closes by examining the 
attitudes of humanitarian actors who would, themselves, erase the line. It is 
suggested that these internal critiques encompass the most devastating indictment of 
the ‘civilian plus’. 
 
7.1 Who draws the line? 
 
As in the Pedagogical realm, in the Kinetic realm, international humanitarian actors 
take it upon themselves to enact distinction on a daily basis. They see themselves as 
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engaged in a delicate dance with other international actors, responsible for keeping 
an appropriate distance from both the civilian and the military component of 
UNMISS. Humanitarian actors who take a strict approach to distinction (i.e. the first 
ideal type) also believe it is their responsibility to communicate the importance of 
distinction to colleagues who might not share their priorities (i.e. the second ideal 
type). Such divisions introduce a new dimension to the contests over distinction that 
were examined in the Pedagogical realm; the battle underway is amongst 
humanitarian actors over what humanitarianness entails. While this study contends 
that humanitarian actors are the ones who forge distinction, the proceeding section 
shows that their practices are animated by the ascribed perceptions of the ‘phantom 
local’. 
 
‘We constant ly  negot iate ,  renegot iate ,  de f ine ,  rede f ine our pos i t ion’  
 
For the head of one international humanitarian NGO in Juba, the effort to safeguard 
distinction whilst operating alongside an integrated mission is akin to a delicate dance – one, 
he suggests, that is underappreciated by other international actors. ‘Fred Astaire, he got all 
the fame, but Ginger Rogers danced backwards, in high heels.’ The challenge, as he sees it, is 
to hold the line in the midst of evolving circumstances. ‘We constantly negotiate, renegotiate, 
define, redefine our position. Goalposts are constantly moving and changing, we are 
changing.’ When it comes to implementing IHL’s civilian–combatant distinction in South 
Sudan, one UN humanitarian actor proposes that humanitarian actors in the field play the 
most significant role. These individuals negotiate distinction on a daily basis, and the 
decisions they make are of more consequence than what international donors, staff based at 
HQ or the written rules say. This individual states: ‘To be frank, I believe that those in the 
field are at the coalface and will work out appropriate arrangements regardless of overarching 
guidelines…so long as humanity remains the guiding light.’ A humanitarian NGO actor 
contemplates the relationship between the rules in the books and operations on the ground. 
He suggests that, even where staff can cite the relevant guidelines on military asset use 
chapter and verse, they tacitly understand that if they follow the proper process they will never 
accomplish their goals. A UN humanitarian actor corroborates this: ‘What is written is 
good, the policy is really good. But when you’re out, on the ground, if you follow every single 
word, you won’t be able to do anything.’ This individual suggests: ‘In particular 
situations…[you] want to react. You just have to bend the rules. I do what I believe is right, 
whether it’s within or against the rules; I just follow my guts.’  
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In contrast to the humanitarian guest trainers who teach in the civil–military training 
programmes, the frontline actors who deploy to South Sudan are more divided on 
the importance of distinction.659 In the opening vignette, the head of one NGO 
depicts himself as engaged in a high-stakes dance with actors he must maintain 
separation from. Meanwhile, some of his humanitarian colleagues believe that they 
will never accomplish their goals if they prioritize distinction. The notion that an 
individual humanitarian actor might ‘follow his guts’ raises pressing questions about 
how distinction as a legal rule is operationalized by international actors in conflict 
zones. This discussion first considers who takes the lead in forging distinction, then 
contemplates how individuals engage with the ‘rule book’ in South Sudan. 
 
7.1.1 Who forges the distinction? 
 
International humanitarian actors find themselves enmeshed with a variety of other 
international actors in South Sudan. This is by virtue of sheer physical proximity, 
interreliance and policies and structures that are intentionally designed to foster 
contact. In the face of such encroachment, international humanitarian actors are 
eager to ensure that only qualities of civilianness – and ideally those of the highest 
degree – attach to them. To this end, they emphasize that their approach to 
protecting local civilian populations has little in common with the PoC mandate of 
UNMISS actors. Humanitarian actors further insist on maintaining separation from 
those who use violent means, lest the qualities of combatantness that attach to these 
other actors rub off on them. As one humanitarian NGO actor explains: ‘Protection 
for us relates to the community; for the UN, it is all about force.’ On a day-to-day 
basis she feels it is the responsibility of her organization to implement distinction 
and hold the line, because otherwise UN forces will not observe it. ‘We do not allow 
them to enter our work areas….they cannot come in here with their weapons. The 
                                                
659 Note that the international humanitarian actors studied in South Sudan represent a much larger range 
of organizations than the ICRC, MSF and OCHA trainers who lead sessions at the civil–military training 
programmes discussed in Part II. This also helps to explain the diversity of views.  
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[UNMISS] patrol can drive up to the gates or pass by, but no weapons can enter. 
They know this.’ Another humanitarian actor contributes: 
For us humanitarians, protection is all activities that involve individuals 
receiving assistance with safety and dignity and their rights are respected, 
as with child protection. But for [UNMISS], they only look at the ‘safety’ 
aspect of the people, but not the ‘dignity’. So I, as an IDP am safe, but 
I’m not dignified. 
 
Another humanitarian actor explains how conceptualizations of ‘access’ also differ: 
We as humanitarians need access free from the military, in order to get 
to civilians. But for UNMISS they need access for their military patrols. 
So we need to clarify that ‘access’ doesn’t mean the same thing for 
us….If UNMISS has good talks with SPLA or government, they are 
pleased. They think they are acting on our behalf to get access. But we 
say ‘No, please don’t’.  
 
While this perspective captures the mainstream view amongst humanitarian actors 
in South Sudan, some humanitarian actors propose that a certain amount of 
interreliance with UNMISS is inevitable. A humanitarian actor in Unity State 
explains: ‘For the UN to protect the people here, they need humanitarian agencies 
to come and provide the assistance and all the services. For humanitarians to be 
more secure and safe, they need UNMISS to provide protection.’ This particular 
actor does not call for the direct use of UNMISS assets,660 but instead advocates for 
a form of ‘area security’ that the civil–military guidelines in South Sudan permit.661 
This might involve mine clearing, securing assurances from armed actors that 
vehicles are allowed to move, or repairing airstrips. 
 
Meanwhile, what most non-humanitarian international actors in South Sudan want 
is to foster contact with humanitarian actors. This is in keeping with the overall 
thrust of UN integration and the goal of working together to achieve peace in South 
Sudan. As the humanitarian actor in the opening vignette sees it, these other 
international actors advance while humanitarian actors dance backwards. This 
dancing imagery nicely captures how reactive the move to draw the line is in the 
                                                
660 See Section 7.2.2. 
661 See Chapter 6. 
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Kinetic realm. Humanitarian actors take the lead in forging distinction and try to 
maintain a certain amount of separation, but they do so within the confines of a 
larger dance orchestrated by others. They assign not only armed UN forces but also 
UNMISS civilian actors to the role of Fred Astaire. Qualities of combatantness, or 
the wrong kind of civilianness, float around these other international actors, and 
humanitarian actors might become contaminated if they are not careful. While 
humanitarian actors are constrained in this sense, this section demonstrates that 
there is still considerable agency in their practices. 
 
In South Sudan, the context-specific guidelines that have been developed to guide 
the relationships of international actors are infused with international law.662 In 
contrast to the Pedagogical realm, in the Kinetic realm of South Sudan, explicit 
appeals to IHL recede and invocations of the ‘phantom local’ take centre stage. 
Although this figure is routinely summoned in monolithic form in South Sudan, 
humanitarian actors also offer more fine-grained accounts of what they believe the 
beneficiary-perceiver, authority-perceiver and attacker-perceiver to see. These 
ascribed perceptions then become a site of contestation for international actors, 
who disagree with each other over what is reflected in the mirror that humanitarian 
actors hold up.  
 
This section focuses on a particular iteration of the phantom local, the beneficiary-
perceiver. International humanitarian actors refer to the beneficiaries of their 
projects as a key audience – and the term ‘audience’ is one they employ – for the 
performance of distinction in South Sudan’s PoC sites. They want to ensure that 
beneficiaries can differentiate them from other international actors and trust them 
to provide appropriate services. 663  When it comes to enacting distinction, one 
humanitarian actor asserts that the perceptions of beneficiaries matter above all else. 
For this individual, the ‘element of distinction is purely from their perspective’.  
 
                                                
662 See Chapter 6. 
663 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the beneficiary category.   
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International humanitarian actors emphasize that beneficiary perceptions 
significantly vary across the different PoC sites in South Sudan. The PoC site in Bor 
hosts the smallest population of IDPs. One humanitarian actor thus suggests that 
IDPs residing on site have a very good idea of who is who amongst international 
actors. Another humanitarian actor agrees: ‘Civilians in Bor can tell you who 
everyone is…they are a closed audience in a small camp that does not move in and 
out, they deal with only so many internationals or outsiders.’ By comparison, the 
PoC sites in Bentiu and Juba host fluctuating IDP populations. In these larger, more 
porous, sites, the prospect of a ‘phantom foreigner’ looms. The same individual who 
describes the Bor site as a small camp says that, in these larger sites, he ‘would 
expect that people there have no idea who is with what agency and what they are 
doing’. A number of humanitarian actors at the Bentiu and Juba PoC sites are 
indeed distressed at the prospect of IDPs confusing them with the UN forces that 
guard the site. One humanitarian NGO actor recalls being called ‘Mongbatt’ by 
IDPs when he first arrived. He suspects they mistook him for the Mongolian 
battalion of UNMISS, because the latter were the first foreigners present when the 
site formed. In this account, qualities of combatantness affix to the humanitarian 
actor simply because he is present in the same physical space as armed UN forces. 
Another humanitarian NGO actor recalls how IDPs voiced anger with his 
organization after UNMISS announced there would be no accompanied daily 
firewood patrols out of the PoC site. Despite the fact that his NGO had nothing to 
do with this UNMISS decision, IDPs accused him: ‘You don’t help us anyway.’ 
Such comments exemplify how a focus on distinction might engender a flattening 
of war-affected populations. Instead of examining whether the IDPs are being 
helped, the humanitarian actor who is consumed by worries about distinction fixates 
on whether the IDPs think he is a UNMISS actor. This is not to say that it is a bad 
thing for humanitarian actors to imagine how local actors see them, but the 
narrower claim here is that, when enacting distinction, the former sometimes treat 
the latter as less than three-dimensional. 
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These concerns about IDP confusion are more palpable in conversations with 
humanitarian actors working for NGOs, as opposed to the UN. One UNICEF staff 
member, who also resides in the large Bentiu PoC site, is confident that the visual 
cues his organization transmits help beneficiaries to distinguish UNICEF from 
other international actors. He elaborates: ‘People look at [the UN] as very big, but 
people here are very quick to distinguish. They can tell you who runs the clinic, who 
provides medicine, who dug a bore hole.’ Hearing these comments by the UNICEF 
staff member, a humanitarian NGO actor working in the same site balks. He 
counters that UN humanitarian actors fail to sufficiently differentiate themselves 
from the UN mission presence in the PoC sites. He suspects that many IDPs 
perceive UNICEF to be affiliated with UNMISS.  
 
At the Juba office of a humanitarian NGO, the Head of Mission links distinction 
practices to the cultivation of beneficiary trust. ‘If I give them a Puritab664 to put in 
their jerry can, they need to know it’s not an anti-pregnancy tab or won’t convert 
you into a Muslim. Any sort of misconception needs to be sorted at the beneficiary 
level.’ Given that his NGO cannot reach the entire population of South Sudan, his 
aim is that, for ‘the people we do reach, we are seen as someone who is there to 
work with them, assist in a dignified way’. The hope is that this reputation will be 
transmitted to other communities through word of mouth. He intimates that the 
perceptions of the beneficiary-perceiver rank above those of the authority-perceiver. 
If the GoSS requests a list of beneficiary names, for example, his organization must 
refuse. ‘Again, it’s a question of trust.’ He believes that, when IDPs arrived at the 
gates of (what became) the PoC sites in December 2013, they approached his NGO 
for help because ‘they knew we weren’t perpetrators or military assets’. The staff of 
his organization always ask to wear his NGO’s T-shirt, he adds, because ‘they do 
protect us, people know that these guys provide water, etcetera. They immediately 
associate us with a need, which is not just felt, but also expressed’.  
 
                                                
664 This is the brand name of tabs for water purification. 
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Building on the Chapter 6 discussion of signs and symbols, the function of the 
NGO T-shirt in this account merits close attention. Initially, this humanitarian actor 
talks about securing beneficiary trust. When he mentions the T-shirt, however, the 
goal shifts to protecting humanitarian actors. It is instructive to recall Hopgood’s 
argument that the suffering of the victims of war imbues both law and the Red 
Cross emblem with authority.665 When the humanitarian actor in South Sudan says 
that his organization’s T-shirt protects staff because the symbol is associated with 
needs, the suffering of vulnerable populations grounds the humanitarian actor’s 
humanitarianness and civilianness. Another humanitarian actor in South Sudan 
intertwines the safety of humanitarian actors with the quality of humanitarian 
programming. 666  This individual looks at the situation ‘from the eyes of 
beneficiaries, because ultimately they will determine whether my intervention is 
successful or otherwise, whether my team is safe’. The actor makes a similar point to 
the previous humanitarian actor, but the linking of humanitarian safety to 
programme quality has additional implications. It could be that the protection 
referred to here is from the attacker-perceiver, whose perceptions are simply folded 
together with those of the beneficiary-perceiver. A further sentiment lurking 
beneath the surface might be that beneficiaries, themselves, pose a potential threat 
to humanitarian actors. This latter possibility was averted to previously in this study, 
where it was noted that some humanitarian actors are fearful and mistrustful of the 
persons they seek to assist.667  
 
7.1.2 The individual in the field, the rules in the book 
 
As outlined in Chapter 6, context-specific guidelines have been developed to guide 
civil–military interactions and inform decision-making around the use of UNMISS 
assets. What is of interest in the present discussion is how the individual actors who 
are responsible for enacting distinction on a daily basis understand and deploy these 
                                                
665 See Chapter 6. 
666 See Chapter 5 on ‘acceptance’ approaches to security. 
667 See Chapter 3. 
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rules. 668  According to one global study, the implementation of civil–military 
guidelines by humanitarian actors is uneven and the guidelines are sometimes 
honoured in the breach.669  Even actors who actively participate in writing the 
guidelines might not explicitly draw on the rules in their advocacy, training, 
decision-making or practice on the ground.670 Staff turnover in the field, and the 
tendency to send low-level staff to coordination meetings, may also adversely 
impact the dissemination of the rules.671 Turning now to the specific case of South 
Sudan, the remainder of this section canvasses the attitudes of humanitarian actors 
to the written rules.  
 
One humanitarian NGO actor proposes that it is for the head of each humanitarian 
organization in Juba to translate the rules from organizational headquarters (HQ) to 
the field. While there might be formal agreement at the HQ level regarding civil–
military interactions, ‘what it boils down to is practical application. It’s really [for the 
Heads of Mission] to make sure global best practices get filtered down to staff’. 
Another NGO actor suggests that humanitarian actors based at HQ fall short in this 
respect. Residing far away from South Sudan, they ‘commit a sin of not briefing 
staff before they go out’, fail to train staff in IHL and often do not require staff to 
sign codes of conduct. It is further suggested that HQ staff might not appreciate the 
importance of safeguarding distinction. One humanitarian actor believes that some 
HQ staff endorse a short-term vision that aligns with brief project cycles. This leads 
them to lose sight of the need to maintain humanitarian space – which he equates 
with enacting distinction – in the ‘years to come’. 672  Donor contracts often 
perpetuate short-term thinking by restricting funding to brief cycles, though they 
could conceivably create incentives for upholding distinction – such as by 
forbidding the use of military assets.  
                                                
668 On the relationships between headquarters and the field with respect to security issues, see Beerli, 
supra.  
669 Metcalfe and Berg, supra, pp. 5–6. 
670 Ibid. 
671 Goodhand, supra, p. 297. 
672 See Chapter 6. 
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Coming back to the encounter presented at the opening of this discussion, one 
humanitarian actor in South Sudan asserts that those at the coalface figure out how 
to conduct themselves ‘regardless of overarching guidelines’. He views this as 
unproblematic, ‘so long as humanity remains the guiding light’. This is a classic 
example of how ambiguity is preserved around the relationship between distinction 
and the traditional humanitarian principles. This platitude about humanity as a 
guiding light conceals the fact that, in some instances, a staunch commitment to 
humanity might invite the undermining of distinction.673 The comments of two 
other humanitarian actors obliquely refer to this prospect. Following the rulebook, 
they both suggest, means not getting anything done. While it may be that these 
individuals are poorly trained (as suggested above), it is striking how often 
humanitarian actors cite distinction while compromising it in the name of other 
ideals. This marks an overt rejection that distinction should be prioritized over other 
strong values. This idea will be revisited in the discussion of the first and second 
ideal types, below.674  
 
7.2 How the line is drawn 
 
In this section, two aspects of daily life in South Sudan that impose serious 
operational pressures on the implementation of distinction are considered: co-
location in the PoC sites and the use of UNMISS assets. Bringing in the perceptions 
of other international actors, such actors accuse humanitarian actors of 
implementing distinction too strictly, and inconsistently. As at the civil–military 
training grounds, in South Sudan, some international actors take humanitarian 
distinction practices personally. 
 
                                                
673 Section 7.2 examines how these dynamics play out within South Sudan’s PoC sites and in decision-
making about military asset use. 
674 See Section 7.4.2. 
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7.2.1 Co-location in the PoC sites 
 
A discussion of how the line is drawn in the Kinetic realm must attend to the spatial 
dimension of distinction practices. Consider the construction of a ‘humanitarian 
hub’ in South Sudan’s PoC sites. The delineation of a separate space for 
humanitarian actors represents a move to assert distinction within a discrete 
segment of a larger setting – the PoC site – in which distinction is already 
compromised. While humanitarian actors invest resources in asserting distinction on 
site on a daily basis, other international actors both resent their presence on site and 
interpret it as a tacit agreement to affiliate. 
 
‘Why do you eat  in our ca fe ter ia?’  
 
As one UN civilian actor notes, the PoC sites in South Sudan are spaces where the UN 
mission ‘comes closest’ to humanitarian actors. Another UN civilian surmises: ‘I’ve never 
seen another example where humanitarians and UNMISS work so closely.’ This issue of 
physical proximity is also flagged by a humanitarian NGO actor living in one of the PoC 
sites. He is concerned that the mere fact of his presence on site undermines his organization’s 
efforts to distinguish itself from UNMISS. An individual working for a different 
humanitarian NGO picks up this thread. He explains that co-locating with UN military 
forces leads ‘fiercely independent’ humanitarian NGOs to fear that they are compromising 
the humanitarian principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality. It is adhering to 
these principles, he explains, that helps humanitarian actors demonstrate they are distinct. 
OCHA plays a pivotal role in mediating relationships between humanitarian actors and 
military actors in South Sudan, and one OCHA staff member contemplates how his own 
presence in the PoC site impinges on these efforts. In a setting dominated by machine guns 
and people in uniform, he often finds himself eating breakfast in the same room as the 
soldiers. He must subsequently impress upon these very people the importance of distinction. 
He wonders: ‘How do you have that conversation?’ His concerns appear to be well-founded. 
When a UNMISS peacekeeper is subsequently asked whether such casual proximity affects 
his thoughts about distinction, he replies: ‘If you are so concerned, why do you eat in our 
cafeteria, why do you drink our water, why sleep in our camp, why use our toilets?’  
 
In order to be close to the displaced populations they serve and to ensure the safety 
of humanitarian personnel, many humanitarian organizations opt to reside in South 
Sudan’s PoC sites. The decision to live in such close physical proximity makes 
humanitarian actors anxious that their vision of distinction may be compromised 
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before they even get out of bed in the morning. The perspectives of other 
international actors that are canvassed here confirm that these fears are justified.  
 
Enforc ing dis t inc t ion whi le  l iv ing together  
 
As noted previously, following the establishment of the PoC sites in South Sudan, 
humanitarian actors received formal permission from the UN Humanitarian 
Country Team to reside in the PoC sites. 675  Humanitarian actors believe that 
qualities of combatantness hover around the PoC sites because they are guarded by 
armed UN forces. They raise the prospect of the ‘phantom foreigner’, worrying that 
local actors lump together all of the international actors who reside in the sites. A 
UNMISS civilian actor recalls lengthy conversations in the early days of the Bentiu 
PoC site about whether humanitarian actors would come there. One humanitarian 
NGO actor submits that humanitarian actors made the decision knowing that it 
would blur the lines and adversely impact local perceptions. For this individual, the 
blurring was between the ‘humanitarian sphere’ and ‘military approaches to 
protection’. Another humanitarian actor describes the PoC sites as a ‘mélange’, with 
principled humanitarian actors wanting ‘to be as far away from the mission as 
possible’. Despite efforts to construct a separate ‘humanitarian hub’ lying physically 
apart from the UN base, one humanitarian actor remarks ‘You can only separate so 
much, they are still all together’. 
 
Efforts to delineate a ‘humanitarian hub’ in South Sudan’s PoC sites harken back to 
a story told by the CAMPO trainer about his efforts to arrange a convoy for 
humanitarian actors in Haiti. 676  He thought that, by joining the convoy, the 
humanitarian actors were agreeing to associate; but they surprised him by haggling 
over the distance between vehicles. Much like at the PoC sites, in Haiti, the 
humanitarian actors likely knew their participation in the convoy already 
undermined distinction. Nonetheless, they sought as much separation as possible 
                                                
675 See Chapter 6. 
676 See Section 5.3. 
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within the constraints of the circumstances. The aim, from the humanitarian actors’ 
perspective, was to preserve distinction to the greatest extent possible within a larger 
context in which it was polluted. Everything was a matter of degree and subtle 
gradations. A given individual might be imbued with qualities of civilianness in one 
moment and combatantness in the next. From the vantage point of other 
international actors, however, the behaviour of humanitarian actors could appear 
erratic. 
 
Much as the PoC sites pose a problem for distinction, they also facilitate access to 
populations in need – at least to the war-affected populations in South Sudan who 
reside in the sites. 677 One humanitarian actor explains: ‘We don’t like the PoC site 
set-up, being associated with military, but we know that we have no other choice. 
Do we want to reach the people we want to reach?’ Distinction and humanity are 
again in tension here. While distinction requires separation from armed UN forces, 
humanity calls for the delivery of services to those in need. This is fleshed out in the 
discussion of military asset use, below. This humanitarian actor also raises the 
spectre of being associated with the military, which resonates with conversations at 
the civil–military training grounds. It was proposed in Part II of this study that 
concerns about affiliation or association are about optics as well as actual influence. 
Living with UNMISS actors in the PoC sites might affect how humanitarian actors 
position themselves with respect to the conflict in South Sudan, how they make 
operational decisions on a day-to-day basis and how they select who receives their 
humanitarian services. But beyond this, there are also perceptions, as humanitarian 
actors also follow the traditional humanitarian principles to demonstrate that they are 
distinct.  
 
Having examined attempts to earn the trust of the beneficiary-perceiver (see Section 
7.1, above), the discussion now turns to the attacker-perceiver. Although living 
under the protection of UN forces in the PoC sites is supposed to keep 
                                                
677 See Section 6.1. 
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humanitarian actors safe, humanitarian actors also want the attacker-perceiver to see 
that they are separate from armed UN forces. As the head of one international 
NGO in South Sudan contends, it is the safety of humanitarian actors that is 
paramount. ‘My biggest concern is safety and security of my personnel; that trumps 
everything, irrespective of what needs are. If I am unable to ensure their safety, my 
team members, then it’s pointless to try to get the work done.’ This perspective 
represents a marked departure from that of the humanitarian actor quoted above, 
who claims that distinction is purely from the perspective of the beneficiaries.678  
 
A humanitarian actor who resides in the Bentiu PoC site says that managing the 
perceptions of nearby SPLA soldiers requires daily effort. He recounts an incident 
in which an SPLA soldier behaved menacingly towards him near the entrance gate 
to the PoC site. At the time, this humanitarian actor was standing close to the armed 
UN peacekeepers who guarded the site. He suspects that simply standing there put 
‘me and the peacekeepers in his head, as the same kind of thing’. Another 
humanitarian NGO actor residing in the same PoC site shares that SPLA soldiers 
called him both ‘UN’ and ‘military’. In an effort to mitigate this confusion, he spent 
a lot of time chatting to SPLA soldiers near the entrance to the POC site. ‘[If] 
something happened, I wanted them to know me.’ Despite these exertions, he 
reports that a recent incident alarmed him. Upon observing an altercation between 
humanitarian actors and SPLA soldiers at the entrance to the site, he intervened and 
asked an SPLA soldier he was well acquainted with to tell his fellow soldiers not to 
‘threaten humanitarians’. To this, the first soldier responded: ‘But you’re UN.’ The 
humanitarian NGO actor was aghast, imploring: ‘You know me, you are my friend. 
Am I UN?’ The soldier replied: ‘Well, you are military as well.’ The humanitarian 
actor pushed on, brandishing his civilian credentials: ‘Do you ever see me carrying a 
gun?’ Lifting up his shirt, he asked: ‘Do I have an imaginary gun, an invisible gun?’ 
Finally, he reminded the soldier that his humanitarian NGO ‘has always been your 
friend, we always come here’. While this particular incident was resolved peacefully, 
                                                
678 See Section 7.1. 
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the humanitarian actor concludes: ‘That was a point where I was feeling a little close 
[to UNMISS].’ In this encounter, qualities of combatantness circle around the 
humanitarian actor, who is seen to have an inappropriate affiliation with armed UN 
forces.   
 
This exchange between the humanitarian NGO actor and the SPLA soldier is 
reminiscent of the virtual reality session at SWEDINT, where the actor playing the 
HELP representative claimed the entire UN is a military, of sorts.679 In this story 
from South Sudan, however, the armed actor sweeps the humanitarian NGO actor 
into the UN, as well. It is likely that this very prospect led the HELP representative 
at SWEDINT to insist on maintaining separation from all UN actors.680  
 
Some humanitarian actors voice doubts about whether it is truly necessary for them 
to reside in the PoC sites. In Bor, a number of humanitarian actors live ‘outside the 
wire’ because security conditions are deemed more favourable than in Bentiu or 
Malakal. Pointing to the looser arrangements in Bor, a humanitarian NGO actor in 
the Bentiu PoC site contends that humanitarian actors would achieve more by living 
outside the site. He thinks it is unnecessary to resort to the help of UNMISS ‘unless 
there was a bunch of bullets – say I had to get to the airport’. He deduces that his 
colleagues are too risk-adverse and bureaucratic to find ways of working outside the 
PoC sites. 
 
It has been noted that humanitarian actors avoid UN forces partly because the latter 
use violent means. Complicating this picture, many humanitarian actors worry that 
UN forces will not use force to protect the populations residing in the PoC sites. 
These anxieties stem from UNMISS’ poor track record of implementing its PoC 
mandate in South Sudan.681 A related concern is that UN forces, themselves, fail to 
                                                
679 See Chapter 5. 
680 It is implicit in the commentary above that the SPLA soldiers have a negative judgment of the UN 
peacekeeping actors. As is discussed below, there are also concerns that UN forces are too friendly with 
the SPLA. 
681 See Section 6.1. 
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keep their distance from the SPLA, when the latter are understood to commit 
violence against the local population.682 A possible UNMISS–SPLA affiliation might 
send the message that UN forces would not use force robustly to protect the sites – 
for example if SPLA soldiers were to breach the perimeter.683 One humanitarian 
actor highlights the optics of UN forces being linked to the SPLA: ‘This is a big 
problem. IDPs see it, that can’t be good….There has to be some sanctity to the 
PoC [site]. I know it’s porous as hell, but at least the visual has to matter a bit.’ 
Invoking the beneficiary-perceiver, humanitarian actors are apprehensive that, if 
IDPs feel unprotected, their view of the humanitarian actors who are on site to 
provide services will be clouded.  
 
Humanitar ian–UNMISS tensions 
As noted, some humanitarian actors question whether it is truly necessary for them 
to reside in South Sudan’s PoC sites. It turns out that many UNMISS actors, both 
civilian and military, wonder the same thing. One humanitarian actor attributes 
strains in the humanitarian–UNMISS relationship to the trajectory of PoC site 
development after December 2013: 
 
My sense is that the mission, as a body, was caught by surprise with the 
emergency. Before, the base was airtight; they went out on missions. 
Now, suddenly, you have 20,000 people living in there, 200 
humanitarians, everyone is taking your food, your shower, your place, so 
you get angry…[UNMISS] couldn’t see that this wasn’t people’s fault. 
I’m here as a humanitarian because of these 20,000 people, and they are 
here because of the war. 
 
A humanitarian NGO actor reports ‘huge fights’ in the early days of the PoC sites, 
including an alleged incident in which UNMISS actors locked humanitarian actors 
                                                
682 See Chapter 6. 
683 One example is the perimeter breach that occurred at the Bor PoC site in 2014. See Radio Tamazuj, 
‘Armed Youth, Uniformed Gunmen Attack UN Camp in Bor Killing 60’, Radio Tamazuj, 17 April 2014, 
available at: https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/armed-youth-uniformed-gunmen-attack-un-camp-bor-
killing-60. 
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out of the bathrooms in Malakal. He shares the story of a UNMISS engineer who 
took scissors and cut off a plug that was powering the small cluster of humanitarian 
tents on site. The engineer apparently told humanitarian actors that they could not 
simply show up and expect to be provided with electricity. The individual recounting 
this altercation says that he urged the UNMISS actor to stop cutting, entreating: 
‘You are talking like I came to your cabin in the woods and we’re guests. Do you 
know why we are here?…Do you know what will happen to you if we just leave?’ At 
the Bor PoC site, a humanitarian actor has a similar message for UNMISS: ‘You 
would not be able to do this without us.’ He wishes UN forces would appreciate 
that, in the absence of humanitarian services, the physical protection that UN forces 
provide is for naught. He suspects that UN forces dismiss humanitarian actors in 
South Sudan as being completely disorganized.684 
 
Picking up the theme of the cabin in the woods, another humanitarian actor 
contends that UNMISS actors treat the PoC sites as a personal home. When 
humanitarian actors request an extension to a PoC site to make space for more IDP, 
‘UNMISS doesn’t see it as a programmatic purpose, it’s as though you requested a 
piece of land to lay down on yourselves’. Although he reports that intergroup 
relations in the Bentiu PoC site are less fraught than in the Malakal site, he 
maintains that ‘If there is a water flow [problem], if they have to switch off valves, 
they’ll switch off humanitarians’. He also recalls that, in the site’s early days, ‘They 
would give you bad looks as a humanitarian when you would take a shower’. Then, 
‘you’d go to a meeting, they’d say, “These humanitarians, they don’t know what they 
do, it’s us and them’’’. 
 
The larger story being told here is one of hostility and resentment in the 
humanitarian–UNMISS relationship. The remarks of the last speaker merge the 
issue of water-hogging in the PoC site seamlessly with a coordination meeting at 
which UNMISS actors not only profess an ‘us and them’ mentality, but also claim 
                                                
684 See Section 7.3. 
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that humanitarians ‘don’t know what they do’.685 These accounts provide important 
context for the OCHA actor’s concerns about living alongside UNMISS actors (see 
opening vignette, above). The OCHA actor routinely finds himself surrounded by 
armed UN peacekeepers on site, sharing meals with them at one moment and trying 
to impress upon them the need for separation in the next. These dynamics acquire a 
new hue when one considers that these UNMISS actors might also view the PoC 
site as their own home. When a UN peacekeeper is asked about whether this is the 
case, he confirms the OCHA actor’s fears. He cannot fathom how humanitarian 
actors could feel so comfortable living and working in ‘his’ environment, if 
distinction is so important to them. From his perspective, humanitarian actors who 
reside in the PoC sites are no different from those who actively rely on UNMISS 
forces for protection or logistics. Their claims to distinction are weak, he argues, 
because ‘they still use us’. Notably, this peacekeeper is more sympathetic when the 
ICRC and MSF wish to keep interactions with the military ‘behind the curtain’. He 
explains: ‘They don’t want to face retaliations and people on the ground need them. 
People in need come first.’ He calls these two organizations the ‘military of the 
humanitarians….they are self-sufficient, they have planes, they go in in any 
emergency’. Similar to the SWEDINT trainee who praises ICRC actors for not 
being ‘total humanitarians’,686 this UN peacekeeper ties humanitarianness to what is, 
in his view, the right kind of combatantness. Humanitarian actors who ‘still use us’ 
are, in contrast, seen to exhibit the wrong kind of combatantness. This adds a 
further dimension to the findings from the Pedagogical realm. It will be recalled 
that, at the civil–military training spaces, military actors do not recognize how their 
‘rush to the intimate’ undermines the civilianness of humanitarian actors. In South 
Sudan, some UN peacekeepers judge harshly those humanitarian actors who rely 
upon them.687 
 
                                                
685 While electricity cutting incidents and the like have abated since the early days of the PoC sites, the 
mistrust and resentment behind these stories was still palpable at the time of the field research in 2015. 
686 See Section 5.4.2. 
687 See Section 7.4.1. 
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Continuing with this exploration of how the line is drawn, the proceeding section 
draws attention to the way in which humanitarian actors make decisions about the 
use of UNMISS assets. 
 
7.2.2 The use of military assets 
 
One form of the militarization of humanitarian assistance, as outlined in Part II, is 
the direct engagement of military actors in humanitarian-like activities. Another 
variant is the use of military logistical, security and other resources by humanitarian 
actors.688 This section grapples with the latter variant. Returning now to the two 
ideal types of humanitarian actor, it will be recalled that the first type prioritizes 
distinction every time and takes a long-term view, while the second balances 
distinction with other values and focuses on immediate need. The ways in which 
these two types grapple with military assets raise fundamental questions about the 
conceptualization of humanitarianness. 
 
‘You become tainted’  
 
One day in 2015, a group of international humanitarian actors689 takes a flight with UN 
peacekeeping forces in a UNMISS helicopter in South Sudan. According to the rumours 
circulating in connection with the incident, the humanitarian actors have not obtained 
permission from OCHA to take this flight. When the helicopter lands at its destination, the 
humanitarian actors embark on some humanitarian activities in an area where UNMISS 
peacekeepers are conducting a force patrol; UN civilian human rights monitors are also 
present, gathering information from the local population. The trip goes smoothly and the 
humanitarian actors return to their point of origin unharmed. As word spreads, however, the 
conduct of these humanitarian actors attracts the ire of the wider humanitarian community. 
Many humanitarian actors are aghast at the optics of flying with UNMISS peacekeepers in 
transport marked with the black UN logo, and delivering services in such close physical 
proximity to a force patrol. They deem this unsanctioned helicopter flight an ill-judged move 
that undermines distinction, putting all humanitarian actors in South Sudan at risk. 
Reflecting on the incident, one humanitarian actor is sympathetic to the impulse to reach 
populations in need. Nevertheless, he wishes his colleagues would consider the reasoning 
                                                
688 Hoffman and Weiss, supra, p. 20; Slim, supra, pp. 124–125 (‘Stretcher’). 
689 The identity of the organization was widely acknowledged in private conversations but is not included 
here for reasons of confidentiality. 
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behind appeals to distinction. ‘Why is it important for me not to board a UNMISS 
helicopter, why should I use a non-military asset?’ The answer, he imparts, is ‘you become 
tainted’. Amongst humanitarian actors, there is a small but discernible current of opinion 
that goes a different way. The fastidious commitment to distinction, some humanitarian 
actors assert, interferes with the alleviation of suffering. One humanitarian actor charges that 
the commitment to Do No Harm is mistranslated as Do No Good. 
 
Questions regarding the use of military assets by humanitarian actors came to the 
fore in the 1990s, when humanitarian actors in Somalia, Rwanda and the Balkans 
resorted to the use of military protection by local and international forces.690 In 
terms of concrete benefits, these assets can prevent humanitarian actors from being 
soft (unprotected, easy) targets for violence by armed actors, and they can also help 
them gain access to populations that are difficult to reach. 691 However, whatever the 
potential gains in terms of safety and access, military asset use can also generate 
problems of association for humanitarian actors and impede adherence to the 
traditional humanitarian principles. 692  Military asset use might, for example, 
incentivize the delivery of assistance to some segments of the war-affected 
population, but not others.  
 
 Two ideal  types  o f  humanitar ian actor  
 
The first ideal type of humanitarian actor in South Sudan proposes that, when 
deciding whether to use the capacity and resources of other international actors, the 
foremost consideration should be distinction. When it comes to declining offers to 
use UNMISS assets, a humanitarian actor of this type states: ‘We are constantly 
challenged, negotiating, trying to explain to people why we do this.’ Some of the 
people this message must be conveyed to, another humanitarian actor emphasizes, 
are fellow members of the humanitarian community. They might not understand 
                                                
690 Pugh, supra, p. 352 (‘Civil–Military Relations’). 
691 See Van Brabant, supra, pp. 74–87; see also Mackintosh, supra, p. 122. 
692 See also Pugh, supra, p. 352 (‘Civil–Military Relations’); Michael Pugh, ‘The Role of Armed Protection 
in Humanitarian Action’, In Humanitarian Action: Perception and Security, European Commission Seminar 
proceedings (Lisbon: European Commission Humanitarian Office and International Committee of the 
Red Cross, 27–28 March 2007). 
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that they should not rely upon or get too close to armed actors. The humanitarian 
actor who alleges that humanitarian actors become tainted by using UNMISS assets 
(see above) flags the fact that UNMISS has previously allowed the SPLA to travel 
on its flights. He contends that any humanitarian actors who now travel with 
UNMISS – and maybe even those who elect not to – are therefore compromised. 
This point is important: individuals who are several degrees removed from the 
decision of a particular humanitarian actor may still be seen to acquire features of 
combatantness. He elaborates: ‘People will perceive us as part of UNMISS, which 
for some is code for supporting the SPLA.’ The ultimate concern of using military 
assets, one humanitarian NGO actor argues, is ‘we need trust, and to be distinct’.  
 
As for the ‘last resort’ rules around military asset use, humanitarian actors belonging 
to the first ideal type advocate a stringent approach. One humanitarian actor is 
dismissive of colleagues who bend the last resort rules. He notes that some 
humanitarian actors say ‘Oh, we use these assets because there’s not enough donor 
money’ – even though this is not an acceptable last resort scenario according to the 
rules. Those who adopt a more lenient approach are also faulted for yielding to the 
temptation of short-term gains. When humanitarian actors view rigid principles and 
guidelines as disabling, a humanitarian actor argues, they fail to understand that ‘As 
[humanitarian] space collapses we can leverage this to negotiate access, ensure safety 
and welfare of staff’. One humanitarian actor recognizes that others tie 
humanitarianness to the need to reach vulnerable populations, at any cost. ‘Yes, the 
humanitarian imperative is front and centre, getting to that place to provide 
assistance is paramount.’ The problem, however, is that ‘What is immediate, might 
not be best’. Another humanitarian actor contends that those who flout the civilian–
combatant divide in South Sudan in order to reach war-affected populations simply 
‘haven’t calculated that distinction has been compromised’. In these last few 
statements, the long-term time horizon does important work. These humanitarian 
actors do not dispute that alleviating suffering is central to their role; what they 
propose, however, is that relying on military assistance to help some people in need 
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now, might adversely impact both distinction and the potential to help more people 
at a later time. There may be a sleight of hand, here, suggesting that no is proposing 
distinction as a trump, but upholding distinction is simply one way to fulfil the 
traditional principle of humanity.  
 
As for the unauthorized helicopter incident, humanitarian actors of the first ideal 
type propose several possible reasons why the humanitarian actors may have 
boarded the UNMISS flight. Some float the possibility that it was done out of 
malicious intent or a competitive instinct, enabling the actors to get a ‘leg up’ over 
other humanitarian actors; however, this view tends to be rejected out of hand. One 
humanitarian actor suggests the motivation was mostly one of ignorance: ‘They 
don’t understand that by using these assets, it is detrimental.’ Another humanitarian 
actor also blames a lack of knowledge: ‘It seems some humanitarians here didn’t 
know about the humanitarian principles – that they can’t just jump into a vehicle 
with a UN logo on it.’ This last commentator does not avert to the possibility that 
the traditional humanitarian principle of humanity might well prompt a 
humanitarian actor to jump into UN transport to deliver services. As with the UN 
humanitarian actor who trusts that arrangements will be worked out ‘so long as 
humanity remains the guiding light’,693 this fuzzy treatment implies that distinction 
and humanity are mutually reinforcing. A further issue to address is the assumption 
that ignorance may have driven the humanitarian actors to take the unauthorized 
helicopter flight. Cutting against this belief, rumour has it that one of the individuals 
who took the flight protested: ‘These are not our principles.’ The individual is said to 
have attributed the principle to OCHA, instead.694  
 
When humanitarian actors belonging to the second ideal type navigate military 
asset use, their understanding of humanitarianness drives a wedge between 
                                                
693 See the opening vignette of Section 7.1. 
694 For a study of how MSF staff understand and interpret the humanitarian principles, see Dorothea 
Hilhorst and Nadja Schmiemann, ‘Humanitarian Principles and Organizational Culture: Everyday 
Practice in Médecins Sans Frontières-Holland’, Development in Practice, Vol. 12, Nos. 3 and 4, 2002, pp. 
490–500. 
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upholding distinction and implementing the traditional humanitarian principle of 
humanity. Advocating for a more flexible approach, they position distinction as a 
good that must compete with other priorities. A humanitarian actor says of last 
resort rules around military asset use: ‘It’s “last resort”. It doesn’t say “No”!’ One 
humanitarian actor, who has repeatedly had his requests for humanitarian transport 
on a UN Humanitarian Air Services helicopter declined, laments that this has 
impeded his efforts to reach populations in need outside the PoC site. Sounding not 
unlike a ‘civilian minus’, he proposes that these refusals ‘took the weapons out of 
our hands, because we didn’t have any other option. We watch UNMISS go for 
missions here and there, but we can’t do it’. The insinuation that a UNMISS mission 
is akin to a humanitarian mission is also worth noting. This viewpoint clashes with 
that of humanitarian actors who emphasize the differing definitions of protection, 
access and so on between humanitarian actors and UNMISS.695  
 
Whatever inequality exists between humanitarian actors and war-affected 
populations at the outset, 696 it may be reinforced and exacerbated by humanitarian 
distinction practices. As humanitarian actors of the second ideal type in South 
Sudan point out, when humanitarian actors refuse to use military assets, they often 
do not elect to proceed without the assets – they simply do not travel at all. One 
humanitarian actor contends: ‘It’s really costly, the risk management is stopping 
people from getting out to where the need is.’ From this vantage point, distinction 
inappropriately privileges the personal safety of humanitarian actors over the 
delivery of services to war-affected populations. In attempting to avoid being 
tainted by the combatantness that floats around military assets, actors of the first 
type are seen to relinquish their humanitarianness. Another common refrain voiced 
by humanitarian actors of the second ideal type claims that there is a fixation on 
delivering services inside the PoC sites, despite the fact that most people in need of 
services reside elsewhere. One individual bluntly states: ‘It’s a distortion.’ It merits 
emphasis that these critiques all come from humanitarian actors. As is shown in the 
                                                
695 See Section 7.1. 
696 See Chapter 3. 
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proceeding section, the misgivings articulated by humanitarian actors of the second 
ideal type resonate with the views expressed by many UNMISS actors.  
 
The perspec t ives  o f  UNMISS actors  
 
A UNMISS civilian actor working in the Bor PoC site praises humanitarian actors 
belonging to the first ideal type for their strict approach to distinction. However, the 
actor thinks that such humanitarian actors are few and far between, and that most 
have become ‘too comfortable using UN assets and not all following the 
humanitarian principles’. This sweeping reference to ‘the humanitarian principles’ 
obscures whether distinction or humanity, are – respectively – in or out.  
 
The view that humanitarian actors are too quick to use UNMISS assets is far from 
an isolated one. However, the UNMISS actors interviewed for this study contend 
that humanitarian actors are not comfortable with the idea of using UNMISS assets. 
They see humanitarian actors who take a stringent approach to distinction as 
obsessed with the purity of their humanitarianness. Humanitarian actors of the 
second ideal type, however, are admired, because they ‘bend the rules’ to reach 
populations in need. One UNMISS military actor alleges that humanitarian actors of 
the first ideal type treat proximity to UNMISS ‘like cursing the prophet’. He believes 
that, if a humanitarian actor wishes to travel with UNMISS to places in South Sudan 
where no one is providing services, they should be supported to do so. Another 
UNMISS military actor decries those who take a ‘fundamentalist’ approach to 
enforcing the humanitarian principles, calling a particular humanitarian actor known 
for zealously enforcing distinction ‘the Taliban guy’. This muddled treatment of the 
relationship between distinction and the traditional humanitarian principles shows 
that humanitarian actors are not the only ones who cultivate ambiguity. 
 
Echoing the findings from the Pedagogical realm, the findings from the Kinetic 
realm in South Sudan show that international actors also express frustration with 
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humanitarian actors who are inconsistent in their usage of military assets. They 
cannot comprehend the logic that leads humanitarian actors to vociferously insist on 
keeping their distance at one moment, and to be ready on a whim to use military 
assets in another. One UNMISS military actor recounts a story of an armed escort 
he helped to arrange in Pibor – a county in Boma State, South Sudan. Although 
humanitarian actors initially requested that he organize the escort, his efforts were 
undermined when the actors abruptly broke off from the convoy. He recalls: ‘They 
just changed their minds and left the area, just screwed off. I thought, “What’s the 
point of being here?” They are keen to go on their own, they moan about us, but 
then this happens.’ What irks this military actor is that, once humanitarian actors 
asked for the escort, he took this as an explicit agreement to associate. This 
resonates with the CAMPO trainer’s story about the convoy he arranged in Haiti, 
where humanitarian actors argued over the distance between cars.697 From the 
perspectives of these non-humanitarian actors, there is an on/off switch for 
association. This clashes with the notion that humanitarian actors navigate subtle 
gradations and degrees of civilianness that can be acquired or lost. The mention of 
how humanitarian actors ‘moan about us’ also shows that some UNMISS actors 
experience distinction practices as a personal affront. 
 
The same UNMISS actor who accuses humanitarian actors of taking a 
fundamentalist approach to distinction also reports that even ‘the Taliban guy’ will 
rely on UNMISS for evacuation in the event of danger. After sharing his personal 
misgivings about this, he is quick to add that, as a member of UNMISS, he 
recognizes that humanitarian actors may need to limit their reliance on military 
assets. He clarifies: ‘We’re fine with DPKO use being last resort.’ This splitting of 
the individual perspective from the institutional outlook is detectable in the 
practices of international civilian actors, as well (see below). It is worth recalling here 
the humanitarian NGO actor residing in the Bentiu PoC site, who says that he 
would rely on UNMISS assets if there were a ‘bunch of bullets’ and he had to get to 
                                                
697 See Chapter 5, and above. 
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the airport. This particular individual – whose diligent approach to implementing 
distinction in all other respects would likely attract a ‘fundamentalist’ label from the 
UNMISS military actor – believes that distinction must give way in a life-or-death 
situation. While making an exception for cases of evacuation is perfectly reasonable 
from his perspective – and likely compliant with international law – the UNMISS 
military actor seizes on this reliance as proof of prevarication.  
 
In sum, from the perspective of other international actors in South Sudan, 
international humanitarian actors try to have it all. They police the boundaries 
between actors, then overstep these boundaries when they deem it necessary.  
 
7.3 Where the line is drawn 
 
This part of the discussion explores where humanitarian actors in South Sudan draw 
lines on an everyday basis, focusing on the delineation of lines within the civilian 
category. The first section addresses the relationship with UNMISS civilian actors 
and examines claims that humanitarian actors enact humanitarian–humanitarian 
distinctions in order to attract donor resources. The second section considers how 
some humanitarian actors attract a ‘civilian minus’ label because they are too close 
to the conflict or lacking competence and credentials. 
 
 7.3.1 The ‘civilian plus’ 
 
On a day-to-day basis in South Sudan, humanitarian actors disseminate a ‘civilian 
plus’ status to set themselves apart from – and perhaps above – other international 
civilian actors. All of the practices discussed here depend upon the relativization of 
civilianness, aligning with the alternative vision of distinction elucidated in Chapter 
2. 
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‘ I t ’ s  not  out o f  puri ty ,  i t ’ s  to  ge t  access ’  
 
A noticeable feature of humanitarian distinction practices in South Sudan is that distinction 
is enacted with respect to UNMISS civilian actors. In some cases, humanitarian actors 
profess the general need to assert distinction from UNMISS as a wider mission. Elsewhere, 
they highlight concerns that are specific to UN civilian actors, extending beyond the latter’s 
membership in the mission. One humanitarian actor elaborates on why he cannot be seen 
with UNMISS civilian actors: ‘[W]e have access to places because of our neutrality. We try 
to distinguish ourselves, by toning down our connections.’ Anticipating his critics, he stresses, 
‘it’s not out of purity, it’s to get access’. This forging of a line within the civilian category 
provokes vexed responses from some UNMISS civilian actors. They fear that humanitarian 
actors are nudging them closer to the combatant category, disregarding their own anxieties 
about being associated with UN forces. One UNMISS civilian actor recalls an incident in 
which she and her civilian colleagues were interviewing local war-affected populations in 
South Sudan. Unexpectedly, armed UN peacekeepers came up behind her with their 
weapons visible. While she acknowledges that ‘We’re not exactly humanitarians’, she is 
adamant that being seen with military forces troubled her in the same way that 
humanitarian actors profess it bothers them. The deployment of distinction to draw lines 
within the humanitarian category also attracts condemnation from other international actors 
in South Sudan. Many attribute this to interagency competition and the fight for donor 
resources. One UN civilian actor wonders aloud if humanitarian actors might not, in fact, 
aim for ambiguity in some cases. They fly a flag in the name of distinction, but this flag 
conveys many other things.  
 
In South Sudan, humanitarian actors sometimes make sweeping statements about 
the need to be distinct from other international actors. What is of interest, presently, 
is how they cite the need for separation from the wider UN mission. A classic 
example of this is shown when a humanitarian actor simply states: ‘The UN 
mission, we’re not part of that.’ Summing up the humanitarian–UNMISS 
relationship across South Sudan’s various PoC sites, one humanitarian actor says: ‘I 
know we are not ideal, I know there are many mistakes done, but we simply need to 
try to stay away.’ In this account, maintaining separation from UN civilian actors is 
placed on the same plane as dissociating from armed UN forces. The former may be 
imbued with too low a degree of civilianness, or even combatantness. This is quite 
consistent with the South Sudan civil–military guidelines, which, as noted in Chapter 
6, provide for a humanitarian–UNMISS distinction. However, some distinction 
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practices depart from the guidelines, such as when humanitarian NGOs call for a 
separation from UN humanitarian actors. 
 
Enforc ing dis t inc t ion from UNMISS c iv i l ian actors  
 
A central reason why humanitarian actors strive to avoid affiliation with UNMISS 
civilian actors is the latter’s connection to UN forces. Qualities of combatantness 
may affix to UN civilian actors because of the structure of the mission: ‘UNMISS is 
a mission with a military component, and we can’t be seen to have anything to do 
with this.’ Alternatively, more specific entanglements of UNMISS civilians with 
armed actors may be problematized. UN civilians work ‘with the military people, 
they fly with their assets, they go on patrol’. Crucially, humanitarian actors also 
express misgivings about UNMISS civilians that are not tied to UN mission 
membership. One individual alleges, ‘the real tension is actually with UN civilians, 
not the UN military’. It is hinted that UNMISS civilians pose a bigger concern than 
military actors because they ‘are willing to break the rules’ and ‘they don’t follow 
orders; they say “We’re not in the military”’. In Part II of this study, it was noted 
that it is commonly assumed that relations between humanitarian actors and other 
civilians are less fraught than humanitarian–military relations. 698  This narrative 
conveniently aligns with the dominant vision of distinction in IHL, which revolves 
around the civilian–combatant divide, to the exclusion of other distinctions. This 
study’s empirical findings dispel the notion that shared interests and overlapping 
mandates translate into positive humanitarian–civilian relationships. It is evident 
that humanitarian actors in South Sudan are deeply concerned about how UNMISS 
civilian actors express their own civilianness.  
 
Also of note, humanitarian actors accuse UNMISS civilian actors of competing with 
them, though UNMISS actors lack the requisite technical expertise and skills to 
deliver humanitarian services. One humanitarian actor says that UNMISS civilians 
                                                
698 See Section 5.4. 
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think ‘they are all humanitarians’. Another adds: ‘They don’t know how to measure 
arms and say “famine”.’ In such accounts, humanitarian actors treat UNMISS 
civilian actors as ‘mere civilians’, at best, often hinting that a ‘civilian minus’ status 
would be appropriate. The ‘civilian plus’ status helps humanitarian actors set 
themselves apart from UNMISS civilian actors, and they exert themselves on a daily 
basis to assert this special status. A more general observation is that humanitarian 
actors tie expertise to the ‘civilian plus’ status (see Section 7.3.2, below). 
 
Widening out to the UN mission as a whole, UNMISS’ posture with respect to the 
Government of South Sudan (GoSS) poses a number of concerns for humanitarian 
actors. It is acknowledged at mission level that UNMISS has a political character; 
this ‘can mean that some positions or activities are not considered neutral by all 
parties in the country’. 699 Here, neutrality requires separation from armed actors 
who are potentially implicated in the conflict, and also from the prospect of 
politicization in various forms. Humanitarian actors frame the UNMISS–GoSS 
relationship as both too warm and too cold. Their first allegation is that UNMISS 
is too friendly with state actors in South Sudan.700 A humanitarian actor ventures 
that UNMISS has been too quick to ‘jump into normal relations’ with the GoSS, 
simply because the UN mission is so desperate for the country to find peace. While 
the international community was heavily involved in the 2011 referendum for 
independence, after the resurgence of violence in 2013, donors were more reluctant 
to be seen supporting the GoSS.701 Humanitarian actors believe that the failure of 
the wider UN mission to sufficiently distance itself from the state after December 
2013 has generated wariness from the international donors they rely upon for 
funding. More generally, humanitarian actors believe that if they become entangled 
with UNMISS, they will, themselves, become too close to the GoSS. 
                                                
699 ‘Humanitarian–UNMISS Guidelines’, supra, p. 2. 
700 See also ‘FBA Report’, p. 4 (finding that NGOs tend to view the work of UNPol and UN Civil Affairs 
as supporting governmental and transitional authorities). 
701  For a discussion of how donors and other international actors changed approaches after the 
December 2013 violence, see Jeremy Astill-Brown, ‘South Sudan’s Slide into Conflict: Revisiting the Past 
and Reassessing Relationships’, Chatham House Research Paper, December 2014. 
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On the other hand, humanitarian actors fear that, if the UNMISS–GoSS 
relationship becomes strained, state actors will block their own access to war-
affected populations. Their specific charge is that UNMISS aggravates state actors 
by speaking out on political and human rights issues.702 One humanitarian actor 
accuses UNMISS civilian human rights monitors of ‘jumping up and down about 
human rights violations’. Another humanitarian actor vents: ‘There are some 
complete idiots in the UN system, getting up on Human Rights day and saying blah 
blah blah.’ A humanitarian actor submits that his fellow humanitarian actors in 
South Sudan mostly fail to appreciate the need to carefully modulate their 
interactions with UN human rights monitors. A point that has not yet been 
addressed in this discussion with respect to the unauthorized helicopter trip703 is 
that UNMISS human rights monitors were also present. Contemplating this fact, the 
same individual says that his colleagues ‘kind of get why we can’t have soldiers in 
the heli[copter] with us, but they don’t understand why not human rights monitors’. 
The implication is that the civilianness of human rights actors is tarnished by the 
political nature of their actions. 
 
This last speaker who addresses the helicopter trip fits with the first ideal type of 
humanitarian actor.704 However, not all who belong to the first ideal type call for a 
similar civilian–civilian distinction. A particularly thorny issue, which is examined 
shortly, is the engagement of some humanitarian actors in human rights advocacy 
and similar activities. As for actors belonging to the second ideal type, they generally 
find efforts to dissociate from other civilian actors dubious. One such humanitarian 
actor reports chilly relations in South Sudan between humanitarian NGOs and 
                                                
702 One example of an official UN report about human rights violations in South Sudan is the following: 
The State of Human Rights in the Protracted Conflict in South Sudan (UNMISS and UNOHCHR, 2015), 
available at: 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNMISS_HRD4December2015.pdf. 
703 See Section 7.2.2. 
704 See Section 7.2.2. 
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actors working for the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). 705 
He protests: ‘Are we really going to exclude someone…because they are with a 
panel of experts?’ Humanitarian actors who urge a more tempered approach to 
distinction fear that such practices drive other civilian actors away. This risks 
isolating humanitarian actors and impeding their understanding of what goes on 
around them in South Sudan.  
 
A final dynamic to consider with respect to a humanitarian–UNMISS distinction is 
the treatment of UN police actors, or UNPol. According to the general 
perceptions of humanitarian actors in South Sudan, UNPol actors appear to occupy 
a middle position between armed UN peacekeepers and UN plainclothed civilian 
actors. 706  Invoking the beneficiary-perceiver, one humanitarian NGO actor 
contends that distinction must be strictly enforced from UNPol actors in the PoC 
sites. If he calls UNPol in response to a security incident in the middle of the night: 
‘You’ve got a distinction problem with the community because you called 
them…you make a call and UNPol shows up. That’s distinction: I’ve just called in a 
mission actor.’ Having said this, he confides that he feels more respect for UNPol 
actors than he does for UN humanitarian actors, because the former work hard to 
protect civilians in South Sudan: ‘I feel affinity with anyone who is getting their 
hands dirty, and that extends to the mission.’ Significantly, some of the actors for 
whom this humanitarian actor feels the most respect are those he seeks to be 
distinct from. As has been pointed out throughout this study, international actors 
often experience humanitarian distinction practices as a personal affront, linking the 
performance of distinction to bias or feelings of superiority on the part of 
                                                
705 On the relationship between humanitarian NGOs and accountability mechanisms, see Dapo Akande 
and Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, ‘Humanitarian Actors’ Engagement with Accountability Mechanisms in 
Situations of Armed Conflict: Workshop Report’, Anuario De Direito Internacional, 2016, pp. 105–132 
(‘Accountability’).  
706 While police actors are often legally categorized as civilians, the status of international police who are 
deployed as part of a UN peacekeeping mission or with international forces raises special issues. See 
Metcalfe and Berg, supra, pp. 3–4. In South Sudan, UN peacekeeping forces are primarily responsible for 
guarding the PoC sites and patrolling the perimeters; UNPol actors oversee security inside the PoC sites. 
See Briggs, supra, p. 75.  
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humanitarian actors.707 This commentary from South Sudan suggests that there is 
not necessarily a straightforward correlation between distinction practices and 
feelings of affinity. 
 
 The perspec t ives  o f  UNMISS c iv i l ian actors  
 
UNMISS civilian actors are well aware that humanitarian actors are reticent to be 
seen with them. While some take umbrage, others are more understanding. One 
UNMISS civilian actor concedes: ‘UNMISS is never neutral, [it] tries to be impartial, 
but not really. Humanitarians are well aware of that perception.’708 This individual 
feels that, though he has civilian status under IHL, only ‘the humanitarians are 
civilian in nature, literally and figuratively’. He emphasizes the fact that humanitarian 
actors have ‘no uniform’ – an observation that is interesting to hold up alongside 
claims made by humanitarian actors that their T-shirts and logos are their 
uniform.709 Although humanitarian actors often depict their ‘uniform’ as protecting 
them, this UN civilian actor thinks that the absence of a uniform is what sets 
humanitarian actors apart. He states that every uniform is associated with a party to 
the conflict in South Sudan, and he depicts UNMISS civilian actors as also wearing 
a uniform. He continues: ‘I am very confident about what I am. I am not 
humanitarian. We are clearly told that at the induction. They say “We are not 
humanitarian, we are the black UN”. My car is painted with black. So, that I know 
so well.’ While this individual has no illusions about his (lack of) humanitarianness, 
he emphasizes that it is part of his mandate, as a UN civilian, to support 
humanitarian actors. 
 
The above account constitutes a fascinating example of how non-humanitarian 
actors participate in carving out a special civilian status for international 
humanitarian actors. While few other UNMISS civilian actors go so far as to 
                                                
707 See Section 5.3. 
708 This individual was interviewed at the SWEDINT training, but is based in South Sudan.  
709 See Section 5.2. 
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propound the ‘civilian plus’, some of this actor’s colleagues voice support for clear 
boundaries and a division of labour.710 Their views are based partly on eradicating 
the prospect of a ‘phantom foreigner’ and partly on ensuring strategic variation 
across the different international organizations operating in South Sudan. One 
individual notes that UN actors tend to be big, slow and risk averse, while also 
noting that ‘You’ve got your ICRCs and your MSFs, and we know they’re going to 
be on the front line’. Once again, the Red Cross (and MSF) fantasy informs the way 
in which humanitarianness is conceptualized. No mention is made of the qualities 
that other humanitarian actors, such as small NGOs, are deemed to possess.711  
 
When humanitarian actors disseminate a ‘civilian plus’ status, UNMISS civilian 
actors feel that the prospect of being downgraded to ‘mere civilian’ or ‘civilian 
minus’ status looms large. As indicated by the UNMISS civilian actor who recoils 
when UN forces come up behind her unexpectedly (see opening vignette, above), 
UNMISS civilian actors are keen to affirm their own civilianness. They are also 
concerned that high-level UNMISS leadership appears to be driving the mission 
closer to the military. One international civilian actor working for the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) imparts: ‘[T]here’s less distinction between the 
black and the blue UN. I think we get lumped together. I think the UN is not as 
appreciated, the logo, because in a conflict both sides like to use the message “Oh, 
you’re helping the other side more”.’ A UNMISS civilian actor says of vehicles 
driving around South Sudan with black and blue UN logos, ‘who the hell knows the 
difference’. Putting a different spin on the ‘phantom local’ and ‘phantom foreigner’ 
concepts, one UNMISS civilian actor reports that the South Sudanese staff who 
work for UNMISS routinely ask her if she is military. She says, exasperatedly: ‘I 
wonder why they think that. They aren’t thinking creatively, aren’t piecing it 
together.’ Finally, one UNMISS civilian actor suggests that, as requests to various 
international actors for help merge over time, the rather banal fact is that ‘People get 
lazy’.  
                                                
710 See the discussion of integration policies in Section 7.4.1. 
711 See also Section 7.3.2. 
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One UNMISS civilian actor speaks of the hostility that humanitarian actors feel 
towards him – particularly those not belonging to the UN. Raising up his hands in 
an abrasive manner, he impersonates a humanitarian NGO actor, exclaiming: ‘No 
no no no, that’s wrong, don’t do things that way.’ He experiences humanitarian 
distinction practices as a rejection of himself and what he stands for. Indeed, many 
UNMISS civilian actors harbour the suspicion that humanitarian actors look down 
on them. One UNMISS civilian actor explains that, when he travelled to meet with 
international humanitarian actors in South Sudan, ‘The last thing they would do is 
sit down with us’. Another UN civilian actor adds: ‘Their independence makes them 
think they are somehow above us. Yes, I get paid more than you, but you’re just 
doing a stint, you won’t be working here forever. They can rub you the wrong way.’ 
These insinuations of a humanitarian superiority complex help to explain why 
UNMISS civilian actors are so opposed to the ‘civilian plus’. The splintering of 
civilianness might not only nudge them closer to UN forces, but it might also situate 
them beneath humanitarian actors in a hierarchy of virtue. Here, the UNMISS 
civilian actor who professes that only ‘the humanitarians are civilian in nature’ (see 
above) stands out as something of an outlier. 
 
 Drawing l ines  within the humanitar ian category 
 
When certain humanitarian actors take steps to differentiate themselves from other 
humanitarian actors, they are often criticized for doing so to promote their 
organizational brand.712 The possibility that distinction is a cover for turf spats and 
competition for donor resources makes a ‘civilian plus’ status for humanitarian 
actors even more difficult for other civilian actors to swallow. As suggested in 
Chapter 6, it is difficult to verify whether a particular flag is flown for distinction in 
the IHL targeting sense, or to promote particular organizations. Other international 
actors in South Sudan, however, are quick to argue that it is the latter. One UN 
                                                
712 See also Chapter 6. 
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civilian actor wonders aloud if humanitarian actors may not, in fact, aim at 
ambiguity in their use of signs and symbols (see opening vignette, above). An 
international civilian actor who conducts long-term development work in South 
Sudan highlights the pressure that humanitarian organizations are under to secure 
funds. She shares: ‘Sometimes I think distinction is a lie, an excuse for visibility.’  
 
Although most humanitarian actors in South Sudan earnestly protest such charges, 
some belonging to the second ideal type713 ask similar questions. If distinction is 
deployed in the service of other goals, such as branding or marketing humanitarian 
projects, then this might well impact where distinction is deemed to sit in the order 
of things. Certainly, it puts a question mark around the belief that humanitarianness 
is grounded in distinction as much as in the imperative to alleviate suffering. One 
humanitarian actor believes that humanitarian actors ‘use’ distinction when it suits 
them, whether this is to win the ‘resource wars’ with other organizations or to 
protect staff. This leads him to wonder whether the distinction that humanitarian 
actors promulgate is valid or honest. Notably, this individual accords the protection 
of humanitarian actors the same validity as branding initiatives. Managing the 
perceptions of the attacker-perceiver, he suggests, is no worthier a cause than 
influencing what might be termed the donor-perceiver. 714  In either case, 
humanitarian actors instrumentalize distinction to some end – stated or otherwise. 
A senior UN humanitarian actor in Juba also believes that humanitarian actors are 
too motivated by economic interests. In his view, the traditional humanitarian 
principle of humanity is the principle that humanitarian actors have forgotten. 
Recalling Pictet’s original formulation of the principles, he emphasizes that 
humanity was positioned at the top of the hierarchy. 715  
 
                                                
713 See Section 7.2.2. 
714 On donors as another audience, see: Cooley and Ron, supra; Krause, supra, p. 48; Koddenbrock, 
supra, pp. 56–57. 
715 See Chapter 4. 
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These allegations that humanitarian actors use distinction for marketing purposes 
and that they fail to deliver services to populations in need impugn their virtue and 
suggest that they are not fulfilling their valued social role. This could fatally 
undermine their main rationales for protecting humanitarian actors in war.716 At the 
very least, it would seem to weaken the legitimacy of the claims they make of 
holding something more than ‘mere civilian’ status. The next section explores the 
possible existence of a ‘civilian minus’ status for humanitarian actors. 
 
 7.3.2 The ‘civilian minus’ 
 
International humanitarian actors may disseminate a ‘civilian plus’ status to carve 
out space from the wider civilian category or to wipe away the suggestion that 
characteristics of combatantness attach to them. The present section delves into the 
notion of a ‘civilian minus’ status for humanitarian actors, exploring how their 
claims of harmlessness and their humanitarian credentials might be impugned. The 
opening encounter highlights the differential positioning of humanitarian NGO and 
UN humanitarian actors. 
 
‘ I  go without force  protec t ion’  
 
A number of humanitarian NGO actors report that they struggle over distinction with UN 
humanitarian actors in South Sudan’s PoC sites. As one individual confides: ‘We had to 
make compromises here. Not all NGOs want to be seen, even with the UN humanitarian 
agencies.’ It has not escaped the notice of UN humanitarian actors that humanitarian 
NGOs might attempt to keep their distance. One UN humanitarian actor faults the ‘close’ 
relationship between UN humanitarian actors and the UN peacekeeping mission. UN 
humanitarian actors, for example, are quick to rely upon UNMISS for protection when 
they travel outside of the PoC sites. Another UN humanitarian actor has noticed 
humanitarian NGOs avoiding him in public, and he interprets this as a warning sign. It 
suggests to him that other, potentially violent, actors such as the SPLA might also question 
his humanitarian status. He attempts to mitigate any potential downgrading of status in 
practical ways, such as by traveling without UNMISS outside of the PoC sites, whenever 
possible. ‘What I do, and this is just me, I go without force protection because I want 
                                                
716 See Chapter 3. 
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government and SPLA to see me first as a humanitarian, and second as UN.’ He makes 
these adjustments not to ingratiate himself with humanitarian NGOs so much as to 
influence local perceptions of his status. As for humanitarian NGOs, the authority of 
certain humanitarian actors to perform distinction is brought into question. Some 
humanitarian actors, it is argued, lack competence and professionalism; others step too far 
outside the bounds of what is properly their humanitarian role. 
 
The first part of this discussion considers two respects in which humanitarian actors 
are accused of being too close to the conflict in South Sudan: UN humanitarian 
actors’ affiliation with UNMISS and all humanitarian actors’ performance of 
humanitarian tasks. The second part of the discussion addresses allegations that 
some humanitarian actors lack the requisite competence and credentials. 
 
Too c lose  to  the conf l i c t  – Entanglement with UNMISS and he lping the 
enemy  
 
A key insight from the Kinetic realm is that humanitarian actors, themselves, utter 
some of the harshest critiques of humanitarian distinction practices. This is also the 
case with respect to proximity to UNMISS: humanitarian NGO actors level 
numerous accusations at UN humanitarian actors on this front. A humanitarian 
NGO actor characterizes living with UN humanitarian actors in the PoC sites as a 
compromise, conveying that humanitarian NGOs do not implement distinction 
practices in tandem with UN humanitarian actors. UN humanitarian actors might be 
deemed to lack the authority to claim a special ‘civilian plus’ status, and may even be 
seen to possess ‘civilian minus’ status. In either case, they are not seen to embody a 
sufficient degree of civilianness. When humanitarian actors police each other’s 
conduct in this way, an evident concern is contamination through the poor choices 
of others. The humanitarian actor who tells the story of the helicopter trip says of 
his colleagues who took the flight, ‘you become tainted’.717 But what he is also 
saying is: ‘I become tainted’. In such accounts, the ‘phantom local’ assigns 
characteristics of combatantness (or a lower degree of civilianness) not only to the 
                                                
717 See Section 7.2.2. 
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humanitarian actors who make poor choices, but also to individuals who were not 
even present when the transgression occurred. 
 
Some UN humanitarian actors are concerned that affiliation with UNMISS will 
adversely impact their status. 718  In terms of what this exact status is, UN 
humanitarian actors appear attuned to the prospect of attracting a ‘mere civilian’ 
status, rather than a ‘civilian minus’ status. In the opening vignette, the UN 
humanitarian actor who interprets being pushed away by humanitarian NGOs as a 
‘warning sign’ clings to his humanitarianness more than his civilianness. While he 
understands that other humanitarian actors might view him as compromised by his 
connection to UNMISS, he tends to think of himself as having a special ‘civilian 
plus’ status. Evidently, his attempts to forgo force protection when traveling outside 
of the PoC sites are not (primarily) about assuaging the concerns of other 
humanitarian actors. Here, the authority-perceiver and the attacker-perceiver – 
assuming tangible form as the GoSS and the SPLA, respectively – galvanize his 
dissociation from UNMISS.  
 
The above accounts shed new light on the situation facing the OCHA actor who 
worries about sharing a cafeteria with UNMISS forces in the PoC site.719 Not only 
does his fellow UN humanitarian actor describe the relationship with UNMISS as 
‘close’, but the humanitarian NGOs he believes he represents do not see themselves 
as implementing distinction alongside him. On the contrary, humanitarian NGO 
actors take steps to distance themselves from him and his UN colleagues. All of 
these practices point to a dynamic and fractured conceptualization of 
humanitarianness. Similar to the treatment of civilianness in the alternative vision of 
distinction, in this perspective, humanitarianness is organized around nuanced 
gradations and perceived hierarchies. 
 
                                                
718 As noted, UNMISS actors generally say that UN humanitarian actors are easier for them to work with 
than non-UN humanitarian actors. 
719 See Section 7.2.1. 
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As noted, humanitarian actors worry that the ‘phantom local’ will confuse or 
mistake them for other international actors.720 An additional fear is palpable in 
South Sudan, namely that it is humanitarian actors’ very humanitarianness that 
renders them enticing targets. Here, humanitarianness is not linked to a high degree 
of civilianness, but to combatantness. As humanitarian actors perform routinized 
tasks, they may be viewed as participants in the conflict who are neither harmless 
nor innocent. This idea revisits the Chapter 6 discussion about the actual meanings 
and representations of the signs and symbols of humanitarianism. In South Sudan, 
one humanitarian NGO actor is curious about what the SPLA thinks of 
humanitarian NGOs. Alluding to the existence of the ‘phantom foreigner’, he wants 
to know if his organization’s T-shirts ‘mean anything to them’. He refines this: ‘Not 
even that, I want to know what they think of me because of my white skin.’ He 
reasons that, if the SPLA has qualms with white Western actors, or indeed any actor 
who seeks to provide humanitarian services, then wearing a T-shirt will do nothing 
to ensure protection. Another humanitarian actor contemplates the reliance on 
visual cues of humanitarianness in South Sudan, and expresses similar worries: ‘The 
question is always, if you wear [our organization’s] T-shirt or hat, is it going to 
protect you or expose you?’ 
 
A further issue is how armed actors in South Sudan view the populations that 
humanitarian actors assist. 721 Doubts about the civilian status of IDPs help to 
explain why armed actors might take issue with international actors providing 
services in the PoC sites. One humanitarian actor who works in the Bor PoC site 
speaks of how he was once confronted by a group of local armed actors who 
berated him for ‘helping our enemy’. This particular individual is South Sudanese, 
working as a national staff member of an international NGO. This fact, and the 
mention of white skin (see above), highlights the differential threats that local 
humanitarian actors face in South Sudan – whether due to ethnicity, nationality or 
involvement in local politics. While there is not room to address this issue within 
                                                
720 See, e.g., Section 7.2.1 for a discussion of how this unfolds in the PoC sites. 
721 See also Chapter 6. 
 255 
the confines of the present study, other scholars have turned their attention to the 
matter.722 On a final note, this accusation of ‘helping our enemy’ resonates with the 
misgivings expressed by international military actors in the Pedagogical realm about 
humanitarian actors assisting the ‘other side’.723  
 
 Quest ioning humanitar ian credent ia ls  
 
At the civil–military training places explored in Chapter 5, some international actors 
question the competency and credentials of humanitarian actors. They accuse 
humanitarian actors of blurring lines and, in so doing, potentially endangering others 
around them.724 One UNMISS civilian actor describes humanitarian actors working 
in South Sudan’s PoC sites as ‘young and green’. She contends that they do not have 
a solid understanding of the humanitarian principles by which they are supposed to 
abide. A UNMISS civilian actor based in Bor also accuses humanitarian NGO 
actors of being ‘third world groupies’ and ‘eager beaver, energizer bunnies’ who are 
‘padding the CV’. She laments: ‘Most experienced people end up going to Bentiu 
and Malakal. I get saddled with the kids.’ On the other hand, some humanitarian 
actors stay too long and become ‘very worn after they’ve done time in the PoC 
sites’. A UNMISS military actor considers the difference between UN and non-UN 
humanitarian actors. The former ‘get paid better, it’s a gravy train. They are slightly 
less altruistic, let’s say’. NGO actors are deemed to be more virtuous, because they 
want to ‘make the world a better place’. 
 
The humanitarian actors who travelled with UNMISS on the unauthorized 
helicopter flight in South Sudan did not belong to an unknown or peripheral 
agency.725 However, as at the civil–military training places,726 the general claim in 
                                                
722 On security risks to local humanitarian actors, see Andersson and Weigand, p. 17; Roth, supra, p. 34 
(‘Paradoxes of Aid’); Egeland et al., supra. 
723 See Section 5.4.2. 
724 Ibid. 
725 The identity of the organization is withheld to protect confidentiality. 
726 Ibid. 
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South Sudan is that smaller, lesser known humanitarian organizations are the least 
predictable. Even amongst humanitarian actors, the Red Cross (and MSF) fantasy 
circulates, though room is also made for a few other named organizations. The head 
of an international humanitarian NGO says: ‘Every year we watch ICRC stand by 
itself. Oxfam, Mercy Corps, MSF will not use military assets or escorts. They might 
be even more principled than CARE, Save [the Children], Concern, Goal.’ Apart 
from these reputable organizations, he explains, there are concerns about the 
decision-making of the myriad smaller humanitarian organizations operating across 
South Sudan. These concerns extend beyond issues of distinction. While ICRC’s 
move to ‘stand by itself’ is lauded, one humanitarian NGO actor denigrates 
humanitarian actors who go ‘cowboy’. The latter undermine joint planning amongst 
international actors in South Sudan, fail to coordinate with others in the UN 
humanitarian Cluster system and refuse to engage in collective needs assessments. 
Interestingly, MSF is cited as one of the ‘cowboy’ organizations but touted as doing 
an excellent job of asserting distinction. 
 
Aside from going ‘cowboy’, humanitarian actors might unwittingly send signals that 
compromise their claims to virtue.727 Looking at humanitarian actors from the 
vantage point of the beneficiary-perceiver, one humanitarian actor in Juba wonders: 
‘What do you see when you see these big NGOs? The vehicle? It’s probably brand 
new. I’m on the street begging for money. I see big offices, new offices. People say 
they’re sending money, where is it going?’ He suggests that more agile humanitarian 
actors with smaller offices and older vehicles get ‘further into the community 
because they’re not saying “I’m going to tell you what to do”. Instead, they say “I’m 
going to work with you, we’ve got these programs”’. He also notes that expatriate 
humanitarian actors go to parties and become intoxicated in public. ‘This person is 
here for fun, are they here to help?’ This recalls the accusations from the civil–
                                                
727 Such behaviours call to mind Goffman’s depiction of expressive incongruities an individual might 
exhibit in performing a given role; he offers the example of the surgeon who picks his nose prior to 
entering the operating room. Goffman, supra, p. 101. 
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military training grounds that unprofessional humanitarian NGO actors go to 
conflict zones on holiday.728  
 
On a final note, humanitarian actors who engage in activities outside their remit, 
such as human rights work and advocacy, may be seen as compromising their 
civilianness. One humanitarian actor explains that, when humanitarian actors spend 
time behind the frontlines of conflict, they develop feelings of solidarity for the 
victims of violence. He believes that the impulse to speak out against atrocity is 
triggered when ‘you start to see through someone else’s eyes’. This account offers a 
striking counterpoint to the way in which humanitarian actors typically ascribe 
perceptions or ‘see through the eyes’ of the phantom local.729 Instead of holding up 
a mirror to grasp how local actors perceive him, this humanitarian actor looks out at 
the world through the local actor’s eyes in order to feel what he feels. While his 
empathic approach is laudable for the gesture of solidarity, the fact remains that 
participating in human rights activities could generate serious problems for 
humanitarian actors in South Sudan. One humanitarian NGO actor proposes that 
such practices are more likely to undermine distinction than anything a UNMISS 
actor might do. 730 Accordingly, this individual contends that all human rights work 
should be left to international human rights organizations such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch. The CAMPO trainer’s warning that 
humanitarian actors ‘burn their fingers’ when they stray outside their remit731 could 
also apply to humanitarian actors in South Sudan. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
728 For more on how the personal lives of humanitarian actors affect their safety, see Fast, supra. 
729 Compare with Section 7.1, wherein a humanitarian actor sees through the eyes of the beneficiary to 
ensure that his own team is safe. 
730 See the earlier discussion of UNMISS’ navigation of human rights issues, particularly relating to the 
concern that the mission might aggravate the GoSS. 
731 See Section 5.4.2. 
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7.4 How the line is erased 
 
This last section of the empirical discussion draws together and revisits many of the 
themes that have been introduced in this chapter. The focus is on the pressures that 
are put on distinction in the operational context, particularly efforts made to erase – 
as opposed to reinforce – the lines that humanitarian actors forge. The first section 
considers the policies, structures and practices of the integrated UN mission in 
South Sudan. The second section gives the last word to international humanitarian 
actors, some of whom erase the line or question whether it should be drawn in the 
first place. 
 
7.4.1 The UN integrated mission  
 
As a specific iteration of comprehensive approaches, UN integration encourages 
different kinds of international actors to work together towards the shared aim of 
peace. The distinction practices of humanitarian actors are treated by UNMISS 
actors as an obstacle that needs to be surmounted. 
 
‘Everything i s  b lurred’  
 
Many of the struggles over distinction in South Sudan are traced back to the presence of an 
integrated UN mission. As one humanitarian NGO actor sums up: ‘A huge problem right 
now is humanitarian distinction in the context of the UN integrated mission.’ Other 
humanitarian actors say, of integration’s impact: ‘We’ve created a problem’, and ‘everything 
is blurred’. A consistent refrain amongst humanitarian NGO actors is that there needs to 
be a humanitarian ‘carve out’ – a clear separation between themselves and international 
actors who participate in integration structures and policies. International actors who belong 
to the integrated UN mission in South Sudan articulate varied responses to these calls for 
separation. One UNMISS peacekeeper appreciates that humanitarian actors need to draw 
the distinction line as they see fit. He accepts that they should take the lead, and simply 
offers: ‘If they need help we’re happy to support.’ Other members of the UN forces, however, 
wish to exert an influence on how and where the line is drawn; they actively strive to close the 
distance that humanitarian actors introduce between them. A Military Liaison Officer who 
works for UNMISS proposes that the trick is to not act too much like a soldier. ‘You 
really have to adapt yourself and think of people’s interests and speak to who they are. 
When I’m talking to humanitarians, maybe I’ll say [here he switches to a much softer and 
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high-pitched voice, adopting a mischievous look] “Is everything ok? Do you need help?” 
Like, sympathetic.’ A UN peacekeeper goes further: ‘In our training, we get the impression 
that the humanitarians will not talk to us because we are military, but there are ways to 
make it happen. For example, I will wear civilian clothes to go visit MSF in the north. I 
won’t carry a gun to go to Pibor.’ 
 
It has been noted that there are civil–military guidelines in place to regulate the 
relationships of international actors in armed conflict settings. These guidelines 
provide little assistance, however, when it comes to the relationships between 
diverse components of UN integrated missions and humanitarian actors.732 On a 
daily basis in South Sudan, tensions arise as international humanitarian actors try to 
maintain separation while other international actors try to foster interaction.  
  
 The pol i cy  and pract i c e  o f  UN integrat ion 
 
One humanitarian NGO actor in Juba is adamant that ‘NGOs need to find ways to 
maintain their independence from all parts of the mission’, but concedes that simple 
necessity often drives humanitarian actors to engage with UNMISS. Humanitarian 
actors can be drawn into the orbit of a UN integrated mission in a myriad of ways. 
They must navigate: participation in the humanitarian Cluster system; reliance upon 
the UN for various forms of logistics support; the presence of armed actors in the 
spaces in which they work; and UN efforts to represent their interests in 
humanitarian access negotiations. UN humanitarian actors might make different 
decisions about distinction than humanitarian NGOs, in this respect. 733  The 
discussion that follows focuses primarily on the distinction practices of 
humanitarian NGOs. 
 
One humanitarian NGO actor proposes that UN integration policy is not 
necessarily problematic in and of itself, but the way in which it is implemented in 
practice discourages respect for distinction. Concerns about practice extend 
                                                
732 Metcalfe and Berg, supra, p. 3. See also Section 7.1. 
733 The former may opt to co-locate their offices inside UN mission compounds, generating some of the 
same distinction concerns that arise through co-location in South Sudan’s PoC sites.  
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upwards to the highest level of public communication. UNMISS leadership has, at 
times, depicted a close association between the mission and humanitarian actors in 
South Sudan. When Hilde Johnson was the head of UNMISS in 2014, for example, 
she stated that UNMISS had successfully built an important partnership with 
humanitarian actors who had remained in South Sudan when the violence spiked.734 
In claiming this, she implied alignment between the mission and humanitarian 
actors, which, for humanitarian actors, undermined their vision of distinction. 735 
Another noteworthy aspect of Johnson’s statement was the suggestion of ‘a’ 
partnership between UNMISS and humanitarian actors. In contrast to this mission-
level narrative in Juba, this study’s empirical findings attest that there is no such 
thing as a singular relationship across South Sudan.  
 
Expressing similar views to those relating to the PoC sites and the use of military 
assets, international humanitarian actors fear that proximity to the UN integrated 
mission blurs the lines between them. Again, concerns about a possible association 
with UNMISS include – but extend beyond – optics. In terms of actual influence, a 
UN humanitarian actor who is deeply enmeshed with the UN mission might be 
influenced by UNMISS about which populations to serve. 736  In regard to 
perception, the threat of UN integration galvanizes especially vague conjurings of 
the ‘phantom local’. Humanitarian actors wave imprecisely at the prospect of 
‘confusion’; they flag ‘perception issues’ and observe that ‘it negatively affects us if 
they see us as the same’. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
734 International Peace Institute, ‘UN Special Representative to the Secretary General Hilde Johnson: 
South Sudan Crisis Changed UNMISS Mindset’, July 2014, available at: 
https://www.ipinst.org/2014/07/srsg-johnson-south-sudan-crisis-changed-unmiss-mindset. 
735 See also the Chapter 4 discussion on civil–military guidelines; these guidelines call for the promotion 
of distinction in both public communication and conduct.  
736 See also Section 7.3.2. 
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 The perspec t ives  o f  UNMISS actors  
 
While some international actors help to reinforce the line drawn by humanitarian 
actors, others embark on their own ‘rush to the intimate’.737 Coming back to the 
opening vignette (see above), a UN peacekeeper says he is happy to help when 
humanitarian actors need support. He also observes that not all humanitarian actors 
enact distinction in the same way. Alluding to the two ideal types, he claims that 
distinction practices vary by organization: ‘Some want to keep it, others are more 
flexible.’ Another UNMISS military actor states that he understands the need for 
separation between actors. That being said, he still expects humanitarian actors to 
share information with UN forces.738 He would be satisfied if humanitarian actors 
were to ‘give us info about bad guys doing A, B, C, D’ and then say ‘you guys go’. 
This would allow UN forces to do their job, while recognizing that humanitarian 
actors must prioritize access to people in need. He believes such information 
exchanges leave the civilianness of humanitarian actors intact.  
 
A UNMISS military actor confesses his envy: ‘Sometimes I am a bit jealous of how 
much [humanitarian actors] know. They seem quite effective in what they do. For 
us, our mission, it is a huge beast. It has to be that way. Maybe they envy us for our 
access to resources.’ Others nod to a humanitarian superiority complex. Noting that 
UN military actors tend to rotate in and out of South Sudan fairly frequently, one 
UNMISS actor has the impression that humanitarian actors see the questions asked 
by UNMISS actors as ‘very basic’. He is convinced that ‘We bore them. It’s more 
about humanitarians being busy and not having time [for] us’. Further: ‘If there is 
no conflict we have nothing to offer, because we just do security.’739 Another 
UNMISS military actor cannot fathom why interreliance does not lead to respect. 
‘They might not like us, but they fucking need us. We feel dismissed as arrogant.’ 
                                                
737 See Section 5.5.1. 
738 See Section 5.2. 
739 This last point rubs up against the general sentiment that, in times of conflict, humanitarian actors 
must be careful to maintain separation from military actors. 
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Much like at the civil–military training grounds, these international actors take the 
everyday distinction practices of humanitarian actors personally.  
 
A UNMISS civilian actor is also puzzled by the way in which humanitarian actors 
treat UN forces in South Sudan,740 alleging that humanitarian actors go too far in 
their performance of distinction. Humanitarian actors have requested, for example, 
that her uniformed UNMISS colleagues refrain from participating in local patrols in 
certain parts of South Sudan. She relays that UN peacekeepers are incredulous 
about such requests: ‘We can’t be here because of a uniform?!’ Particularly in the 
early days of the mission, she explains, ‘because we were not used to working so 
closely with humanitarians, our uniformed colleagues were unhappy and could not 
understand why [humanitarians] would not want them, but then would call 
whenever they heard a shooting’.741  While humanitarian actors may understand 
themselves to be engaged in a delicate dance, other international actors perceive 
them to be prevaricating, muddled, and even hostile. These tensions can be 
attributed, at least in part, to discord between different actors’ visions of distinction. 
International military actors who are wary of humanitarian distinction practices 
doubt that being found in proximity to combatants will undermine the civilianness 
of humanitarian actors. 
 
Elsewhere in South Sudan, one UNMISS military actor appears to be catching more 
flies with honey. The UN MLO who is cited in the opening vignette (see above) 
adapts his behaviour for humanitarian actors. He changes the pitch of his voice and 
works hard to endear himself to them. He understands this shapeshifting to be an 
integral part of his role as an MLO.742 Notably, his efforts to ‘make people feel 
special’ are not reserved solely for humanitarian actors. He does the same thing 
                                                
740 The UN civilian actors cited in this paragraph were interviewed at the SWEDINT training venue; 
however, they are based in South Sudan. 
741 This scenario tracks along very closely with the accusations by participants of the civil–military 
training programmes that humanitarian actors are inconsistent in their appeal to distinction (see Section 
5.2). Note that the first speaker was interviewed at the SWEDINT training. 
742 The MLO mainly serves as a conduit between the civilian and military components of the UN 
mission.  
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when visiting other international civilian actors, such as UN Civil Affairs and UN 
Human Rights officers. When he approaches these civilians, he says: ‘I really need 
your help on this patrol. I have this specific task for you, it’s so valuable.’ This is 
perhaps the smoothest example of the ‘rush to the intimate’ described previously in 
this study. As noted, some of his colleagues on the military side of UNMISS also try 
to get close to humanitarian actors by downplaying their combatantness. The UN 
peacekeeper who wears civilian clothing and leaves his weapon behind when visiting 
MSF sounds much like his counterparts at the civil–military training grounds.743  
 
The techniques employed by the UNMISS MLO attest to the importance of 
individual personalities in shaping relationships at the institutional level in South 
Sudan. This emerges as a recurring theme in conversations with different kinds of 
international actors. One UNMISS military actor proposes that the relationship 
dynamics between humanitarian actors and others are in fact heavily based on 
personality. A UNMISS civilian actor adds: ‘Things are so personality based, what 
you get at HQ is not what you will see in implementation.’ A humanitarian NGO 
actor confirms this from his side, as well. He contrasts his ‘very poor’ relationships 
with a particular UNMISS coordinator in one location with his generally ‘good’ 
relationship with UNMISS elsewhere, highlighting the trust he has for specific 
individuals in specific locations. Moreover, his feelings towards individual UNMISS 
actors have concrete implications for whether or not he lets them come close. An 
UNMISS actor he gets along with and trusts will be brought with him to places and 
receive information about his movements. In contrast, a humanitarian NGO actor 
in the Bor PoC site explains: ‘We don’t tell the UN everything, and when we 
accompany people to a given place we will not say to the UN “Come with us”.’ The 
latter approach appears to be the norm in South Sudan. 
 
However, not everything can be neatly traced to feelings of affinity between 
individuals. It is worth recalling the humanitarian NGO actor who, while 
                                                
743 See opening vignette, above; see also Section 5.5.2. 
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emphasizing his strong respect for UNPol’s effectiveness, remains adamant that he 
must maintain separation from UN Police.744 Part of the concern is that these actors 
belong to the UN mission, and part also pertains to core differences in their beliefs, 
such as whether protection can be achieved through violent means. 745  One 
humanitarian actor traces the tensions between international actors in South Sudan 
– which she describes as ‘palpable’ – to unmet expectations on both sides. 
‘UNMISS wanted humanitarians to do certain things. Humanitarians thought 
UNMISS should do things as [part of] its PoC mandate.’ In her view, it is imperative 
that UNMISS actors come to grips with the limitations of humanitarian NGOs – 
for example, in terms of capacity. Contemplating this, one UNMISS civilian actor 
alleges that capacity is not the issue so much as a lack of will to deliver services 
outside PoC sites. This individual claims, ‘We try to push the organizations to work 
outside’, but humanitarian actors stay inside, where life is easier. Meanwhile, 
humanitarian actors are seen as slow to accept that UNMISS actors must make 
decisions on the basis of mission priorities, such as those relating to the safety of 
UN staff, UN reputation and UN ‘stay and deliver’ policies.746  One UNMISS 
civilian actor sees humanitarian actors as having wildly unrealistic expectations of 
the UN mission, treating it as ‘a redeemer or Jesus Christ’.747 In contrast to concerns 
that humanitarian actors look down on others from a higher perch, the claim here is 
that humanitarian actors expect too much. 
 
 7.4.2 Humanitarian actors do humanitarian things  
 
This last section of the discussion on South Sudan finishes with two stories from 
the operational context. It embarks on a rich description at the micro-level of 
how different humanitarian actors reason through the implementation of 
distinction in the Kinetic realm. 
                                                
744 See Section 7.2.1. 
745 See also Chapter 6 and Section 7.1. 
746 See, more generally, Egeland et al., supra.   
747 This interview took place at the SWEDINT training. 
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‘ In a true emergency ,  I  think dis t inc t ion isn’ t  something that matters ’  
 
There has recently been active fighting in Upper Nile, South Sudan, and most humanitarian 
actors have had to leave the area for security reasons. There is no steady provision of 
humanitarian services. Civilian populations residing in Upper Nile have mostly been 
required to fend for themselves, while also being targets of violence. Pointing to this situation, 
a humanitarian NGO actor inquires: ‘If you’re wounded, do you care if our [international 
NGO] or a UN surgeon operates? Do you care who your food comes from, in a true 
emergency?’ He goes on to say: ‘Where there is an acute need, in an emergency, I think 
distinction isn’t something that matters. I think it matters more on a policy level: What will 
the rest of the world, the government here, the press think?’ Subsequently, he acknowledges 
that the above attitude is open to accusations of short-term thinking. He ventures: ‘I think 
it’s an ethical dilemma. You don’t care about distinction at that point in time, but then you 
think: Do you want someone who is a non-mutual party doing that work?’ Another 
humanitarian NGO actor in South Sudan also vacillates on this issue. He initially 
espouses a strong commitment to distinction, attesting to the way in which it infuses all of his 
decision-making on a daily basis. However, he also believes that, at a certain point, its 
observance is diametrically opposed to helping populations in need. Discussing the plight of 
war-affected populations in South Sudan’s Southern Unity state, he explains: ‘For obvious 
reasons, I support distinction as much as possible. But I think it hits a threshold where the 
need to just get in and provide services and do something outweighs the distinction risks. 
That comes way, way, down the line, [when] you’ve tried everything else.’ In a context in 
which war-related violence leads to many civilian deaths daily, he probes: ‘So we’re not going 
to bring food in because it would involve a military helicopter? Really?’ 
 
It will be recalled that the first ideal type of humanitarian actor prioritizes distinction 
and takes a long-term view. In contrast, the second type balances distinction against 
other goals on a case-by-case basis, tending to prioritize the immediate need to help. 
The two speakers in the opening vignette begin from diametrically opposed 
positions, but they work their way towards each other. This suggests that 
humanitarian actors cannot simply be statically characterized as belonging to the 
first or second ideal types. To some extent, each individual may be capable of both 
types of thinking and assume a particular outlook as a default. Considering these 
two accounts side by side illuminates the crucial work that the temporal aspect 
performs in the production of distinction and the conceptualization of 
humanitarianness. 
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 The second ideal  type ,  reconsidered 
  
In the above encounter, the first speaker initially exhibits all of the proclivities of the 
second ideal type. Leaning on the importance of implementing the principle of 
humanity, he draws attention to injured and hungry people in need of service. In a 
‘true emergency’, he argues, distinction does not matter. Or, he adjusts, it matters – 
but only to those who are removed from the pressing needs of the victims of war. 
Here he cites the world, the press and the GoSS as the relevant audiences, couching 
these diverse stakeholders as the ‘policy level’. Having said this with firm conviction, 
he senses he is open to critique, particularly by humanitarian actors who might think 
of the longer-term implications. In his words: ‘You don’t care about distinction at 
that point in time, but…’ The reference to a non-mutual party also casts the UN 
surgeon in a different light than before. Previously, the surgeon was treated as 
almost a pair of disembodied hands that could heal. In this second take, the UN 
surgeon forms part of an international mission with political and military aspects. 
He is potentially implicated in, or at least not doing enough to stop, the conflict in 
South Sudan – the same conflict that led to the injury of the wounded person before 
him.  
 
The temporal aspect of the distinction calculus is pivotal: the very same scenario 
looks completely different when the humanitarian NGO actor widens his 
perspective beyond immediate needs. It is also important to note how the ‘phantom 
local’ is mobilized in this account. Initially, the ‘phantom local’ takes the form of the 
(wounded) beneficiary-perceiver, who simply wishes to have needs met and is 
ostensibly unconcerned with which international actor will provide the service. 
Next, when the goal of meeting the needs of war-affected populations is juxtaposed 
with the importance of upholding distinction, distinction matters to three 
stakeholders: local government, the press and the world. While the GoSS is not at 
the kind of remove that the press and the world are, it is insinuated that the 
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perceptions of the authority-perceiver can be dealt with once the humanitarian 
imperative is met. 
 
The f i rs t  ideal  type ,  reconsidered  
 
Turning now to the second speaker from the opening encounter (see above), this 
humanitarian actor begins by encapsulating the tendencies of the first ideal type. He 
positions distinction as a priority and states that it inflects all of his daily decisions. 
Taking this as a point of departure, he, too, finds himself in situations where 
enforcing distinction seems impossible without compromising humanity. While he 
asserts that this only comes ‘way, way, down the line’, when all other options have 
been exhausted, his commitment to distinction comes with a caveat. He supports 
distinction, but only ‘as much as possible’. Here, he begins to sound more like the 
second ideal type, emphasizing that there are other values and priorities to consider. 
He averts to the risks of compromising distinction, but he believes that, at a certain 
point, ‘the need to just get in and provide services and do something’ prevails. 
Again, the temporal aspect does crucial work here, as he shifts to focus on 
immediate need. His crossover to the second ideal type is complete when he says: 
‘So we’re not going to bring food in because it would involve a military helicopter? 
Really?’ 
 
Picking up this thread, one humanitarian actor confides that he has discreetly joined 
UNMISS forces on a few unauthorized trips outside of the PoC site where he 
resides. He says that had he not gone on these journeys, ‘I wouldn’t have been able 
to see anything’. He elaborates: ‘I would think twice if bending the rules involved a 
bunch of agencies, but if I, just myself, if I could see myself, touch the ground, then 
I can come back.’ At one point he asserts that he does not feel personally bound by 
the rule of distinction. Subsequently, he modifies this to say that he believes that 
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distinction is subsumed by other pressing priorities.748 In a similar vein, a UN 
humanitarian actor contends that distinction should not stand in the way of 
responding to vulnerable populations who have nowhere else to turn for help. 
‘When you are between a rock and a hard place, you have to choose. There are 
pluses and minuses. Maybe I will lose on distinction, but I will win on something…I 
would gain more than I would lose.’ Another humanitarian actor is adamant that 
distinction stands in the way of real humanitarian work. He alleges that distinction 
prevents humanitarian actors ‘from even thinking about what could be possible – 
it’s hampering thinking even before doing’. He offers the hypothetical situation of 
armed attack on UN food distribution to local civilian populations in South Sudan, 
and proposes:  
 
If we remove all distinction issues, the best scenario is to plunk in a 
bunch of peacekeepers, set a perimeter, do patrols, lay the smack-down. 
‘No shit’s going down while we’re here.’ That’s what we could do if we 
removed everything we know about distinction.  
 
This individual’s attention is not on the identity of the international actor providing 
the service, but on the service, itself, and the fact that it is provided. From this 
perspective, competent military engagement in humanitarian assistance is preferable 
to a humanitarian organization doing it poorly for the sake of ensuring it is purely 
humanitarian. This perspective can be contrasted with that of the discussion in 
Chapter 5 regarding the direct engagement of military actors in humanitarian 
activities. 749  It was noted there that, while humanitarian actors recognize the 
capability of military actors to deliver humanitarian assistance, they question 
whether it can be done appropriately. Far from disseminating the ‘civilian plus’ 
figure, or even ‘mere civilian’ status, this humanitarian actor in South Sudan appears 
to link humanitarianness to a sort of virtuous ‘civilian minus’. This imagined 
humanitarian actor is more agile, and does not let fears of proximity to armed actors 
                                                
748 While it appears that other members of the humanitarian community are not aware of this individual’s 
discreet trips with UNMISS, the much-discussed unauthorized helicopter trip suggests how opinions 
might divide. 
749 See Section 5.5.2. 
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stand in the way of getting things done. The abdication of distinction is explicit 
here: the individual openly admits that his plan requires neglecting ‘everything we 
know about distinction’.  
 
Conclus ion  
 
This empirical exploration has investigated the way in which humanitarian actors 
implement their everyday distinction practices in the presence of an integrated UN 
mission with a robust PoC mandate. It was demonstrated that frontline 
humanitarian actors in South Sudan invoke the ‘phantom local’ at most every turn 
to ground their appeals to distinction. The lone individual who speaks about seeing 
‘through the eyes’ of local populations for the purposes of solidarity stands out from 
his humanitarian colleagues, with the latter often peering through local eyes to 
assess the success of their distinction performance. Living and working inside South 
Sudan’s PoC sites, which are protected by armed UN forces, imposes challenges for 
drawing the line on a daily basis. The decision of some humanitarian actors to rely 
upon UNMISS assets also puts the commitment to distinction under strain. 
Looking in from the outside, other international actors accuse humanitarian actors 
of being overzealous and inconsistent in their performance of distinction. 
Meanwhile, pressing questions arise as to where humanitarian actors in South Sudan 
draw the line. It is evident that the practices of many humanitarian actors depend 
upon a relativized and contingent concept of civilianness. This comes to light 
especially in their attempts to dissociate from UNMISS civilian actors. UNMISS 
civilian actors push back against the move to draw lines within the civilian category, 
fearing that their own civilianness might be tarnished by humanitarian distinction 
practices. Other international actors propose that some humanitarian actors might 
actually attract qualities of combatantness, earning them a ‘civilian minus’ status. An 
overarching point made in the empirical discussion is that distinction is not 
something humanitarian actors seek to preserve from external threats, only. On the 
contrary, humanitarian actors hold different visions of distinction and disagree with 
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each other regarding what it means to actualize (or compromise) distinction on a 
daily basis in South Sudan. The moral uprightness and virtue symbolized by the 
‘civilian plus’ are seen in a very different light when one considers that the 
promulgation of this status might interfere with alleviating the suffering of war-
affected populations.  
 
* 
 
Conclus ion to Part  III  
 
Deepening and complicating the insights gleaned from the Intellectual and 
Pedagogical realms, this chapter’s discussion of the Kinetic realm has showcased the 
difficulty of enforcing distinction in the context of ongoing conflict. On a day-to-
day basis in South Sudan, international humanitarian actors summon local 
perceptions to ground their need for distinction. Distinction must be enacted, 
humanitarian actors argue, not (only) because international law demands it, but also 
because the ‘phantom local’ is watching. Similar to the civil–military training 
grounds, where international actors fault humanitarian actors for enforcing 
distinction either too strictly or inconsistently, in South Sudan, similar criticisms 
materialize. The unique challenge that emerges for humanitarian actors in South 
Sudan is to maintain separation from international actors with whom they are 
already associated. Co-location in the PoC sites showcases this conundrum in a 
spatial and concrete way.  
 
The move humanitarian actors make to draw lines within the civilian category, 
carving out a ‘civilian plus’ status for themselves, once again meets with pushback. 
One reason that other international actors resist these practices is that they digest 
them at the individual level and take distinction personally. A further reason is that 
distinction impedes their efforts to work together and blocks their attempts to 
dissolve the boundaries between international actors. This is not the full story, 
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however, as some humanitarian actors, themselves, question whether distinction 
should serve as a trump. This introduces a new dimension to contests over 
distinction, illuminating the fact that the conceptualization of humanitarianness is as 
complex and loaded as that of civilianness or combatantness. This study argues that 
the conflict between enforcing distinction and implementing the principle of 
humanity is obscured outside of the Kinetic realm because humanitarian actors 
cultivate ambiguity around this relationship. When the operational context forces 
humanitarian actors to make difficult choices in this respect, questions about 
distinction’s true function are brought into stark relief.  
 
Chapter 8, which serves as the concluding chapter of this study, brings this study to 
a close. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION TO THE STUDY 
 
Introduct ion 
 
This study has shown how the everyday practices and interactions of differently-
situated international actors shape, and are shaped by, IHL’s principle of distinction. 
It has been emphasized throughout the discussion that even – and perhaps 
especially – when international actors enter into contests over distinction, they are 
bound up relationally in their struggles with each other. This multi-sited study has 
interrogated the idea of distinction across three domains: the Intellectual, the 
Pedagogical and the Kinetic. As the idea of distinction was followed across each of 
these three realms, it was not only the civilian–combatant distinction that was 
broken up; other, unfamiliar, distinctions were also introduced and subsequently 
shattered – such as that between the ‘civilian plus’ and the ‘mere civilian’. By 
devoting attention to unconventional actors and choosing unconventional sites of 
study, this study has revealed that many distinctions are constituted and 
reconstituted by international actors in many places, on a daily basis. The dynamics 
that have been scrutinized here are mostly hidden, both to IHL and to legal 
scholars. This opacity can largely be attributed to the tendency to see everything 
through the prism of a civilian–combatant divide. While this study has 
foregrounded actual practice, it has also taken care to show that messiness is not 
confined to the operational context. At every level, including legal text and doctrine, 
the disorder of distinction is palpable.  
 
This concluding chapter reflects on what this study has accomplished. The first 
section outlines the core contributions to the relevant literature. It also highlights 
the limitations of the study and proposes potential avenues for further research. The 
second section contemplates the study’s wider implications; it revisits the question 
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of a special status in law for international humanitarian actors, offering final remarks 
on the humanitarian actor as a ‘civilian plus’. 
 
8.1 Contributions of the study 
 
The originality of this study derives from its theoretical offerings and the 
methodological approach it espouses. These aspects, in turn, shape the impact this 
study has on the relevant scholarly literature. The first part of this discussion 
outlines the contribution of the study to the literature on the civilian and the theory 
and practice of humanitarianism. The second part elucidates the study’s 
methodological contributions, highlighting its multi-sited style and socio-legal 
approach, as well as its interrogation of the doctrine–practice divide. The third part 
revisits the two main conceptual claims at the heart of this inquiry, the ‘civilian plus’ 
and the ‘phantom local’, specifying the substantive contributions that the study has 
made in this respect. The fourth part identifies the limitations of the study, 
specifying what it did and did not set out to achieve.   
 
 8.1.1 Contributions to the literature 
 
In Chapter 1, it was noted that, until recently, legal scholars have not paid adequate 
attention to the civilian. This study contributes to the burgeoning literature on the 
civilian by showing how the civilian is produced in the practices and interactions of 
international actors operating in armed conflicts. In this study, the international 
humanitarian actor was not treated as an isolated entity. Instead, this actor was 
situated alongside other international civilian and military actors, as well as the 
general civilian populations that comprise IHL’s civilian category. Many of the other 
international actors examined in this study, such as NATO soldiers and UN 
peacekeepers, do not share the goals or worldview of humanitarian actors. By 
attending to the perspectives of the former actors, this study has showcased how 
distinction is produced on the ground, through struggle and contestation. This 
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grounded empirical investigation complements other emerging scholarship on the 
civilian, much of which adopts a normative or more critical genealogical approach 
to distinction. Effort has also been made in this investigation to engage with the 
relevant history, in order to appropriately contextualize and situate contemporary 
practice. It has been demonstrated that the idea of a stable distinction – and the 
related notion of a unified civilian category populated by (equally) protected civilians 
– is more myth than historical reality. This understanding should inform the way in 
which we think about contemporary practices that impugn the idea of a bright line 
binary and a mythically pure civilian.  
 
The study has also highlighted the efforts that international humanitarian actors 
make to distinguish themselves from others, introducing the concept of everyday 
distinction practices. This marks an important contribution to the IHL literature, as 
little attention has been paid to the need for civilian actors to enact distinction. While 
the civilian self-protection literature generated by political science scholars addresses 
the way in which civilians strive to protect themselves in war,750 scholars immersed 
in the study of the civilian as a legal entity have not yet grappled with these 
dynamics. This study has offered a way of doing so. It has focused on the specific 
case of international humanitarian actors and considered the ways in which their 
distinction practices could interfere with the efforts of other civilians – such as 
UNMISS civilian actors in South Sudan – who also seek to distinguish themselves. 
A final contribution of this study to our understanding of the civilian is its 
elucidation of the important role that perceptions play in the practices of 
international actors. This remedies a notable gap in the legal literature, which, to 
date, has paid insufficient attention to the ways in which the perceptions of 
individual actors shape the implementation of international legal rules. This is 
elaborated upon further, below. 
 
                                                
750 See Chapter 1. 
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A concerted effort has been made in this study to implement a genuinely 
interdisciplinary approach, putting the theory and practice of humanitarianism into 
direct conversation with international law. As a consequence of this engagement, 
the study makes a number of contributions to the literature on humanitarianism. 
First, it contributes to the literature on everyday humanitarianism by positioning 
civil–military trainings and armed conflicts as sites in which everyday humanitarian 
practices unfold, and illuminating the ways in which law and the daily practices of 
humanitarian actors are co-constitutive. Second, it adds to the literature that adopts 
a relational understanding of humanitarian practice. By bringing the practices of 
international humanitarian actors into contact with the practices, perceptions and 
preferences of other kinds of international actors, this study has revealed how so 
much of daily humanitarian practice revolves around interactions with others. Third, 
this study makes a crucial contribution to scholarship that deals explicitly with the 
figure of the humanitarian actor, by identifying the limitations of IHL’s 
understanding of the humanitarian actor and arguing that humanitarian actors are 
protected according to their ability to approximate the Red Cross figure. The study 
has also grouped critiques of humanitarian practice into a ‘humanitarian 
exceptionalism’ outlook. It espoused a qualified version of this view, and articulated 
the form the ‘humanitarian exceptionalism’ critique might take if it were to engage 
more explicitly with law and legal rules. In doing so, the study has generated a 
potentially debilitating critique of what it has termed the ‘help the helpers help’ 
position. This critique is expanded upon in Section 8.2, below.  
 
 8.1.2 Methodological contributions 
 
One of the dyads this study has collapsed is the doctrine–practice divide. It has 
taken the view that there is no definitive and inert legal doctrine of distinction to be 
found in a text or single practice. Rather, it has attended to the multiplicity of ways 
in which distinction can be deployed, describing how the idea of distinction 
circulates in a wide variety of places and in the practices of many different actors. In 
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this study, a PoC site in South Sudan was treated as the same kind of place as a 
courtroom at the ICTY, in terms of its significance for distinction. As the chaos and 
disarray of distinction have been uncovered everywhere, this study has revealed 
distinction to be perpetually disrupted. This is a very different finding than what 
might have been concluded in a compliance-focused inquiry. Indeed, many of the 
dynamics uncovered in this study would have been completely overlooked had IHL 
rule been taken as a given and all departures from it framed as violations. 
 
An overarching claim of this socio-legal study has been that law is constituted by 
activity in the Intellectual, Pedagogical and Kinetic realms. A crucial move this study 
has made, in this respect, has been to position the practices of international 
actors at the centre of things. This has facilitated a concerted engagement with the 
ambiguity and indeterminacy of IHL rules and highlighted the large swath of actors 
who enact distinction on a daily basis. As this study has pursued the idea of 
distinction across a number of global sites, it has consistently found ambiguity at its 
side. Ambiguity is the shadow that follows distinction around, allowing different 
actors to speak to each other about distinction without realising – or, perhaps, 
knowing full well – that they are not even having the same conversation. This fact 
has both confounded this investigation and yielded one of its most important 
discoveries. The revelation that distinction means many things to many people is 
deceptive in its simplicity; however, this finding could have enormous implications 
for our understanding of the daily enactment of IHL.  
 
As for the practices of unconventional actors, one reason they are routinely 
overlooked is because few of these individuals are thought of as traditional legal 
actors. This multi-sited study makes an unorthodox contribution to the literature on 
the individual in international law by attending, in particular, to lower-level, frontline 
actors. A further reason for the neglect of these unconventional actors is the nature 
of their practices. As this study has shown, some of their distinction practices 
reshape distinction beyond recognition. The study has identified a number of new 
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fault lines, and, while these may be unfamiliar, they are not inexplicable. The study 
has sought to capture and analyse the relevant dynamics by introducing the ‘civilian 
plus’, ‘mere civilian’ and ‘civilian minus’ figures (see also below). It has argued that 
these strange entities have as much relevance to the everyday interactions of 
international actors as the civilian–combatant divide – if not more. Such revelations 
also highlight the value of applying a socio-legal lens. Noting that doctrinal and 
normative approaches have had an outsized influence in the scholarship on law and 
humanitarianism, this study has charted an alternative path. Espousing concern for 
the everyday aspects of both subjects, this study has elucidated a different way of 
putting humanitarianism in contact with the international legal imagination.751 The 
benefits of this critical and socio-legal approach are considerable: it shines a light on 
aspects of distinction’s production that would not otherwise be revealed. 
 
8.1.3 Substantive and theoretical contributions 
 
This study has elucidated a practice-based law of distinction, distilled from the 
everyday practices and interactions of a range of international actors operating at 
diverse global sites. This law of distinction very closely resembles the alternative 
vision articulated in Chapter 2 of this study, and it integrates the perceptions 
international actors have of themselves and each other. To give shape to this 
practice-based law, the study has introduced the ‘civilian plus’ and its corollaries. It 
has also proposed that international actors direct their performance of distinction to 
the figure of the ‘phantom local’. This entity, as imagined by international actors, 
assigns qualities of civilianness and combatantness to individuals as it deems 
appropriate. 
 
The core substantive contribution of this study comes from its 
reconceptualization of the civilian. The study has framed the way in which 
international lawyers tend to think about distinction as a dominant vision. This is 
                                                
751 Drumbl, supra, p. 9. 
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not to say that everybody truly believes in the existence of this vision, but merely 
that it is what the mind reaches for when IHL’s principle of distinction is invoked. 
This vision is characterized by a bright line binary distinction – one that is generally 
thought to be fixed and stable. Further, the vision contains the seeds of its own 
disruption: the concept of DPH, for example, is connected to the dominant vision, 
yet it also destabilizes that vision. This study has articulated an alternative vision of 
distinction – one that captures the collective impact of all the disruptions of the 
dominant vision. In this alternative vision, the civilian and combatant are no longer 
treated as static entities who are juxtaposed. Instead, qualities of civilianness and 
combatantness are detached from these entities; these qualities float around with the 
potential to affix to any individual, depending on their comportment, behaviour and 
the situation in which they find themselves.  
 
The study has not made the claim that this alternative vision is what distinction 
should look like; rather, it has argued that it reflects what distinction actually looks like. 
As the discussion moved through the Pedagogical and Kinetic realms, it revealed 
that international humanitarian actors relativize civilianness and detach civilianness 
from the civilian on a daily basis. They seek to disseminate an image of themselves 
as ‘civilian plus’ – a status that is positioned apart from, and above, the ‘mere 
civilian’ and the ‘civilian minus’. A more general point here is that distinction 
circulates not only in civilian–combatant relations, but also in civilian–civilian 
relations. Crucially, this study has not suggested that the ‘civilian plus’ is a stable 
entity. On the contrary, the ‘civilian plus’ is characterized by the same fragmentation 
and disruption that plagues the mythical civilian. The perceived existence of these 
different civilian entities, which respectively embody different degrees of 
civilianness, provides an important clue as to the shape of the distinction contests 
that international actors engage in. It has been demonstrated that international 
humanitarian actors link humanitarianness to the highest degree of civilianness 
available, while other actors—both civilian and combatant—push back against such 
practices. 
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The second substantive contribution of this study is its articulation of the important 
role of perception in understanding distinction. This study has engaged with 
several layers of perception. First, there were the self-perceptions of international 
humanitarian actors and their perceptions of other international actors. Next, there 
were the perceptions that other international actors actually have of humanitarian 
actors. Further, there were the perceptions all international actors have of how they 
are seen by local actors. This study has framed this last set of perceptions as a sort 
of mirror that may or may not produce an accurate reflection. Much is concealed 
behind this reflection, and this study has worked both to unearth what is hidden and 
to show what is visible. The figure of the ‘phantom local’ captures the way in which 
international actors invoke the perceptions of local actors in armed conflicts. It has 
been argued that, whatever international humanitarian actors know to be true about 
the multiplicity of local actors, rallying local perceptions to distinction’s end 
engenders a flattening of these local actors.  
 
To elucidate the functions of distinction, both manifest and hidden, this study has 
scrutinized how and when the ‘phantom local’ is invoked. Attention has been paid 
to whether international actors summon a monolithic observer in a given instance, 
or perhaps one of its more specific iterations – the beneficiary-perceiver, attacker-
perceiver or authority-perceiver. The invocation of the attacker-perceiver, it has 
been suggested, maps most easily onto IHL’s principle of distinction, as narrowly 
conceived. Identifying the times at which humanitarian actors appeal to the attacker-
perceiver is helpful for untangling which practices go to targeting in the IHL sense, 
and which do not. Having said that, the way in which humanitarian actors invoke 
this figure also departs from the dominant vision of a fixed civilian–combatant 
binary. Humanitarian actors behave as though the attacker-perceiver plucks qualities 
of combatantness from the air, affixing them to humanitarian actors who have 
become tainted or compromised – perhaps through their proximity to international 
military actors. More generally, the routine summoning of the attacker-perceiver in 
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this study’s empirical findings shows the extent to which anxieties about personal 
safety shape humanitarian practice. The way in which other international actors 
respond when humanitarian actors invoke this figure also showcases a lack of 
agreement about the modalities of violence against humanitarian actors. Many of the 
non-humanitarian actors who attend civil–military trainings or operate in South 
Sudan doubt that the ‘blurring of lines’ between different international actors 
endangers the lives of humanitarian actors. Even in the civil-military training 
programmes, with their more normative bent, conversations about ‘blurring’ or 
‘confusion’ are not typically resolved with reference to obligations under 
international law. Instead, practical concerns and competing views on perceptions 
are foregrounded.  
 
Consider also how humanitarian actors deploy the beneficiary-perceiver. When 
humanitarian actors enact distinction, they also seek to secure the trust of this entity. 
It is proposed that such practices are double-edged for beneficiary populations. On 
the one hand, they position the recipients of assistance at the forefront of the 
humanitarian endeavour, evincing an understanding on the part of humanitarian 
actors that the impressions made on war-affected populations matter. On the other 
hand, they also position beneficiary populations as an audience for the performance 
of distinction. While this practice might be wholly unintentional, it engenders a 
subtle shift. Instead of asking what beneficiaries need,752 humanitarian actors fixate 
on what beneficiaries see: Do they know who is who amongst international actors? 
Do they view humanitarian actors as inappropriately enmeshed with other 
international actors engaged in political or conflict-related tasks? Will they approach 
someone wearing a T-shirt with a particular organization’s logo and trust that 
individual to provide appropriate assistance? While these questions do need to be 
asked, after a certain threshold, it may be that preoccupation with what the victims 
of war see, think and feel about humanitarian actors displaces concerns about how 
they might be helped. Taken to the extreme, a fixation on local perceptions 
                                                
752 It is important to consider the limitations of framing those who receive services as beneficiaries, and 
the attendant focus on need that this provokes. 
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reconfigures the victims of war from receivers of aid to perceivers of aid. In light of 
Hopgood and Krause’s respective observations about the sanctity and purity of 
humanitarianism, there is a danger that the performance of distinction might 
become an end in itself.  
 
 8.1.4 Limitations of the study 
 
One of the most significant challenges in executing an interdisciplinary study of this 
nature is deciding what should be included in, or excluded from, the investigation. 
Some of the threads that were not ultimately pursued in this study represent 
potential avenues for future exploration, while other topics were avoided because 
they have been well attended to by scholars.  
 
It is important to reiterate that this study is not about compliance with IHL’s 
principle of distinction. It was a deliberate choice to avoid this line of inquiry, and 
the study’s most important findings flow from this choice. The study suggests that 
the question should not be whether a given actor follows the law of distinction, but 
how international actors make and remake distinction as a matter of grounded 
practice. Thus, it refrains from simply juxtaposing the practices of international 
actors with a rule of distinction found ‘in the books’.  
 
There are several other topics or concepts that this study has mostly avoided, either 
because they are well-trod scholarly ground or because they were seen to have 
limited analytical promise. The humanitarian space paradigm is one such example. 
This concept was only mentioned briefly, as this study has taken the view that it 
obscures more than it clarifies. Debates over the humanitarian space have always 
been both heated and unresolved, and this study has sought new ways of rethinking 
the relationships in question. A similar point can be made regarding debates on the 
politics of humanitarianism. By taking a socio-legal approach, this study has tried 
to reinvigorate and breathe fresh life into these perennial debates about 
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humanitarian practice. It is also hoped that the methodology employed could be 
adopted to consider other types of actors. The status of police actors deployed with 
international missions, for example, poses interesting questions for IHL’s civilian–
combatant distinction.  
 
Some strands of this study offer interesting avenues for future research. One 
limitation of this single-author study, as mentioned, is that it was not possible to 
conduct an extensive empirical investigation of (actual) local perceptions of 
distinction. While articulating definitive findings on this matter might not be 
possible for the reasons identified in Chapter 4, much work can and should be done 
to expand on the efforts of those who have chipped away at this question over the 
past decade or so. A related point is that, for analytical purposes, this study has 
employed a simplified categorization of ‘local’ and ‘international’ actors. It is 
important that future projects probe these categories further. Such inquiries should 
recognize, for example, the fact that many ‘local’ actors might well be foreigners and 
that many individuals working for international humanitarian organizations are in 
fact ‘local’ actors. A study of distinction practices that more explicitly attends to the 
nuances within organizations and between different types of humanitarian actors 
would form a welcome contribution to the literature on humanitarianism. 
 
Another aspect of the study’s empirical findings that merits further attention 
pertains to the feelings and emotions of international actors. While conducting 
field research for the study, it was striking how frequently international actors – 
without prompting – chose to speak about their feelings towards other international 
actors in their midst. Feelings of hostility and resentment, as well as affinity and 
respect, seemed to shape not only their interactions with each other but also their 
interpretations of their obligations under international law. Fascinating empirical 
material was gathered and coded in connection with this, but there was simply not 
enough room to address the affective dimension within the confines of the present 
study. I will pursue the emotional life of distinction in my next research project, 
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building on the present study’s efforts to grasp the actual practice of IHL by 
individual actors on the ground.   
 
Finally, an important avenue for future research, which it is hoped that other 
scholars will take up, is the work of untangling the various uses of distinction. 
While this study has made an earnest foray in this respect, there is certainly more to 
be done to tease apart the functions of distinction as practiced by international 
actors. One of the most demanding aspects of this untangling work is determining 
the underlying motivations of humanitarian actors’ distinction practices. An 
intellectually honest but admittedly unsatisfactory summary of what this study has 
discovered with respect to the ‘why’ question is as follows: it depends on who you 
ask. In order to understand the ‘why’ of these distinction practices, it will be 
necessary to further probe the disconnect between what international actors say they 
do and what they actually do. Some of the practices canvassed in this study suggest 
that these actors might not be altogether sure, themselves. The perspectives of other 
(non-humanitarian) international actors have helped to reveal much of what lies 
beneath humanitarian distinction practices, but it would be misguided to think that 
these external perceptions reveal the truth about distinction. As noted, these other 
actors also view humanitarian actors through the prism of their own biases and 
grievances. Both civilian and military actors working for international missions have 
their own reasons for not wanting to support the vision of distinction that 
humanitarian actors propound. In the present study, the technique of participant-
observation was absolutely crucial in grappling with some of these dynamics. A 
NATO soldier might have bemoaned the special distinction demanded by 
humanitarian actors in a simulation exercise in a civil–military training programme, 
but in a subsequent interview profess respect for humanitarian actors and the 
concerns they articulate regarding personal safety. This adds further nuance to the 
point made above – that the ‘why’ of distinction depends not only on who is asked, 
but also when and where they are asked. Further engagement with these questions 
by scholars in other disciplines would be welcome, particularly from (legal) 
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anthropologists with the training and resources to carry out fine-grained qualitative 
studies. Having suggested this, it should be recognized that turning towards a micro-
level inquiry might generate other challenges. For example, it might be difficult to 
generalize the empirical findings and link them back to the legal categories in 
question. This highlights a key benefit of this multi-sited investigation’s approach to 
its object of study. The micro and the macro were consistently put into conversation 
with each other, so as to enable an understanding of how the practices in question 
implicate the relevant legal rule. 
 
8.2 Implications of the study 
 
What does it mean if distinction is a perpetually disrupted idea? Nouwen’s 
articulation of the two souls dwelling in each socio-legal scholar strikes a chord: 753 
one soul seeks to clarify and explain, while the other is overwhelmed by the 
complexity of what has been found.754 There is a temptation to simplify what is 
messy, but, given the multiplicity this study has contended with, it seems 
problematic to offer neat assertions about what should be done.  
 
As a point of clarification, it is not necessarily desirable to have legal rules that 
reflect empirical reality. Alexander locates the value of IHL’s civilian entity in its 
very artificiality: it aims not to reflect but to supplant the realities of war-affected 
populations.755 Whatever distance there is between a real-life civilian and the IHL 
version, from this vantage point, is understood as an achievement.756 Taking a cue 
from this, the present study does not issue a call for legal reforms that make the 
principle of distinction more reflective of actual practice. 
 
                                                
753 Nouwen, supra, p. 233 (‘Ithaka’). 
754 Ibid. 
755 Alexander, supra p. 36 (‘PhD Thesis’). 
756 Ibid., pp. 35–36. 
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This study has argued that, from the vantage point of IHL, the humanitarianness of 
a given actor hinges on the extent to which he or she reflects IHL’s Red Cross 
fantasy. The study has found that it could plausibly be argued that IHL does indeed 
constitute such humanitarian actors as special civilians. By allocating them ‘civilian 
plus’ status, IHL effectively sets this subset of humanitarian actors apart from other 
civilians. The special status thus relies upon and perpetuates the relativization of the 
civilian category. When the actual practices of international humanitarian actors are 
examined, it becomes apparent that a much greater number of humanitarian actors 
than those legible to IHL disseminate ‘civilian plus’ status. Amongst these 
humanitarian actors, there is a tacit understanding that one’s claim to this special 
status depends upon one’s likeness to the Red Cross figure. Humanitarian actors 
espouse a commitment to the humanitarian principles in order to affirm this distinct 
humanitarian identity, and they subscribe to a Red Cross meta-narrative, more 
generally. Humanitarian actors such as NGO actors express anxiety that their own 
emblems are not protected to the same extent as those of the Red Cross, so they 
attempt to resemble Red Cross actors and effectively maintain this fantasy in 
circulation. This effect is bolstered by the practices of other international civilian 
and military actors, who evidently hold the ICRC – and often MSF – actors in 
higher regard than other humanitarian actors. Intriguingly, this is not necessarily 
because they deem these two organizations to possess a higher degree of 
civilianness. In some instances, it is their combatant-like qualities that the other 
actors esteem. 
 
This study proposes that the special civilian status promulgated by humanitarian 
actors is grounded in both heroism and vulnerability. Their heroism comes from the 
social value of the role that humanitarian actors perform in war, as well as the 
connotations of virtue and moral uprightness that flow from the tasks they perform. 
Their vulnerability also stems from this role, which is seen to render humanitarian 
actors more at risk of harm than other civilians. The move to protect humanitarian 
actors from violence, embodied in the ‘help the helpers help’ perspective, responds 
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to these twin features. It sets humanitarian actors up as worthy of special protection 
and suggests that law should be mobilized to secure this end. A concern this study 
articulates with respect to this outlook is its failure to approach IHL’s civilian 
category holistically. Part of the problem is that those who wish to ‘help the helpers 
help’ generally focus on one side of the equation. That is, they fixate on bestowing 
something extra to humanitarian actors. What often drops off from the analysis, 
however inadvertently, are the implications for other civilians who are not singled 
out for special treatment.  
 
As a preliminary point, a practical issue arises with respect to the idea of giving 
humanitarian actors a special status. It may be the case that no escape from the 
civilian’s vulnerability is ultimately possible. As noted at various junctures in this 
study, a special status for humanitarian actors might increase their appeal as targets. 
Aside from this practical point, the stakes of (further) relativizing civilianness must 
also be considered. To give shape and texture to this concern, this study has 
introduced the ‘mere civilian’ and ‘civilian minus’ figures. These entities have been 
presented as the necessary consequences of the ‘civilian plus’, and they represent a 
fate that humanitarian actors seek to evade. However, these corollaries do not 
merely exist to highlight the power of the ‘civilian plus’ (though that is an important 
aspect of what they do). More than this, they reflect the cost of a special status for 
the humanitarian actor. This study has proposed that this cost is a downgraded 
status for some other civilian, somewhere else.    
 
With respect to the implications for other international actors, the findings from 
South Sudan capture the stakes poignantly. In particular, this study has highlighted 
the anxiety of UN civilian actors that the distinction practices of humanitarian 
actors might adversely impact their own civilian status. On an everyday basis in 
South Sudan, humanitarian actors jostle with other civilians in the hopes of claiming 
the highest degree of civilianness available. Indeed, the whole point of the ‘civilian 
plus’ is to set humanitarian actors apart from these other actors; the latter are 
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viewed as having the wrong kind of civilianness, or even qualities of combatantness. 
In the case of UN civilian actors, the threat of contamination comes first from their 
involvement in wider UN peacekeeping missions. Notably, humanitarian actors also 
view UN civilians as compromised in ways that have nothing to do with the latter’s 
involvement with armed UN peacekeepers. The ‘civilian plus’, it emerges here, is 
also used by humanitarian actors to convey to UN civilians that they have no 
legitimate claim to humanitarianness.  
 
While this study has focused on international actors, it has frequently noted that 
international actors are not the only ones who reside in IHL’s civilian category. Of 
particular concern are the consequences of the ‘civilian plus’ status for local war-
affected populations. Earlier in this concluding chapter, it was reiterated that the 
distinction practices of humanitarian actors serve to flatten out populations in need. 
By transforming the recipients of assistance into the beneficiary-perceiver, 
humanitarian actors set them up as an audience for distinction. The possibility that 
these distinction practices might perpetuate or entrench pre-existing inequalities 
between humanitarian actors and the populations they serve merits serious 
attention. Coming back to the ‘civilian plus’, there is a further dimension to be 
considered here, as well. Local civilian populations, who are not eligible for such a 
special status, might find themselves relegated to ‘mere civilian’ status at best, or 
‘civilian minus’ status at worst. When the ‘phantom local’ is invoked in monolithic 
form, populations caught up in war’s upheaval are repackaged into the beneficiary-
perceiver and subsequently lumped together with the attacker-perceiver and the 
authority-perceiver. This collapsing of different kinds of local actors becomes more 
ominous when one considers that a special status for humanitarian actors renders 
local civilian populations ‘mere civilians’, and perhaps not even that. Bringing these 
observations together, it may be that humanitarian distinction practices – or, more 
precisely, the dissemination of the ‘civilian plus’ and the invocation of the ‘phantom 
local’ – enact a kind of violence against war-affected populations. 
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Conclus ion 
 
This study has sought to make distinction strange and unfamiliar, reconceptualizing 
it in new forms. It is only when we recognize these three new civilian figures (the 
‘civilian plus’, the ‘mere civilian’ and the ‘civilian minus’) that we can begin to 
fathom why international actors struggle with each other for recognition of different 
degrees of civilianness. As this study has demonstrated, the distinction between 
civilians and combatants is, in fact, more a matter of degree than the proponents of 
the dominant vision would likely acknowledge. Nonetheless, the dominant vision of 
distinction is sustained in large part because of the continued allure of its promise of 
clarity. Many of the international actors examined in this study, from NATO 
soldiers to UN peacekeepers and international humanitarian actors, continue to 
reach for this bright line binary, even as it slips through their grasp.  
 
This study has elucidated an alternative vision of distinction – one based on the 
practices of international actors and which captures the collective impact of various 
disruptions to the dominant vision; one that is reminiscent of the world in which we 
actually live. According to the practice-based law of distinction that has been 
distilled, any individual at any given moment may be assigned qualities of 
civilianness or combatantness. Here, civilianness is both relative and contingent; it 
can be lost or downgraded at the slightest indication that one is not correctly 
behaving like a civilian. This vision informs the everyday practices of international 
humanitarian actors, who engage in contests over distinction with other 
international actors. These dynamics dilute the power of the dominant vision, but 
their continued neglect also attests to this very power. If it achieves nothing else, 
this study extends an invitation to spend time in a world where distinction’s 
perpetually disrupted nature no longer remains hidden.  
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